Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had denied Jesse James Hollywood's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Hollywood had been previously convicted of first-degree murder with a special circumstance that the murder occurred during a kidnapping. He contended that the court erred in denying his petition because the record did not conclusively establish that he had aided the actual killer in the commission of the murder. However, the court held that Hollywood was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because aiding and abetting an enumerated felony under section 189 with the intent to kill suffices to constitute felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(2), which precludes a petitioner from section 1172.6 relief. This decision was based on the jury finding that Hollywood had the intent to kill during the commission of a kidnapping and the fact that Hollywood had provided the murder weapon and ordered his subordinates to carry out the killing. The court rejected Hollywood's argument that the absence of an explicit reference to section 190.2, subdivision (c) in the amended section 189, subdivision (e)(2) meant the Legislature intended to alter this specific ground for liability under the felony murder rule. The court noted that the Legislature used the same phrase interpreted by the Supreme Court in a previous case when amending section 189 to state the new felony-murder rule, and therefore, they assumed it was intended to have the same meaning. View "People v. Hollywood" on Justia Law

The case involved Rhonda Persiani, a defendant charged with multiple counts of driving under the influence (DUI) in California. Due to doubts about Persiani's mental competence, the criminal proceedings were suspended, and she was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Persiani was evaluated and found suitable for outpatient treatment through mental health diversion. However, the court and parties believed Persiani was ineligible for such treatment due to a California Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion in cases where a defendant is charged with DUI. Persiani sought dismissal of her cases, asserting that dismissal was required under the Penal Code because she was ineligible for any of the treatment options. The court denied Persiani’s motion to dismiss and imposed mental health treatment provisions as conditions of her release. In an appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District held that a trial court has the authority under the Penal Code to order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with DUI. The court concluded that the Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion for DUI does not prevent a court from ordering a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant to receive treatment through mental health diversion after criminal proceedings have been suspended. The matter was remanded back to the lower court to determine whether to order Persiani to receive mental health diversion treatment. View "Persiani v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from the defendant, Royce Lanele Robinson, who was convicted of domestic violence with great bodily injury and spousal battery. The charges were based on three separate incidents involving his girlfriend, referred to as Jane Doe. Robinson contended on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of his prior domestic violence conviction without a description of the underlying facts.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three upheld the trial court's decision. The court concluded that Robinson's claim had been forfeited on appeal because he did not raise this argument in the trial court. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of the prior conviction under Evidence Code section 1109. Even if there was an error, the court stated it would not have been prejudicial, and thus, the judgment was affirmed.The key facts of the case include a series of incidents where Robinson allegedly inflicted bodily harm on Doe. The first incident involved Robinson pushing Doe out of his moving car. In the second incident, Doe reported that Robinson had pushed down on her chest, causing a fracture. In the third incident, Doe reported a prolonged assault by Robinson. Throughout the trial, Doe provided inconsistent testimonies, and Robinson's mother testified that her son attempted to aid Doe during a choking incident. The jury found Robinson guilty of spousal battery for the first incident and guilty of inflicting Doe's chest injury for the second incident. However, Robinson was found not guilty for the charges related to the third incident. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 1995, Armondo Lopez was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder for his role in an incident where his co-defendant, intending to kill a rival, accidentally shot and killed an unintended victim. Lopez had assisted his co-defendant, knowing that the co-defendant intended to kill the rival. Although Lopez was not the shooter, he was deemed liable for the unintended victim's death under the doctrine of transferred intent. This doctrine holds that if a person intends to harm one individual but unintentionally harms another instead, the intent to harm is transferred to the actual victim, making the person liable for that harm.In 2021, Lopez filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that changes in the law under Senate Bill 1437 meant he could no longer be convicted of murder. Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019, amended California's murder law to limit murder liability for accomplices who did not act with intent to kill and were not major participants in the crime. Lopez argued that the doctrine of transferred intent, which had been used to establish his liability for murder, was a form of imputed liability and therefore incompatible with the revised law.The Court of Appeal of the State of California disagreed, holding that Senate Bill 1437 did not abrogate the doctrine of transferred intent. The court reasoned that the bill's language did not suggest any intent to abolish this long-established doctrine. Furthermore, the court found that the doctrine of transferred intent requires an intent to kill, which Lopez had demonstrated through his actions and admissions. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision denying Lopez's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from a postconviction order for restitution in the amount of $6,700. The defendant, Joshua Jereco Pittman, was ordered to pay this amount for jewelry stolen from the home of victims Michael F. and Betty F. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four affirmed the trial court's restitution order. The court noted that a victim's estimate of the value of stolen items is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of loss, subject to rebuttal by the defendant. In this case, the victims' estimates were contained in a police report and in restitution forms, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by relying on these estimates. The appellate court also found that evidence of replacement value for the stolen property was sufficient to support the restitution order. View "People v. Pittman" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, the defendant, Devin Gaillard, appealed from a lower court decision denying his petition for resentencing on a 2014 voluntary manslaughter conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). Gaillard argued that he had established a prima facie case because the record of conviction did not conclusively establish his ineligibility for relief. The People, represented by the Attorney General, conceded this error and agreed that the order must be reversed.Gaillard had initially pled guilty to counts of voluntary manslaughter and transportation of marijuana, admitting that he "aided [and] abetted the voluntary manslaughter of Dillon Davis [and] transported marijuana." The trial court sentenced him to a 25-year prison term.In 2022, Gaillard filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. However, the trial court denied the petition, concluding that Gaillard was a direct aider and abettor and therefore ineligible for relief under the law. Gaillard then filed a timely appeal.The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in its decision. It found that Gaillard’s guilty plea did not conclusively establish his ineligibility for relief under section 1172.6. The court ruled that Gaillard’s admission that he aided and abetted in the crime did not definitively establish that he could still be convicted of murder under current law, which requires the defendant to personally harbor malice aforethought. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings, directing the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition. View "People v. Gaillard" on Justia Law

The California Fifth Appellate District Court examined a case where the defendant, Brandon Michael Patterson, petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Patterson was initially convicted for first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. He later petitioned for resentencing, claiming that he did not meet the criteria for murder under changes made to sections 188 and 189. The lower court agreed and redesignated his murder conviction as attempted robbery and first-degree residential burglary.However, the appellate court found that the murder conviction could not be redesignated as a first-degree residential burglary because it was not the "underlying felony" of Patterson's felony-murder conviction. Based on the instructions given to the jury during the original trial, the only "underlying felony" was attempted robbery. The court ruled that the term "underlying felony" refers to the specific crime that underlies a felony-murder conviction, which, in this case, was attempted robbery. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's decision to redesignate the murder conviction as a first-degree residential burglary, and remanded the case for Patterson to be sentenced on the redesignated attempted robbery conviction. View "People v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The California Court of Appeal held that evidence from a TruNarc laser narcotics identification test was improperly admitted at trial because the prosecution failed to establish its reliability under the Kelly rule. The Kelly rule requires that expert testimony based on a new scientific technique must be shown to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, that the expert testifying about the technique is qualified, and that correct scientific procedures were used in the test. The court found that the TruNarc test, which uses a laser to identify substances, was a new scientific technique and that the prosecution did not demonstrate its general acceptance or reliability. Consequently, it was error to admit testimony about the TruNarc test at trial. However, the court also held that this error was not prejudicial in relation to the defendant's two methamphetamine convictions because there was other compelling evidence supporting those convictions. It concluded, though, that the error was prejudicial with respect to the defendant's conviction for simple possession of carisoprodol (a muscle relaxant), because the officer's identification of the pills as carisoprodol was less certain and partly based on an unverified public website. As a result, the court reversed the carisoprodol conviction but affirmed the methamphetamine convictions. View "People v. Rios" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, the defendant, Daniel Oliver Mares, had appealed from an order that denied his petition to vacate his voluntary manslaughter conviction and resentence him under Penal Code section 1172.6. Mares had pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter while facing a murder charge. The record of conviction includes the preliminary hearing transcript, where police recounted Mares’s admissions that he stabbed the victim and acted alone. Mares claimed in his petition that he could not be convicted today due to changes made to the murder laws in 2019 legislation. The court determined that Mares had failed to make a prima facie showing for relief, as he was the actual killer and acted alone in stabbing the victim. The court's decision was based on the record of conviction, which contained uncontradicted facts that refuted Mares’s assertion. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny Mares's petition. View "People v. Mares" on Justia Law

In the case presented, Wesley McDowell Jr. was convicted of human trafficking of a minor and other offenses, leading to a sentence of 23 years to life in prison. McDowell appealed this sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss his elevated sentence of 15 years to life under section 236.1(c)(2) of the Penal Code, which pertains to human trafficking of a minor with aggravating circumstances. He cited Senate Bill 81, claiming it compelled the sentencing courts to dismiss enhancements under certain circumstances, applicable to his elevated sentence.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three held that Senate Bill 81 applies only to enhancements--additional terms of imprisonment added to the base term. As McDowell conceded, section 236.1(c)(2) provides an alternative punishment for the underlying offense and is therefore not an enhancement. Thus, Senate Bill 81 did not apply to McDowell’s elevated sentence under section 236.1(c)(2). The court affirmed the original sentence. View "People v. McDowell" on Justia Law