Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence in Riverside County, California, and sought pretrial military diversion under Penal Code section 1001.80. He had served five months of active duty in the United States Marine Corps and several years in the reserves. The trial court denied his request, finding him ineligible because he had not completed at least one year of active service or one day of combat, relying on a local Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and its interpretation of legislative intent.The defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate in the Appellate Division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The People conceded that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not require a minimum of one year of service. The Appellate Division agreed, holding that the statute contains no such time requirement and remanded for the trial court to reconsider eligibility. The Appellate Division also clarified that, even if eligible, a defendant is not automatically entitled to diversion; the trial court retains discretion to assess suitability for diversion, guided by the statute’s rehabilitative purpose.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, then transferred the case for review. The court held that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not impose a minimum service duration for eligibility for military diversion, and the MOU’s one-year requirement does not apply to diversion under this statute. The court further held that trial courts must first determine eligibility under the statute and then exercise discretion to assess suitability for diversion, considering factors consistent with the statute’s rehabilitative goals. The court issued a writ directing the superior court to vacate its denial and conduct further proceedings consistent with these principles. View "Angulo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Yvette Renee Garcia was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and two counts related to driving under the influence of alcohol, following an incident in which she, while intoxicated, deliberately rammed her car into another vehicle during an argument. A breath test showed her blood-alcohol concentration was between .22 and .24. The charges stemmed from a single course of conduct.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Garcia’s request for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, finding her ineligible due to the DUI charges. Garcia then pleaded no contest to the assault and one DUI count, while the other DUI count was dismissed. The court imposed three years of formal probation for both the assault and DUI convictions, with additional conditions including community labor and jail time already served. Garcia appealed, and the trial court issued a certificate of probable cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that Vehicle Code section 23640 bars diversion in any case where a defendant is charged with a DUI offense, regardless of whether other non-DUI charges are included in the same case. The court rejected Garcia’s argument that she should be eligible for diversion on the assault charge, since all charges arose from a single incident and were prosecuted together. The court also found that the probation term for the assault charge exceeded the statutory maximum and modified it from three years to two years, while affirming the judgment as modified. The trial court was directed to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Carlos Mendoza was charged with second degree robbery and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, along with related enhancements, following an incident in San Francisco. At his arraignment on the original felony complaint, Mendoza pled not guilty and waived his right to a preliminary hearing within 10 court days, but did not waive his right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days. Shortly before the expiration of the 60-day period, the prosecution moved to amend the complaint to add gang-related allegations and a new count for participation in a criminal street gang, based on recent discovery. Mendoza was arraigned and pled not guilty to the amended complaint, but did not waive the 60-day time limit.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco permitted the amendment and recalculated the statutory time limits, treating the arraignment on the amended complaint as restarting the 60-day period for holding a preliminary hearing. Mendoza’s counsel objected, arguing the preliminary hearing should occur within 60 days of the original arraignment. The trial court denied motions to dismiss based on violation of the 60-day limit, holding that material amendments to the complaint could restart the statutory period unless prompted by improper purpose. After the preliminary hearing, Mendoza was held to answer, and subsequent motions to dismiss were denied.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed Mendoza’s petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. Although the underlying criminal case was dismissed as moot, the appellate court exercised its discretion to resolve the legal question. The court held that, absent a personal waiver by the defendant, an arraignment or plea on an amended complaint does not restart the 60-day period for holding a preliminary hearing under Penal Code section 859b. The statutory 60-day limit is absolute, and its purpose is to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy preliminary hearing. The petition was dismissed as moot. View "Mendoza v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a Los Angeles County jury in 2000 of eight counts of first-degree special-circumstance murder and numerous other violent crimes, with firearm and gang enhancements found true. He received eight death sentences and a noncapital sentence exceeding 100 years to life, to be served consecutively. While his automatic appeal from the capital judgment was pending before the California Supreme Court, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified him as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which retroactively invalidates certain prior prison term enhancements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County set the matter for possible resentencing, appointed counsel, and held several hearings in the defendant’s absence. At the hearing, defense counsel requested the court strike the now-invalidated enhancement and conduct a holistic resentencing, including consideration of the Racial Justice Act and reassessment of the death sentences. The trial court declined to resentence, finding it lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence while the direct appeal was pending before the California Supreme Court, and denied the motion without prejudice to revisiting the issue after the Supreme Court’s decision.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that, under California law, the filing of a notice of appeal in a capital case vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the California Supreme Court over the entire judgment, including both capital and noncapital convictions and sentences. The court concluded that Penal Code section 1172.75 does not create an exception allowing trial courts to resentence defendants in capital cases while a direct appeal is pending. The appellate court also found no prejudicial error in holding the resentencing hearing in the defendant’s absence. The postjudgment order denying resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Millsap" on Justia Law

Daniel Orozco was involved in a drive-by shooting in Los Angeles, where he and three other members or associates of the Varrio Norwalk gang entered rival Chivas gang territory. During two separate incidents about twenty minutes apart, a shooter in Orozco’s car used Orozco’s gun to wound one man and kill another, who was not a gang member. Police quickly connected the car to Orozco, found the group at his home, and recovered the weapon and other evidence. Orozco was arrested along with the others. At trial, Orozco’s defense centered on his alleged intoxication, arguing he was too drunk to form criminal intent.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate suppressed a confession by the shooter, Martinez Garibo, due to a Miranda violation. Despite this, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold Orozco to answer for murder and attempted murder, but not for conspiracy to commit murder, as there was no evidence of an agreement to kill. On the day of trial, the prosecution moved to add a conspiracy charge, which the trial court allowed over Orozco’s objection. The jury convicted Orozco of all three charges, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms for murder and attempted murder, with a stayed sentence for conspiracy.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the conspiracy conviction must be reversed because the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support that charge, and Orozco was not given proper notice. The court affirmed the convictions for murder and attempted murder, finding no merit in Orozco’s other arguments, including ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged prosecutorial error. The court also held that Orozco forfeited his challenge to the attempted murder sentence by failing to object and having adequate notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "People v. Orozco" on Justia Law

In 2020, an incident occurred in which Jacob Frederick Ball, while stopped at a traffic signal on a parkway, pointed a handgun in the direction of another driver after the driver had taken a picture of Ball’s license plate due to his reckless driving. Ball then sped away onto a freeway onramp. The driver called 9-1-1, and police later found Ball at his home, recovering a handgun and black gloves from his vehicle. Ball was charged with felony brandishing of a firearm at a person in a motor vehicle, along with two misdemeanors.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Orange County, the magistrate found probable cause to hold Ball to answer on all charges. Subsequently, the trial judge granted Ball’s motion to dismiss the felony brandishing count under Penal Code section 995, reasoning that there was no evidence the victim actually experienced subjective fear as a result of Ball’s actions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Penal Code section 417.3 does not require proof that the victim subjectively experienced fear; rather, the statute sets forth an objective standard, requiring only that the defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to experience apprehension or fear of bodily harm. The court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the count based on the absence of evidence of subjective fear. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the felony brandishing count be reinstated. View "P. v. Ball" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by a California Highway Patrol officer for speeding on Interstate 680. He was the sole occupant of the vehicle and did not have a valid driver’s license, instead presenting a fake one. During an inventory search of the impounded car, the officer found a loaded handgun and a large sum of cash. The firearm was determined to be registered to several previous owners, but not to the man. He was charged with carrying a concealed, loaded firearm in a vehicle and carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him.Before trial in the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, the defendant filed a demurrer arguing that the statutes under which he was charged were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as interpreted by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. The trial court denied the demurrer. The defendant then pled no contest to the charges and appealed, with the trial court granting a certificate of probable cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that California’s licensing scheme for carrying concealed firearms, even as it existed prior to recent amendments, was not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that requiring a license to carry a concealed firearm is a reasonable means of screening for ineligible individuals, such as felons, and does not require a finding of dangerousness for each applicant. The court found that the statutes at issue are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and rejected the argument that the absence of a dangerousness finding rendered the statutes unconstitutional. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and assault with a firearm, with several enhancements found true, including prior convictions and use of a firearm. He was sentenced to a total prison term of 23 years and four months, later reduced to 21 years and four months after some enhancements were struck on remand. The sentencing court imposed various fines and fees, including a restitution fine, court operations assessment, criminal conviction assessment, and a booking fee. The defendant previously challenged the imposition of these fines and fees on due process grounds, but the California Court of Appeal found any error harmless, as he could pay from future wages.After his conviction became final, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion in the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate the fines and fees, arguing that statutory changes rendered some unenforceable and that others were unconstitutional without an ability-to-pay hearing. The trial court denied the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief through a freestanding postjudgment motion and suggested that a writ petition would be the proper procedural vehicle.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that neither the trial court nor the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s postjudgment motion because his conviction was final and he had begun serving his sentence. The court explained that, absent express statutory authorization, a defendant cannot challenge fines and fees through a standalone motion after judgment is final. The court also rejected arguments that recent statutory amendments or case law provided jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2003 after pleading no contest to several counts of lewd and lascivious acts with minors and one count of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor. The plea agreement amended one charge from forcible to nonforcible oral copulation, and the factual basis for the plea referenced police reports describing acts involving force. In 2005, mental health professionals evaluated the petitioner and, relying in part on a probation report, certified him as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under California law, finding he had committed a qualifying offense involving force or violence. The Board of Parole Hearings affirmed this certification, and the petitioner did not seek review in the superior court at that time. He has remained in state custody under annual recommitment orders since then.Years later, the petitioner challenged his original MDO certification in the Fresno County Superior Court through a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for MDO commitment because he did not admit to using force or violence, and that reliance on hearsay in the probation report violated his constitutional rights. The superior court denied the petition, finding the probation report admissible and sufficient to establish use of force, and concluded the petitioner’s offense qualified under the statutory “catchall” provision for nonenumerated crimes involving force or violence.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that a habeas corpus petition is an appropriate means to challenge an initial MDO certification based on the nature of the underlying offense, even many years after the initial commitment. The court further held that the evidentiary rule announced in People v. Stevens, which restricts the use of expert testimony to prove qualifying offenses, does not apply retroactively. The court found sufficient evidence supported the original certification under the law in effect at the time and rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Grinder" on Justia Law

Ricardo Sarabia was involved in a shooting incident on December 23, 2016, where he shot three people: brothers German and Ramon Servin, and Domenica Romero. The altercation began over Sarabia’s missing phone, car keys, and gun. After a heated exchange, Sarabia shot Ramon through a bathroom door, then shot German multiple times, and finally shot Romero as she hid in a closet. German died at the scene, Ramon survived after medical intervention, and Romero also survived. Both Ramon and Romero identified Sarabia, known as “Clover,” as the shooter. Sarabia was later arrested in Arizona, where police recovered evidence from his phone and residence.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over Sarabia’s trial. During the proceedings, the court excluded gang evidence and instructed witnesses to avoid related terminology. Sarabia’s motions for mistrial, based on a witness’s use of the word “moniker,” and to exclude certain evidence, were denied. The court also denied his midtrial requests to substitute counsel and to represent himself, finding them untimely and not knowing. The court admitted prior testimony from Ramon, who asserted his Fifth Amendment right, and allowed impeachment of Romero with her prior inconsistent statements. The jury convicted Sarabia of first degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, dissuading a witness, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, with firearm enhancements. He was sentenced to 90 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, denial of mistrial, refusal to give a heat of passion instruction, or in denying Sarabia’s Marsden and Faretta motions. The court also found sufficient evidence supported the convictions and enhancements. The case was remanded solely to correct the abstract of judgment regarding the sentence and custody credits. View "People v. Sarabia" on Justia Law