Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, Darlene Renee Fouse, who was convicted in 2006 for several crimes, including attempted murder of a peace officer, appealed a resentencing order under Penal Code section 1172.6. Fouse was originally convicted as a getaway driver in a series of violent home invasion robberies. After her petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, the court vacated her two convictions for attempted murder of a peace officer, as she was deemed not culpable under the amended law. Instead, the court redesignated the offenses as two counts of assault with a firearm on a peace officer and added a conviction for felony evading a peace officer.Fouse argued that the court erred in redesignating the attempted murders as assaults with a firearm on a peace officer and in adding a conviction for evading a peace officer, as the jury had convicted her of the target offenses of robbery. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District agreed with Fouse, stating that since the target offenses (robbery) were charged and Fouse was convicted of them, the statute required the court to resentence Fouse on the remaining charges. It did not permit the court to redesignate the attempted murder convictions to other offenses. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Fouse" on Justia Law

In early 2022, a three-year-old child, L.C., was taken from his mother, D.C., after she was arrested for transporting fentanyl pills with L.C. in the car. After the juvenile court removed L.C. from his mother's care, D.C. returned to Mexico on the advice of her criminal defense attorney. Despite being in Mexico, D.C. maintained a relationship with L.C. through weekly video calls and completed necessary programs as part of her case plan, including a drug treatment program, individual counseling, and parenting classes. However, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services expressed concerns about the validity of her drug tests performed by Mexico's child protection agency. At a 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court terminated D.C.'s reunification services, citing her failure to return to California for drug testing and other services, speculation about L.C.'s developmental services in Mexico, and D.C.'s refusal to surrender herself in response to an arrest warrant.L.C. sought relief, arguing that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that returning him to his mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety or well-being. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven agreed with L.C. and found that the mother had complied with her case plan, maintained a bond with L.C., and that Mexico's child protection agency could provide services to the mother and L.C. Therefore, the court granted the petition, vacated the juvenile court's termination of reunification services, and ordered a new review hearing to consider any developments since the last hearing. View "L.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Alexander Alberto Frias, was convicted of stalking. Frias appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice by denying his four requests to substitute the Castaneda Law firm as his counsel. The trial court denied the first three requests on the grounds that the firm's attorneys were not ready for trial and the case had been pending for three years, with four different attorneys had handled Frias’s defense at his request. However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Frias's fourth request. At the time of the fourth request, the case had been pending for three-and-a-half years, the case was set for trial, and the prosecutor and deputy public defender had announced they were ready for trial. An attorney from the Castaneda firm announced he was ready for trial. The trial court's concerns that the Castaneda firm was not prepared for trial and that Frias would seek to substitute new counsel were not sufficient grounds to deny Frias's request to have retained counsel of his choice. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment based on the trial court's denial of Frias's right to counsel of his choice. However, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Frias's conviction for stalking and remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Frias" on Justia Law

This case concerns a defendant, Jeanette Sarmiento, who requested mental health diversion after being charged with attempted robbery. Sarmiento suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depressive disorder, and stimulant use disorder, all of which have never been treated. Despite meeting many of the requirements for diversion, her request was denied by the Superior Court of San Diego County due to her history of drug abuse and the court's conclusion that she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the public.Sarmiento sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, State of California. The court determined that her past failures in drug treatment did not predict her response to mental health treatment, since her underlying mental health conditions, which were the core of her substance abuse issues, were never previously addressed. The court also found that the trial court's concern about Sarmiento's lack of success in past attempts at substance abuse treatment did not support the finding that the recommended treatment would not meet her specialized needs. Further, the court found that the trial court misapplied the statutory criteria in determining that residual concerns for public safety could justify the denial of diversion.Given these findings, the Court of Appeal granted the writ and directed the Superior Court to approve Sarmiento's request for mental health diversion. The court emphasized that the purpose of mental health diversion is to treat individuals with mental disorders in order to prevent them from entering and reentering the criminal justice system, and to protect public safety. The court concluded that the trial court's decision failed to follow the Legislature's direction to focus less on Sarmiento's past and more on the promise of her future and that of her community. View "Sarmiento v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, the defendant, Menique Lashon, was convicted of one count of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree murder, along with true findings of special circumstance allegations. Lashon sought to appeal her conviction under the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA). The court had initially found that Lashon had forfeited her right to bring a CRJA claim on direct appeal by failing to file a motion in the trial court before judgment was entered. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeal, instructing it to reconsider its decision in light of Assembly Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1118), which modified the CRJA to allow for additional avenues of relief for claims made on direct appeal.After considering AB 1118's amendments to the CRJA, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed its original decision, stating that the long-standing procedural appellate rules governing forfeiture of issues continue to apply. The court further rejected Lashon's separate motion requesting that the appeal be stayed and the matter remanded to the superior court to allow her to file a CRJA motion, stating that they did not find good cause to grant this request. The court held that the general appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been but were not made in the trial court applied to Lashon's section 745 claim, which is under the CRJA. Furthermore, the court affirmed that a defendant may be found to have forfeited a section 745 claim of racial bias made for the first time on direct appeal in the absence of a showing that an exception to the forfeiture doctrine applies. View "People v. Lashon" on Justia Law

In California, a defendant, Gary Marcus Hall, convicted of two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years, challenged his sentence on several grounds. He argued that the court (and the parties) mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation, that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded, and that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the defendant's 10-year prison sentence, rejecting all his arguments. The court found that the defendant had waived his objections by failing to raise them at trial. It also held that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated by the trial court's reliance on a properly established aggravating factor—namely, the defendant's prior convictions. View "P. v. Hall" on Justia Law

In the case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, the defendant, who was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death, appealed his conviction on the grounds that his trial counsel exhibited racial bias towards him in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He argued that his counsel's advice to testify in his natural linguistic style, which included the use of slang terms and a certain accent, displayed racial bias or animus. The court disagreed, ruling that advising a defendant to testify in an authentic and genuine manner did not indicate racial bias or animus and did not violate the Racial Justice Act. The defendant also argued that the trial court erred in imposing two sentence enhancements and a parole revocation restitution fine. The court agreed that the parole revocation restitution fine should be stricken, as the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The judgment was thus modified to remove the parole revocation restitution fine, but otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In the case of Joshua Zamora Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Board, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two affirmed a lower court ruling that upheld the California Victim Compensation Board's denial of compensation to Gonzales. Gonzales was previously convicted of a gang-related shooting but had his convictions overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit due to insufficiency of evidence. Subsequently, he applied for compensation for the time he was wrongfully imprisoned. The Board denied his claim, finding that he failed to prove his factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. Gonzales then filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, which was denied by the lower court. Upon appeal, the appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, concluding substantial evidence supported the Board's ruling that Gonzales failed to establish his factual innocence. View "Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Bd." on Justia Law

In the case of a contested divorce between Quin Whitman and Douglas F. Whitman, the founder of a once successful hedge fund, the Court of Appeal of the State of California ruled on several issues. The court affirmed that Doug failed to prove he retained any separate property interest in the hedge fund at the time of dissolution, despite an initial $300,000 investment of his own separate funds. The court also ruled that the community was not financially responsible for any of the legal fees Doug incurred to defend against criminal charges brought against him for insider trading or the $250,000 fine imposed on him in that case. However, the court erred in holding the community responsible for the $935,000 penalty imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission for illegal insider trading. Quin did not demonstrate that the court erred in holding the community responsible for legal fees expended by the hedge fund when it intervened as a third party into these proceedings. The court also concluded that Quin failed to prove her claim that Doug breached his fiduciary duty in connection with the sale of the couple’s luxury home. The court concluded that the couple’s entire interest in the hedge fund is community property, subject to equal division. The court also found that Doug's legal expenses incurred in defending against insider trading charges and the $250,000 fine imposed on him were his separate debts. View "In re Whitman" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw from a person involved in a car accident, where unconsciousness or unresponsiveness occurred in a hospital about 90 minutes after the incident. The defendant, Francisco Andres Alvarez, was involved in a fatal car accident and was transported to the hospital. He appeared unresponsive approximately 90 minutes after the accident. An officer, suspecting Alvarez was under the influence of alcohol, requested a blood draw without obtaining a warrant. The blood test revealed a 0.05 percent blood alcohol level with the presence of cocaine and THC.Alvarez moved to suppress the blood testing results, arguing that the officer had ample time to obtain a warrant and that no exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw. The trial court initially granted the motion, but later, following a U.S. Supreme Court decision (Mitchell v. Wisconsin), the court reconsidered and denied the motion, ruling that exigent circumstances permitted a blood test without a warrant.On appeal, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District of the State of California reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The court concluded that no exigent circumstances, as defined in Mitchell v. Wisconsin or Schmerber v. California, allowed a warrantless blood draw in this case. The court found that the officer had ample time to obtain a warrant and no emergency medical interventions were required that would have justified the warrantless blood draw. Furthermore, the court found that the officer did not reasonably and in good faith rely on California's implied consent statute, which allows for a blood draw without a warrant if the driver is unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusal. The court remanded the case with instructions to grant Alvarez's motion to suppress the blood test results and allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. View "P. v. Alvarez" on Justia Law