Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Lamar Love was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his son, Gary Love. Gary, who was cared for by his grandmother, Geraldine Thomas, sustained multiple injuries while in Love's care, culminating in his death from blunt force trauma to the abdomen. Love was charged with murder, child abuse, spousal abuse, assault with a deadly weapon, and dissuading a witness. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder, spousal abuse, and one count of child abuse resulting in death, while acquitting him of the other charges.Love appealed his conviction, but it was affirmed by the appellate court. In 2022, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes to sections 188 and 189 meant he could not be convicted of murder under the current law. The trial court denied his petition, noting that the jury was not instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, aiding and abetting liability, or any theory of imputed malice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that Love was ineligible for resentencing because he was convicted as the actual killer who personally harbored malice, not under any abrogated theory of liability. The jury instructions required a finding of express or implied malice for second-degree murder, and there was no basis for the jury to convict him using a criminal negligence standard from unrelated instructions. Thus, the court concluded that Love was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. View "People v. Love" on Justia Law

Lavell Calvin White was convicted of first-degree murder in 2018 based on a felony-murder theory, with a special circumstance finding that the murder occurred during a robbery. The jury found that White was a major participant in the felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). White later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court granted, reducing his sentence to a two-year determinate term for attempted second-degree robbery.The trial court's decision to grant White's petition for resentencing effectively overruled the jury's special circumstance finding. The court concluded that the jury's finding had no preclusive effect because the jury had not been properly instructed on the factors established in People v. Banks and People v. Clark. The People sought a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court's order and reinstate the original murder conviction and LWOP sentence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and granted the People's petition. The court held that the jury's special circumstance finding should have preclusive effect in the section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings. The court noted that the jury's finding, made after the Banks and Clark decisions, was binding and that the trial court erred in not giving it preclusive effect. The appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its order redesignating White's conviction and to reinstate the original murder conviction, special circumstance finding, and LWOP sentence. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2008, Eddie Arturo Bravo pleaded no contest to multiple charges, including rape and sex offenses involving a minor, in exchange for a 20-year prison sentence. The original judgment included a stayed enhancement for a prior prison term. In 2023, Bravo sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 after the Legislature eliminated certain sentencing enhancements. The trial court resentenced Bravo, striking the prison prior enhancement and other enhancements, but maintained the 20-year aggregate sentence.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially imposed the agreed-upon 20-year sentence, which included upper terms for specific counts and concurrent middle terms for others. Bravo was paroled in 2022. Following legislative changes, Bravo requested resentencing, arguing for a reduced sentence based on his rehabilitation and lack of public safety risk. The trial court held a hearing, considered the arguments, and ultimately struck the stayed enhancement but maintained the original sentence length.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the fact the enhancement was originally stayed did not preclude resentencing under section 1172.75. The court found no reversible error in the trial court's resentencing decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Bravo received a lesser sentence as required by section 1172.75 because the stayed enhancement was eliminated, even though the aggregate term remained the same. The court also found no error in the trial court's application of section 1385 or section 1170, and it upheld the decision to impose upper terms for certain counts. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Bravo" on Justia Law

In 2012, Jason Robert Hodge pleaded no contest to three felony counts of battery and assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to 21 years in prison. On January 5, 2024, Hodge filed two requests in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County: a motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act and a request for resentencing under section 1172.1. The trial court denied both requests in a single order on February 6, 2024, stating it declined to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence.Hodge appealed the trial court's decision. His appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo, raising no arguable issues, and Hodge filed a supplemental brief without addressing the appealability issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, requested briefing on the appealability of the trial court’s denial of Hodge’s request for resentencing under section 1172.1, considering the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Loper.The Court of Appeal concluded that neither component of the trial court’s order was appealable. The court held that the trial court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence did not affect Hodge’s substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the trial court had no statutory obligation to act on Hodge’s request. Additionally, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Hodge’s motion under the Racial Justice Act, as incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final may only raise claims under that act in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "P. v. Hodge" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that one of the investigating officers had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the officer’s department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense counsel requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). Concurrently, the petitioner filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material from the officer’s personnel file. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the disclosure of the records related to the officer’s dishonesty, but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate the protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The trial court had issued the protective order under Evidence Code section 1045(e), which restricts the use of disclosed records to the court proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court noted that Senate Bill No. 1421 amended sections 832.7 and 832.8 to make certain law enforcement personnel records, including those involving sustained findings of dishonesty, nonconfidential and subject to public disclosure. The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for records that are nonconfidential under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer’s sustained finding of dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order directing the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after evidence suggested that the deputy public defender currently assigned to Sanchez's case made racially charged remarks during plea negotiations, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate the deputy public defender's conflict of interest. The motion included a declaration from the prosecutor detailing the deputy public defender's remarks, which implied racial bias. During a closed hearing, the trial court read the prosecutor's declaration to Sanchez and asked if he wanted the current public defender to continue representing him. Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court later ordered the public defender's office to assign a new attorney, citing potential RJA issues and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the trial court's decision to prevent potential future RJA claims and ensure adequate representation was within its discretion. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In March 2011, a grand jury indicted Prentice Robinson on multiple felony charges, including attempted murder, for crimes committed between January and February 2011. Robinson pleaded no contest to several charges, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, which led to an evidentiary hearing. Robinson appealed the trial court's denial of his petition, arguing that the court erred by considering grand jury testimony, which he claimed was inadmissible hearsay.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially sentenced Robinson based on his no contest plea and the grand jury transcripts. In 2022, Robinson sought resentencing under new laws that amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court found that Robinson made a prima facie case for relief but ultimately denied his petition after considering the grand jury transcripts and other evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the grand jury testimony was admissible under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), which allows the consideration of evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial if it remains admissible under current law. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and that the procedural safeguards in place ensured the reliability of the testimony. The court also determined that Robinson's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply in the context of a section 1172.6 resentencing hearing, as it is a postconviction collateral proceeding. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Robinson's petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Mark did not appear at trial, and the court entered judgment against him, awarding Jennifer $250,000 in damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Kovtun argued that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 and the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications. The judgment against Kovtun was affirmed. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

The case involves Eliseo Martinez, who restrained Nicasio Calixto Pascual while his cousin, Valente Martinez, stabbed Calixto 18 times. During an interview with detectives, Martinez admitted his participation in the stabbing. Martinez appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly denied an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion and violated his rights by finding him voluntarily absent from the trial.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found Martinez guilty of attempted murder and determined several aggravating circumstances, including that the crime was a hate crime. Martinez was sentenced to 23 years in state prison, which included enhancements for a prior serious felony conviction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court correctly denied the instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no substantial evidence that Martinez acted in the heat of passion. The court found that neither Calixto’s behavior nor Martinez’s version of events constituted sufficient provocation. Additionally, the court noted that Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) prohibits considering provocation based on the victim’s sexual orientation as objectively reasonable.Regarding Martinez’s absence from the trial, the appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that Martinez voluntarily absented himself. The court noted that Martinez was aware of the trial proceedings, had no sound reason for his absence, and had refused to attend court despite being given the opportunity. The appellate court concluded that any error in proceeding with the trial in Martinez’s absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Leonardo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. The trial court found Garcia had made a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary hearing. Garcia's counsel subpoenaed the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for contact information of two witnesses, but the trial court granted the LAPD's motion to quash, ruling that section 1172.6 did not allow for postconviction discovery. Garcia then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging this decision.The trial court had previously found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, but on appeal, his first-degree murder conviction was reversed due to a change in the law, and his sentence was reduced to second-degree murder. Garcia's subsequent petitions for resentencing were initially denied, but his third petition led to the current proceedings. The trial court's decision to quash the subpoena was based on the belief that the evidentiary hearing should be limited to the facts presented at trial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that section 1172.6 allows for postconviction discovery after an order to show cause is issued. The court held that denying Garcia the ability to obtain relevant evidence would thwart his right to present or respond to new or additional evidence at the evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing Garcia from obtaining contact information for the witnesses, which could be crucial for his defense against new theories of liability. The appellate court granted Garcia's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the LAPD's motion to quash and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Garcia v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law