Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, the appellants, Stephon Anthony, Rafael Campbell, Samuel Flowers, and Anthony B. Price, were seeking relief from their first degree murder convictions on multiple grounds. The court found that the trial court was entitled to consider the jury's intent-to-kill findings at the prima facie stage, but that these findings did not preclude relief as a matter of law. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. Furthermore, the court agreed with the People that recent amendment of the gang statutes requires retrial or resentencing on gang-related special-circumstance and enhancement allegations. The court also ordered a remand to strike the multiple-murder special circumstance for Campbell, Flowers, and Price, and to reconsider sentencing on their Vehicle Code convictions in light of recent legislative changes. The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to strike the enhancements and prior strikes. View "P. v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In 2010, Ryan Berry-Vierwinden was convicted of first degree murder in the state of California. Berry-Vierwinden did not commit the murder himself but was convicted as an aider and abettor. The prosecution argued that he and Benjamin Medina, the actual murderer, had planned to murder the victim, Krishana F., by means of lying in wait. Berry-Vierwinden was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.In 2022, Berry-Vierwinden filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows defendants to petition for resentencing if they could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder due to legislative changes made effective January 1, 2019. Berry-Vierwinden claimed that he was eligible for relief because the jury instructions given at his trial permitted the jury to convict him of first degree murder by imputing malice to him based solely on his participation in a crime.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition for resentencing. The court noted that at the time of his trial in 2010, California law did not allow a direct aider and abettor to be convicted of a lying-in-wait murder on an imputed malice theory. The court reasoned that the legislative changes made in 2019 did not change this aspect of the law. Thus, Berry-Vierwinden's argument that he could not presently be convicted of murder due to the changes made in 2019 was not valid. As such, he did not meet the requirements to establish a prima facie case for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6. View "P. v. Berry-Vierwinden" on Justia Law

The court case in question involves James McCray, a violent offender with mental health disorders (OMHD), who has been committed to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) since 2005. McCray appealed a 2022 order recommitting him for another one-year term, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove he represented a substantial danger to others due to his severe mental health disorder, that he voluntarily absented himself from his recommitment trial, and that the trial court did not obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury from him before the trial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four dismissed McCray's appeal as moot since the recommitment order he appealed from had expired and he had been recommitted for another year. However, the court addressed his claim that the trial court failed to ensure he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial, given its recurring importance.Upon review, the court found that the trial court relied entirely on McCray's counsel's brief questioning about his understanding of the right to a jury trial and did not take any steps to ensure McCray fully understood the significance of a jury trial and the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial. The court concluded that McCray did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial, and highlighted the importance of the court directly informing an OMHD defendant about the right being waived to ensure a meaningful record of the defendant's understanding of a jury waiver. View "P. v. McCray" on Justia Law

In the case being reviewed, Alfredo Ramirez was found guilty of multiple counts of sexual offenses against minors and was sentenced to 107 years in prison. Ramirez appealed, arguing that the evidence obtained from his phone, which was unlocked using his fingerprint, was obtained unlawfully and violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also argued that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony concerning child sexual abuse victims’ responses, incorrectly instructed the jury, and imposed fines without determining his ability to pay.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, disagreed with Ramirez and affirmed the judgment. The court held that using Ramirez's fingerprint to unlock his phone did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment or violate his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. The court also found no violation of Ramirez's due process rights. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury or in admitting the expert testimony. Finally, the court found that Ramirez had forfeited his right to challenge the imposed fines and fees due to his failure to object at sentencing. View "P. v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, directed the Superior Court of Sacramento County to dismiss the case of Adam Walsworth. Walsworth was previously convicted, but his conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. The remittitur (official court document that returns a case to a lower court) was issued on October 27, 2022, and received by the court clerk on November 1, 2022. However, Walsworth was not brought to trial within 60 days of the remittitur filing, a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial.The Superior Court argued that the 60-day speedy trial period had not passed because the remittitur was filed when the sentencing court received it on February 1, 2023, not when it was received by the court clerk. The appellate court disagreed, holding that, under the California Rules of Court, a document is deemed filed when it is received by the court clerk. As such, the remittitur was filed on November 1, 2022, and the 60-day speedy trial period expired on December 31, 2022.No good cause for the delay was provided, and the court noted that risks of clerical error or neglect must rest with the prosecution, not the defendant. Thus, the court concluded that Walsworth's case must be dismissed due to violation of section 1382 of the Penal Code, which mandates dismissal when a defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days after the filing of the remittitur in the trial court, unless good cause for the delay is shown. View "Walsworth v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case is an appeal from a decision of the Superior Court of Yolo County, California. The defendant, Silverio Saldana, was found guilty of possession for sale of a controlled substance and was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison as a three-strikes offender. The court also imposed and stayed four prior prison term enhancements. Nearly a decade later, Saldana's defense counsel moved to strike the four prior prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 1172.75 and requested a full resentencing under that statute. The trial court struck the previously stayed enhancements but declined to conduct a full resentencing because of the enhancements' status as stayed. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, held that the defendant was entitled to full resentencing. The court noted that even though the enhancements were stayed, they were part of the sentence and could potentially increase the sentence under certain circumstances. Therefore, striking the enhancements provided some relief to the defendant by eliminating that potential. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with section 1172.75 and all current sentencing statutes that apply to the defendant. View "P. v. Saldana" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, Jose Diaz, who was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting a street vendor, William Garcia, to death over a dispute about selling on someone else's turf. Diaz appealed his conviction, arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District concluded that police had ample probable cause to arrest Diaz, noting that Diaz, with his distinctive neck tattoo, was observed in an incriminating location at an incriminating time. The court also found no prosecutorial misconduct. However, Diaz successfully raised issues about his sentence. The court decided to remand the case for the trial court to consider whether the recent ruling in People v. Tirado and Senate Bill No. 81 have any bearing on Diaz’s sentence. The court otherwise affirmed Diaz's conviction. View "P. v. Diaz" on Justia Law

In a criminal case in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, the defendant, Terrell Trammel, was convicted of multiple charges arising from his violent relationship with his former girlfriend, M.T. Trammel first appealed his aggregate 12-year prison term sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously failed to stay the punishment for two convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The appellate court agreed and remanded the case for a full resentencing. On remand, the trial court corrected its errors and resentenced Trammel to a total prison term of 12 years, four months.Trammel then filed a second appeal arguing that his new sentence violated the prohibition against double jeopardy in the California Constitution. The appellate court agreed with Trammel, finding that the addition of four months to his sentence upon resentencing violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because the errors in his original sentence were not the result of "unauthorized leniency" that might have warranted a harsher sentence under the exception outlined in People v. Serrato. The court also found that the amended abstract of judgment did not accurately reflect Trammel's total custody credits at the time of resentencing.The court remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to modify the sentence and impose a total aggregate sentence of 11 years, four months, and to determine Trammel's actual total custody credits as of the time of his resentencing. The court also instructed the trial court to order the clerk of the superior court to prepare a second amended abstract of judgment reflecting these changes. View "P. v. Trammel" on Justia Law

The case concerns Junaid Manzoor, who pleaded guilty in 2006 to a felony violation of attempting to distribute harmful material to a minor. As a result of his conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender for life under former section 290 of the Penal Code. Almost 14 years later, the trial court granted his petition to reduce his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. After the Legislature amended section 290 to provide for a tiered system of registration time periods, Manzoor filed a petition for relief from the registration requirements. The court summarily denied his petition. On appeal, Manzoor argued that due to the amendments to section 290, he was entitled to relief from the registration requirements because the reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor placed him in "tier one" under the statute. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order denying Manzoor's petition for relief. The court held that the reduction of Manzoor’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor did not qualify him for relief from the registration requirements, because subdivision (e) of section 17 of the Penal Code bars courts from granting such relief when the defendant was found guilty of an offense for which lifetime registration is required, and the amendments to section 290 do not reflect a legislative intent to create an exception to this rule. View "People v. Manzoor" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, the defendant, Mariano Alejandro De La Rosa Burgara (De La Rosa), was initially sentenced to an aggregate stipulated sentence of eight years in prison after pleading no contest to charges of assault with a deadly weapon and hit-and-run driving resulting in permanent, serious injury. On appeal, De La Rosa argued that the postsentencing enactment of Senate Bill 567, which altered the requirements for imposition of an upper term under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), necessitated a remand for resentencing.The court agreed with De La Rosa, concluding that defendants who received an upper term pursuant to a plea agreement that included a stipulated sentence are entitled to a remand under Senate Bill 567. The court found that the changes brought about by Senate Bill 567, which made the middle term the presumptive sentence for a term of imprisonment unless aggravating circumstances stipulated to by the defendant or proven true beyond a reasonable doubt justified imposition of an upper term, applied retroactively to De La Rosa's nonfinal judgment. The court also noted that the implementation of these new requirements could result in a complex series of decisions by the parties and the trial court on remand.Thus, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). However, the court did not decide whether De La Rosa could be sentenced to a prison term greater than the aggregate eight-year term agreed to in the original plea agreement, leaving that issue for the trial court to consider on remand. View "P. v. De La Rosa Burgara" on Justia Law