Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A man was accused by his young daughter of repeated sexual abuse when she was five years old, including acts of oral copulation. The daughter delayed reporting the abuse due to emotional attachment to her father and fear of family disruption. After eventually disclosing the abuse to her mother, law enforcement was notified. The defendant denied the allegations, suggesting another individual may have been responsible during a trip abroad.The Superior Court of San Diego County conducted a jury trial. The prosecution presented expert testimony from a social worker to address common misconceptions about child sexual abuse, such as the prevalence of abuse by known individuals and the reasons for delayed disclosure by victims. The expert did not opine on the truthfulness of the specific allegations. The jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of oral copulation of a child 10 years old or younger and acquitted him of other charges. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 15 years to life.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of expert testimony, that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to certain expert statements, and that cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. The appellate court reviewed the instructional claim de novo and found the jury was properly instructed on the limited use of the expert’s testimony. The court also held that the expert’s statistical testimony was admissible to counter common misconceptions and did not constitute improper vouching. Finding no instructional error or ineffective assistance, the court rejected the cumulative error claim and affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Page" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old committed a violent home invasion, during which he sexually assaulted his former neighbor at knifepoint. He was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses, including rape, sodomy, oral copulation, robbery, burglary, and related enhancements. The original sentence was a combination of determinate and indeterminate terms, ultimately resulting in a total sentence of 44 years to life in prison, with parole eligibility at age 60 after a later modification.After serving more than 15 years, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Tulare County for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and that excluding him from resentencing relief violated equal protection principles. The trial court denied the petition, finding that his sentence was not functionally equivalent to LWOP and that, under People v. Heard, he was not eligible for relief.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, considered whether the functional equivalency analysis from People v. Contreras, which is rooted in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, should apply to equal protection challenges under section 1170(d). The court declined to import the Eighth Amendment standard, instead applying a rational basis review as articulated in recent California Supreme Court decisions. The court held that the Legislature could rationally distinguish between juveniles sentenced to explicit LWOP and those, like the appellant, sentenced to lengthy terms with parole eligibility within their expected lifetimes. The court concluded that section 1170(d)’s limitation to LWOP sentences does not violate equal protection as applied to a 44-years-to-life sentence. The trial court’s denial of the petition was affirmed. View "People v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant charged with several sex offenses who asserted his right to a speedy trial. The prosecution sought multiple continuances, arguing that the assigned prosecutor was unavailable due to involvement in another sex offense trial (the Lopez Perez case). However, at the time the continuances were granted, the judge assigned to the Lopez Perez case was still engaged in a different trial and was not available to begin the Lopez Perez trial to conclusion. The defendant objected to the continuances and later moved to dismiss the charges, claiming his statutory speedy trial rights were violated.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted the prosecution’s requests for continuances under Penal Code section 1050(g)(2), finding that the prosecutor’s involvement in the Lopez Perez case constituted good cause. The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the prosecutor was engaged in another trial “in progress” as required by the statute.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that, under the standard articulated in Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817, a trial is “in progress” for purposes of section 1050(g)(2) only if the judge is available and ready to try the case to conclusion, the court has committed its resources, and the parties are ready to proceed. The appellate court found that, at the time of the continuances, the Lopez Perez trial was not “in progress” because the assigned judge was not available to try the case to conclusion. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the continuances and in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The appellate court issued a writ directing the superior court to vacate its order denying dismissal and to grant the motion to dismiss. View "Hernandez v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In 1996, the defendant broke into a home, raped a woman at knifepoint, and carried a child at knifepoint while stealing a firearm and ammunition. He was charged with multiple offenses, including kidnapping to commit robbery and, later, a one-strike rape allegation. After a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury and the emergence of DNA evidence linking him to the crime, the defendant pled guilty in 1998 to several charges under a plea agreement. The plea resulted in the dismissal of the rape charge and the one-strike allegation, and the kidnapping charge was amended. He was sentenced to a determinate prison term, which was later reduced.In 2024, the defendant, who is ethnically Samoan, filed a motion in the Superior Court of Riverside County seeking discovery under the Racial Justice Act (RJA). He argued that the addition of the one-strike allegation before trial was racially motivated, citing a different case involving a white defendant who was not similarly charged. He requested records of comparable cases, including defendants’ races and charges. The People opposed, arguing that the plea negotiations were driven by DNA evidence, not the added charge, and that the comparison case was not analogous. The trial court granted the discovery motion but limited the scope of the records to be produced.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that the defendant failed to establish good cause for discovery under the RJA because his factual scenario was not plausible in light of the record, the comparison case did not support an inference of racial disparity, and statewide incarceration statistics did not provide specific facts of misconduct in his case. The court granted the writ, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting discovery and to deny the motion. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Lalo)" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who participated in a home invasion robbery during which he and several accomplices entered a residence, brandished firearms, assaulted the inhabitants, and stole valuables. During their escape, a gun battle erupted between the intruders and a neighbor, resulting in the death of one of the defendant’s accomplices. The identity of the shooter who killed the accomplice was never determined. The defendant was later identified by a victim and arrested after driving the wounded accomplice to the hospital.Following a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold the defendant to answer for murder under a provocative act theory, as well as for other related charges. The defendant subsequently pleaded no contest to first degree murder, and the court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison. In 2022, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law rendered him ineligible for a murder conviction under the theory applied in his case. The superior court issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately denying the petition after finding the defendant was convicted under a still-valid provocative act murder theory.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the defendant made a prima facie case for resentencing relief. The court held that because the defendant was convicted after the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Concha, which requires a personal finding of malice for provocative act murder, and because this theory remains valid under current law, the defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The appellate court affirmed the superior court’s denial of the resentencing petition. View "People v. Venancio" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence in Riverside County, California, and sought pretrial military diversion under Penal Code section 1001.80. He had served five months of active duty in the United States Marine Corps and several years in the reserves. The trial court denied his request, finding him ineligible because he had not completed at least one year of active service or one day of combat, relying on a local Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and its interpretation of legislative intent.The defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate in the Appellate Division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The People conceded that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not require a minimum of one year of service. The Appellate Division agreed, holding that the statute contains no such time requirement and remanded for the trial court to reconsider eligibility. The Appellate Division also clarified that, even if eligible, a defendant is not automatically entitled to diversion; the trial court retains discretion to assess suitability for diversion, guided by the statute’s rehabilitative purpose.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, then transferred the case for review. The court held that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not impose a minimum service duration for eligibility for military diversion, and the MOU’s one-year requirement does not apply to diversion under this statute. The court further held that trial courts must first determine eligibility under the statute and then exercise discretion to assess suitability for diversion, considering factors consistent with the statute’s rehabilitative goals. The court issued a writ directing the superior court to vacate its denial and conduct further proceedings consistent with these principles. View "Angulo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Yvette Renee Garcia was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and two counts related to driving under the influence of alcohol, following an incident in which she, while intoxicated, deliberately rammed her car into another vehicle during an argument. A breath test showed her blood-alcohol concentration was between .22 and .24. The charges stemmed from a single course of conduct.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Garcia’s request for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, finding her ineligible due to the DUI charges. Garcia then pleaded no contest to the assault and one DUI count, while the other DUI count was dismissed. The court imposed three years of formal probation for both the assault and DUI convictions, with additional conditions including community labor and jail time already served. Garcia appealed, and the trial court issued a certificate of probable cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that Vehicle Code section 23640 bars diversion in any case where a defendant is charged with a DUI offense, regardless of whether other non-DUI charges are included in the same case. The court rejected Garcia’s argument that she should be eligible for diversion on the assault charge, since all charges arose from a single incident and were prosecuted together. The court also found that the probation term for the assault charge exceeded the statutory maximum and modified it from three years to two years, while affirming the judgment as modified. The trial court was directed to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Carlos Mendoza was charged with second degree robbery and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, along with related enhancements, following an incident in San Francisco. At his arraignment on the original felony complaint, Mendoza pled not guilty and waived his right to a preliminary hearing within 10 court days, but did not waive his right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days. Shortly before the expiration of the 60-day period, the prosecution moved to amend the complaint to add gang-related allegations and a new count for participation in a criminal street gang, based on recent discovery. Mendoza was arraigned and pled not guilty to the amended complaint, but did not waive the 60-day time limit.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco permitted the amendment and recalculated the statutory time limits, treating the arraignment on the amended complaint as restarting the 60-day period for holding a preliminary hearing. Mendoza’s counsel objected, arguing the preliminary hearing should occur within 60 days of the original arraignment. The trial court denied motions to dismiss based on violation of the 60-day limit, holding that material amendments to the complaint could restart the statutory period unless prompted by improper purpose. After the preliminary hearing, Mendoza was held to answer, and subsequent motions to dismiss were denied.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed Mendoza’s petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. Although the underlying criminal case was dismissed as moot, the appellate court exercised its discretion to resolve the legal question. The court held that, absent a personal waiver by the defendant, an arraignment or plea on an amended complaint does not restart the 60-day period for holding a preliminary hearing under Penal Code section 859b. The statutory 60-day limit is absolute, and its purpose is to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy preliminary hearing. The petition was dismissed as moot. View "Mendoza v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a Los Angeles County jury in 2000 of eight counts of first-degree special-circumstance murder and numerous other violent crimes, with firearm and gang enhancements found true. He received eight death sentences and a noncapital sentence exceeding 100 years to life, to be served consecutively. While his automatic appeal from the capital judgment was pending before the California Supreme Court, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified him as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which retroactively invalidates certain prior prison term enhancements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County set the matter for possible resentencing, appointed counsel, and held several hearings in the defendant’s absence. At the hearing, defense counsel requested the court strike the now-invalidated enhancement and conduct a holistic resentencing, including consideration of the Racial Justice Act and reassessment of the death sentences. The trial court declined to resentence, finding it lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence while the direct appeal was pending before the California Supreme Court, and denied the motion without prejudice to revisiting the issue after the Supreme Court’s decision.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that, under California law, the filing of a notice of appeal in a capital case vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the California Supreme Court over the entire judgment, including both capital and noncapital convictions and sentences. The court concluded that Penal Code section 1172.75 does not create an exception allowing trial courts to resentence defendants in capital cases while a direct appeal is pending. The appellate court also found no prejudicial error in holding the resentencing hearing in the defendant’s absence. The postjudgment order denying resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Millsap" on Justia Law

Daniel Orozco was involved in a drive-by shooting in Los Angeles, where he and three other members or associates of the Varrio Norwalk gang entered rival Chivas gang territory. During two separate incidents about twenty minutes apart, a shooter in Orozco’s car used Orozco’s gun to wound one man and kill another, who was not a gang member. Police quickly connected the car to Orozco, found the group at his home, and recovered the weapon and other evidence. Orozco was arrested along with the others. At trial, Orozco’s defense centered on his alleged intoxication, arguing he was too drunk to form criminal intent.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate suppressed a confession by the shooter, Martinez Garibo, due to a Miranda violation. Despite this, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold Orozco to answer for murder and attempted murder, but not for conspiracy to commit murder, as there was no evidence of an agreement to kill. On the day of trial, the prosecution moved to add a conspiracy charge, which the trial court allowed over Orozco’s objection. The jury convicted Orozco of all three charges, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms for murder and attempted murder, with a stayed sentence for conspiracy.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the conspiracy conviction must be reversed because the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support that charge, and Orozco was not given proper notice. The court affirmed the convictions for murder and attempted murder, finding no merit in Orozco’s other arguments, including ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged prosecutorial error. The court also held that Orozco forfeited his challenge to the attempted murder sentence by failing to object and having adequate notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "People v. Orozco" on Justia Law