Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Jenkins left the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office to join the campaign to recall Boudin, the then-San Francisco District Attorney. After leaving the Office, Jenkins spoke to a reporter about a homicide case being prosecuted by the Office in which the victim was her husband’s cousin. Jenkins criticized the Office for its lax approach toward prosecuting the alleged killers, Mitchell and Pomar. Jenkins faulted the Office for dropping felony gang charges against the two and for failing to detain Pomar—which she claimed allowed Pomar to commit additional crimes, including attempted murder. After Boudin was recalled, Jenkins became the District Attorney. The Office instituted an “ethical wall” to prevent Jenkins from influencing its prosecutions of Mitchell and Pomar. Mitchell and Pomar moved to disqualify the entire Office from that case, Penal Code 1424.1 Pomar also moved to disqualify the Office from his separate prosecution for the additional crimes mentioned by Jenkins in the newspaper article.The court of appeal affirmed the disqualifications of the Office from both cases. The trial court reasonably concluded that Jenkins’s animosity toward Pomar extended to the other case; that, due to Jenkins’s public statements, the cases had become inextricably intertwined in the eyes of the ADAs, and the public; and that Jenkins’s belief that the prosecution of Pomar was doomed due to the lack of gang charges would likely influence ADAs “consciously or unconsciously” to be more aggressive in prosecuting Pomar. View "People v. Pomar" on Justia Law

In 2006, Manzoor pleaded guilty to a felony violation of Penal Code sections 288.2 and 6641 for attempting to distribute harmful material to a minor. The prosecutor dismissed a count that alleged Manzoor attempted to commit a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, As a result of his conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender for life under former section 290(a)(2)(A). Almost 14 years later, the court granted his petition to reduce his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor, section 17(b).After section 290 was amended to provide for a tiered system of registration time periods, Manzoor sought relief from the registration requirements. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the petition, rejecting Manzoor’s argument that the section 290 amendments reflect a legislative intent to relieve a defendant whose section 288.2 felony conviction has been reduced to a misdemeanor from the lifetime obligation to register. Under both the current and pre-2021 versions of section 290, a felony conviction of section 288.2 requires lifetime registration and misdemeanor violations of section 288.2 are not mentioned; section 17(e) continues, both before and after the amendments, to prohibit a court from “reliev[ing] a defendant of the duty to register as a sex offender pursuant to Section 290” where the defendant is charged with an offense for which registration is required under Section 290, and for which the defendant was found guilty. View "People v. Manzoor" on Justia Law

Appellant purports to appeal from the trial court’s post-judgment order denying his petition to strike two prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) (667.5(b)). In a separate proceeding, co-Appellant purports to appeal from a similar post-judgment order.   The Second Appellate District dismissed both appeals. The court held that the orders appealed were non-appealable because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitions. The court explained that Appellants’ prior prison terms had been served for offenses that were not sexually violent. After the imposition of the prior prison term enhancements, former section 667.5(b) was amended to limit its application to prison terms served for sexually violent offenses. Appellants contend the trial court erroneously denied their petitions to strike the now invalid prior prison term enhancements. But, the court explained, the Legislature has not authorized their appeals from the trial court’s orders. View "P. v. Escobedo" on Justia Law

Defendant Curtis Slaton was convicted by jury of murder. The prosecution’s theory in the case was that defendant committed the murder because he affiliated with a gang that wore blue and the victim wore red—a color associated with a rival gang. The trial court allowed the prosecution to present limited gang evidence to advance this theory, including screenshots from a music video that, among other things, show defendant affiliating with a known gang member, displaying a symbol of the gang, and holding up a blue bandana. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court wrongly admitted these screenshots for three reasons: (1) this evidence was inadmissible to show his potential motive for the charged murder; (2) they were highly inflammatory and carried minimal relevance; and (3) a new statute governing the admission of music videos and other forms of creative expression—which became effective after the trial here— applied retroactively and requires reversal. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Slaton" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sabrina Aranda was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility. During jury selection, the State exercised a challenge for cause against a prospective juror who admitted she would hold police officers to a higher standard of credibility than other witnesses. Aranda objected to the challenge, but the trial court overruled her objection. The jury convicted Aranda. On appeal, Aranda argued the State's challenge for cause during jury selection was based on the juror’s general distrust of police officers, that this was a presumptively invalid reason to challenge a juror under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, and the trial court prejudicially erred when it overruled her objection to the challenge. The Court of Appeal determined that argument failed because section 231.7 applied only to peremptory challenges, not challenges for cause. View "California v. Aranda" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Anthony Narro molested two of his stepdaughters and one of his stepdaughter’s friends for a period of over 10 years. He was convicted of numerous sexual offenses and sentenced to 195 years to life. On appeal he argued: (1) the judgment should have been reversed because CALCRIM No. 1191B violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution by allowing jurors to rely on currently charged crimes to find he had the propensity to commit other currently charged crimes; and (2) the trial court erred by awarding restitution in the amount of $9,461.34 as noneconomic damages pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) in order for a victim’s mother to replace the furniture where the molestations had occurred because the furniture invoked painful memories. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment. View "California v. Narro" on Justia Law

Defendant Fermin Perez-Robles, a massage therapist, was convicted by jury on 16 counts of sexual penetration and sexual battery involving six clients and sentenced to 15 years in prison. On appeal, he argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on 10 counts, including those for sexual battery by restraint; (2) the jury was not properly instructed on lesser included offenses on four counts; (3) the jury was improperly instructed on using other charged sex offenses as propensity evidence; (4) the prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument; and (5) the imposition of the upper term sentence on one count had to be reversed and remanded based on recent changes to Penal Code section 1170. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the evidence was insufficient to support one count (count 4); although there was sufficient evidence of restraint, the jury should have been instructed on lesser included offenses on two counts (counts 14 & 20); and the imposition of the upper term sentence on count 11 had to be vacated and remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Perez-Robles" on Justia Law

Lashon was convicted of one count of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree murder, together with true findings of special circumstance allegations of multiple murders. She was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Lashon argued the judgment was the result of the trial judge’s implicit racial bias against her and her trial counsel in violation of the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), Penal Code section 745.1, effective on January 1, 2021. She claimed that certain portions of the trial and sentencing proceedings constitute a prima facie showing for relief.The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Lashon forfeited her section 745 claim on direct appeal by not filing a section 745 motion in the trial court before judgment was entered. The court did not address her argument that she has alleged a prima facie showing for relief under section 745. The CRJA was effective four months before Lashon’s trial began and sets forth the procedure for seeking relief during various stages of a criminal proceeding. View "People v. Lashon" on Justia Law

In 2001, petitioner Ronnie Harrell was charged with five felonies, including attempted murder, each with a firearm enhancement and a gang enhancement; a prior prison term enhancement and a strike prior were also alleged. He was allowed to enter into a plea bargain, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to robbery, with a firearm enhancement, and admitted a strike prior. He was sentenced to 28 years in prison — the term prescribed by the plea bargain. In 2023, Harrell filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91. Harrell was honorably discharged from the United States Army in 1981, and he claimed to suffer from several service-related disorders. The trial court denied the petition, relying on case law holding that a person serving a stipulated sentence was categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.91. It rejected Harrell’s argument that recent amendments to section 1170.91 had abrogated that case law. To this, the Court of Appeal found was error: the amendments deleted language from section 1170.91 that courts had previously relied on in holding that persons serving a stipulated sentence were ineligible. They also added new language allowing a trial court to reduce a conviction or a sentence “regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a trial or plea . . . .” View "California v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Rhonda Jenkins appealed an order recommitting her as a mentally disordered offender pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. Jenkins contended substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that she represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others because of her severe mental disorder. After careful review of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed: the mental health experts who evaluated Jenkins expressed concern that she was not ready to leave the hospital due to her mental illness and level of functioning, and that she had unrealistic expectations about the challenges she would face. "They nevertheless failed to identify any history of dangerous behavior beyond her commitment offense in 1999 or explain how their concerns translate into difficulty controlling her dangerous behavior." Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins then-represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the Court reversed the trial court’s order recommitting her for an additional year. View "California v. Jenkins" on Justia Law