Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In the State of California, the Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Six heard the third appeal in the sentencing of Frank Ruiz. Originally, Ruiz was sentenced to 18 years in prison, but this was increased to 28 years after a 10-year consecutive sentence for a firearm-use enhancement was reinstated. The decision to reinstate the sentence was made because the trial court's stay of execution of the sentence was unauthorized. However, the court was directed to reconsider whether to strike the firearm-use enhancement and a five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction. The trial court refused to strike either enhancement, resentencing Ruiz to an aggregate term of 28 years.This sentencing was appealed twice. The second appeal was dismissed, but the sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567, which amended section 1170. On remand, Ruiz was sentenced to an aggregate term of 23 years. Ruiz appealed again, contending that the true finding on the gang enhancement allegation must be vacated and that in selecting the upper term for both the conviction of assault with a firearm and the firearm-use enhancement, the trial court relied on aggravating factors that are inapplicable pursuant to S.B. 567. He also contended that he is entitled to additional days of custody credit, that the aggregate sentence imposed on remand could not have exceeded the 18-year aggregate sentence originally imposed, and that the matter must again be remanded for resentencing because of a recent amendment of section 1385.The court agreed with Ruiz's contention regarding the gang enhancement allegation and vacated the true finding on the allegation, remanding the matter to afford the People an opportunity to retry the allegation. The court also agreed that Ruiz was entitled to additional days of custody credit and modified the judgement to award him more credit. However, the court disagreed with Ruiz's other contentions and affirmed the judgement in all other respects. View "P. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

The case concerns Gary Marcus Hall, who was convicted on two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years. Hall was a registered sex offender and lived with the victims' grandfather. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison, which included the upper term on one of the two counts. Hall challenged his sentence on three grounds. Firstly, he claimed the court mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation. Secondly, he argued that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded. Lastly, he contended that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to a jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District held that Hall's sentence was not constitutionally or statutorily infirm due to failure to allege sentencing factors in aggravation. The court also ruled that Hall knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to jury trial, including as to aggravating facts, and his aggravated sentence is constitutionally permissible for that reason. The court further concluded that even if Hall did not sufficiently waive his constitutional jury trial right, the trial court found at least one aggravating factor—recidivism—on a basis consistent with the Sixth Amendment and therefore his aggravated sentence is not constitutionally infirm. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Hall" on Justia Law

In California, Maximino Delgado Lagunas was convicted of second-degree murder after he struck and killed a six-year-old girl while driving under the influence of alcohol. Lagunas had been previously convicted of driving under the influence in 2007 and 2015 and was warned that if he continued to drive while intoxicated and hit someone, he could be charged with murder. On the day of the incident, Lagunas was driving at high speeds in a residential neighborhood, failed to negotiate a turn, and did not apply his brakes, ultimately killing the child. On appeal, Lagunas argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction and that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on a lesser related offense (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated). The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three disagreed with Lagunas' claims, finding substantial evidence to support the jury's determination that he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life, affirming the trial court’s judgment. View "P. v. Lagunas" on Justia Law

In the state of California, Robert Otto Carter Jr. appealed the denial of his request for a full resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Carter was originally sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and the trial court declined to conduct a full resentencing under the new law. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District in California agreed that section 1172.75 required the trial court to conduct a full resentencing, and that the People (prosecution) are not entitled to withdraw their assent to the plea bargain if the trial court further reduces Carter’s sentence on resentencing. The court concluded that section 1172.75 applies to all sentences, including those imposed as part of a plea bargain, and that the prosecution may not withdraw from the plea agreement if the court imposes a lower sentence on resentencing. The court thus reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a full resentencing. View "People v. Carter" on Justia Law

In California, Edgardo Ortiz Guevara was sentenced to 28 years to life under the "Three Strikes" law, due to his third strike being a nonserious, nonviolent felony. He also had prior prison term enhancements. When the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36) (Reform Act) was enacted, Guevara petitioned for relief from his life sentence, but the trial court denied his petition due to concerns of public safety. Later, Guevara moved to have his prior prison term enhancements struck under Penal Code section 1172.75, arguing that he was entitled to have his three strikes life term reduced to eight years, double the term for his current offense, irrespective of the denial of his section 1170.126 petition. The trial court agreed and reduced his life term to eight years.The People petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six for a writ of mandate or prohibition seeking to direct the trial court to recall its sentence and reinstate Guevara’s 25-years-to-life sentence. The appellate court granted the writ, finding that Guevara's interpretation of section 1172.75 would result in a repeal of section 1170.126 for inmates serving an indeterminate term with a prior prison enhancement, which would be unconstitutional. It also stated that Guevara’s prior prison term enhancements were struck, but not his 25-years-to-life term mandated by the Reform Act, which remains in effect as Guevara was found to be a danger to the public. Therefore, the appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its order recalling Guevara’s sentence and imposing a second strike sentence, and to reinstate Guevara’s three strikes sentence of 25 years to life in prison. View "People v. Super. Ct. (Guevara)" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Ryan Berry-Vierwinden, was convicted of first-degree murder under the theory that he aided and abetted the crime. The murder was deemed first degree because it was committed by means of lying in wait. The defendant appealed the decision, arguing that he is eligible for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 because the jury instructions at trial allowed for his conviction based on the malice of his accomplice, which was imputed to him solely based on his participation in the crime. He based his argument on previous court decisions, particularly People v. Maldonado.However, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, disagreed with the defendant's argument. The court referenced their prior decisions in People v. Burns and People v. Flores, concluding that the defendant's claim of instructional error does not establish that he "could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189," as required by Penal Code section 1172.6.The court noted that the law already required an aider and abettor to personally harbor malice for a conviction at the time of the defendant's trial. Therefore, the defendant failed to demonstrate that he could not presently be convicted of murder due to changes made by Senate Bill No. 1437. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. View "P. v. Berry-Vierwinden" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Cedrick Conway, is awaiting trial on a petition to commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In preparation for the trial, he requested a court order directing a Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluator to update a previous evaluation of Conway which was done several years earlier and concluded that he did not meet the criteria for commitment as an SVP. The trial court denied the request, believing that the pertinent statute only allows the prosecution (the party seeking commitment) to request an updated evaluation—not the defense. Conway challenged this ruling, leading to the present case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five concluded that the trial court had misunderstood the statute. While the SVPA does allow the prosecution to request an updated evaluation from DSH, the court found nothing in the statute that would prohibit the defense from obtaining an updated evaluation if authorized by a court order. The court therefore held that the trial court erred in denying Conway’s request for an updated evaluation based on a mistaken understanding of the statute.The court also rejected the defense’s claim that the prosecution was not entitled to oppose the defense motion for an updated evaluation. The court determined that the trial court has discretion to decide whether to entertain opposition from the prosecution. The court therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reconsider Conway’s request for an updated evaluation, taking into account the court's discretion to authorize such an evaluation for the defense. View "Conway v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Buckner was convicted of arson of an inhabited structure and sentenced to three years in prison. He argued that: there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the house was inhabited because the evidence did not show that he intended to continue living in the house after the fire; the court erred by admitting statements he made during a police interview that he argues were taken in violation of his Miranda rights; and the trial court improperly ordered him to pay restitution to his insurance company and the fire department.The court of appeal affirmed in part. The law does not require the prosecution to prove that Buckner intended to continue living in the house after the fire; since Buckner was living in the house at the time of the fire, substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that the house was inhabited. Buckner’s statements to the police were properly admitted at trial because, under the totality of the circumstances, the interview during which he made them was not custodial. The restitution order must be reversed because the insurance company and the fire department are not victims of Buckner’s crime for purposes of restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4. View "People v. Buckner" on Justia Law

Phillips. arrested for DUI, was taken to a lab facility. Ramos, a phlebotomist, took a needle from a sealed package supplied by the County Forensic Lab, cleaned Phillips’ arm, and drew two vials of blood. The county lab measured Phillips’ BAC at 0.110 percent, +/- 0.004 percent. The lab report certifies the "sample appears to be compliant with Title 17” of the California Code of Regulations. At a hearing, Phillips attempted to rebut the presumption, Evidence Code section 664, that the blood was properly collected. Phillips called one witness, Ribeiro, the president of Bay Area Phlebotomy and Laboratory Services, who testified that Ramos was a CPT, not a "qualified person" (licensed physician, RN, LVN, licensed clinical laboratory scientist, licensed clinical laboratory bioanalyst, certified paramedic, or licensed physician assistant). Phillips also established that a licensed physician had not approved the policies and procedures that Ramos followed; a qualified person had not verified Ramos’ competency to draw blood for alcohol testing before she was first allowed to do so without direct supervision; a qualified person had not reviewed Ramos’ work at least once a month; and no qualified individual was accessible for consultation within 30 minutes.The hearing officer rejected Phillips’ arguments and ordered the suspension of Phillips’ driving privilege. The court of appeal affirmed. While Phillips rebutted the presumption that the blood test was properly performed, the evidence established the reliability of the manner of collection of Phillips’ blood. View "Phillips v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Wiley was charged with kidnapping and making a criminal threat. Wiley pled guilty to the criminal threat charge. The court imposed the upper term (three years) but suspended the execution of the sentence and placed Wiley on probation with a condition that Wiley obey all laws. Wiley was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a billy club, and possession of a stun gun by a felon. The information alleged Wiley had sustained a prior serious felony conviction, a strike, his criminal threat conviction. Wiley pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court dismissed the other counts and the prior conviction allegation and found that Wiley had violated his probation in the criminal threat case.The court imposed a three-year upper term for the criminal threat conviction and a consecutive eight months (one-third the midterm) for the firearm possession conviction. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court erred under federal and state law by selecting the upper term, relying in part on aggravating factors—the increasing seriousness of Wiley’s convictions and his poor performance on probation—that were not admitted by Wiley or found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts were proved by a certified record of Wiley’s convictions, and fall within the prior conviction exception to the heightened proof requirements. View "People v. Wiley" on Justia Law