Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Rhonda Jenkins appealed an order recommitting her as a mentally disordered offender pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. Jenkins contended substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that she represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others because of her severe mental disorder. After careful review of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed: the mental health experts who evaluated Jenkins expressed concern that she was not ready to leave the hospital due to her mental illness and level of functioning, and that she had unrealistic expectations about the challenges she would face. "They nevertheless failed to identify any history of dangerous behavior beyond her commitment offense in 1999 or explain how their concerns translate into difficulty controlling her dangerous behavior." Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins then-represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the Court reversed the trial court’s order recommitting her for an additional year. View "California v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and gang and firearm enhancements and sentenced to a total term of 22 years. Appellant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). The trial court granted the petition, vacated Appellant’s conviction, and resentenced him to the midterm of three years on the target offense of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The court awarded Appellant the same number of custody credits he was awarded at his initial sentencing and reimposed the same fines, fees, and direct victim restitution. Appellant contends the court erred in several respects. He primarily argued that he should have received additional custody credits for the time he served on his original sentence. Respondent Attorney General concedes Appellant is correct.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order in part, specifically to the calculation of Appellant’s custody credits and their application to his restitution and parole revocation fines. The court explained that where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.” In the specific context of a resentencing under section 1172.6, a person resentenced “shall be given credit for time served.” The court held that the trial court did not fulfill this obligation, rendering Appellant’s sentence unauthorized. View "P. v. Rojas" on Justia Law

San Francisco Officer Gunn testified that he observed a Buick parked in a “known high-crime area” and ran a license plate check, which came back as belonging to an Acura. Finley, who is Black, stepped out of the vehicle with his wife. Finley stated that they had recently purchased the vehicle and provided title and registration information, establishing the car was not stolen. After obtaining Finley’s driver’s license, Gunn learned that Finley was on federal probation with a search clause. Gunn searched the vehicle and retrieved a backpack, containing a loaded handgun without a serial number.Finley alleged a violation of the Racial Justice Act (Penal Code 745(a)(1)). The prosecution noted that the Supreme Court has stated that an area’s reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in determining the reasonableness of investigative detention and that it is “common practice” for an officer to run a query of a person’s name. The trial court concluded that Finley did not establish a prima facie violation of the Racial Justice Act under the totality of the circumstances, noting that the officer was courteous.The court of appeal ordered a rehearing. The trial court’s review of Finley’s motion went beyond the confines of determining whether it stated a prima facie case. The focus at this stage of the proceedings should be on Finley’s allegations and supporting evidence, not evidence supporting the prosecution’s argument. View "Finley v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A trial court denied defendant Monica Njoku’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. Defendant owned a house in Sacramento of which she rented rooms to short term tenants, primarily single mothers with children. She also rented a room to Edward W., the victim and a single father with a two-year-old son. Other tenants in the house during the relevant period included Jasmine M., a single mother with an eleven-month-old daughter, and Amanda F., a single mother with a five-or six-year-old son. At the time of the events detailed below, Edward had been living in the house for two weeks, Jasmine for three weeks, and Amanda for three months. Defendant and Jasmine had a disagreement several days before the murder. On November 14, 2014, defendant appeared at the house unannounced and learned Jasmine had violated house rules by allowing her sister to spend the night. Defendant came back to the house two days later, confronting Jasmine again, and demanding she leave. Edward, standing nearby, interjected. This disagreement between Defendant and her tenants would end with Defendant calling her brother and his wife for help evicting her tenants, tempers flaring, all three tenants making multiple calls to 911, and Edward ultimately being stabbed and stomped where he later died an hour after he placed his last call to 911 from loss of blood from his wounds. On appeal, defendant argued insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding she aided and abetted implied malice murder. Defendant also argued any factual disputes should have been resolved in her favor because the prosecution did not introduce live testimony at the evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes as it was required to do pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Njoku" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Karl Doron appealed after his guilty plea to nine counts of robbery, two counts of attempted robbery, and allegations he was armed with a firearm during the commission of the robberies. Before entering into his plea, Doron unsuccessfully requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The court sentenced Doron to a prison sentence of 10 years four months in accordance with his plea. In his initial appellate briefing, Doron contended the trial court abused its discretion by ruling he had not made a prima facie showing he was entitled to mental health diversion. After the State filed its respondent’s brief, the Legislature amended section 1001.36 to revise the eligibility test for pretrial diversion (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023), and the parties submitted supplemental briefing on the issue. Doron then contended under the amended statute, which applied retroactively to his case, the trial court was required to find his mental disorder was a substantial factor in the commission of his crimes absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. He maintained there was no substantial evidence to rebut this presumption, and thus he was both eligible and suitable for pretrial mental health diversion. Doron alternatively asked the Court of Appeal remand his matter for an evidentiary hearing governed by section 1001.36’s new principles. The State conceded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that amended section 1001.36 applied retroactively to Doron’s nonfinal judgment. The State argued, however, the proper remedy was not for the Court to engage in factfinding so as to decide whether Doron met the criteria for diversion, but to remand the matter for a new prima facie evidentiary hearing consistent with section 1001.36’s amendments. To this the Court concurred, and remanded the case with directions that the trial court consider Doron’s request for mental health diversion under amended section 1001.36. View "California v. Doron" on Justia Law

Castaneda-Prado was convicted of five counts of committing a lewd act on a child under age 14, with allegations that the charges involved multiple victims and substantial sexual conduct. Castaneda-Prado was sentenced to 125 years to life; five consecutive prison terms of 25 years to life. Castaneda-Prado argued the court erred by excluding evidence that one of the children believed that, by accusing Castaneda-Prado of sexual molestation, she was helping her mother obtain a “U visa,” which can provide legal status for victims of certain crimes who assist in the investigation of those crimes.The court of appeal reversed his convictions. The exclusion of this evidence violated Castaneda-Prado’s right to confront a witness against him under the federal and state constitutions. On the record cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury’s guilty verdicts turned almost entirely on the credibility of the girls. There was no physical evidence of the alleged sexual offenses. The court noted that it was irrelevant whether a U visa was possible or whether the mother actually sought a visa; what mattered was the girl’s belief. In addition, the prosecutor highlighted the absence of any proven basis to question the motives of either witness. View "People v. Castaneda-Prado" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Ceja was convicted by jury of being a felon in possession of ammunition and other charges. On appeal, Ceja’s sole claim was that the felon in possession of ammunition statute facially violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Another Court of Appeal recently held that California’s laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and ammunition did not violate the Constitution because “only law-abiding citizens are included among ‘the people’ whose right to bear arms is protected by the Second Amendment.” To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Ceja" on Justia Law

In 1996, Escobedo was convicted of second-degree murder and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 19 years to life. In 2016, Escobedo was released from prison and placed on lifetime parole. If a court determines that a lifetime parolee has committed a violation of law or violated his conditions of parole, the person “shall be remanded to the custody” of the Department of Corrections (CDCR) (Penal Code 3000.08(h).) In 2020, the Alameda County DA charged Escobedo with forcible oral copulation and making criminal threats and sought revocation of Escobedo’s parole. The petition did not reflect that Escobedo was on lifetime parole. CDCR filed a petition for revocation of Escobedo’s parole, which did reflect Escobedo was on lifetime parole, with a report alleging additional criminal conduct and violations of his parole and documenting Escobedo’s criminal history, which predated his murder conviction.At a hearing, the DA explained a negotiated disposition, under which Escobedo would be placed on three years of felony probation. A CDCR supervisor explained by email that a different process was required because Escobedo is a “lifer parolee.” The court nonetheless accepted the plea agreement with no mention of Escobedo's lifetime parole.The court of appeal granted CDCR’s mandate petition. Because Escobedo was on lifetime parole, the court lacked the authority to release him on probation after finding that he committed a new criminal offense; it was required to remand him to the custody of CDCR. View "California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Superior Court of Alameda County" on Justia Law

The Penal Code authorizes but does not require, county sheriffs to issue licenses to carry concealed weapons. The Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office rarely issued CCW licenses; the office would not even process a CCW application absent a special instruction Sung, who apparently ran Sheriff Smith’s 2018 re-election campaign and subsequently became the undersheriff, could issue such instructions and could place applications on hold even after licenses were signed by the sheriff. Sung abused that authority to extract favors.Apple executives, concerned about serious threats, met with Sung, who asked whether they would support Sheriff Smith’s re-election. Apple would not give anything of value in exchange for CCW licenses but two executives personally donated $1,000, the maximum allowable amount, to Smith’s campaign. After the election, the applicants were fingerprinted and completed their firearm range qualification tests. Sheriff Smith signed the CCW licenses but they were not handed over. Although Apple had no program for donating products to law enforcement agencies, after a meeting with Sung, an Apple executive (Moyer) emailed an inquiry about donating iPads or computers to the sheriff’s office's “new training facility,” not mentioning Apple’s pending CCW applications. The Office was not setting up a new training center but asked for 200 iPads, worth $50,0000-$80,000. Apple’s team then received their CCW licenses, Apple terminated the promised donation.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of a bribery charge against Moyer. A public official may be bribed with a promise to donate to the official’s office. View "People v. Moyer" on Justia Law

In the midst of a group contacted by officers for smoking cannabis on the street, 16-year-old T.F.-G. witnessed first one and then another of his companions be restrained, searched, and made to sit on the curb as the officers worked their way through the group. T.F.-G. ran. Chased, tackled, and punched, he was arrested for resisting or delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code 148(a)). In a search incident to that arrest, the police found a loaded handgun in his pocket, which T.F.-G. was not licensed to carry.The court of appeal affirmed his convictions. The totality of the circumstances, establishing the existence of probable cause for his arrest for resisting or delaying a peace officer—the asserted basis for the eventual search that revealed his possession of a loaded handgun in public–indicated that a reasonable person in T.F.-G.’s position would have understood he was not free to leave. The court also rejected a Second Amendment facial challenge to the prohibition on the unlicensed public carrying of loaded firearms. Although California’s “good cause” licensing requirement is undisputedly unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” decision, the unconstitutionality of a discrete licensing requirement does not render section 25850 facially unconstitutional. View "In re T.F.-G." on Justia Law