Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jose Haro Nevarez was involved in a fatal collision on Interstate-15 after driving while intoxicated at excessive speeds. His SUV became disabled and blocked a high-occupancy vehicle lane with its lights off. Minutes later, a motorcyclist, Robert Cole Sutton, struck the rear of Nevarez’s SUV and was killed. Nevarez admitted to officers at the scene that he was drunk and on DUI probation, and subsequent tests confirmed his blood alcohol level was well above the legal limit. Nevarez had previously been convicted of DUI and received a Watson advisement, warning him of the potential for a murder charge if he killed someone while driving under the influence.Following the incident, the People charged Nevarez with second-degree murder and other related offenses in the Superior Court of San Diego County. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for all charges, distinguishing the facts from People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499. Nevarez’s defense moved to set aside the murder charge under Penal Code section 995, arguing that Chagolla precluded liability because he was not driving at the moment of the fatal collision. The trial court denied the motion, finding Chagolla factually distinguishable.Nevarez then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, for a writ of prohibition to overturn the trial court’s order. The appellate court denied the petition, holding that probable cause supported the murder charge. The court clarified that liability for second-degree murder under People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 does not automatically end when an intoxicated driver ceases driving. Instead, a fact-specific analysis of implied malice and proximate cause is required. The court rejected a rigid rule and affirmed that the circumstances supported probable cause for both implied malice and proximate cause in Nevarez’s case. View "Nevarez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A defendant committed several serious offenses, including first-degree murder and attempted murder, when he was 17 years old. In 2002, a jury convicted him of these crimes, and he was sentenced to a total term of 79 years to life with the possibility of parole. The sentence included both determinate and indeterminate terms, with firearm enhancements. The crimes occurred in 2000, and the defendant was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), but rather to a lengthy term that could be considered the functional equivalent of LWOP.Years later, the defendant filed a petition in the Superior Court of Ventura County seeking recall of his sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), which allows for resentencing of juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that the defendant’s 79-year-to-life sentence was functionally equivalent to LWOP, relying on the reasoning in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 and People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435. The court recalled the sentence, conditionally reversed the conviction and sentence, and certified the matter to juvenile court for further proceedings under Proposition 57. Meanwhile, the defendant received a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, but was found unsuitable for parole.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant was not eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A) because he was not sentenced to LWOP, and that subsequent legislative changes, specifically section 3051, rendered the Heard rule moot. The court concluded that since the defendant had already received a parole hearing, he was not serving the functional equivalent of LWOP. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s orders. View "P. v. Lara" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing an officer, domestic battery with corporal injury, and assault on a peace officer. During jury selection, the defendant sought to remove Juror 122 for cause due to the juror’s background in law enforcement and personal experience with domestic violence, but the Superior Court of Orange County denied the challenge for cause after Juror 122 stated he could remain impartial. The defendant then used a peremptory challenge to remove Juror 122, but the prosecution objected under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, arguing the challenge was based on impermissible grounds. The trial court sustained the objection, keeping Juror 122 on the panel. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant on one count, convicted him of a lesser included offense on another, and acquitted him on the third count.The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California, County of Orange, reviewed the case. It reversed the conviction on one count but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. The Appellate Division held that the “deemed prejudicial” standard in section 231.7(j)—which requires automatic reversal if an objection to a peremptory challenge is erroneously denied—does not apply when an objection is erroneously granted. Instead, the court applied traditional harmless error analysis and found the defendant had not shown prejudice from Juror 122’s inclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The main holding is that the “deemed prejudicial” standard in section 231.7(j) applies only to erroneous denials of objections to peremptory challenges, not to erroneous grants. When an objection to a peremptory challenge is erroneously granted, traditional rules regarding prejudicial error govern, and automatic reversal is not required. View "P. v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of first degree murder by torture and assault causing the death of a child. The prosecution’s theory was that the defendant either directly committed the crimes or aided and abetted his codefendant, the child’s mother, in committing them. The jury was instructed only on murder by torture and aiding and abetting, not on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and assault causing death of a child, but a special circumstance finding was later reversed on appeal due to insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill.After the California Court of Appeal reversed the special circumstance finding but otherwise affirmed the judgment, the trial court resentenced the defendant. Following the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, which limited certain theories of murder liability and created a resentencing procedure under Penal Code section 1172.6, the defendant petitioned for resentencing. He argued that the jury instructions permitted conviction on an impermissible theory of imputed malice. The Napa County Superior Court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding the defendant had not shown he could not be convicted of murder under the amended statutes.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the denial. The court held that the record conclusively established the defendant’s ineligibility for relief under section 1172.6 because he was convicted under a theory of murder—murder by torture, either as a direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor—that remains valid after Senate Bill 1437. The court found that any alleged instructional error did not relate to changes made by the new law and affirmed the trial court’s order denying resentencing. View "People v. Warner" on Justia Law

The case concerns a woman who was charged, along with a codefendant, with the murder of her young daughter, with the special circumstance of torture, and with assault resulting in the death of a child under eight. The prosecution’s theory was that the murder was committed by torture, and that the defendant either directly committed the crimes or aided and abetted her codefendant. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine; the only theory presented was murder by torture. The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder by torture and assault causing death of a child. On direct appeal, the special circumstance finding was reversed for insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill, but the murder conviction was affirmed based on evidence of deliberate and premeditated intent to cause extreme pain for a sadistic purpose.After the passage of Senate Bill 1437, which amended California’s murder statutes to eliminate certain forms of accomplice liability and created a resentencing procedure for those convicted under now-invalid theories, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Superior Court of Napa County denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding the defendant ineligible for relief because she was not convicted under any theory affected by the statutory changes. The defendant appealed this denial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the record conclusively established the defendant’s ineligibility for relief under section 1172.6, as she was convicted solely under a theory of murder by torture, which remains a valid basis for murder liability after Senate Bill 1437. The court found that any alleged instructional error did not relate to the statutory changes and thus could not support resentencing relief under section 1172.6. View "People v. Krueger" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, while under the influence of methamphetamine, set fire to his sister’s doorbell and started another fire in the street. He was charged with arson of an inhabited structure and had a prior strike conviction. The defendant sought mental health diversion, presenting evidence of bipolar disorder and substance abuse disorder, and a mental health professional recommended residential treatment. The court initially granted diversion on the condition that the defendant be accepted into a residential treatment program. However, due to issues with Medi-Cal coverage and facility requirements, the defendant was unable to secure placement in the recommended residential program.After it became clear that residential treatment was not available, the defendant requested to participate in an intensive outpatient program with housing at a room and board facility, but the Superior Court of Sacramento County denied this request, citing concerns about public safety and the need for residential treatment as a condition precedent for diversion. The court then set aside the grant of diversion, without prejudice to reconsideration if a suitable residential program became available. The defendant later moved for public funding for private residential treatment, but the court denied the motion, explaining it lacked authority to order such funding after Medi-Cal declined coverage.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating mental health diversion when the required residential treatment was unavailable. The appellate court also held that Penal Code section 1001.36 does not require a trial court to order public funding for private treatment when existing public programs decline coverage. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "People v. Riddle" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant was charged with murder and released on a $1 million bail bond posted by United States Fire Insurance Company. The trial court ordered the defendant to “return on any and all future hearing dates.” After his release, the defendant appeared personally at several hearings and later executed a Penal Code section 977 waiver, allowing his attorney to appear on his behalf at certain proceedings. On April 26, 2022, the defendant did not personally appear at a trial readiness conference, but his attorney appeared pursuant to the waiver. The court continued the hearing and ordered the defendant to be personally present at the next hearing. The defendant subsequently failed to appear at the rescheduled hearing, and the court forfeited the bail bond.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied United’s motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond, finding the motion barred by res judicata. United argued that the court lost jurisdiction to forfeit the bond because it did not do so at the defendant’s first unexcused failure to appear, claiming the section 977 waiver was ineffective for the trial readiness conference and that the court’s prior order required personal appearance. United’s subsequent appeal of the summary judgment was dismissed as untimely, but its appeal of the order denying the motion to set aside summary judgment was considered.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside summary judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court was not required to forfeit the bond when the defendant appeared through counsel pursuant to a valid section 977 waiver at the trial readiness conference. The court further held that the order for the defendant to “return on any and all future hearing dates” did not require personal attendance at all hearings, and California Rules of Court, rule 4.112, did not prohibit waiver of personal presence at a trial readiness conference. Thus, the trial court retained jurisdiction to forfeit the bond at the later date. View "People v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A Black man was charged with multiple offenses, including felony false imprisonment, after a domestic violence incident in which his girlfriend alleged he struck her and prevented her from leaving his car. Witnesses observed the girlfriend attempting to exit the moving vehicle and heard shouting. The girlfriend initially told police that the defendant hit her and threatened her if she tried to leave, but later recanted, claiming she fabricated the story out of anger. The prosecution introduced both her initial statements and her recantation at trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of felony false imprisonment and other related charges, but acquitted him of attempted robbery. He admitted a prior conviction, and the trial court imposed a total sentence of nine years and four months, including time for an unrelated prior case.During trial, the defendant’s counsel raised concerns under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) regarding the racial composition of the jury venire and the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of a Black prospective juror. The Santa Clara County Superior Court denied these motions, finding no evidence of bias or violation of the RJA. At sentencing, the court made comments referencing the defendant’s race and background, but defense counsel did not object to these statements under the RJA.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant forfeited his RJA claims on appeal by failing to object to the trial court’s statements at the appropriate time. The court also found no merit in the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was a conceivable tactical reason for not objecting. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on misdemeanor false imprisonment, as there was no substantial evidence to support that lesser offense. The judgment of conviction and sentence was affirmed. View "People v. Wagstaff" on Justia Law

In October 2017, a family in Santa Rosa was the victim of a violent home invasion robbery involving multiple armed intruders. The defendant was apprehended shortly after the incident with stolen property and marijuana linked to the victims. He was charged and convicted by a jury of home invasion robbery, kidnapping, assault with a firearm, and several counts of false imprisonment. The trial court also found true allegations that he had two prior convictions for active gang participation, qualifying as strikes under California’s Three Strikes law and as serious felonies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence that both prior convictions qualified as strikes and serious felonies, vacated the sentence, and remanded for retrial of the prior conviction allegations and resentencing. On remand, the prosecution retried only one prior conviction, which was again found to be a strike and a serious felony. The trial court then granted the defendant’s Romero motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction, citing changes in sentencing law and the remoteness of the prior offense, and imposed a reduced sentence. The People appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike and the five-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667(a).The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, held that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike conviction, as remoteness alone cannot justify dismissal under the Three Strikes law. However, following the California Supreme Court’s instructions, the proper remedy is to remand for the trial court to reconsider the Romero motion based on a correct understanding of the law. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in dismissing the five-year enhancement or in imposing the middle term for the principal offense. The order striking the prior strike conviction was reversed and remanded. View "People v. Dain" on Justia Law

Shawn Otis Hernandez was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit first degree residential burglary and attempted first degree residential burglary, following an incident in which multiple individuals attempted to break into a home late at night. Evidence against Hernandez included cell phone records, home security video, DNA analysis, and a prior conviction for a similar crime. During jury selection, the prosecution exercised several peremptory challenges against jurors under the age of 25, prompting Hernandez to object on the basis that these challenges were discriminatory.The Ventura County Superior Court reviewed Hernandez’s objection under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which prohibits discrimination in jury selection based on certain protected categories. The trial court found that the prosecution’s reasons for excusing the young jurors were valid and supported by the record, and that age was not a substantial factor in the use of peremptory challenges. The court also noted that neither party raised objections based on ethnicity or gender during trial, and that the empaneled jury included several males and individuals with Spanish surnames.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the judgment. The court held that youth alone is not a cognizable group under section 231.7, and neither Batson v. Kentucky nor Wheeler prohibits excusing jurors solely based on youth. The court further held that objections to the dismissal of jurors based on protected class membership under section 231.7 must be made in the trial court, or the claim is forfeited on appeal. Hernandez’s claims regarding ethnicity and gender were deemed forfeited, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was rejected due to lack of deficient performance and prejudice. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Hernandez" on Justia Law