Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Dewayne Keith Parker faced criminal charges in both Fresno and Napa counties, including murder, burglary, and assault. He was found incompetent to stand trial in Fresno County and admitted to Napa State Hospital. While hospitalized, Parker allegedly assaulted another patient, leading to new charges in Napa County. The Napa County Superior Court found him incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Department of State Hospitals. After Parker was restored to competency, he was discharged to Fresno County due to his primary commitment there. More than a year later, after being arrested on a Napa County bench warrant, Parker was returned to Napa County, where the court again found him incompetent to stand trial.The Napa County Superior Court held a restoration hearing and, relying on equitable tolling, paused the two-year maximum commitment period for Parker’s Napa County charges during the time he was involved in proceedings in Fresno County. Parker argued that this tolling was unauthorized by statute and violated his due process and equal protection rights. The court rejected these arguments, denied his request for release or conservatorship, and set a new commitment expiration date based on the tolled period.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, although the statutory scheme for competency commitments does not expressly address tolling, courts have inherent equitable powers to pause the running of the commitment period when a defendant is unavailable due to proceedings in another jurisdiction. The court found that the delay caused by Parker’s simultaneous proceedings in Fresno County constituted good cause for tolling. The appellate court affirmed the Napa County Superior Court’s order, concluding that the tolling did not violate Parker’s constitutional rights. View "People v. Parker" on Justia Law

A man was charged in 2002 with multiple sexual offenses involving three minor males. In 2003, he entered a plea agreement, pleading no contest to several counts of committing lewd acts on children aged 14 or 15 and one count of oral copulation with a victim under 16, which was amended from a charge of forcible oral copulation to a nonforcible offense. He did not admit to using force or violence in his plea, but the factual basis for the plea referenced police reports describing acts involving force. He was sentenced to state prison in accordance with the plea agreement.In 2005, two psychologists evaluated him for commitment as a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) under California Penal Code section 2962. A chief forensic psychiatrist certified that he met the criteria, including having committed a crime involving force or violence, based on documentary evidence such as probation and police reports. The Board of Parole Hearings affirmed the certification. He did not challenge the certification in superior court at that time. He remained in custody under annual recommitment petitions, and his only prior challenge was an unsuccessful appeal of a 2022 recommitment order.After that, he filed a habeas corpus petition in Fresno County Superior Court in 2023, arguing that his conviction did not qualify as an MDO offense and that reliance on hearsay in the probation report violated his constitutional rights. The superior court denied the petition, finding the probation report admissible and sufficient to establish use of force.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that a habeas corpus petition is a proper vehicle to challenge an initial MDO certification based on static factors, even years later. The court found that the evidence was sufficient under the law at the time of certification, and that subsequent changes in evidentiary standards were not retroactive. The court also found no ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Grinder" on Justia Law

In December 2007, the defendant participated in a gang-related shooting in which he, along with two other gang members, drove into rival territory. The defendant, seated in the back of the car, rolled down his window, confronted a rival gang member, exited the vehicle, and fired multiple shots, injuring the victim but not fatally. After the incident, the driver, an uninvolved high school student, reported the shooting to authorities. The defendant later admitted to being the shooter.The Orange County District Attorney charged the defendant and his codefendants with attempted murder, street terrorism, and related enhancements. In 2011, the defendant pleaded guilty and received a negotiated 19-year sentence. One codefendant went to trial and was convicted by a jury of the same charges and enhancements. In 2022, the defendant filed a petition under Penal Code section 1172.6 to vacate his attempted murder conviction and be resentenced, arguing that changes in the law regarding accomplice liability applied to his case. At the evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court of Orange County admitted transcripts from the codefendant’s trial over the defendant’s objection and denied the petition, finding the defendant was the actual shooter and thus ineligible for relief.On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting evidence from a trial in which he was not a party. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that Penal Code section 1172.6(d)(3) allows the admission of evidence from any prior hearing or trial, so long as it is admissible under current law, regardless of whether the petitioner was a party to that proceeding. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition. View "P. v. Ramos" on Justia Law

A registered nurse was convicted by a jury of misdemeanor elder or dependent adult abuse for her role in the care of a 62-year-old dependent adult, Michael H., at an unlicensed boarding house in Riverside, California. The facility, Secure Hands, was not authorized to provide medical care and was intended for residents who could manage their own daily activities. However, Michael, who had recently suffered a stroke and had significant physical and mental limitations, was admitted to the facility under the nurse’s assessment and supervision. The nurse determined his care needs, recommended equipment, and was responsible for ensuring that appropriate caregivers were available. Despite knowing the facility was not equipped for dependent adults, she admitted Michael and did not report or address ongoing concerns about his care, including poor hygiene and lack of basic necessities, which were repeatedly brought to her attention.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially charged the nurse with four counts of felony elder or dependent adult abuse, but one count was dismissed before trial. The jury deadlocked on two counts, resulting in a mistrial for those, but found her guilty of the lesser included misdemeanor offense regarding Michael. She was sentenced to four months in county jail and fined $1,000.On appeal, the nurse argued that the definition of “care or custody” from the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act should apply to her criminal prosecution, and that there was insufficient evidence she had such responsibility. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, rejected this argument, holding that “care or custody” in Penal Code section 368(c) should be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning, not the more restrictive civil definition. The court found substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict and affirmed the conviction. View "P. v Molina" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant was charged with murder and released on a $1 million bail bond posted by United States Fire Insurance Company. After his release, the defendant appeared at several hearings, sometimes personally and sometimes through his attorney under a Penal Code section 977 waiver, which allows a defendant to be represented by counsel at certain proceedings. On March 15, 2022, the court ordered the defendant to return for all future hearing dates and continued the bond. On April 26, 2022, the defendant’s attorney appeared on his behalf, and the court ordered the defendant to be personally present at the next hearing. The defendant failed to appear on May 18, 2022, citing illness, and again on June 2, 2022, at which point the court vacated the trial date, forfeited the bond, and sent notice to the surety.United filed a motion in the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond, arguing that the court should have forfeited the bond on April 26, 2022, when the defendant first failed to appear without sufficient excuse, and that the June 2 forfeiture was void for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion. After summary judgment was entered against United, it filed a motion to set aside the judgment, again arguing lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied this motion, finding the issue barred by res judicata.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the denial of the motion to set aside summary judgment. The court held that the trial court was not divested of jurisdiction to forfeit the bail bond on June 2, 2022, because the defendant was not required to personally appear on April 26, 2022, and his appearance through counsel was valid under section 977. The order denying the motion to set aside summary judgment was affirmed. View "People v. United States Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A man was accused by his young daughter of repeated sexual abuse when she was five years old, including acts of oral copulation. The daughter delayed reporting the abuse due to emotional attachment to her father and fear of family disruption. After eventually disclosing the abuse to her mother, law enforcement was notified. The defendant denied the allegations, suggesting another individual may have been responsible during a trip abroad.The Superior Court of San Diego County conducted a jury trial. The prosecution presented expert testimony from a social worker to address common misconceptions about child sexual abuse, such as the prevalence of abuse by known individuals and the reasons for delayed disclosure by victims. The expert did not opine on the truthfulness of the specific allegations. The jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of oral copulation of a child 10 years old or younger and acquitted him of other charges. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 15 years to life.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of expert testimony, that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to certain expert statements, and that cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. The appellate court reviewed the instructional claim de novo and found the jury was properly instructed on the limited use of the expert’s testimony. The court also held that the expert’s statistical testimony was admissible to counter common misconceptions and did not constitute improper vouching. Finding no instructional error or ineffective assistance, the court rejected the cumulative error claim and affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Page" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old committed a violent home invasion, during which he sexually assaulted his former neighbor at knifepoint. He was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses, including rape, sodomy, oral copulation, robbery, burglary, and related enhancements. The original sentence was a combination of determinate and indeterminate terms, ultimately resulting in a total sentence of 44 years to life in prison, with parole eligibility at age 60 after a later modification.After serving more than 15 years, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Tulare County for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and that excluding him from resentencing relief violated equal protection principles. The trial court denied the petition, finding that his sentence was not functionally equivalent to LWOP and that, under People v. Heard, he was not eligible for relief.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, considered whether the functional equivalency analysis from People v. Contreras, which is rooted in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, should apply to equal protection challenges under section 1170(d). The court declined to import the Eighth Amendment standard, instead applying a rational basis review as articulated in recent California Supreme Court decisions. The court held that the Legislature could rationally distinguish between juveniles sentenced to explicit LWOP and those, like the appellant, sentenced to lengthy terms with parole eligibility within their expected lifetimes. The court concluded that section 1170(d)’s limitation to LWOP sentences does not violate equal protection as applied to a 44-years-to-life sentence. The trial court’s denial of the petition was affirmed. View "People v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant charged with several sex offenses who asserted his right to a speedy trial. The prosecution sought multiple continuances, arguing that the assigned prosecutor was unavailable due to involvement in another sex offense trial (the Lopez Perez case). However, at the time the continuances were granted, the judge assigned to the Lopez Perez case was still engaged in a different trial and was not available to begin the Lopez Perez trial to conclusion. The defendant objected to the continuances and later moved to dismiss the charges, claiming his statutory speedy trial rights were violated.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted the prosecution’s requests for continuances under Penal Code section 1050(g)(2), finding that the prosecutor’s involvement in the Lopez Perez case constituted good cause. The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the prosecutor was engaged in another trial “in progress” as required by the statute.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that, under the standard articulated in Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817, a trial is “in progress” for purposes of section 1050(g)(2) only if the judge is available and ready to try the case to conclusion, the court has committed its resources, and the parties are ready to proceed. The appellate court found that, at the time of the continuances, the Lopez Perez trial was not “in progress” because the assigned judge was not available to try the case to conclusion. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the continuances and in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The appellate court issued a writ directing the superior court to vacate its order denying dismissal and to grant the motion to dismiss. View "Hernandez v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In 1996, the defendant broke into a home, raped a woman at knifepoint, and carried a child at knifepoint while stealing a firearm and ammunition. He was charged with multiple offenses, including kidnapping to commit robbery and, later, a one-strike rape allegation. After a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury and the emergence of DNA evidence linking him to the crime, the defendant pled guilty in 1998 to several charges under a plea agreement. The plea resulted in the dismissal of the rape charge and the one-strike allegation, and the kidnapping charge was amended. He was sentenced to a determinate prison term, which was later reduced.In 2024, the defendant, who is ethnically Samoan, filed a motion in the Superior Court of Riverside County seeking discovery under the Racial Justice Act (RJA). He argued that the addition of the one-strike allegation before trial was racially motivated, citing a different case involving a white defendant who was not similarly charged. He requested records of comparable cases, including defendants’ races and charges. The People opposed, arguing that the plea negotiations were driven by DNA evidence, not the added charge, and that the comparison case was not analogous. The trial court granted the discovery motion but limited the scope of the records to be produced.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that the defendant failed to establish good cause for discovery under the RJA because his factual scenario was not plausible in light of the record, the comparison case did not support an inference of racial disparity, and statewide incarceration statistics did not provide specific facts of misconduct in his case. The court granted the writ, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting discovery and to deny the motion. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Lalo)" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who participated in a home invasion robbery during which he and several accomplices entered a residence, brandished firearms, assaulted the inhabitants, and stole valuables. During their escape, a gun battle erupted between the intruders and a neighbor, resulting in the death of one of the defendant’s accomplices. The identity of the shooter who killed the accomplice was never determined. The defendant was later identified by a victim and arrested after driving the wounded accomplice to the hospital.Following a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold the defendant to answer for murder under a provocative act theory, as well as for other related charges. The defendant subsequently pleaded no contest to first degree murder, and the court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison. In 2022, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law rendered him ineligible for a murder conviction under the theory applied in his case. The superior court issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately denying the petition after finding the defendant was convicted under a still-valid provocative act murder theory.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the defendant made a prima facie case for resentencing relief. The court held that because the defendant was convicted after the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Concha, which requires a personal finding of malice for provocative act murder, and because this theory remains valid under current law, the defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The appellate court affirmed the superior court’s denial of the resentencing petition. View "People v. Venancio" on Justia Law