Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Francisco Carlos Ibarra was convicted by a jury of the attempted murders of A.U. and R.M., and two counts of attempted robbery. The incident occurred on a rural property used for illegal marijuana cultivation, where Ibarra and others, wearing black clothes and ski masks, fired multiple shots into a shed where A.U. and R.M. were hiding. A.U. was severely injured, and R.M. was shot in the back. Ibarra was sentenced to a total of six years plus an indeterminate sentence of 14 years to life.The Superior Court of Riverside County found Ibarra guilty on all counts and imposed consecutive sentences for the attempted murders and robberies. Ibarra appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the "kill zone" theory of attempted murder, failing to instruct on self-defense or imperfect self-defense, and imposing consecutive sentences.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court agreed that the evidence did not support the "kill zone" instruction for the attempted murder of R.M., as there was no evidence Ibarra knew R.M. was present in the shed. Consequently, the conviction for the attempted murder of R.M. was reversed, and the case was remanded for a potential retrial on that count. The court found no error in the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on self-defense or imperfect self-defense, as there was insufficient evidence to support these defenses. Additionally, the court upheld the imposition of consecutive sentences, concluding that the attempted murders were not incidental to the robberies and involved gratuitous violence.The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions for potential retrial and resentencing. View "People v. Ibarra" on Justia Law

James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also argued the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred in ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed the section 1170(d) resentencing provision despite amendments to related laws. The court also found that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and placing him outside juvenile court jurisdiction.The court declined to reverse the stay order, noting it would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes. The court presumed the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation would calculate Bagsby's custody credits correctly. View "People v. Bagsby" on Justia Law

The defendant, Santiago Gonzalo Canales, was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children, specifically his stepdaughter and niece, both under the age of 14 during the abuse. Canales's niece testified that he molested her from ages seven to 13, while his stepdaughter testified that he began molesting her when she was about 11, including vaginal penetration. Canales denied all allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Canales guilty on all counts, including multiple victim allegations, and sentenced him to 60 years to life in prison under the One Strike law. Canales appealed, challenging the jury instructions CALCRIM No. 1120 and CALCRIM No. 252, arguing they were incorrect and misleading. He also claimed a third challenge was forfeited and agreed with the prosecution on the need for resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court upheld the use of CALCRIM No. 1120, finding it properly reflected the statutory requirements and did not need a heightened mental state for "substantial sexual conduct." The court acknowledged an error in CALCRIM No. 252 but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of Canales's guilt. The court also noted that the terms "general intent" and "specific intent" are outdated and suggested future instructions avoid these terms.The court agreed with Canales and the prosecution that the sentence must be vacated due to an ex post facto violation, as the One Strike law did not apply to the stepdaughter's abuse before 2006. The court affirmed Canales's convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

Fahim Anthony Multani appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Multani, diagnosed with stage IV lung cancer in 2014, had his cancer metastasize to his brain by 2017. Despite this, his cancer, caused by a specific gene mutation, has been successfully treated with targeted medication for seven years, showing no evidence of disease progression. Multani argued that his illness should qualify as having an "end-of-life trajectory" under the statute, making him eligible for compassionate release.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Multani’s petition, concluding that his illness did not currently have an end-of-life trajectory. The court noted that while Multani’s cancer is incurable, it is perfectly suppressed with no active disease, and thus does not meet the statutory requirement of progressing toward death.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the term "end-of-life trajectory" requires the illness to be actively progressing toward death, not merely incurable. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Multani’s cancer, while serious and advanced, is not currently progressing toward death due to effective treatment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the petition for compassionate release. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, indicating that Multani could file another petition if his condition worsens in the future. View "People v. Multani" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Fredi Analberto Lopez-Flores and Christian Alejandro May Quintero, were convicted of multiple sex crimes, including forcible rape, sodomy, and oral copulation in concert, after they abducted an inebriated woman, Jane Doe, from the streets of San Francisco, drove her 50 miles away, and assaulted her. The prosecution used terms like "monsters" and "predators" during closing arguments, which the defendants later claimed violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) and constituted prosecutorial misconduct.In the lower court, the jury found both defendants guilty on all counts. Lopez-Flores was also found to have a prior conviction, which was considered during sentencing. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (d), finding that the offenses occurred on separate occasions. The court also stated that even if this finding was incorrect, it would impose consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c), based on the nature of the crimes and aggravating factors.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the prosecution's use of the terms "monsters" and "predators" did not violate the RJA, as these terms were race-neutral and based on the defendants' conduct. The court also found no prosecutorial misconduct, determining that the comments were within the permissible range of descriptive commentary based on the evidence. The court held that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c), and any potential error under subdivision (d) was harmless because the court provided adequate reasons for its discretionary decision. The judgments were affirmed. View "P. v. Quintero" on Justia Law

Angel Garcia and Armando Alvarado, members of the Logan Red Steps gang in San Diego, were convicted by a jury of murdering Eduardo S., attempting to murder Ruben T., and committing robbery. Alvarado was also found guilty of shooting at an occupied structure, and Garcia of an additional robbery. The jury found true various firearm allegations and a robbery murder special circumstance. The trial court sentenced both to life without parole for the murder and special circumstance.The Superior Court of San Diego County admitted gang-related evidence despite bifurcating the gang enhancements. The court excluded evidence that Eduardo had stolen a BB gun and refused to instruct on lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Garcia argued cumulative errors required reversal, and both appellants claimed their sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Alvarado also contended errors regarding a firearm enhancement and concurrent sentencing for shooting at an occupied dwelling. The People conceded Alvarado was entitled to additional custody credit and correction of the abstract of judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting gang-related evidence, which was more prejudicial than probative and not relevant to proving the substantive crimes. The court concluded this error likely influenced the jury's verdict, particularly affecting the credibility contest between Ruben and Alvarado. Consequently, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address the instructional error claims, as they were moot given the reversal of the convictions. View "P. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Jason Robert Hodge filed a notice of appeal from a trial court order denying two requests for relief: a motion under the Racial Justice Act and a request for resentencing under section 1172.1. Hodge had pleaded no contest in 2012 to three felony counts of battery and assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 21 years. On January 5, 2024, Hodge filed a motion for relief due to discrimination and a request for recall of sentence and resentencing. The trial court denied both requests in a single order dated February 6, 2024.The trial court declined to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence under section 1172.1. Hodge appealed, and appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo, raising no arguable issues. Hodge filed his own supplemental brief but did not address the issue of appealability. The appellate court requested briefing on the appealability of the trial court’s denial of Hodge’s request for resentencing in light of People v. Loper. The parties subsequently briefed the issue.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, concluded that neither component of the trial court’s order was appealable. The court held that the trial court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence did not affect Hodge’s substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the trial court had no statutory obligation to act on Hodge’s request. Additionally, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Hodge’s motion under the Racial Justice Act, as incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final may only raise claims under that act in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "P. v. Hodge" on Justia Law

A Black man, known for his career in the NFL, was accused by an intellectually disabled woman of raping her at gunpoint during a babysitting job interview at his home. The jury found him guilty of forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and false imprisonment, with firearm use in the first two offenses. He was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. The prosecution argued that the police did not search his house due to his fame and race, suggesting a search would have caused controversy.The trial began in March 2020 but was paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic, resuming three months later. The jury acquitted him on two counts related to the victim's incapacity to consent. The trial court sentenced him in October 2020. The defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecution's statements violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 by appealing to racial bias.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the prosecution violated the Racial Justice Act by explicitly asserting that the defendant's race influenced the police's decision not to search his house, implying he gained an undeserved advantage at trial because he was Black. The court concluded that the prosecution's statements constituted racially discriminatory language under Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a)(2). The court held that Penal Code section 745, subdivision (e)(2)(A) precludes harmless error analysis and mandates vacating the conviction and sentence. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded for new proceedings consistent with the Racial Justice Act. View "P. v. Stubblefield" on Justia Law

Fredy Cordero Gudiel, a member of the West Side Locos gang, was convicted of second-degree murder for his involvement in the 2004 killing of William Maldonado, a member of the rival Toonerville gang. Gudiel, along with fellow gang members William Torres and Pedro Pena, attacked Maldonado after confronting him in Toonerville territory. During the attack, Pena and Torres struck Maldonado with bats, and Gudiel punched, kicked, and threw a bicycle at him. Maldonado sustained severe head injuries and died four days later from blunt head trauma.In 2007, a jury convicted Gudiel of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. Gudiel's conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 2022, Gudiel filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that he could not be convicted of murder under the amended laws. The trial court appointed counsel, and after a series of hearings, the court held an evidentiary hearing in May 2023.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's denial of Gudiel's petition for resentencing. The court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Gudiel aided and abetted an implied malice murder. The court determined that Gudiel knew his co-defendants intended to commit a life-endangering act, intended to aid them, and acted with conscious disregard for human life. The court rejected Gudiel's argument that the trial court should have applied the "reckless indifference to human life" standard, noting that it is distinct from the "conscious disregard for human life" standard required for implied malice second-degree murder. View "P. v. Gudiel" on Justia Law

Luis Mendez was charged with two misdemeanors in one case and several felonies and a misdemeanor in a separate case. The trial court found him mentally incompetent and suspended criminal proceedings in both cases. After determining that Mendez's mental competency was restored, the court reinstated all charges and denied Mendez's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor case under Penal Code section 1370.01.The Superior Court of Orange County initially suspended criminal proceedings in both cases and committed Mendez to the State Department of State Hospitals. Mendez's counsel moved to dismiss the misdemeanor charges, arguing that section 1370.01 applied, which does not provide for restoring competency in misdemeanor cases. The trial court denied the motion, stating that section 1370 applied because Mendez was charged with felonies, and reinstated criminal proceedings after finding Mendez competent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1370 applies to a person charged with a felony, even if misdemeanors are charged in a separate document. The court interpreted section 1367(b) to mean that section 1370.01 applies only when a defendant is charged with misdemeanors and no felonies. Since Mendez was charged with felonies, section 1370 applied to all charges. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in applying section 1370, reinstating criminal proceedings, or denying the motion to dismiss. The petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition was denied. View "Mendez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law