Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Bingham was charged with infliction of corporal injury on a romantic partner (Pen. Code 273.5(a)). The victim did not testify at trial, but her 911 call was admitted into evidence. Bingham argued that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding the victim’s prior convictions and inconsistent statements made after her 911 call, which Bingham offered for impeachment. He also argued that his case should be remanded for resentencing based on recent changes in the law.The court of appeal affirmed and remanded. While the trial court erred in excluding the impeachment evidence, the error was harmless. Under Evidence Code section 1202, when a hearsay statement by a declarant who is not a witness is admitted into evidence by the prosecution, an inconsistent hearsay statement by the same person offered by the defense is admissible to attack the declarant’s credibility. However, even if the victim’s statements recanting what she said in the 911 call and her prior convictions were admitted, it is not reasonably probable that Bingham would have obtained a more favorable outcome, considering all the evidence. The court remanded for resentencing under amended Penal Code section 1170(b), which limits the court’s ability to impose an upper-term sentence; the amended law applies retroactively to Bingham’s case. View "People v. Bingham" on Justia Law

After defendant Christopher Esparza was pulled over for a Vehicle Code violation, a detective who specializes in gang enforcement recognized him and two of his passengers as members of a City Heights gang. The detective thought one of the passengers, Delfino Osnaya, was likely to be armed and told the other officers they needed to search him. After their patdown of Osnaya yielded a loaded gun, the officers searched Esparza as well and found another loaded weapon. Esparza contested the constitutional validity of his detention and search, arguing: (1) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous when they conducted his patdown; and (2) his detention was unreasonably prolonged because it lasted longer than necessary for the officers to issue him a citation for the Vehicle Code violation. The Court of Appeal found the detention lasted a mere seven minutes, during which the officers proceeded expeditiously consistent with reasonable concerns for officer safety. "The totality of the circumstances known to the initial investigating officer justified those concerns, which were only heightened as additional factors came to light during the course of the traffic stop." View "California v. Esparza" on Justia Law

At age 16, defendant Tory Bratton confessed to robbing a local market, with an accomplice, shooting the clerk dead, and taking $184. At his trial, his counsel argued that defendant’s confession was false and that he did not participate in the robbery at all. However, trial counsel did not argue that, even if defendant did participate, he was not the shooter. Defendant was convicted of (among other things) first degree murder, with a personal firearm use enhancement and felony-murder special circumstances. He appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed. When defendant filed a petition to vacate the murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, the trial court denied it; it ruled that the Court of Appeal's opinion in defendant’s direct appeal showed that he was the actual killer. The State conceded that this was error, but that the error was harmless because the record of conviction established defendant was the actual killer. Anticipating this response, defendant argued that, under standard principles of issue preclusion (a/k/a collateral estoppel), preclusion did not apply here because: (1) Whether defendant was the shooter was not actually litigated; (2) Trial counsel had an incentive not to contest whether defendant was the shooter; (3) The significance of whether defendant was the shooter was small at trial but, due to the then-unforeseeable enactment of section 1172.6, has since become great; (4) Section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law that warranted reexamination of whether defendant was the shooter. The Court of Appeal agreed that standard principles of issue preclusion applied here. However, the Court held that the issue of whether defendant was the shooter was actually litigated. Moreover, trial counsel did have an incentive to contest this issue; evidently, he simply made a tactical decision not to. Because trial counsel did have an incentive to contest the issue, it did not matter that it was unforeseeable that the issue would have additional future consequences. And finally, while section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law, the Legislature intended that it not constitute an exception ipso facto to issue preclusion. View "California v. Bratton" on Justia Law

Defendant Wesley Panighetti and Jill Doe met in 2000 and began dating. According to the Court, the couple practiced bondage, discipline, sadism, and masochism (BDSM) together. When defendant went beyond the scope of Jill’s consent, his conduct became criminal. A jury rejected the argument that, by virtue of a written agreement to consent to BDSM at all times, Jill had irrevocably agreed to allow defendant to dominate all aspects of her life. The jury found him guilty of multiple sex offenses, attempting to dissuade a witness, and residential burglary. He challenged those convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his multiple requests for new counsel pursuant to California v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970); (2) instructing the jury it could consider prior uncharged offenses involving Jill Doe; (3) inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in imposing a 280 year-to-life sentence; and (4) failing to calculate and award presentence custody credit. After review, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to award presentence custody credit but otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Panighetti" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in count 1, second-degree murder in count 2, and attempted murder in count 3. He admitted the truth of the personal firearm use enhancements in each count. Counts 4 and 5 and the special circumstance allegations were dismissed pursuant to the plea. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 25 years to life in count 1, plus two years for the firearm enhancement. On February 1, 2021, Defendant executed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court summarily denied Defendant’s petition in a written memorandum of decision. Defendant appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. However, the court modified the trial court’s memorandum of decision and minute order to reflect that Defendant, and not D.M., is the petitioner in this matter. The court explained that there is no merit to Defendant’s argument that the trial court engaged in premature fact-finding. The trial court reviewed and relied upon the plea colloquy, which is part of the record of conviction. The court also rejected Defendant’s assertion that he only admitted that he was guilty of murder and attempted murder, which did not require that he harbor malice at that time. The court wrote that regardless of whether Defendant was required to admit to being the actual killer/attempted murderer, or could stipulate to particular facts without admitting them, the only reasonable view of the record here is that Defendant did admit that he was the actual killer/attempted murderer. View "P. v. Fisher" on Justia Law

In August 2010, after the California v. Samaniego, 174 Cal.App.4th 1148 (2009) and California v. Nero, 181 Cal.App.4th 504 (2010) were decided, defendant Brandon Burns was convicted on one count of first degree murder arising out of his participation with a codefendant in a gang-related shooting. The jury was instructed using the now-disapproved version of CALCRIM No. 400, but his counsel did not argue he was guilty of a lesser crime than the codefendant. Neither did the attorney argue the instruction was given in error. In 2022 however, Burns petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, claiming he “could not presently be convicted of murder…because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” He argued that based on the error in former CALCRIM No. 400, the jury might have convicted him based on some “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” This possibility, he argued, required he be granted an evidentiary hearing. Even accepting Burns’ argument regarding the flaw in the earlier version of CALCRIM No. 400, the Court of Appeal found the alleged error he identified had nothing to do with the 2018 and 2021 legislative changes that gave rise to section 1172.6’s petition process. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Burns failed to establish a prima facile case for relief under section 1172.6. View "California v. Burns" on Justia Law

While his two teenaged children were across the hall, defendant Anthony Morones, Jr., fired a gun outside a bathroom window. After he was arrested and a complaint was filed against him, he attempted to persuade his children to lie to law enforcement about the incident. A jury found defendant guilty of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm, two counts of misdemeanor child endangerment, felon in possession of a weapon, and two counts of dissuading a witness. On appeal, defendant contended his witness dissuasion convictions under Penal Code section 136.11 should have been reversed because the statute only applied to efforts to dissuade a witness prior to charges being filed. He also contended the trial court erred when it failed to properly instruct the jury on elements of the offenses and consider section 654 in sentencing. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed two of defendant’s convictions for witness dissuasion, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Morones" on Justia Law

Defendant, while having an elevated blood-alcohol level, drove his 2008 Ford Focus at a high rate of speed off the highway, through a fence, and into agricultural equipment parked in an adjacent yard. His passenger was ejected from the vehicle and killed. Defendant was charged and convicted with various offenses related to this incident. On appeal, among other claims, Defendant contends remand is required for the court to resentence him in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), statutes 2021, chapter 731 (Senate Bill No. 567), and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), statutes 2021, chapter 695 (Assembly Bill No. 124), and the court erred in ordering restitution in favor of Garton, the agricultural equipment company whose property was damaged in the collision, because the company was not a direct or derivative victim of a crime of which Defendant was convicted.   The Fifth Appellate District remanded the matter for resentencing consistent with Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124. However, the court affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that as the People concede, Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124 are ameliorative changes in law that apply retroactively to Defendant. Here, the trial court imposed an upper-term sentence on count 5, thus implicating Senate Bill No. 567. Additionally, Defendant’s statement in mitigation, submitted to the trial court at sentencing, suggests defendant may have a history of childhood trauma, including childhood abuse, thus potentially implicating Assembly Bill No. 124. View "P. v. Suazo" on Justia Law

AguilarJimenez was charged with two counts of murder (Penal Code 187(a)), DUI, and driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or more and causing injury. A magistrate concluded that Aguilar-Jimenez did not have the requisite state of mind for implied malice murder,.Two weeks later, the district attorney recharged the same two murder counts, stating that the magistrate had not made factual findings but reached legal conclusions to which the superior court owed no deference. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of implied malice and dismissed. The district attorney filed a felony complaint, charging AguilarJimenez with two counts of murderThe court dismissed the murder counts under the “two-dismissal rule” (Penal Code section 1387), which “bar[s] further prosecution of a felony if the action against the defendant has been twice previously terminated according to the provisions of that statute.” with exceptions, The court of appeal reversed. The exception under section 1387(c)(3) applies; there had only been one prior termination—when the superior court previously granted the section 995 motion. As the magistrate did not make factual findings that were “fatal to the allegation that the offense was committed,” the prosecutor was authorized to recharge the murder counts under section 739. When the prosecutor refiled the charges in case C1922671, the prosecutor commenced a second prosecution—not a third. View "Pwoplw v. Aguilar-Jimenez" on Justia Law

Appellant, a former police officer, was terminated from the Merced City Police Department (Department) based on allegations he conducted an illegal search, submitted a false police report, and committed perjury at a court hearing. Appellant appealed to the personnel board (Board), which found the City of Merced (City) failed to show Appellant had submitted a false police report or had conducted an illegal search. However, the Board found that Appellant was not truthful in explaining certain details concerning the search. Consequently, the Board rejected the majority of charges against Appellant, but sustained portions of charges relating to his untruthfulness. The Board recommended that Appellant not be terminated, but instead that he be demoted without backpay. The Merced City Manager reversed the decision and upheld Appellant’s termination. The trial court rejected Appellant’s challenges to the city manager’s decision.   The Fifth Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred in upholding several of the charges against Appellant. The court explained that while it upholds several other charges, it remanded for the trial court to determine whether the surviving charges are sufficient to support the consequence of termination. The court upheld the court’s apparent finding that Appellant intentionally opened the bag and that Appellant’s testimony that the bag opened inadvertently as a result of how he grabbed the straps was untruthful. The court wrote that it cannot affirm the judgment because the possibility remains that the trial court could conclude, in its independent judgment, that the surviving charges are insufficient to support Defendant’s termination (i.e., that the termination decision was an abuse of discretion). View "Cruz v. City of Merced" on Justia Law