Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Hildo Ocampo Estrada, who was convicted of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter. The charges stemmed from an incident where Estrada and others were involved in a fight with another group, which resulted in the death of Martin Corio and the severe injury of Carlos Zuniga Flores. Estrada was charged with murder and attempted murder, but he pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder, admitting to the use of a deadly weapon and causing great bodily injury. He was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 15 years and 4 months.Estrada later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61, arguing that the record of conviction did not establish that he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The prosecution opposed the petition, asserting that Estrada was ineligible for relief because he was the actual killer. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied his petition at the prima facie stage, concluding that Estrada was the actual killer. Estrada appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight reviewed the case. The court found that the record of conviction did not conclusively establish that Estrada was the actual killer or that he acted with intent to kill or actual malice. The court concluded that the lower court erred in denying Estrada's petition at the prima facie stage without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to issue an order to show cause under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), and to hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1). View "People v. Estrada" on Justia Law

Tyshawn Michael Lewis, a prisoner diagnosed with rapidly progressing amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), appealed the denial of a petition for his compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Lewis was serving a 75-year sentence for first-degree murder committed in 2020. In 2023, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended his release due to his deteriorating health condition. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that despite his physical condition, Lewis posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, based on his criminal history, the nature of his crime, and his alleged gang affiliations.The trial court's decision was based on a diagnostic study and evaluation report that suggested Lewis retained the capacity to commit or influence others to commit criminal acts endangering public safety. The court also considered Lewis's criminal history, including his conviction for first-degree murder, his lack of remorse, and his alleged ongoing association with a violent criminal street gang.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Lewis's petition for compassionate release. The court concluded that the evidence did not support the trial court's finding that Lewis posed an unreasonable risk of committing a violent felony. The court noted that Lewis's mere capacity to commit a crime did not prove that he posed an unreasonable risk of doing so. The court also found that the evidence of Lewis's gang involvement was ambiguous and did not support the trial court's finding. The court reversed the trial court's order and directed it to grant the petition for compassionate release. View "People v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Adam Daniel Barooshian, who was convicted of murder under a Watson murder theory in his second trial. The Watson murder theory refers to a situation where a person who kills another while driving under the influence of alcohol may be charged with second-degree murder if the circumstances support a finding of implied malice. In Barooshian’s first trial, the jury did not reach a verdict on a murder charge but convicted him of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated among other offenses.Barooshian argued that his second trial violated double jeopardy principles because gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated should be considered a necessarily included (or lesser included) offense of a Watson murder. However, the court noted that under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all the elements of the lesser offense.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. The court held that gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of murder. The court also rejected Barooshian's argument that his second trial violated double jeopardy principles. The court concluded that Barooshian had not persuaded them to create a new test to apply to his second trial. View "People v. Barooshian" on Justia Law

The case involves Manuel Dejesus Flores, who was convicted of four counts of lewd and lascivious acts committed against two victims under 14 years old. The victims, sisters B.C. and Y.G., lived with Flores in their family apartment between 2006 and 2008. Both victims testified that Flores had touched them inappropriately multiple times. B.C. disclosed the abuse to her friends in 2016, which was reported to Child Protective Services. The trial court admitted B.C.'s disclosure statements under the "fresh complaint" doctrine, despite the significant delay in reporting the abuse.The trial court also admitted expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), which explains common behaviors and reactions of child victims of sexual abuse. Flores was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life in prison and denied any conduct credits. Flores appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting B.C.'s disclosure statements and the CSAAS expert testimony.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the trial court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. The court found no error in the trial court's admission of victim disclosure evidence and CSAAS expert testimony. However, it agreed with Flores that he was entitled to presentence conduct credits, and remanded the matter for the trial court to calculate and award these credits. View "People v. Flores" on Justia Law

The case involves the appeal of the state against a defendant, Shawn Vincent Gray, who had been committed to the Department of Mental Health after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) for one count of stalking and two counts of making criminal threats. Gray had also admitted a prior strike allegation and six one-year prior prison commitment allegations. The trial court had determined Gray's maximum term of commitment to be 19 years four months, which could be extended if his sanity was not restored. No appeal was filed at the time, and the judgment became final.In 2019, Senate Bill No. 136 (SB 136) amended the Penal Code and limited one-year prior prison term sentencing enhancements to sexually violent offenses. All other one-year sentencing enhancements from prior prison commitments were declared legally invalid. In 2021, Senate Bill No. 483 (SB 483) made SB 136’s changes to the Penal Code partially retroactive to include previously final criminal judgments.In 2023, Gray's counsel filed a petition to recall the maximum commitment time and strike the legally invalid enhancements. The court granted the petition, recalled the judgment, and reset the maximum term of commitment to 13 years four months. This decision was appealed by the state.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District found that the Superior Court of Kern County did not have jurisdiction to consider Gray's petition in the first instance and therefore its subsequent orders were void. The court noted that SB 483 and section 1172.75 of the Penal Code did not apply to NGI judgments or to their underlying maximum terms of commitment. The Court of Appeal thus reversed and vacated the Superior Court's orders and directed the court to deny Gray's petition in its entirety. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law

The case involves Eric Bean Knudsen, who had his driver's license suspended following an administrative per se (APS) hearing. The hearing officer from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) concluded that Knudsen had driven his car with a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or greater. Knudsen challenged this decision through a writ of mandate in the Kern County Superior Court, which was denied, and the suspension was upheld.Knudsen appealed the decision, arguing that his state and federal due process rights were violated because the hearing officer who conducted the APS hearing was not constitutionally impartial. He cited a previous case, California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. DMV, which held that a public hearing officer who acts as both an advocate and adjudicator violates a driver’s due process right to an impartial adjudicator.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reviewed the case. The court agreed with Knudsen, concluding that the public hearing officer acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate, which violated Knudsen's due process right to an impartial adjudicator. As a result, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new APS hearing. View "Knudsen v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Gregory Terence Brown, who was charged with aggravated mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon. Initially declared incompetent due to a diagnosed mental disorder, Brown was later considered competent for trial. He requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, which was denied. Brown was subsequently convicted and sentenced.Brown appealed, arguing that the denial of his motion for mental health diversion was incorrect, and that amendments to section 1001.36 (effective after his conviction but before sentencing) should be applied retroactively, warranting reconsideration of his motion. The People argued that Brown waived his right to invoke the retroactivity of the amendments by failing to request reconsideration prior to sentencing.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, found that the trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion in 2022, but concluded that the amendments to section 1001.36 were retroactive. The court also determined that under the circumstances, Brown did not forfeit his right to invoke the retroactivity of the amendments by failing to request reconsideration. Accordingly, the court of appeal conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for further consideration under the amended statute. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves Gail Dee Lew-Williams, as the surviving spouse and successor in interest of Wilbur Williams, Jr., M.D., and Wilbur Williams, M.D., Inc. (collectively, the Williams plaintiffs) and Sevana Petrosian and her associates Salina Ranjbar, Vana Mehrabian, and Staforde Palmer (collectively, the Petrosian defendants). The Williams plaintiffs accused the Petrosian defendants of embezzling approximately $11.5 million from the Corporation’s bank accounts. The trial court compelled the case to arbitration, but the Williams plaintiffs failed to initiate arbitration proceedings. As a result, the trial court dismissed the Williams plaintiffs’ claims against the Petrosian defendants.The Williams plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they did not have the funds to initiate the arbitration and that the trial court erred in compelling arbitration. The Petrosian defendants argued that the claims were properly dismissed because the Williams plaintiffs had the funds to arbitrate and should not be allowed on appeal to challenge the trial court’s order compelling arbitration before first arbitrating their claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, concluded that once a trial court has compelled claims to contractual arbitration, the court has “very limited authority with respect to [the] pending arbitration.” If a party fails to diligently prosecute an arbitration, the appropriate remedy is for the opposing party to seek relief in the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Williams plaintiffs’ claims against the Petrosian defendants for failure to prosecute. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the case. View "Lew-Williams v. Petrosian" on Justia Law

This case pertains to a defendant, Nicholas Beaudreaux, who was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted robbery. He is serving a 50-year sentence. Beaudreaux made two unsuccessful attempts to petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court ruled that the denial of relief on his first petition, which was affirmed in 2020, forecloses relief. However, Beaudreaux appealed again, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lewis and Senate Bill No. 775, which clarified the procedural law governing section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings. He claimed that the trial court erred at the prima facie stage of these resentencing proceedings by not appointing counsel and relying on substantive facts from this court’s 2011 opinion affirming his conviction. However, the court concluded that these errors were harmless. The dispositive question was whether, based on the record of conviction, it must be concluded that Beaudreaux was convicted as Drummond’s actual killer. The court believed so, and therefore, Beaudreaux's attempt to allege entitlement to section 1172.6 relief was refuted. The order dismissing Beaudreaux’s second petition for section 1172.6 relief was affirmed. View "P. v. Beaudreaux" on Justia Law

In this case, the People of the State of California filed a lawsuit against Holiday Liquor (owned by Abdul Jamal Sheriff and operated under Freetown Holdings Company) for public nuisance. The People claimed that the store had become a hub for illegal drug transactions, with customers and dealers using the store as a meeting point. The store was accused of tolerating loitering and drug dealing, lacking security, operating until 2 a.m., and selling alcohol in cheap single-serving containers.The trial court granted summary judgment for the People, ordering the store to hire guards, stop selling single-serving containers of alcohol, and take other measures to address the issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision.The court held that Holiday Liquor had indeed facilitated a public nuisance by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent the sale of illegal drugs on its property. The court ruled that the proprietor was aware of the illegal activities as he had been informed multiple times by the police. Despite this knowledge, he failed to implement recommended measures to mitigate the issue, such as hiring security guards, limiting operating hours, and ceasing the sale of single-serving alcohol containers. The ruling was based on the violation of sections 11570 et seq. of the Health and Safety Code (the drug house law), sections 3479 et seq. of the Civil Code (the public nuisance law), and sections 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code (the unfair competition law). View "P. v. Freetown Holdings Co." on Justia Law