Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the California Supreme Court upheld a superior court's dismissal of a felony case under Penal Code section 1382 because there was no available judge or courtroom to hear the case. The Supreme Court held, without qualification, that “the state’s failure, over a considerable period of time, to provide a number of judges sufficient to meet the needs of Riverside County’s rapidly growing population and caseload” did not provide good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. More recently, Courts of Appeal in other parts of California have held that delay and docket congestion caused by the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. In October 2022, about two years and seven months after the pandemic began, the Superior Court granted Jose Tapia’s motion to dismiss his felony case because there was no available judge or courtroom to try the case by the time the section 1382 deadline expired. In doing so, the Superior Court found that there was no good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. The Riverside District Attorney sought writ review of that decision. Finding that the superior court did not err, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "California v. Superior Ct. (Tapia)" on Justia Law

Madrigal was among several men who got out of a van and beat a man, robbing him of $25-30. One attacker stabbed the victim with a knife. The victim died soon thereafter. A jury found Madrigal guilty of first-degree murder and second-degree robbery but acquitted him of participation in a criminal street gang. The court imposed an aggregate term of 100 years to life consecutive to 12 years in prison. Madrigal argued that the retroactive application of Senate Bill 1437, which added elements to the definition of felony murder, required the reversal of the first-degree murder conviction and that after defense counsel subpoenaed audio recordings of the van driver’s jailhouse phone calls, the court erred by refusing to review the calls or release them to the defense.The court of appeal vacated the first-degree murder conviction, conditionally reversed the robbery conviction, and remanded. A rational juror could have a reasonable doubt whether Madrigal was subjectively aware of a grave risk of death when he participated in the attack; it was not impossible for a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdicts without also making the 39 findings that would support a valid theory of liability. The error was not harmless. Once Madrigal showed good cause to release the documents, the court erred by refusing to release them on the ground it could not review them quickly and easily; it is impossible to assess prejudice from the error. View "People v. Madrigal" on Justia Law

In January 2017, Jackson was convicted through a no-contest plea of felony second-degree burglary and was sentenced to five years of probation, including less than a year in jail. In July 2020, he was charged with having committed probation violations in July and October 2019. In August 2020, the court summarily revoked probation pending a formal hearing. In January 2021, Assembly Bill 1950 took effect, amending Penal Code sections 1203a and 1203.1 and decreasing the maximum period of felony probation (with certain exceptions) to no more than two years. Sections 1203.2 and 1203.3, relating to probation violations, were not amended. In August 2021, Jackson unsuccessfully moved to terminate probation. In February 2022, the trial court sustained two probation violations, one involving a robbery for which Jackson had been charged and convicted in Alameda County. While declining to impose additional jail time, the court revoked and terminated Jackson’s probation as unsuccessful.The court of appeal reversed. AB 1950 applies retroactively, in cases not yet final when the bill took effect, to prevent a court from finding a violation of probation based on misconduct that occurred more than two years after a defendant’s probationary term began, but before the bill’s effective date. The court noted that the California Supreme Court has accepted the issue for review. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant attempted to appeal the denial of his petition for resentencing based on Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No. 483). In 2012, Defendant was sentenced to state prison for 49 years to life. He claims his current sentence is invalid due to recent legislative changes involving sentencing enhancements.   The Second Appellate District dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court explained that Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), provides: “The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in the law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” The court must appoint counsel for the defendant and hold a resentencing hearing unless a hearing is waived. Section 1172.75 contains no provision for an individual defendant to file the type of petition Defendant has filed. The court wrote that Section 1172.75 simply does not contemplate resentencing relief initiated by any individual defendant’s petition or motion.” Defendant has not shown that the DCR did not comply with its statutory duty. View "P. v. Newell" on Justia Law

Defendants B.G. and D.R. were making a purchase at a convenience store where they exchanged words with a man who was accompanied by his girlfriend and her two young children. A short time after leaving the store, B.G. stopped his vehicle in the street near where the man, girlfriend, and children were walking on the sidewalk while D.R. exited the vehicle and shot at the individuals multiple times. Defendants were convicted of premeditated attempted murder and related charges and were sentenced to terms of seven years to life plus 10 years (as to B.G) and seven years to life plus 49 years and eight months (as to D.R). Defendants challenged their convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle and permitting someone to discharge a firearm from a vehicle because Ross was not in the vehicle when the shooting occurred. Defendants argued that recent amendments to the sentencing law require we remand their cases for resentencing.   The Fifth Appellate District vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing in accordance with section 1170, as amended by Senate Bill 567. The judgments are otherwise affirmed. The court explained that when a court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, “the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion. After reviewing the trial court’s comments and sentence in this case, the court was unable to conclude that the trial court would not exercise its discretion to impose different sentences. View "P. v. Gaines" on Justia Law

The juvenile court found that at a 2020 neighborhood party, 17-year-old D.L. shot and killed a six-year-old boy and shot an adult twice. Video footage showed D.L. running down a hill seconds after the shooting, stumbling, and then running. Officers recovered a handgun in a dirt-filled hole where D.L. had stumbled. DNA swabbed from the handgun was a match with D.L.’s DNA. D.L. admitted to several felonies prior to the incident, including assault, robbery, and theft in 2018, and burglary in 2019. D.L. appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm in San Francisco. (Pen. Code 25850(a)), arguing that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” holding section 25850 must be facially unconstitutional based on its relationship to California’s laws for obtaining a concealed-carry license.The court of appeal affirmed. Before Bruen, California required an applicant for a concealed carry license to show “good cause,” usually by establishing a specific need to carry a gun for self-defense. D.L. argued that the requirement was substantially similar to the “proper cause” requirement for a New York unrestricted firearm license, struck down in Bruen. California’s “good cause” requirement did not survive Bruen but is severable from the other requirements for obtaining a concealed carry license, saving California’s regulatory framework for gun possession and preserving D.L.’s conviction. View "In re D.L." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Seth Hilburn was charged with first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, first degree robbery, and carjacking, with allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of all three offenses. Before trial, Hilburn entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the first degree robbery charge and the related firearm enhancement in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and a maximum sentence of 13 years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, the court considered aggravating and mitigating factors and imposed an eight year sentence, consisting of the middle term of four years for both the first degree robbery conviction and the admission of the firearm enhancement allegation. Hilburn appealed the sentence, asserting the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by imposing the middle, and not low terms, on the charges. Hilburn argued recent changes to the sentencing laws required the court to impose the low terms for the crimes he pleaded guilty to because the aggravating factors relied on by the court were not stipulated or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Hilburn also argued the court abused its discretion by imposing the middle terms because the aggravating factors did not outweigh those in mitigation. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and sentence, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Hilburn" on Justia Law

On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant Ahmad Raheem Price petitioned for a writ of prohibition, directing the superior court to grant his motion to set aside the information charging him with the 2019 first degree, premeditated murder of Jovany R., and unlawfully possessing a firearm on the same day. The information further alleged Price personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the death in count 1, and that Price had two prior serious felony convictions and two prior strikes. At the preliminary hearing and as part of his section 995 motion to set aside the information, Price moved to quash, traverse, and suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to 11 search warrants for electronic information, including a geofence warrant to Google, LLC (Google). In the suppression motion, Price claimed that the geofence warrant and several of the other 10 warrants for electronic information: (1) failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and particularity requirements; (2) had to be traversed based on material factual omissions in their affidavits; and (3) violated the particularity and notice requirements of the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA). Price also moved to suppress evidence that the gun used in the shooting was found in Price’s vehicle during a January 2020 parole search. Price claimed that the gun evidence was fruit of Price’s unlawful detention for being lawfully parked on a private driveway. The suppression motion was denied in its entirety. In the writ petition to the Court of Appeal, Price renewed his arguments made to the magistrate court. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the geofence warrant satisfied the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and was not overbroad; the good faith exception to the warrant requirement precludes the suppression of the geofence warrant evidence and its fruits, even if the geofence warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment; and CalECPA did not require the suppression of the geofence warrant evidence despite the government’s violation of CalECPA’s notice provisions. In the unpublished portion, the Court rejected Price’s claims concerning the other 10 warrants and the gun evidence. View "Price v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Anthony drove the car in which four defendants fled after they shot and killed the brother of a rival gang member. Two bystanders were hit and killed during the ensuing vehicle chase, resulting in two second-degree murder convictions for each defendant. The trial court granted three defendants (not Anthony) relief from the second-degree murder convictions under Penal Code section 1172.6, which provides persons convicted of murder before the 2019 amendments to the murder statutes to seek relief from such convictions if they could not be convicted of murder under the current murder statutes. The defendants argued the court should also have granted them relief from their Vehicle Code section 2800.3 conviction arising out of the bystander killings and erred by failing to explicitly strike the multiple-murder special circumstance found true by the jury as to each of them. They also sought resentencing on the Vehicle Code convictions based on recent legislation constraining sentencing decisions about whether and when to impose upper, middle, and lower terms of imprisonment.The court of appeal remanded for the trial court to strike the multiple murder special circumstance as to the three defendants; affirmed the denial of relief for the Vehicle Code convictions; remanded for resentencing based on an amendment to section 1170(b); reversed the gang-murder special circumstance and the 25-years-to-life sentences resulting from the gang enhancement and the life without parole sentences resulting from the gang-murder special circumstance. View "People v. Campbell" on Justia Law