Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Daniel Orozco was involved in a drive-by shooting in Los Angeles, where he and three other members or associates of the Varrio Norwalk gang entered rival Chivas gang territory. During two separate incidents about twenty minutes apart, a shooter in Orozco’s car used Orozco’s gun to wound one man and kill another, who was not a gang member. Police quickly connected the car to Orozco, found the group at his home, and recovered the weapon and other evidence. Orozco was arrested along with the others. At trial, Orozco’s defense centered on his alleged intoxication, arguing he was too drunk to form criminal intent.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate suppressed a confession by the shooter, Martinez Garibo, due to a Miranda violation. Despite this, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold Orozco to answer for murder and attempted murder, but not for conspiracy to commit murder, as there was no evidence of an agreement to kill. On the day of trial, the prosecution moved to add a conspiracy charge, which the trial court allowed over Orozco’s objection. The jury convicted Orozco of all three charges, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms for murder and attempted murder, with a stayed sentence for conspiracy.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the conspiracy conviction must be reversed because the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support that charge, and Orozco was not given proper notice. The court affirmed the convictions for murder and attempted murder, finding no merit in Orozco’s other arguments, including ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged prosecutorial error. The court also held that Orozco forfeited his challenge to the attempted murder sentence by failing to object and having adequate notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "People v. Orozco" on Justia Law

In 2020, an incident occurred in which Jacob Frederick Ball, while stopped at a traffic signal on a parkway, pointed a handgun in the direction of another driver after the driver had taken a picture of Ball’s license plate due to his reckless driving. Ball then sped away onto a freeway onramp. The driver called 9-1-1, and police later found Ball at his home, recovering a handgun and black gloves from his vehicle. Ball was charged with felony brandishing of a firearm at a person in a motor vehicle, along with two misdemeanors.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Orange County, the magistrate found probable cause to hold Ball to answer on all charges. Subsequently, the trial judge granted Ball’s motion to dismiss the felony brandishing count under Penal Code section 995, reasoning that there was no evidence the victim actually experienced subjective fear as a result of Ball’s actions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Penal Code section 417.3 does not require proof that the victim subjectively experienced fear; rather, the statute sets forth an objective standard, requiring only that the defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to experience apprehension or fear of bodily harm. The court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the count based on the absence of evidence of subjective fear. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the felony brandishing count be reinstated. View "P. v. Ball" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by a California Highway Patrol officer for speeding on Interstate 680. He was the sole occupant of the vehicle and did not have a valid driver’s license, instead presenting a fake one. During an inventory search of the impounded car, the officer found a loaded handgun and a large sum of cash. The firearm was determined to be registered to several previous owners, but not to the man. He was charged with carrying a concealed, loaded firearm in a vehicle and carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him.Before trial in the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, the defendant filed a demurrer arguing that the statutes under which he was charged were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as interpreted by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. The trial court denied the demurrer. The defendant then pled no contest to the charges and appealed, with the trial court granting a certificate of probable cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that California’s licensing scheme for carrying concealed firearms, even as it existed prior to recent amendments, was not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that requiring a license to carry a concealed firearm is a reasonable means of screening for ineligible individuals, such as felons, and does not require a finding of dangerousness for each applicant. The court found that the statutes at issue are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and rejected the argument that the absence of a dangerousness finding rendered the statutes unconstitutional. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and assault with a firearm, with several enhancements found true, including prior convictions and use of a firearm. He was sentenced to a total prison term of 23 years and four months, later reduced to 21 years and four months after some enhancements were struck on remand. The sentencing court imposed various fines and fees, including a restitution fine, court operations assessment, criminal conviction assessment, and a booking fee. The defendant previously challenged the imposition of these fines and fees on due process grounds, but the California Court of Appeal found any error harmless, as he could pay from future wages.After his conviction became final, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion in the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate the fines and fees, arguing that statutory changes rendered some unenforceable and that others were unconstitutional without an ability-to-pay hearing. The trial court denied the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief through a freestanding postjudgment motion and suggested that a writ petition would be the proper procedural vehicle.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that neither the trial court nor the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s postjudgment motion because his conviction was final and he had begun serving his sentence. The court explained that, absent express statutory authorization, a defendant cannot challenge fines and fees through a standalone motion after judgment is final. The court also rejected arguments that recent statutory amendments or case law provided jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2003 after pleading no contest to several counts of lewd and lascivious acts with minors and one count of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor. The plea agreement amended one charge from forcible to nonforcible oral copulation, and the factual basis for the plea referenced police reports describing acts involving force. In 2005, mental health professionals evaluated the petitioner and, relying in part on a probation report, certified him as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under California law, finding he had committed a qualifying offense involving force or violence. The Board of Parole Hearings affirmed this certification, and the petitioner did not seek review in the superior court at that time. He has remained in state custody under annual recommitment orders since then.Years later, the petitioner challenged his original MDO certification in the Fresno County Superior Court through a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for MDO commitment because he did not admit to using force or violence, and that reliance on hearsay in the probation report violated his constitutional rights. The superior court denied the petition, finding the probation report admissible and sufficient to establish use of force, and concluded the petitioner’s offense qualified under the statutory “catchall” provision for nonenumerated crimes involving force or violence.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that a habeas corpus petition is an appropriate means to challenge an initial MDO certification based on the nature of the underlying offense, even many years after the initial commitment. The court further held that the evidentiary rule announced in People v. Stevens, which restricts the use of expert testimony to prove qualifying offenses, does not apply retroactively. The court found sufficient evidence supported the original certification under the law in effect at the time and rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Grinder" on Justia Law

Ricardo Sarabia was involved in a shooting incident on December 23, 2016, where he shot three people: brothers German and Ramon Servin, and Domenica Romero. The altercation began over Sarabia’s missing phone, car keys, and gun. After a heated exchange, Sarabia shot Ramon through a bathroom door, then shot German multiple times, and finally shot Romero as she hid in a closet. German died at the scene, Ramon survived after medical intervention, and Romero also survived. Both Ramon and Romero identified Sarabia, known as “Clover,” as the shooter. Sarabia was later arrested in Arizona, where police recovered evidence from his phone and residence.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over Sarabia’s trial. During the proceedings, the court excluded gang evidence and instructed witnesses to avoid related terminology. Sarabia’s motions for mistrial, based on a witness’s use of the word “moniker,” and to exclude certain evidence, were denied. The court also denied his midtrial requests to substitute counsel and to represent himself, finding them untimely and not knowing. The court admitted prior testimony from Ramon, who asserted his Fifth Amendment right, and allowed impeachment of Romero with her prior inconsistent statements. The jury convicted Sarabia of first degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, dissuading a witness, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, with firearm enhancements. He was sentenced to 90 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, denial of mistrial, refusal to give a heat of passion instruction, or in denying Sarabia’s Marsden and Faretta motions. The court also found sufficient evidence supported the convictions and enhancements. The case was remanded solely to correct the abstract of judgment regarding the sentence and custody credits. View "People v. Sarabia" on Justia Law

A defendant was stopped by police in the early morning hours after being observed swerving and speeding. The officer detected signs of alcohol intoxication, and the defendant refused a chemical test, leading to a blood draw pursuant to a warrant. The defendant was charged with four misdemeanor offenses related to driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, with additional allegations of a high blood alcohol content and refusal to submit to testing. The defendant, a military veteran, moved for pretrial military diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.80, submitting evidence of his military service and documentation of alcohol use disorder and other mental health conditions allegedly resulting from his service.The Superior Court of Orange County denied the motion for military diversion, reasoning that there was no nexus between the defendant’s alcohol abuse and his military service, and that his alcohol use predated his service. The court appeared to require the defendant to show a relationship between his qualifying condition and the commission of the charged offenses. The defendant then sought a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that for misdemeanor charges, Penal Code section 1001.80 does not require a defendant to show a nexus between the qualifying condition (such as substance abuse) and the commission of the offense. The court further clarified that the burden of proof for eligibility is a “reasonable possibility” standard: the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that he is suffering from a qualifying condition as a result of military service. The court granted the writ, directed the trial court to vacate its denial, and ordered a new hearing applying the correct legal standards. View "Segura v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2006, Victor Arriaga entered into an oral agreement with Gilbert Torres to repair water-damaged drywall in Torres’s home. The project expanded to include additional repairs and a room addition, with Torres paying Arriaga substantial sums by check and cash. After several weeks, Arriaga and his father, who worked with him, left the job unfinished and removed their tools and materials from the property. Torres was unable to contact Arriaga afterward. The Los Angeles Building and Safety Department later issued a stop-work notice due to unpermitted and non-code-compliant work, and the Contractors State License Board (CSLB) discovered Arriaga was unlicensed. The CSLB referred the matter to the district attorney, who filed a felony complaint in 2007 for wrongful diversion of construction funds. However, there was no evidence that law enforcement attempted to contact Arriaga or inform him of the warrant. Arriaga moved to Nevada, and only learned of the warrant in 2022 after a misdemeanor arrest there. He returned to Los Angeles in 2023 to address the warrant and was arraigned.The Los Angeles County Superior Court held a preliminary hearing in 2023, after which Arriaga was held to answer. In 2024, Arriaga moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the 16-year delay between the complaint and his arraignment violated his state and federal speedy trial rights, causing him prejudice due to lost evidence and the death of his father, a key witness. The trial court denied the motion, finding no actual prejudice and concluding that the People had a legitimate justification for the delay.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that Arriaga’s state speedy trial right was violated by the 16-year post-complaint delay, finding that he made a prima facie showing of prejudice due to the loss of his father’s testimony, and that the prosecution failed to provide a legitimate justification for the delay. The court granted Arriaga’s petition for a writ of prohibition and directed the trial court to dismiss the felony count. View "Arriaga v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Andre Hart was convicted of first-degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm following a 1996 jury trial. The incident involved Hart and another individual planning a robbery to obtain drugs. Hart approached the victim, Gary Hendricks, outside Hendricks’s apartment, and after a brief interaction, Hendricks was shot and killed. Witnesses saw Hart crouched over the victim immediately after the shooting, and later, Hart admitted to a friend that he had shot someone. However, the jury found not true an allegation that Hart personally used a firearm during the murder.After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Hart filed a petition in the Superior Court of San Diego County under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking to vacate his murder conviction based on changes in California’s felony murder law. At the evidentiary hearing, Hart argued that the jury’s prior finding on the firearm use allegation precluded the court from finding he was the actual killer. The court admitted Hart’s 2021 statements to a forensic psychologist, in which he admitted to being the shooter, and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hart was the actual killer. Alternatively, the court found Hart was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that Hart’s statements to the psychologist were admissible and not protected by privilege or the privilege against self-incrimination. It further held that neither section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2), due process, nor issue preclusion barred the trial court from finding Hart was the actual killer, as the jury’s not true finding on the firearm use allegation was not an “ultimate fact” necessary for murder liability. The order denying Hart’s petition was affirmed. View "People v. Hart" on Justia Law

A Black defendant was convicted of multiple felonies, including attempted premeditated murder, torture, and assault, after a series of violent incidents. The most serious event occurred at a hotel, where the defendant attacked a night manager with a boxcutter, stabbed him, and then continued to assault him with a pen and by biting and headbutting him. The defendant also assaulted correctional officers on two separate occasions while in jail. At trial, the defense did not dispute the violent conduct but argued that the defendant lacked the specific intent required for the most serious charges, emphasizing his impulsive behavior and likening his actions to those of an animal.The case was tried in the San Mateo County Superior Court, where the jury found the defendant guilty on all charges presented. The court imposed consecutive sentences for attempted murder and torture, finding that the crimes involved separate acts of violence and objectives. The court also described the defendant’s conduct as “animalistic” at sentencing. The defendant appealed, arguing that his counsel’s and the court’s animal comparisons violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA), that the court erred in evidentiary rulings and sentencing, and that cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, held that the defendant was procedurally barred from raising RJA claims based on his counsel’s animal comparisons because those statements were part of a deliberate defense strategy, invoking the doctrine of invited error. The court also found that the RJA claim regarding the trial court’s comment was forfeited due to lack of objection. The court rejected the defendant’s other claims, finding no evidentiary or sentencing error, and affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Midell" on Justia Law