Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Ramon Del Rio appealed a the trial court’s decision to redesignate robbery as the basis for his conviction after granting Del Rio’s petition to vacate his two first degree murder convictions under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95). Del Rio contended the trial court violated his due process rights because he had no notice the court might take this action. He further argued the robbery conviction was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed the lack of notice and substantial evidence supporting the robbery conviction warranted reversal. The Court therefore remanded the case for further proceedings. View "California v. Del Rio" on Justia Law

Menlo Park police officers responded to a domestic disturbance call from M.O., who stated she was dating Gruis and had discovered nude pictures of her 13-year-old daughter, C.V., on one of his electronic devices. Officers obtained a search warrant and seized several of Gruis’s devices. One USB drive contained 60 images and three video recordings of C.V. in various states of undress. The laptop’s hard drive contained “over 500 still images and videos of [C.V.] or [C.V.’s] mother or her sister in their home, in the bedroom, and the bathroom, throughout the house in various stages of dress or undress.”Gruis pleaded no contest to felony possession of child pornography in exchange for dismissal of a charge of disabling a telephone line and a maximum sentence of one year in county jail. The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence, placed Gruis on two years’ probation, and ordered him to serve one year in county jail. As a condition of probation, Gruis was ordered: “You may not possess any pornographic magazines, videos, pictures or written material or images unless prescribed by a therapist during the course of your treatment.” The court of appeal remanded, finding the term “pornographic” unconstitutionally vague. View "People v. Gruis" on Justia Law

Defendant Anterion Suggs appeals a judgment following entry of a plea of no contest to misdemeanor possession of a concealed firearm after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence of the firearm and methamphetamine found in his vehicle. On appeal, Defendant contended the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because the detention was unlawfully prolonged. Specifically, defendant claimed that once the arresting officer noticed the proper documentation attached to his vehicle’s rear window and thus learned that the reason he had stopped defendant was invalid, any further detention was unlawful. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal concurred: the detention became unlawful when: (1) the purpose of the stop completely dissipated (when the officer saw the documents in the window and thus realized that defendant had not committed the Vehicle Code violation that was the purpose of the stop); and (2) the officer then made inquiries aimed at finding evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. The judgment was reversed, the conviction was vacated, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to enter a new order granting that motion. View "California v. Suggs" on Justia Law

Kelsey Carpenter gave birth to a baby girl at home, alone, after deciding that she would not risk having her child removed from her custody as had happened with her two older children when they tested positive for drugs after being delivered at the hospital. She again used drugs during her pregnancy. After Carpenter’s daughter was born, the baby struggled to breathe, and Carpenter attempted to provide her with CPR. Carpenter also cut the baby’s umbilical cord but did not clamp it, and the umbilical stump continued to bleed. Carpenter bathed, diapered, clothed, and attempted to breastfeed the baby before seemingly passing out. When she woke up, her newborn daughter was dead. Before Health & Saf. Code, § 123467(a) was effective, the State charged Carpenter with implied malice murder and felony child endangerment, contending that Carpenter intentionally chose an unattended at-home delivery, despite being warned of the dangers, in an effort to evade child welfare services and at the risk of her daughter’s life. According to the State, Carpenter’s acts and omissions, including her failure to seek medical assistance after realizing her baby was in distress, caused the baby to bleed to death. Carpenter challenged the superior court’s order denying her motion to set aside the information for lack of probable cause under Penal Code section 995. She contended she was immune from prosecution based on the new law, which went into effect after the preliminary hearing, but before the superior court ruled on her section 995 motion. While the Court of Appeal agreed that Carpenter could not be prosecuted for her decision to have an unattended home birth or any effect that her alleged drug use or lack of prenatal care during pregnancy may have had on her baby, the law did not preclude the State's prosecution for her acts and omissions after her daughter was born alive. The Court therefore denied Carpenter's petition. View "Carpenter v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Valle appealed restitution order regarding an undamaged cell phone. Valle and his girlfriend M. got into an argument at defendant’s home. The argument turned physical when defendant headbutted M. in the face, causing bleeding and a nasal fracture. M. was able to quickly get out, but she left her purse and new phone behind. Later that month, defendant pled no contest to battery in a dating relationship. On April 19, 2022, defendant returned the phone to M. at his sentencing hearing. A few weeks later at the victim restitution hearing, M. sought $629.99 for her phone. She testified she had intended to get a refund for the phone in that amount, but the refund period had lapsed by the time defendant returned the phone to her. The court awarded her the purchase price of the phone and allowed her to keep the phone. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion because it overcompensated the victim, and reversed and remanded with one of two options: (1) if the victim has not sold the phone, the court shall hold a hearing on the difference in value of the phone between the day the victim purchased the phone and the day the defendant gave it back to her; or (2) if the victim has sold the phone, the court shall hold a hearing on the difference between the purchase price and the amount for which she sold it. The defendant shall then be ordered to pay that difference. View "California v. Valle" on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District dismissed two Appellants’ appeals of the trial court’s post-judgment orders. One Appellant purported to appeal from the trial court’s post-judgment order denying his petition to strike two prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to former Penal Code 2 section 667.5, subdivision (b) (667.5(b)). In a separate proceeding, the other Appellant purported to appeal from a similar post-judgment order.   The Second Appellate District dismissed both appeals, holding that the orders appealed from are non-appealable because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitions. The court explained that Appellants’ prior prison terms had been served for offenses that were not sexually violent. After the imposition of the prior prison term enhancements, former section 667.5(b) was amended to limit its application to prison terms served for sexually violent offenses. Appellants contend the trial court erroneously denied their petitions to strike the now invalid prior prison term enhancements. But, the court explained that the Legislature has not authorized their appeals from the trial court’s order. “‘It is settled that the right of appeal is statutory and that a judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute.’” View "P. v. Escobedo" on Justia Law

Here, a police officer received information via a radio broadcast from another officer that a juvenile on probation with a firearm restriction likely placed a firearm under the front passenger seat in defendant Hilario Leal, Jr.’s car before defendant got into his car and drove away. Defendant’s car was under constant surveillance from the time of the alleged firearm placement until the searching officer conducted the search. When a search of the passenger compartment of defendant’s car yielded no firearm, the searching officer decided to search the trunk, where he discovered a firearm. Defendant was charged with several offenses and filed a motion to suppress the firearm; the trial court denied the motion. Defendant ultimately pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The question presented was whether the search of defendant’s trunk was justified under the automobile exception. The Court of Appeal concluded it was not. "[W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime will be found specifically in the passenger compartment of a vehicle (as compared to having probable cause to believe it will be found somewhere in the vehicle), and no other subsequent discovery or information provides further probable cause to believe the evidence will be found in the trunk, an officer’s search of the trunk exceeds the permissible scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to set aside the order denying defendant’s motion to suppress, enter an order granting the motion, and allow defendant to move to withdraw his plea. View "California v. Leal" on Justia Law

In 2001, G.A. was charged with lewd acts with a child, sexual battery by restraint, and false imprisonment. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court committed G.A. to the Redwood Regional Center. G.A. never regained competency but was released and received services through the Center until 2008. In 2010, G.A. was charged with kidnapping with the intent to sexually assault, rape, annoy, or molest a child under the age of 10 and sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court again committed him.A 2021 petition to extend G.A.’s commitment alleged that G.A. suffers from developmental disabilities and that he represents a danger to himself or to others. A psychologist, who evaluated G.A. several times, calculated G.A.’s I.Q. at 42 and testified that G.A. poses a danger to himself and to others, particularly children. The court continued the commitment.The court of appeal dismissed an appeal because the commitment order has expired. The court found that Welfare and Institutions Code 6500 does not violate due process by dispensing with the need for proof of a recent overt act of dangerousness but that substantial evidence did not support the finding of G.A.’s danger to others--it was based on the testimony of an expert witness who relied on unsupported assumptions of fact about G.A.’s offenses. The court noted significant ambiguity as to the meaning of “danger to self.” View "People v. G.A." on Justia Law

Defendant Oscar Lopez was convicted of multiple crimes including: first degree murder and willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. He was sentenced to 141 years to life. In his direct appeal, the Court of Appeal modified the sentence; the Court also reversed conditionally and remanded with directions to consider striking defendant’s prior serious felony conviction enhancement and firearm enhancements. On remand, in October 2022, the trial court struck the prior serious felony enhancement but refused to strike the firearm enhancements. It resentenced defendant to 101 years to life. Defendant appealed again, contending that at resentencing, the trial court erred under various amendments to the Penal Code, all of which went into effect on January 1, 2022. In the published portion of the Court's opinion, the Court addressed his contention that under section 186.22 — as amended by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) — there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement to count 5 (unlawful possession of a firearm). To this, the Court held that, because the judgment against defendant was not final, he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of A.B. 333. However, because the Court reversed solely with respect to the sentence and directed the trial court to resentence defendant, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider the gang enhancement. "A.B. 333 was simply irrelevant to anything the trial court had jurisdiction to do." In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court found no other error. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from an order summarily denying his petition to vacate his murder conviction and be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6.   The Second Appellate District agreed with the trial court that Defendant has not made a prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6. The court explained that although Defendant’s petition is facially sufficient and thus entitled him to the appointment of counsel, it is devoid of factual allegations concerning the killing of the victim. Defendant does not deny that he was the actual killer, nor does he assert that another person fired the shot that killed the victim or that he acted without the intent to kill. He merely states the legal conclusion that he could not now be convicted of murder because of changes made to the law of murder under Senate Bill No. 1437. Under these circumstances, where Defendant alleged no facts concerning the murder to which he pleaded guilty, the People introduce without objection uncontroverted evidence from the preliminary hearing transcript showing that the Defendant acted alone in killing the victim, and Defendant does not put forth, by way of briefing or oral argument, any factual or legal theory in support of his petition, Defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Pickett" on Justia Law