Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court’s denial of her peremptory challenge. The Second Appellate District denied the petition for failure to demonstrate a prima facie case entitling her to extraordinary relief. After Petitioner filed a petition to review, our Supreme Court stayed all further proceedings pending its review. The court ultimately granted the petition and transferred the matter back to the court with directions to vacate its order denying the petition for writ of mandate and issuing an order to show cause. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the peremptory challenge because the subsequent lower court proceeding, specifically the subject hearing, constitutes a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2).   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court explained that there is no indication, despite the constitutional and practical distinctions between a new trial and the subject hearing, that the Legislature intended such a hearing on remand be considered a new trial under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). To the contrary, the legislative history of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) “does not support the assertion that the Legislature intended to permit a [peremptory] challenge at any hearing on remand in a criminal case.” Thus, section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2), was not intended “to counter every possible situation in which it might be speculated that a court could react negatively to a reversal on appeal.” The court concluded that the hearing conducted after a reversal and remand of a trial court’s order denying a petition for resentencing is not a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). View "Estrada v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Keandre Session was convicted of five counts of residential burglary, street terrorism, and numerous enhancements. On appeal he argued: (1) the placement of a GPS surveillance device on his vehicle without a warrant was unconstitutional because the officer who did so did not offer specific testimony as to how he knew that defendant (who was, indeed, on parole) was on parole; and (2) due to changes in the law, he is entitled to a new trial where the gang counts are bifurcated from the other charges. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding: (1) the surveillance device argument had no merit because no case or statute has ever articulated such a requirement with respect to parolee searches; and (2) even if the change in the law should be retroactively applied, any error was not reasonably likely to change the outcome of the case. View "California v. Session" on Justia Law

Defendant acknowledged that in 1991 he “was convicted of provocative act murder.” He appeals a post-judgment order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly Section 1170.95) petition to vacate the first-degree murder conviction.1 Section 1172.6 was added to the Penal Code by Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437). Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6 was amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (S.B. 775). Appellant claimed the trial court erred in denying the second petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. He argued he made a prima facie case for relief based on S.B. 775’s amendment of section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to add the following ground for relief: the petitioner’s murder conviction was pursuant to a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Appellant maintains he was convicted of provocative act murder pursuant to such a theory of “imputed” malice because he did not personally commit a provocative act. The provocative acts allegedly were committed by his accomplices.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that because Appellant was convicted of provocative act murder, as a matter of law, he is not eligible for section 1172.6 relief. The court explained that a conviction of provocative act murder cannot be premised on “malice that is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” The court further explained that the law of provocative act murder requires that the defendant personally harbor malice. View "P. v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant MaeReichelle Villamor Marquez appealed a court order directing her to pay restitution to the victim of her crimes. Marquez and two others fraudulently used the identities of 60 prisoners to obtain unemployment benefits from the Employment Development Department (the Department). The State of California charged Marquez with 21 felonies, some arising out of her participation in the fraudulent scheme and others out of her possession of controlled substances. Marquez and the State agreed to an indicated prison sentence range of four to seven years, and Judge Link granted the State's motion to dismiss all other charges. Marquez agreed “[r]estitution to [the Department] [would] be joint and several with co-defendants.” Appealing the restitution order, Marquez claimed the trial court breached the implied agreement under California v. Arbuckle, 22 Cal.3d 749 (1978) that the same judge who accepted her guilty plea and sentenced her to prison would also determine the amount of victim restitution to be awarded. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Marquez" on Justia Law

After the truck defendant-appellant Joseph Gyorgy was driving was pulled over for making an unsafe lane change, a police officer used his narcotics detection dog to sniff the truck’s exterior. The police dog alerted, signaling it detected the odor of narcotics inside the truck’s cab. In a subsequent search of the truck, officers found methamphetamine, a pipe, a handgun, and ammunition. Gyorgy twice moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of his truck, arguing the search occurred during an unlawfully prolonged traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied his motions, and he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. His sole argument on appeal was that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress. Based in its analysis of of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the Court of Appeal agreed the court erred. "What began as a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment’s shield against unreasonable seizures when the officers detoured from the traffic stop’s mission by conducting the dog sniff and inquiring into matters unrelated to the traffic violation." The Court also rejected the California Attorney General’s alternative argument the stop was lawfully prolonged based on reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. View "California v. Gyorgy" on Justia Law

In November 2008, a California trial court sentenced defendant Kelly Kimble to 25 years to life under the former Three Strikes law, plus an additional year for a prior prison term enhancement. In October 2022, defendant appeared for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., codified as Penal Code section 1172.75). At the hearing, the trial court struck defendant’s prior prison term enhancement, but otherwise left his sentence intact. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred in resentencing him under Senate Bill 483 without applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)). To this the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the sentence. View "California v. Kimble" on Justia Law

The National Center on Missing and Exploited Children reported a tip that username “mrwadleigh@sbcglobal.net” had uploaded 23 images of child pornography to an Adobe account, associated with an AT&T account. Detective DeRespini prepared a warrant application, identifying four images as child pornography and describing the images and why he believed the subjects were children. DeRespini did not attach the images. With a warrant, DeRespini learned the address of Wadleigh’s likely residence and that the Adobe and AT&T accounts were his. The search yielded 41 more images. DeRespini conducted social media searches and surveillance, confirmed Wadleigh’s residence and vehicle, and prepared a second warrant application to search Wadleigh’s person, vehicle, and residence; to search for and seize his electronic devices and stored digital media; and to conduct a forensic examination of seized items. DeRespini restated his experience and training and repeated the description of the original four images but did not include actual images. With the second warrant, officers seized items that contained additional child pornography.Wadleigh unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The court of appeal affirmed. The warrant applications contained sufficient factual detail to establish probable cause. DeRespini misdescribed one of the images and testified that he was taught not to include images of suspected child pornography in warrant applications; the court noted that the preferable course is to include the actual images purporting to establish probable cause. View "People v. Wadleigh" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in the stabbing death of a man during a street brawl. The jury in Defendant’s case also found a sentencing enhancement alleging that he personally used a knife to be not true. Defendant appealed for a third time, arguing, among other things, that substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s ruling he could still be convicted of murder as the actual killer.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s summary denial of that petition and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing per section 1172.6. The court agreed that the court erred in finding that Defendant stabbed the victim to death after the jury found not true an allegation that Defendant personally used a knife. The court explained that it is appropriate to remand the matter for a new hearing to determine whether the prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant is guilty under a permissible theory of murder. The court directed that in doing so, the court shall not make any finding or rely on any evidence which contradicts the jury’s finding that the personal use of a knife sentencing enhancement was not true. View "P. v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder; the jury rejected the special circumstance allegation that the murder occurred during the course of a robbery. In 2019, Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s petition on the grounds that Defendant was ineligible for resentencing because he aided and abetted the murder and acted with malice. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s findings but argued he should have been resentenced without a hearing under the streamlined procedure described in section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2), which applies when “there was a prior finding by a court or jury that the petitioner did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the felony.” He asserted that the jury’s rejection of the special circumstance constitutes such a finding, regardless of any other viable grounds for his conviction.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2) does not mandate vacatur of a murder conviction and resentencing when there are viable bases for murder liability independent of a rejected special circumstances allegation. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2) provides a mechanism to streamline the process of resentencing only if it is clear the petitioner is otherwise eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Marilyn Joy Zemek was convicted by jury of first degree murder (count 1); elder abuse (count 2); two counts of grand theft (counts 3 and 5); identity theft (count 4); and perjury (count 6). Regarding count 2, the jury found true that Zemek caused the death of the victim who was then over 65 years and under 70 years of age within the meaning of Penal Code section 368 (b)(3)(A). Also, concerning counts 3 and 5, the jury found true that Zemek committed two or more related felonies involving fraud with the taking of more than $100,000 within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.11 (a)(1). The court sentenced Zemek to prison for an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on count 1, plus a total determinate term of five years, comprised of eight-month terms (one-third the middle term) on each of counts 3, 4, and 5, and the middle term of three years on count 6. Zemek appealed, contending: (1) she was denied her right to a public trial; (2) the trial court erred by failing to sufficiently investigate and then dismiss a juror for misconduct; (3) insufficient evidence supports her murder conviction; (4) the trial court erred in denying her request for a pinpoint jury instruction; and (5) the trial court erred in permitting evidence of her prior thefts. The Court of Appeal concluded none of these arguments has merit, and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Zemek" on Justia Law