Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After hearing a rumor that Cesar Gonzalez had raped a child, and after being encouraged by a close friend to exact revenge, appellants Daniel Gallegos and Gustavo Nunez, Jr., chased Gonzalez and beat him with metal pipes as he lay on the ground. Gallegos then stabbed Gonzalez six times in the back, killing him. A jury convicted Gallegos of first degree murder, and Nunez of assault with a deadly weapon. Both appealed, Gallegos arguing the trial court erred when, in response to a jury question during deliberations, it instructed the jury that in order for provocation to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder, the provocation must come from the victim, not a third party. As a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal concluded the court’s instruction was correct, and any potential error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence that the murder was premeditated, deliberate, and willful. Gallegos and Nunez also both contended the trial court erred when it declined to dismiss their prior strike convictions under California v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996), and then sentenced them under the Three Strikes law. To this the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling on Gallegos’s motion and therefore affirmed the judgment as to him. As for Nunez, however, the record indicated the court was unaware of the scope of its sentencing discretion; the appellate court therefore remanded the matter so the court could exercise its informed discretion as to whether to dismiss Nunez’s prior strikes. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Nunez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. He contends the trial court erroneously denied his petition at the prima facie stage because the record of conviction shows that jurors were instructed on now-invalid theories of murder and attempted murder at trial.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law if, for example, the jury instructions show that jurors were not instructed on any theory of liability affected by Senate Bill 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189. The court explained that the trial court here correctly concluded that Defenadnt was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. The court instructed jurors on two theories of liability at trial: direct aiding and abetting and conspiracy. If the jury adopted the former theory, Defendant was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief because jurors would have had to conclude that he harbored the intent to kill. Further, under current California law, “conspiracy to commit murder may be based on an agreement to kill ‘“a human being” ’ who is not specifically identified.” That Defendant and his coconspirators did not conspire to kill the victims specifically is not relevant. View "P. v. Allen" on Justia Law

The Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 penalizes human trafficking of a minor. It targets a person who preys upon, and forces, a minor to engage in commercial sex acts for the person’s financial benefit. The penalty for this crime is fifteen years to life imprisonment. That was the sentence imposed here. Defendant appealed the judgment after a jury convicted him of human trafficking of a minor (“Doe”) for a commercial sex act and found true the allegation that the offense involved force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury. Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle, (2) he has standing to challenge the search of Doe’s cell phone, (3) the evidence is insufficient that he used force or fear to induce Doe to engage in commercial sex, (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during argument, (5) the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted pandering, and (6) the cumulative impact of the “errors” requires reversal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. First, the court found that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant used force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury as set forth in section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2). Further, the court explained here there is no substantial evidence that Defendant was guilty of the lesser offense of attempted pandering but not the greater offense of trafficking of a minor. View "P. v. Banks" on Justia Law

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant-appellant Ryan Christianson as an inmate potentially eligible for relief under California Penal Code section 1172.75, but the trial court corrected the original sentence by administratively striking section 667.5(b) enhancements that had been stayed by the original sentencing court, and thus concluded resentencing was unnecessary. On appeal, the parties asked the Court of Appeal to decide whether section 1172.75 applied in cases like this, where the abstract of judgment on which an inmate was currently serving time included one or more section 667.5(b) enhancements that were previously imposed but stayed. To this, the Court concluded that it did and that therefore resentencing was required. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying Christianson’s request for resentencing. View "California v. Christianson" on Justia Law

According to H.B., Hall “mentally and physically” abused H.B. “every day [she] was under his control for over [three and a half years].” Hall made H.B. “work for him,” providing “sexual services to customers” and charging “from $80 to $1,000 per customer.” She “earned approximately $300 daily” but Hall “took all of this money.” After Hall pleaded no contest to human trafficking and pimping, H.B. sought restitution of $340,500: $31,336 for stolen Social Security payments and damage to her credit score, $340,500 for money she received for acts of prostitution, and accrued interest.In declining to make the award as to the prostitution earnings under Penal Code 1202.4(p), which does not expressly authorize restitution for a victim’s labor where that labor is itself proscribed by law, the court stated: “public policy arguments favor H.B.’s position, but … public policy decisions are for the legislature.” The court of appeal vacated, citing the statutory language: “Upon conviction for a violation of [s]ection 236.1, the court shall … order the defendant to pay restitution to the victim in a case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct.” The court also noted that the law contemplates measuring restitution by the defendant's profit. View "H.B. v. Superior Court of Solano County" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to a charge of second-degree murder. Appellant admitted as true an enhancement allegation regarding the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced Appellant to prison for 15 years to life. Appellant filed a petition for resentencing in the trial court, claiming he could not be convicted of murder based on the 2019 changes to the law. After giving the parties a chance to brief this issue, the court denied the petition, concluding Appellant was ineligible for resentencing because his conviction had occurred after Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s petition. The court explained that Appellant is ineligible for resentencing for two reasons. First, in order to be resentenced, the charging document filed against Appellant must have allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder liability that is now invalid. This requirement is not met here. The prosecution filed the information against Appellant in 2020. Thus, when this criminal proceeding was initiated, the prosecution was precluded from proving the murder charge under a theory of imputed malice. This deficiency amply demonstrates that the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant’s petition for resentencing. Further, when Appellant entered his change of plea, the now invalid theories of murder liability had already been eliminated. Consequently, Appellant has already received the benefits of Senate Bill No. 1437. View "P. v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Villegas was charged with six counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (his tenants’ daughters), dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (count seven), forcible rape of a minor over 14 (his daughter), sexual penetration by a foreign object on a minor over 14, and forcible oral copulation of a minor over 14. As to counts one through six, enhancements were alleged under the One Strike law, that the crimes were committed against children under the age of 14, and that Villegas was convicted of qualifying offenses against more than one victim. As to counts eight through ten, enhancements were alleged that the qualifying convictions committed by Villegas involved more than one victim. As to all counts, it was further alleged that upon conviction Villegas was ineligible for probation. Convicted, he was sentenced to 202 years to life in prison.The court of appeal affirmed in part, rejecting an argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek exclusion of a portion of a custodial interrogation based on Miranda violations. The court reduced the sentences on counts eight to ten; an must information afford a One Strike defendant fair notice of the qualifying statutory circumstance or circumstances that are being pled, proved, and invoked in support of One Strike sentencing. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the court reduced his sex offender fine to $4,300 but imposed $12,320 in additional mandatory assessments. View "People v. Villegas" on Justia Law

A police officer testified that during a forensic interview, 14-year-old Doe stated that when Doe was six years old, Gomez, his father, “sucked [Doe’s] penis” and had him suck Gomez's penis. The officer observed Doe call Gomez and recount the incident. Gomez apologized and said he wanted to kill himself. Doe remembered multiple incidents of inappropriate touching. The officer did not describe Doe’s emotional reactions. No other witnesses testified. The probation report did not include information about Doe. Doe's victim impact statement read: “I am many things, but a victim I am not. I am a survivor. ... I will continue to strive in my life reaching my goals ... as all you ever were to me was a setback.” The government argued that noneconomic damages could be inferred. The court stated, “common sense and experience ... tells you what kind of horrific damage is done ... I can only imagine the torment ... for the last ten years and what he’s going to go through for the rest of his life.” The court ordered restitution of $100,000.The court of appeal reversed, While victims have a right to restitution from criminal defendants (Cal. Const., art. I, section 28) and the law does not require any particular kind of proof to establish the victim’s losses,” there must be some evidence of the impact of the crime on the particular victim. There was no such evidence here. View "People v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Senate Bill 567 amended Penal Code section 1170(b)(2) to provide that when a statute specifies three possible terms of imprisonment, the court cannot impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless it finds that a longer sentence is justified by “circumstances in aggravation of the crime” and “the facts underlying those circumstances” have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury at trial. Before SB 567, trial judges had discretion to impose the lower, middle, or upper term of imprisonment based on their own assessment of which term best served the interests of justice, without making any factual findings.The court of appeal upheld a trial court order allowing the prosecution to amend an information to allege aggravating factors against a criminal defendant. Section 1170(b)(2)'s phrase “circumstances in aggravation” refers to the factors listed in California Rules of Court, 4.421; the Legislature has not violated the separation of powers by that delegation. The use of qualitative terms and the requirement that an aggravating circumstance make the commission of the offense distinctively worse does not render rule 4.421's factors unconstitutionally vague. The factual allegations supporting the aggravating circumstances do not need to be supported by evidence at the preliminary hearing. View "Zepeda v. Superior Court City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrew Rhodius appealed the trial court’s denial of a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Defendant contended the trial court erred in denying him a full resentencing hearing on the basis that defendant’s prison priors were imposed and stayed, not imposed and executed. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that "interpret the statute to include enhancements that were imposed and stayed would be contrary to the legislative intent and the plain language of the statute." Accordingly, judgment was affirmed the trial court's denial of a full sentencing rehearing. View "California v. Rhodius" on Justia Law