Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term with the possibility of parole. He is eligible for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3046, which sets a minimum eligible parole date (MEPD). Additionally, because he was under 26 years old when he committed his crimes, he is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which sets a youth parole eligible date (YPED). Nguyen can earn various credits to advance his MEPD, but only educational merit credit can advance his YPED.Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he should be able to use additional credits to advance his YPED. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the Court of Appeal to vacate its order, and issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the regulations governing parole eligibility dates. Youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED), while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court held that the difference in how credits are applied to MEPD and YPED does not violate equal protection because the groups are not similarly situated, and there is a rational basis for the distinction. The court concluded that the regulations ensure the youth offender parole scheme operates as intended by the Legislature. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Nguyen" on Justia Law

Gabriel M., a minor, was charged with murder, robbery, and active gang participation. The juvenile court ordered his transfer to adult criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. Gabriel's counsel immediately informed the court of their intent to appeal the transfer and requested a stay of the criminal proceedings. The juvenile court initially granted the stay but later lifted it and transferred Gabriel, who was nearly 20 years old, to county jail. Gabriel then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the lifting of the stay and his transfer to county jail.The juvenile court had ordered Gabriel detained in juvenile hall, but upon the prosecution's motion, the court transferred him to criminal court. Gabriel's counsel requested a stay of the criminal proceedings, which the court initially granted. However, the court later lifted the stay and ordered Gabriel transferred to county jail, citing his age and the seriousness of the charges. Gabriel's counsel objected, arguing that the stay could only be lifted upon Gabriel's request and that his transfer to an adult facility required a petition under section 208.5, which had not been filed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that under section 801 and rule 5.770(e)(2), the juvenile court was required to stay the criminal court proceedings until the final determination of Gabriel's appeal and could only lift the stay upon Gabriel's request. The court also held that Gabriel's transfer to county jail without following the procedures set forth in section 208.5 was erroneous. The court granted Gabriel's petition, directing the juvenile court to reinstate the stay and vacate the order transferring him to county jail. The court allowed for the possibility of a new petition under section 208.5 to transfer Gabriel to an adult facility. View "Gabriel M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Luis Armando Caratachea was convicted by a jury of 52 felony sexual offenses against four of his step-granddaughters, all minors under 14 years old. The majority of the charges involved one victim, Y.M., with additional counts involving other victims. One victim, Lilly, testified about an uncharged sexual offense that allegedly occurred in Mexico. Caratachea conceded the admissibility of this testimony and requested a jury instruction on its proper use. The trial court admitted the testimony and provided the requested instruction without conducting an analysis under Evidence Code section 352.The Superior Court of San Diego County admitted the testimony and read the instruction without performing a section 352 analysis. Caratachea argued that the court erred by not conducting this analysis sua sponte. The trial court also imposed consecutive sentences on all counts, believing it lacked discretion to impose concurrent sentences.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that neither Evidence Code section 1108 nor the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Villatoro required a sua sponte section 352 analysis before admitting the testimony or reading the corresponding jury instruction. The court found that the trial court had no sua sponte duty to exclude evidence or conduct a section 352 analysis without a request from the defense.However, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court mistakenly believed it lacked discretion to impose concurrent sentences for the lewd act convictions. The appellate court vacated the sentences on these counts and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to consider its discretion to impose concurrent sentences and to state its reasons if it chooses to impose consecutive sentences. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Caratachea" on Justia Law

Antonio German Armas was convicted of distributing and possessing child pornography. He was placed on two years of formal probation, set to expire on August 16, 2023. However, Armas violated the terms of his probation twice, leading to extensions of his probation, with the final expiration date set for June 9, 2024. Armas appealed the trial court's first order finding that he violated the terms of his probation.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County found that Armas violated his probation terms and imposed a suspended sentence of two years and eight months, reinstating formal probation with a new expiration date of January 20, 2024. Armas's appeal from this order was initially rejected as untimely, but he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was granted, allowing his appeal to proceed. Meanwhile, the trial court found another probation violation but reinstated probation instead of imposing the suspended sentence, extending the probation to June 9, 2024. Armas appealed this second order, which was affirmed by the appellate court.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. By the time of the review, Armas had completed his probation. The court held that the appeal was moot because Armas had already served his probation term, and any decision would have no practical effect. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that potential future consequences of the probation violation were too speculative to prevent a finding of mootness. The court relied on precedents that established that the completion of a probation term renders an appeal moot unless there are ongoing adverse collateral consequences, which were not present in this case. View "People v. Armas" on Justia Law

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was convicted in 2003 of attempted murder, kidnapping, and assault with a firearm. The jury also found true firearm allegations. He was sentenced to a determinate term of 14 years, an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, and a life term with the possibility of parole. While incarcerated, Nguyen earned various credits, including good conduct and educational merit credits. His minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) is set for February 2036, and his youth parole eligible date (YPED) is set for October 2026.Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus in 2022, arguing that he should be allowed to use all earned credits to advance his YPED, not just educational merit credit. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the appellate court to vacate its order, and issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and held that Nguyen's right to equal protection was not violated. The court found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the challenged regulations, as youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED) while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court also determined that there is a rational basis for the regulation, as it aligns with the legislative intent to provide youth offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release while maintaining a relatively fixed YPED. Consequently, the court denied Nguyen's petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Nguyen" on Justia Law

In 2011, a defendant was convicted in California of multiple sex offenses, including lewd acts on a minor and oral copulation with a child under ten. His sentence was enhanced due to a prior Michigan conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual penetration. Years later, he sought to have the enhancement removed under the new Penal Code section 1172.75, arguing that out-of-state convictions should not be considered sexually violent offenses under the new law. The trial court denied his request, concluding that the Michigan conviction was indeed a sexually violent offense, making him ineligible for relief.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially sentenced the defendant to a determinate 15-year prison term, plus an indeterminate term of 30 years to life, including a one-year enhancement for the prior Michigan conviction. The judgment was affirmed on appeal in 2012. In 2023, the case was revisited to determine eligibility for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75. The defendant argued that his Michigan conviction did not disqualify him from relief, but the court disagreed, finding that out-of-state convictions could still be considered sexually violent offenses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that out-of-state convictions could be considered sexually violent offenses if they included all the elements of the offenses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b). The court found that the Michigan conviction met these criteria, and thus, the defendant was not entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75. The order denying relief was affirmed. View "People v. Vicencio" on Justia Law

The case involves Tiree Austin Jarmel Hall, who was convicted by a jury of one felony count of inflicting corporal punishment or injury on a child (minor T.E.), one misdemeanor count of child abuse as to a different child (minor A.F.), and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The trial court suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed Hall on probation with various terms and conditions. Hall appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements made by the two non-testifying children to police officers at the scene, claiming these statements were inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington and Ohio v. Clark.The Superior Court of Kings County initially found the children’s statements admissible under various hearsay exceptions and determined that the statements were not testimonial under Crawford. The court also found that Hall had forfeited his right to confront the witnesses by intentionally causing their unavailability, as evidenced by his actions and those of his domestic partner, Deanna English, who repeatedly refused to comply with subpoenas and made the children unavailable for trial.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s rulings. The appellate court independently concluded that the children’s statements were not testimonial, as they were made during an ongoing emergency and were not intended to be used as trial testimony. Additionally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Hall had forfeited his confrontation rights by intentionally causing the children’s unavailability. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the children’s statements and rejecting Hall’s Sixth Amendment claims. View "People v. Hall" on Justia Law

In 2018, Wendall Porter Muhammad pled no contest to attempted murder after stabbing Moses Sow during an altercation. Muhammad admitted to inflicting great bodily injury on Sow and using a deadly weapon, a knife. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. In January 2023, Muhammad filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes to sections 188 and 189 meant he could not be convicted of attempted murder under current law.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Muhammad's petition, concluding he failed to establish a prima facie case for relief. The court determined there was no possibility Muhammad was convicted on a theory of liability that was no longer valid, as he was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the record of conviction conclusively established Muhammad was the sole and direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The court noted that the preliminary hearing transcript and Muhammad's admissions during his plea supported this conclusion. Since the natural and probable consequences doctrine applies only to accomplices, and Muhammad acted alone, he was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. The court also rejected Muhammad's procedural due process argument, stating that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the record of conviction demonstrated his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. View "People v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

In March 2011, Prentice Robinson was indicted by a grand jury for multiple criminal counts, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He pleaded no contest to the charges and received a 22-year prison sentence. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that the trial court erred in considering grand jury testimony. The People agreed that the grand jury testimony was inadmissible hearsay but disagreed on the proper remedy. The San Joaquin County District Attorney, as amicus curiae, argued that the grand jury transcripts were part of Robinson’s record of conviction and admissible under section 1172.6.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County denied Robinson’s petition for resentencing, finding that the grand jury transcripts were admissible and that Robinson was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. Robinson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury testimony and that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) created a hearsay exception for evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial, including grand jury testimony. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and that the procedural safeguards in place ensured the reliability of the testimony. The court also held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to section 1172.6 hearings, as they are postconviction collateral proceedings. The court concluded that Robinson’s due process rights were not violated, as he had the opportunity to present new evidence and challenge the grand jury testimony at the evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Ulysses Gonzalez entered a no-contest plea to two charges of domestic violence against two different victims and admitted to an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury, as well as various prior convictions. He was sentenced to 15 years in state prison. Following the passage of Senate Bill 483, Gonzalez requested resentencing in 2022, arguing that his sentence should be reduced due to changes in the law. The trial court struck the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, reducing his sentence by one year but denied further reduction.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially sentenced Gonzalez to 15 years, including enhancements for prior convictions and great bodily injury. In 2022, Gonzalez sought resentencing under Senate Bill 483, which invalidated certain enhancements. The trial court struck one enhancement, reducing his sentence to 14 years but refused to reduce it further, citing aggravating factors and Gonzalez's conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in not applying the requirements of amended section 1170, subdivision (b), which mandates that aggravating factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated by the defendant. The appellate court held that the trial court improperly relied on unproven aggravating factors and failed to consider Gonzalez's childhood trauma as required by section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to apply the amended sentencing laws and consider all relevant factors. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law