Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1998, a jury convicted Travis Scott Frederickson of two counts of first-degree murder, found that he personally used a firearm, and found true a special circumstance of multiple murder. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Following changes in California law that gave courts discretion to strike certain firearm enhancements, Frederickson petitioned for resentencing. In 2024, Frederickson asked the Superior Court of Orange County to recall his sentence and resentence him under the amended law. The prosecution agreed that the court could resentence as to the firearm enhancement, but argued that the court could not take any action that would effectively strike or dismiss the special circumstance finding.The Superior Court, however, reduced Frederickson’s convictions from first-degree to second-degree murder and imposed sentences on those lesser charges, including firearm enhancements. The trial court explicitly stated it was not striking or dismissing the special circumstance findings, but rather vacating the first-degree murder convictions; since the special circumstance only attaches to first-degree murder, it no longer applied once those convictions were vacated. The court entered new judgments for second-degree murder and imposed sentences accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not violate Penal Code section 1385.1—which prohibits judges from striking or dismissing special circumstance findings—by vacating the first-degree murder convictions and resentencing on the lesser offenses under section 1172.1. The appellate court reasoned that when a conviction is validly vacated, the attached special circumstance falls away by operation of law, not by judicial action proscribed by section 1385.1. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Frederickson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with multiple counts, including murder and attempted murder, arising from an alleged retaliatory shooting involving the “Mongolian Boys Society” gang. He was originally arraigned on a felony complaint in February 2020 and entered a general time waiver for his preliminary hearing. In May 2021, the prosecution amended the complaint to change the nature of certain firearm enhancements; petitioner was arraigned on the amended complaint the same day and agreed to a limited time waiver for the preliminary hearing until August 16, 2021, plus ten court days. The preliminary hearing was ultimately delayed several times due to requests for continuances, discovery issues, and pandemic-related quarantine measures, despite petitioner’s repeated objections to further continuances.The Superior Court of Fresno County held the preliminary hearing in November 2021, outside the period covered by petitioner’s limited waiver on the amended complaint, and subsequently held petitioner to answer on all charges. After the information was filed and the prosecution indicated intent to seek the death penalty, petitioner moved to set aside the information, initially without raising the timeliness issue. Later, he supplemented his motion to argue that the delay violated his right to a speedy preliminary hearing under Penal Code section 859b. The superior court denied the motion. Petitioner then sought writ relief, which was initially denied by the California Court of Appeal, but the California Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider whether petitioner’s speedy preliminary hearing rights were violated.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that while general time waivers for preliminary hearings under section 859b are irrevocable, a new 60-day period commences upon arraignment on an amended complaint unless expressly waived. Because petitioner did not enter a general time waiver at the second arraignment, and the preliminary hearing was held beyond the statutory time limit, the court granted relief and ordered the information set aside and the complaint dismissed as to petitioner. View "Lee v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Anthony Seigler and his girlfriend, Katrina Fowles, were involved in two incidents in Lake County in early 2023. In the first, they called 911 reporting armed threats to their son and shots fired into their home; responders found Seigler had fired two shots through a bathroom wall while his son was present, but there was no evidence of an actual attack. Both appeared under the influence of drugs. In the second incident, Fowles’s mother reported a burglary at her home by Seigler and Fowles, and Seigler was found with stolen property. Seigler was charged in two separate cases: one for negligent discharge of a firearm, and another for burglary.The Lake County Superior Court repeatedly continued trial dates over several months for reasons including the need for witness availability, discovery issues, and defense counsel’s request for a mental health evaluation of Seigler due to concerns about his mental state and substance abuse. Despite counsel’s continued difficulty communicating with Seigler and attempts to secure a mental health evaluation, such evaluation was never performed. On the day of trial, defense counsel moved for a continuance and filed an application for mental health diversion. The trial court denied both, finding them untimely and inadequately noticed, and proceeded toward trial. Seigler then entered no contest pleas to both charges and was placed on probation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the continuance, particularly given indications that Seigler’s mental health and substance abuse were significant factors and the statutory right to seek diversion before trial or plea. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded, directing that Seigler be given a reasonable opportunity to apply for mental health diversion and, if granted and completed, for dismissal of charges; if not, the judgment would be reinstated. View "People v. Seigler" on Justia Law

One evening, a group of friends gathered at an apartment, where alcohol and marijuana were consumed. Among them was A.S., who became highly intoxicated and passed out on a couch. Later, Ruben Paramo Gallardo, who was also present, was observed by another friend, D.L., on top of A.S., appearing to penetrate her while she was unconscious. D.L. intervened and called the police. A.S. later underwent a medical exam that documented various injuries and found Gallardo’s DNA on her body. At trial, Gallardo testified that the sexual contact was consensual and that A.S. was awake, but this was contradicted by other evidence.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a jury found Gallardo guilty of two offenses: rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(4), and assault with intent to commit rape under section 220, subdivision (a)(1). The court sentenced him to four years for the assault count and stayed a concurrent three-year term for the rape count pursuant to section 654. Gallardo appealed, arguing that assault with intent to commit rape is a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person, and therefore his conviction for assault should be reversed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. Applying the statutory elements test, the court determined that assault with intent to commit rape requires proof of intent to use force, which is not an element of rape of an unconscious person. Therefore, assault with intent to commit rape is not a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Gallardo could properly be convicted of both offenses. View "People v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted in 2011 of felony possession of child pornography, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2015, he was convicted of failing to register a change of address, an offense classified as a felony because his registration requirement was based on his prior felony conviction. Years later, after his child pornography conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, he sought to have his 2015 failure to register conviction likewise reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, citing his rehabilitation, lack of subsequent offenses, and support from family and associates.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court had previously granted the defendant’s motion to reduce his 2011 conviction to a misdemeanor and dismissed that case. However, when the defendant petitioned to reduce and dismiss his 2015 felony registration offense, the court denied the motion, finding that the offense was a straight felony, not a wobbler, and that it was not appropriate to dismiss the case. The defendant appealed, arguing that the later reduction of his underlying offense should retroactively affect the status of his 2015 conviction, or that the court should have exercised discretion to reduce or dismiss it in the interest of justice.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the 2015 failure to register conviction was a straight felony under Penal Code section 290.018(b), and not subject to reduction under Penal Code section 17(b), which only applies to wobblers. The reduction of the underlying 2011 offense did not retroactively convert the 2015 conviction to a misdemeanor. The court also found no substantive due process violation, as the legislative scheme had a rational basis. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4. View "People v. Woodward" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Geovanni Quijadas Silva, and North River Insurance Company posted a $100,000 bail bond for his release. Silva failed to appear at a required court hearing, leading the Superior Court of Santa Clara County to declare the bond forfeited and begin the statutory appearance period during which the bail company could either produce Silva or demonstrate why forfeiture should be set aside. North River requested and was granted two extensions of this period. On the final day, North River moved to vacate the forfeiture, claiming Silva was located and detained in Mexico, and requested either exoneration of the bond or a tolling/continuance to allow time for extradition. The prosecution did not timely decide whether to pursue extradition and opposed the motion, arguing that no obligation existed for it to decide within the appearance period.The Superior Court denied North River’s motion to vacate or continue, finding that the prosecution was not required to decide on extradition by the end of the appearance period and that the motion was untimely. Judgment was entered against North River, which appealed. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed, but later reversed and remanded, concluding that the lower court should have either required a prosecution decision on extradition or granted a continuance.The Supreme Court of California subsequently held that Penal Code section 1305 does not authorize trial courts to compel prosecutors to make extradition decisions or require a continuance solely for that purpose. However, the Supreme Court did not address whether courts may, for good cause, extend time for extradition decisions by continuing the hearing on the motion to vacate. On remand, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, adopted the concurring analysis that trial courts have discretion to grant limited continuances for good cause to allow extradition decisions. The case was remanded for the trial court to exercise this discretion in accordance with that interpretation. View "People v. The North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 2001 of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence that included enhancements for firearm use and gang involvement, resulting in a total sentence of 42 years to life. On direct appeal in 2003, the gang enhancement was stricken, and his sentence was reduced to 32 years to life. Years later, the defendant filed several petitions for resentencing, arguing that he was improperly sentenced due to changes in the law and because he was not the actual shooter. The trial court eventually acknowledged that the defendant was serving a longer sentence than he should have, as he was not eligible for the firearm enhancement once the gang enhancement was stricken, but believed it lacked the authority to correct the sentence absent a habeas corpus petition or a request from the district attorney or the Department of Corrections.The Los Angeles County Superior Court repeatedly denied the defendant’s requests for resentencing, finding either that he failed to make a prima facie case under the applicable statutes or that the court lacked jurisdiction to correct the sentence. Although the trial court recognized a sentencing error, it maintained that procedural limitations prevented it from acting unless prompted by a specific type of petition or an external agency.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, held that the trial court did have the authority to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, regardless of procedural posture or the form of the defendant’s petition. The appellate court concluded that the unauthorized sentence doctrine is an exception to the usual statutory restrictions and time limits, and it reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to hold a prompt resentencing hearing and correct the sentence if it is found to be unauthorized. View "P. v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of felony driving under the influence causing injury, with a prior DUI conviction, after causing a crash that injured another person. As part of her plea agreement, the defendant was ordered to serve jail time, complete probation and an alcohol program, and pay over $78,000 in restitution to the victim. After successfully completing her probation, she petitioned the trial court to expunge her conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4 and to reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17. At the time of her petition, she had paid only a small portion of the restitution, explaining that job and license loss hampered her ability to pay, and that relief would help her restore her employment and ability to pay.The Superior Court of Napa County denied both requests, emphasizing the limited amount of restitution paid as a principal reason for denial, along with the defendant’s prior DUI and delays in completing her alcohol program. The trial court suggested that a more substantial restitution payment might warrant a different result in the future. The People argued that unpaid restitution could be considered among other factors in denying relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the statutory language and legislative history of sections 1203.4 and 17. The court held that under both statutes, an unfulfilled order of restitution or restitution fine cannot be relied upon as any basis for denying expungement or reduction of a conviction, not even as a partial factor. Because the trial court based its denial on unpaid restitution, the appellate court found this to be legal error. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration without reliance on the unpaid restitution. View "P. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who, along with his wife, adopted two young girls through the foster care system. Years later, when one of the girls was nearly 17, she disclosed to a friend’s mother that she had been sexually abused by her adoptive father over several years. This disclosure led to a law enforcement investigation, during which the defendant voluntarily went to the sheriff’s department to “turn himself in.” He was subsequently interrogated by two officers in a closed interview room at the station. During the third segment of questioning, after persistent and increasingly accusatory interrogation techniques, the defendant confessed to engaging in sexual acts with one of the victims.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County heard pretrial motions regarding the admissibility of the defendant’s statements to law enforcement. The prosecution sought to admit the statements, while the defense moved to suppress them, arguing they were obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. The trial court ruled the interrogation was not custodial and admitted the statements. At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from the victims and law enforcement, while the defense highlighted inconsistencies and lack of physical evidence. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to over 120 years to life in prison.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona. The appellate court held that while the initial questioning was noncustodial, the interrogation became custodial during the third segment, at which point Miranda warnings were required but not given. The court found the admission of the confession was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. NavaAdame" on Justia Law

In 1994, Karl Senser was fatally stabbed during a carjacking, following a series of related crimes. Law enforcement quickly identified Steven Thomas as a prime suspect and later arrested him, but although circumstantial evidence suggested Leon Daniel McInnis was Thomas’s accomplice, authorities did not believe they had enough evidence to charge McInnis with murder at that time. The investigation included interviews, lineups, and early DNA testing, but no physical evidence directly linked McInnis to the murder scene. McInnis ultimately pled guilty to a related carjacking, while Thomas was convicted of Senser’s murder.The Superior Court of San Diego County dismissed the murder charge against McInnis in 2023, after he argued that the 27-year delay in prosecution violated his state due process rights. The court found the delay negligent, reasoning that law enforcement could have tested key evidence, such as a napkin found at the scene, for DNA in 1994. The court also determined that the loss of eyewitnesses due to the passage of time prejudiced McInnis’s ability to defend himself, and that no remedy short of dismissal could cure this prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that, under California Supreme Court precedent, courts may not find negligence by second-guessing prosecutorial decisions about when sufficient evidence exists to file charges, how investigations are conducted, or how resources are allocated. The delay was deemed “investigative,” not negligent, because prosecutors waited until new DNA evidence provided a strong basis for charging McInnis. The appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to properly balance the prejudice to McInnis against the prosecution’s justification for the delay, and to consider alternative remedies. View "P. v. McInnis" on Justia Law