Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, considered a habeas corpus request by Ropati Afatia Seumanu, a capital case convict. Seumanu sought a certificate of appealability (COA) after his habeas corpus petition was dismissed, as he sought to challenge the superior court's decision on nine points. The court agreed to issue a COA on one claim but declined to do so for the remaining claims. The court also addressed three unprecedented issues: whether the 10-day time limit for granting or denying COA requests was mandatory or directory; how strong a showing a COA applicant must make to meet the “substantial claim for relief” test; and whether an as-applied attack on the constitutionality of section 1509, subdivision (d) was appealable under section 1509.1(c). The court found that the 10-day time limit was not mandatory, a “substantial claim to relief” required a strong enough showing for reasonable jurists to debate whether the trial court erred, and as-applied attacks on the constitutionality of section 1509(d) were appealable under section 1509.1(c). The court also discussed the need for a COA applicant to provide an adequate record for review. View "In re Seumanu" on Justia Law

A California Court of Appeal has affirmed a lower court's judgment in a case involving a defendant convicted of rape by an intoxicating substance and kidnapping to commit rape. The defendant, Rodney Taurean Lewis, was accused of getting the victim intoxicated and then taking her away from a bar with the intent of sexually assaulting her. The court found substantial evidence supporting the conviction for rape given the victim's high blood alcohol concentration and the presence of a sedative in her system, and Lewis's admission of the sexual encounter.Despite Lewis's argument that there was no force involved in the kidnapping, the court applied a "relaxed force standard" previously applied to cases involving minors, which also applies to incapacitated adults. This standard does not require physical force or fear, but rather the physical act of moving the victim. The court found that Lewis driving the victim away from the bar satisfied this standard.Concerning the kidnapping charge, the court found that there was sufficient evidence that Lewis intended to sexually assault the victim when he moved her, and that he knew or should have known that she was too intoxicated to consent to the movement. The court also noted Lewis's deception in claiming to help the victim find her lost phone and his lie to the police about having sexual intercourse with her as consciousness of guilt. As such, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. View "People v. Lewis" on Justia Law

This case pertains to Jeremiah Paul, a parolee, who was convicted of possession of a firearm due to his prior violent conviction, after police officers discovered a firearm in his vehicle. The discovery occurred after the officers asked him about his parole status during an encounter, which he contends was an unlawful detention that led to the discovery of the firearm. Paul argued that the evidence of the firearm should have been suppressed as it was only discovered following his unlawful detention.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, disagreed with the trial court's ruling that the initial encounter between Paul and the police officers was consensual. The appellate court highlighted several factors such as the positioning of the police officers, their use of flashlights on Paul, the fact that Paul was engaged in a phone conversation when the officers approached, and the opening of the vehicle's door, which would have led a reasonable person to believe that they were not free to leave. This, they concluded, constituted an unlawful detention.Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling stating the initial encounter was consensual. The court held that Paul's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm, which was discovered as a result of the unlawful detention, should have been granted. The court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to grant Paul's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm. View "People v. Paul" on Justia Law

This case involved Jason Felix, who was arrested for a traffic violation in Utah where a consensual search of his car led to the discovery of a handgun, ammunition, and over five kilograms of methamphetamine. Felix became a suspect in two murders in Southern California while in custody in Utah on drug charges. Upon his return to California, Felix invoked his right to counsel during an interview about one of the murders. He was then placed in a cell with an undercover detective, to whom he made incriminating statements about both murders. The trial court denied Felix's motion to suppress the evidence from the Utah traffic stop and admitted his incriminating statements made to the undercover agent. He was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.On appeal, Felix contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence from the warrantless search of his car and in admitting his statements to the undercover agent as he had previously invoked his right to counsel. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed and affirmed the judgment of conviction in its entirety. The court held that the traffic stop was lawful and not unduly prolonged, and Felix's consent to the car search was voluntary and free from coercion. It also held that Felix's incriminating statements to the undercover detective were properly admitted, as they were made freely to someone he believed to be a fellow inmate. However, the court agreed that Felix should be awarded an additional day of presentence custody credits and remanded the case to the superior court for correction. View "People v. Felix" on Justia Law

This case involves the multiple appeals of a juvenile, Miguel R., who was transferred to criminal court for alleged felonies including murder and second-degree robbery. A juvenile wardship petition alleged that Miguel committed these crimes when he was 17 years old. The juvenile court initially granted the People’s motion to transfer Miguel to criminal court. Miguel appealed this order, but the decision was affirmed. Following the remittitur issue, the juvenile court transferred the matter to criminal court.However, subsequent amendments to section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code necessitated a second transfer hearing. The amendments raised the standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence on the issue of whether a juvenile should be transferred. The juvenile court, after considering the statutory changes, again ordered Miguel to be transferred to criminal court based on the conclusion that he was “not amenable to the care, treatment and training programs available through the juvenile court system”. Miguel appealed this order as well, arguing that the juvenile court misapplied the statutory changes and that the prosecution did not carry its burden under the clear and convincing evidence standard.The court of appeal rejected Miguel’s arguments and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court was not required to give greater weight to any particular statutory criterion in its determination of whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings. Thus, the order transferring Miguel to criminal court was affirmed. View "In re Miguel R." on Justia Law

In 2015, defendant Lee Farley allegedly shot and killed four men in a car in San Francisco. The prosecution claimed it was a drive-by shooting committed for the benefit of "Page Street," a supposed "criminal street gang" under Penal Code section 186.22(f). The superior court ruled that the prosecution had not presented evidence that Page Street was sufficiently "organized" to qualify as a criminal street gang.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District disagreed with the lower court's ruling. It found that the prosecution had indeed met its burden to show that Page Street was an "ongoing, organized association or group," which is the requirement for a criminal street gang under the amended version of Penal Code section 186.22(f). The court relied on the testimony of a police officer who described Page Street as "informal but organized" with members having particular roles in carrying out crimes and some members having more influence than others.As a result, the court granted a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order setting aside the gang-related count, allegations, and enhancements against Farley. This means that the prosecution can proceed to trial on the gang-related charges. View "P. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

This case involves the appeal of an order to transfer a juvenile, Miguel R., from the juvenile court system to the criminal court system in California. Miguel was originally charged with murder and other offenses when he was 17 years old. After a juvenile wardship petition was filed, the juvenile court granted a motion to transfer Miguel to the criminal court. The defendant appealed this order, but it was affirmed by the appellate court.Subsequently, changes in legislation led to the case being transferred back to the juvenile court to address the statutory amendments. The juvenile court, applying the new standard of proof, again ordered Miguel to be transferred to the criminal court. Miguel appealed this second order, arguing that the juvenile court misapplied the statutory changes and that the prosecution did not meet its burden under the clear and convincing evidence standard.The appellate court affirmed the order of the juvenile court. It clarified certain points about the recent amendments to the relevant statute, stating that the statute does not require any one factor to be given more weight than others when determining whether a minor is suitable for rehabilitation under the juvenile court's jurisdiction.The appellate court also found that the juvenile court's decision to transfer Miguel to the criminal court was supported by substantial evidence, and that it was not reasonably probable that the juvenile court would have reached a different conclusion even if it had applied the most recent version of the statute. The court's ruling was based on factors such as Miguel's degree of criminal sophistication, his potential for rehabilitation before the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, the success of previous attempts to rehabilitate him, and the circumstances and gravity of his offenses. View "In re Miguel R." on Justia Law

In the State of California, a defendant, Kevin Lunsted, sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant his motion to quash a subpoena from the prosecution. The prosecution subpoenaed Lunsted's case file (c-file) from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to prepare for his resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Lunsted argued that the request for his entire c-file was overbroad and sought privileged and immaterial medical and mental health records. The trial court denied the motion, stating that the c-file was likely to contain information relevant to the resentencing hearing.Lunsted appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to apply the factors set out in Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Touchstone) (2020) to determine whether the prosecution made a sufficient demonstration of good cause to defeat his motion to quash.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two agreed with Lunsted. It held that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard by failing to apply the seven-factor test set out in the Facebook case. The Court therefore granted Lunsted's petition and remanded the case for the lower court to reconsider the motion to quash under the correct legal standard. The Court clarified that the Facebook factors apply to subpoenas issued not only by the defense but also by the prosecution. View "Lunsted v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had denied Jesse James Hollywood's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Hollywood had been previously convicted of first-degree murder with a special circumstance that the murder occurred during a kidnapping. He contended that the court erred in denying his petition because the record did not conclusively establish that he had aided the actual killer in the commission of the murder. However, the court held that Hollywood was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because aiding and abetting an enumerated felony under section 189 with the intent to kill suffices to constitute felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(2), which precludes a petitioner from section 1172.6 relief. This decision was based on the jury finding that Hollywood had the intent to kill during the commission of a kidnapping and the fact that Hollywood had provided the murder weapon and ordered his subordinates to carry out the killing. The court rejected Hollywood's argument that the absence of an explicit reference to section 190.2, subdivision (c) in the amended section 189, subdivision (e)(2) meant the Legislature intended to alter this specific ground for liability under the felony murder rule. The court noted that the Legislature used the same phrase interpreted by the Supreme Court in a previous case when amending section 189 to state the new felony-murder rule, and therefore, they assumed it was intended to have the same meaning. View "People v. Hollywood" on Justia Law

The case involved Rhonda Persiani, a defendant charged with multiple counts of driving under the influence (DUI) in California. Due to doubts about Persiani's mental competence, the criminal proceedings were suspended, and she was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Persiani was evaluated and found suitable for outpatient treatment through mental health diversion. However, the court and parties believed Persiani was ineligible for such treatment due to a California Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion in cases where a defendant is charged with DUI. Persiani sought dismissal of her cases, asserting that dismissal was required under the Penal Code because she was ineligible for any of the treatment options. The court denied Persiani’s motion to dismiss and imposed mental health treatment provisions as conditions of her release. In an appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District held that a trial court has the authority under the Penal Code to order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with DUI. The court concluded that the Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion for DUI does not prevent a court from ordering a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant to receive treatment through mental health diversion after criminal proceedings have been suspended. The matter was remanded back to the lower court to determine whether to order Persiani to receive mental health diversion treatment. View "Persiani v. Superior Court" on Justia Law