Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Renteria was sentenced to 34 years in prison on 18 drug- and gang-related offenses. Changes in sentencing laws took effect while an appeal was pending. Senate Bill 136 amended Penal Code section 667.51 to limit prior prison term enhancements to terms for sexually violent offenses; Senate Bill 1393 amended section 1385 to give trial courts discretion to strike enhancements in the furtherance of justice. The trial court declined to conduct a full resentencing.The Attorney General conceded that under newly enacted Senate Bill 483, the trial court should have conducted a full resentencing. The court of appeal remanded. The trial court did not consider the applicability of the newly amended section 1170, addressing the choice between sentencing a defendant to lower, middle, or upper terms, and whether any of the seven consecutive sentences totaling 26 years imposed on Renteria should be reduced. Renteria is entitled to application of Assembly Bill 518, amending section 654, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same acts or omissions. The trial court must either vacate the sentence for gang participation, which was one year and four months, or the sentences for accessory after the fact and offering to sell cocaine, which total four years. The trial court was not required to strike the prior serious felony enhancement. View "People v. Renteria" on Justia Law

A defendant in a criminal proceeding (“Defendant”) was arrested based on a co-defendant’s statement. The petitioning Newspaper sought an interview with the then-unindicted co-defendant (“Co-defendant”). Subsequently, Defendant filed a subpoena seeking all material relevant to Newspaper’s interview with co-defendant.The trial court denied Newspaper’s request to quash the subpoena, finding that newsperson’s immunity must yield to a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court ultimately held Newspaper in contempt.The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s denial of a Newspaper’s motion to quash a subpoena but vacated the trial court’s finding of contempt. View "Bakersfield Californian v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner Juan Boitez moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his mother’s car. After the trial court denied his motion, Boitez petitioned for writ of mandate or prohibition The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review was whether Boitez gave voluntary consent for the police to search his mother’s car after he was pulled over for a traffic violation. As a material part of obtaining Boitez's consent, the police officer falsely, but apparently with subjective belief that it was true, stated that he had the authority to tow the car, but would not do so if Boitez consented to the search. Specifically, the Court considered whether, but for the police officer’s false promise of leniency as to the towing of the mother’s car, the prosecution met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that Boitez's consent was uncoerced. To this, the Court concluded the prosecution did not meet its burden: the false promise of leniency not to tow the car was a material and inextricable part of the agreement inducing defendant’s consent to the search, and thus, under the totality of the circumstances, petitioner's consent was not voluntarily given. As part of its analysis, the Court adopted the reasoning of the First Circuit Court of Appeals that the question of voluntary consent "cannot be based on the subjective good faith of a police officer in making the false statement that induced the defendant’s consent to search." The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to suppress and to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Boitez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Edgar Flores appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing on his second degree murder conviction. The superior court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing on the ground Flores was ineligible for resentencing because he had been convicted of provocative act murder. Flores contended the superior court erred by denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie review stage. He argued the instructions given at his trial allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder based on a now-invalid theory of imputed malice, namely, that he aided and abetted co-defendant Anthony Paez’s provocative act without himself acting with malice. Flores also argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to amend the petition after legislation made relief available to persons convicted of murder on any theory that imputed malice based solely on participation in a crime and by failing to make the instructional argument he urged here. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with a multiple-death special-circumstances finding, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The jury found true allegations that a principal in the commission of the offenses had been armed with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life plus one year for a firearm enhancement. Defendant filed his first section 1172.6 petition. After issuing an order to show cause, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d). Defendant again appealed an order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court’s holding is the law of the case and conclusively established at the prima facie stage that Defendant is not entitled to resentencing based on his second 1172.6 petition. The court explained that Defendant has not shown that, by applying the law of the case doctrine, the court would be shutting our eyes to a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice. View "P. v. Medrano" on Justia Law

Venson, her fiancé Mitchell, and her 11-year-old daughter were at a house party when a car pulled up. Ponder, an 18-year-old high school senior, got out and started shooting. Ponder admitted killing Venson, claiming he was reacting to a man pulling a gun on him. Ponder was convicted of second-degree murder, assault with a firearm, and shooting at an inhabited building. Ponder moved to strike firearm enhancements in the furtherance of justice (Penal Code 1385). The trial court made extensive findings regarding Ponder’s neurodevelopmental disorders, immaturity, and history of trauma and struck the enhancement for the assault offense, but declined to strike the 25-year-to-life enhancement (section 12022.53(d)) associated with the murder conviction.In 2021, the court of appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion. On remand, the trial court struck that murder enhancement and imposed the lesser included enhancement. Ponder was resentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court failed to follow recent amendments to the sentencing laws, The record unmistakably shows the trial court would not sentence Ponder differently if it believed A.B. 518, amending section 654 and giving the trial court discretion, applied. Section 1385(c)(2), amended by Senate Bill 81 does not require dismissal of an enhancement when a mitigating circumstance is present unless the sentencing court finds dismissal would endanger public safety. View "Peoplew v. Ponder" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey LaRoche deprived Antonio Davila a hunting trophy. Following a plea, LaRoche was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, receiving a stolen vehicle, and second degree burglary. Pursuant to the agreement, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of two years eight months in state prison. LaRoche challenged the amount of restitution ordered to Davila for his loss. Davila claimed the loss of the ram’s head (the trophy)amounted to $7,500, which included the cost of the associated hunting trip, taken approximately 10 years prior. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred when it included the hunting trip as an economic loss because the experience was not property lost as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct. "While the statutory framework for victim restitution is broad, we conclude it is not so broad as to include costs attendant to the acquisition of the stolen property." View "California v. LaRoche" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Paul Hupp was convicted by jury on four counts of violating Penal Code section 69 based on threatening statements he made to four judges. On appeal, Hupp raised an issue of first impression: Is a judge an “executive officer” within the meaning of section 69, which makes it a crime to attempt to deter, by means of any threat, an executive officer from the performance of a legal duty? The Court of Appeal concluded the answer was no: in this context, “executive officer” unambiguously refers to an officer of the executive branch, and judges are not part of the executive branch. The Court therefore agreed with Hupp that his convictions had to be reversed. View "California v. Hupp" on Justia Law

Weeks after Hampton left his employment at a restaurant, the restaurant was robbed. During Hampton's January 2022 trial, the judge dismissed two jurors for reasons related to COVID-19 and seated the two remaining alternate jurors. After jury deliberations began, the judge was called away by a personal emergency. Another judge took her place. A juror subsequently tested positive for COVID-19. Hampton claimed that the original judge had made an off-the-record ruling prohibiting remote deliberations. After consulting the original judge, the substitute judge denied a mistrial and permitted the COVID-positive juror to deliberate remotely for one day, after which the jury returned its verdicts. The foreperson disclosed that the jury agreed on the verdicts while all the jurors were present in person; during the remote deliberations, the jury discussed only the lesser weapon enhancements on which it hung. Hampton was convicted of felony counts of second-degree robbery and false imprisonment but acquitted of accompanying firearm enhancements, and placed on probation for three years.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the substitute judge improperly relied on ex parte communications with the original judge and that the jury deliberations in which one juror participated remotely were unauthorized and unconstitutional. The judges’ communications were ethical and did not deny Hampton a fair trial. Any error in permitting the jury to deliberate remotely for one day was harmless because that deliberation did not result in a finding of guilt. View "People v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Das appealed a trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding the stated factual basis for defendant’s guilty plea refuted the allegations in his petition for resentencing, rendering him ineligible for relief. While the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s assessment that the stated factual basis, if true, demonstrated defendant stabbed the attempted murder victim with the intent to kill, defendant did not stipulate to the factual basis or otherwise admit the truth of the facts recited by the prosecutor. The Court agreed with defendant that the trial court improperly engaged in factfinding at the prima facie stage and reversed for that reason. View "California v. Das" on Justia Law