Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Jeremiah Paul, who was convicted of possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction. Paul had pleaded no contest following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a firearm by the trial court, pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. He contended that the evidence of the firearm should have been excluded because law enforcement officers discovered it only after they unlawfully detained him to verify his parole status. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five found that the initial encounter between Paul and the officers was indeed an unlawful detention. The court pointed to several factors leading to this conclusion such as the positioning of the officers that blocked Paul from leaving, the officers approaching Paul from both sides of his car and shining their flashlights into his car, and the fact that the officers approached Paul while he was on his phone in a legally parked vehicle. The court held that these factors would lead a reasonable person to believe they are not free to leave, thus constituting a detention. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and vacated its order denying Paul's motion to suppress evidence. The court concluded that the officers would not have obtained Paul's parole status if they had not first unlawfully detained him and thus, the firearm was not lawfully obtained and should be suppressed. View "P. v. Paul" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue at hand revolves around the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA). The petitioner, Michael Earl Mosby III, was charged with the drive-by shooting of Darryl King-Divens, along with a gun enhancement and three special circumstances, including having committed multiple murders. The District Attorney sought the death penalty for Mosby, who had been previously convicted in Los Angeles County of two additional murders and attempted murder. Mosby filed a motion claiming that the District Attorney's decision to seek the death penalty violated the CRJA, which prohibits seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction on the basis of race. The trial court denied Mosby's motion, ruling that he had failed to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination under the CRJA.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District granted the writ petition and directed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The court held that under the CRJA, a defendant must present not only statistical evidence of racial disparity in the charging of the death penalty but also evidence of nonminority defendants who were engaged in similar conduct and were similarly situated but charged with lesser offenses, to establish a prima facie case. The court found that Mosby had met his burden of establishing a prima facie case under the CRJA. Therefore, the trial court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing at which the District Attorney could produce evidence of the relevant factors that were used to determine the charges against the nonminority defendants who were involved in similar conduct, and who were similarly situated to Mosby; and to provide any race-neutral reasons that it considered in deciding to charge Mosby with the death penalty. View "Mosby v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Kelly Vaughn Kimble, who was sentenced to 25 years to life under the former Three Strikes law, plus an additional year for a prior prison term enhancement, sought resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483. He argued that the trial court erred in resentencing him under Senate Bill 483 without applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. He further contended that he was entitled to application of the Reform Act’s revised penalties at his resentencing. However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District disagreed. The court held that the Reform Act created a specific resentencing process for offenders sentenced under the former Three Strikes law, which requires consideration of various factors, such as the offender's criminal history, disciplinary record, and other relevant information. The court further noted that the Reform Act provided the only path for relief under the Reform Act for defendants who had already been sentenced. Thus, the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to automatic resentencing under the Reform Act as part of his resentencing under Senate Bill 483. The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "People v. Kimble" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, the appellant, Esteban Jimenez, was convicted of evading an officer while driving recklessly and leaving the scene of an accident. The court also found true a prior strike allegation. Jimenez appealed the conviction on two grounds: (1) that the prosecutor improperly exercised a peremptory challenge in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 and state and federal constitutions; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of violating Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) (leaving the scene of an accident).The appellate court held that the prosecutor did not violate section 231.7 or Jimenez's constitutional rights by exercising the peremptory challenge. The court assessed the reasons given by the prosecutor for the challenge and found no evidence of bias related to the prospective juror's membership in a cognizable group.However, the appellate court agreed with Jimenez's second argument, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Jimenez violated Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a). The court found that there was no evidence that Jimenez had knowingly and willfully left the scene or whether Jimenez had provided the information to the wall owner and police as required.Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed Jimenez's conviction for evading an officer while driving recklessly and the prior strike allegation, but reversed his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. The case was remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the conviction on that count and to prepare an amended abstract of judgment. View "People v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

In this juvenile wardship proceeding in California, defendant M.B. admitted to attempting murder and related enhancement allegations. M.B. was committed to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) for a four-year baseline term of confinement and a maximum term of confinement of 22 years to life. On appeal, M.B. challenged the court's jurisdiction to modify an earlier order setting the maximum term of confinement at four years. He also argued that the indeterminate 22 years to life term was unauthorized and that his precommitment credits should be applied against his four-year baseline term rather than against the maximum term of confinement.The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter the challenged order and rejected M.B.'s argument that equal protection principles required application of precommitment credits against the baseline term. However, the court agreed with M.B. and the Attorney General that the 22 years to life maximum term of confinement was unauthorized. As such, the court modified the juvenile court's order to specify the maximum term of confinement as 22 years and otherwise affirmed the order. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, the court analyzed a second appeal involving a defendant, Yacob Dain, who was found guilty of home invasion robbery, kidnapping, assault with a firearm, and other offenses. The trial court also found that he had two prior convictions for active gang participation that qualified as strikes under the Three Strikes law.Following a first appeal, the court remanded the matter for resentencing. The prosecution retried only one of the prior convictions, which was again found to be a strike and a serious felony conviction. The trial court then granted Dain's motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction. The People appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law.Dain argued that Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c), which directs trial courts to consider specified mitigating circumstances when deciding whether to dismiss an “enhancement” in furtherance of justice, should apply to decisions about dismissing a prior strike conviction under the Three Strikes law. However, the appeal court disagreed with this argument, stating that section 1385(c) does not apply to the decision whether to dismiss a strike under the Three Strikes law.The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike conviction because Dain cannot be deemed outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to dismiss the five-year enhancement under section 667(a) and imposing the middle term for the principal offense of home invasion robbery.The court reversed the order dismissing the prior strike conviction and remanded the case for the trial court to resentence Dain as a person who has suffered one prior strike conviction. View "People v. Dain" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three, the mother (B.S.) appealed the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over her child (R.M.) under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and (g), based on her and the father's incarceration.The parents were arrested on murder charges, and no prior arrangements had been made for the care of their minor child. The child was taken into protective custody by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. The court exercised jurisdiction over the child because it believed the parents had not made plans for the child's care prior to their arrest.However, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the court's exercise of jurisdiction was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court noted that the parents' incarceration alone was not sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court stressed that the law does not require parents to make an appropriate advance plan for the child's ongoing care and supervision to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal found that the Department didn't prove that there was something more than the mere fact of the parents' incarceration to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court found that the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that jurisdiction was appropriate. Therefore, the court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders were reversed. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

In the early hours of New Year's Day in 1987, O'Neal Underwood and an accomplice mugged a pedestrian in Richmond, California. During the mugging, Underwood's accomplice stabbed the victim, who subsequently died from his wounds. Underwood was convicted of first degree murder and robbery and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Years later, the Legislature amended the murder statutes to limit felony murder liability for persons who were not the actual killers. Underwood petitioned for resentencing under the new law. The trial court denied the petition, finding Underwood ineligible for relief because he aided and abetted murder with intent to kill and was a major participant in the underlying robbery, acting with reckless indifference to human life. Underwood appealed, arguing that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof, the prosecution's evidence does not prove he is guilty of first degree murder under current law, and his attendance at the evidentiary hearing by speakerphone and without a means of confidentially communicating with his counsel violated his constitutional and statutory rights. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, agreed with Underwood that the prosecution failed to prove he is guilty of first degree murder under current law because no substantial evidence supports a finding that he intended to kill or acted with reckless indifference for human life. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and instructed it to vacate the murder conviction and resentence Underwood in accordance with the appropriate section of the Penal Code. View "People v. Underwood" on Justia Law

The case arises from an appeal by a minor, K.B., from the juvenile court's order denying his request to dismiss a juvenile justice petition and seal records pertaining to his commission of several criminal offenses, for which he was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation. K.B. argued that he had met the requirements for "satisfactory completion" of probation and therefore, the petition should be dismissed and records sealed despite his subsequent admission for possessing marijuana for sale, an infraction.The central legal issue in this case was the interpretation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, subdivision (c)(1), which provides that a subsequent wardship adjudication during probation does not preclude satisfactory completion unless it stems from "a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District disagreed with the juvenile court's interpretation of the statute that any juvenile adjudication, even an infraction, precludes satisfactory completion of probation.The appellate court held that the language of the statute, when considered in light of its purpose and to avoid absurd results, meant that the limiting phrase "for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude" applies equally to juvenile wardship adjudications and adult convictions. Hence, K.B.'s infraction did not preclude satisfactory completion of probation. The court reversed the juvenile court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition and seal all records pertaining to the dismissed petition. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

The case involves Adrian Lamont Brooks, who was found guilty of inflicting corporal injury on his domestic partner, R.J., and committing assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. On appeal, Brooks argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that R.J. had invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because she was never called and sworn. He also asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to replace a juror who was allegedly biased. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. The appellate court found that R.J. had validly asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege through her counsel and that the juror's potential bias did not warrant removal. The court also held that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury regarding R.J.'s refusal to testify. View "People v. Brooks" on Justia Law