Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a joint trial, defendants and appellants Larry Fletcher and Eric Taylor, Jr. were convicted of several crimes stemming from a shooting outside of a convenience store. At trial, an expert opined that both Fletcher and Taylor were members of the Four Corner Hustler Crips gang. The jury found appellants guilty on all charges and enhancements. The trial court then found the allegations on the prior convictions to be true. Given their strike priors, Fletcher was sentenced to 56 years and four months to life, and Taylor 100 years to life. One of the issues presented on appeal was one of first impression: whether, and to what extent, appellants were entitled to relief under California Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Session), which narrowed the applicability of certain punishments for offenses involving a criminal street gang. Although the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill 333 required the Court to reverse the conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang (count 2) and the gang enhancements (counts 1, 5, and 6), the Court held that the new law did not apply to the findings on serious felony and strike priors. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected several of appellants’ other challenges to their convictions and sentences, reversed on various counts and findings based on other new laws, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "California v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

In January 2020, Achane pleaded guilty to willfully inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (case 1); he was sentenced to an upper-term sentence of four years, suspended. On August 6, (case 2) Achane pleaded guilty to stalking and admitted violating probation in case 1. The court placed Achane on probation. On August 31, 2021, (case 3), Achane pleaded guilty to obstructing an executive officer. The trial court again placed Achane on probation. The probation department filed petitions to revoke probation in all three cases, alleging that in March 2022, Achane carried a loaded firearm in public, carried a concealed firearm, unlawfully possessed a firearm and ammunition, transferred an unmarked firearm, resisted arrest, and possessed a controlled substance while armed with a firearm.The trial court revoked probation. A sentencing hearing was held in Achane’s absence after he told the court he did not wish to remain in the courtroom. The court acknowledged that the probation department recommended reinstating probation but ordered Achane to serve the case 1 suspended four-year aggravated term and consecutive eight-month, one-third middle terms in cases 2 and 3. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Achane’s argument that he was entitled to resentencing under legislation enacted after the initial imposition of sentence that limits courts’ discretion to impose an upper-term sentence and, in certain circumstances, creates a presumption in favor of a lower-term sentence. Achane forfeited those claims. View "People v. Achane" on Justia Law

After shooting his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend, Defendant was convicted by a jury of the following: two counts of premeditated attempted murder; two counts of assault with a deadly weapon; one count of inflicting corporal injury on a prior dating partner; and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury also found true multiple enhancement allegations under section 12022.53. The trial court imposed the following sentence: two consecutive indeterminate terms of seven years to life for the premeditated attempted murder convictions (counts 1 & 4), plus two additional terms of 25 years to life for the respectively attached firearm enhancements under section 12022.53(d). All other enhancements attached to counts 1 and 4 were stayed under section 654. On appeal, Defendant argued the sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing under People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado).     The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment but vacated Defendant’s sentence. The court remanded the case to the trial court for a resentencing hearing where further evidence and argument may be received regarding the sentence to be imposed. The court held that the trial court, in this case, made its sentencing decision in the absence of the new presumption against exceeding the middle term, and the record does not clearly indicate that the court would have imposed upper-term sentences had it been aware of the new constraint on its discretion. The court held that Gutierrez is binding and the appropriate remedy is to remand for the sentencing court to exercise its newly informed and circumscribed discretion in the first instance. View "P. v. Falcon" on Justia Law

Nicholas Yedinak petitioned for mandamus relief, challenging the trial judge’s order denying him bail. Yedinak was charged with two counts of felony child abuse based on allegations he inflicted severe, nonaccidental injuries to his six-week-old son. For the two years and nine months after arraignment, Yedinak had been out on bail, making each court appearance and living in the community without incident. After his preliminary hearing, the judge issued a pretrial detention order based on a finding that other children in the community would probably not be safe if Yedinak were released pending trial, given the violent nature of the charged crimes. In support of his petition, Yedinak argued the order failed to satisfy the legal requirements for pretrial detention articulated in article I, section 12, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution, and In re Humphrey, 11 Cal.5th 135 (2021). The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court's order "fell short of the standard set forth in section 12(b)." The Court granted Yedinak's petition, ordering the trial court to vacate its pretrial detention order, and to reconsider the motion to set affordable bail. View "Yedinak v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendent Ernest Tilley pled no contest to robbery and admitted a prior strike conviction, for which he was sentenced to the middle term, doubled pursuant to the strike. Tilley appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the middle term, because the court did not consider defendant’s mental health problems in accordance with Penal Code section 1170(b)(6); (2) if that claim was forfeited, he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the judgment had to be modified, as the trial court improperly advised defendant as to the parole consequences of his plea. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Tilley" on Justia Law

Defendant inmates Jesse Farias and Fernando Miranda were found guilty of various charges stemming from their attack on a fellow inmate. Defendants, their counsel, and the State then agreed to allow the trial court to determine the truth of allegations that they had previously been convicted of crimes that constituted both serious felonies under Penal Code section 667(a), and strikes under Penal Code sections 667(e)(2) and 1170.12(c)(2), without their appearances. The trial court expressly found the prior convictions were for serious felonies under section 667 (a), but made no mention of the allegations under sections 667(e)(2) and 1170.12(c)(2). However, at the sentencing hearing, the court imposed sentences on the defendants as if it had found the strike allegations to be true. Had all parties attended the hearing on the priors, the Court of Appeal surmised someone in the group would have requested the court clearly make an oral record of its findings. Instead, the record was silent "with little way to know if the error was purely clerical in nature or if the trial court, in fact, failed to consider the strike allegations at all." On appeal, both defendants argued the court could not impose a strike sentence here, because it made no strike finding. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed a strike sentence was not appropriate, and vacated the sentence without prejudice for the trial court to correct the record. In addition to joining Farias’s challenge to the strike sentence, Miranda also challenged the trial court’s finding that two of his prior convictions were for serious felonies on grounds that those findings are not supported by substantial evidence. While the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding on one of the two subject prior convictions, the Court agreed with Miranda that, considering changes to the law governing gang offenses, the trial court lacked substantial evidence to support its finding that his prior conviction under section 186.22(a), was for a serious felony as contemplated by section 667(a). Both Defendants argued that amendments to Penal Code section 654 made after the trial court entered its sentence applied here; to this the Court remanded the case to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the amended law. View "California v. Farias" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal denied a writ of mandate sought by Petitioner to compel the superior court to dismiss the allegation that he committed various crimes "for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members," holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the writ.While Petitioner awaited trial, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 333 altering the requirements for imposing the gang enhancement by altering the proof necessary to establish the existence of a criminal street gang. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to dismiss the gang allegation against him. The trial court denied the motion and, instead, reopened the preliminary hearing to allow the People to offer additional evidence to satisfy the new gang enhancement statute. The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner's mandamus petition, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reopening the preliminary hearing to permit the People to address the amended gang enhancement elements because the defects in the evidence were minor errors of omission under section 995a. View "Rodas-Gramajo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Darrick Ocegueda was convicted by jury for first degree murder. He contended on appeal that the trial court misinstructed the jury on the theory of provocation as it related to the premeditation and deliberation elements of the offense and, relatedly, that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a clarifying pinpoint instruction. Ocegueda argued the combination of some of the standard instructions given (CALCRIM Nos. 521, 522 & 570) might have misled the jury to believe that provocation could negate the elements of first degree murder only if it satisfied an objective, “person of average disposition” standard. Additionally, Ocegueda claimed the evidence was insufficient to support the elements of premeditation and deliberation. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Ocegueda" on Justia Law

Waqa was convicted of forcible rape after he sexually assaulted a woman in a public restroom. Because Waqa moved the victim from the restroom’s small stall to its large stall before raping her, the jury also found true an aggravated kidnapping circumstance under the One Strike law, Penal Code section 667.61, requiring a sentence of 25 years to life in prison for the rape. Waqa argued there was insufficient evidence of the aggravated kidnapping asportation element, which requires that “the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense.”The court of appeal modified the sentence to a 15-year-to-life term. The One Strike law requires a term of 15 years to life for qualifying sexual offenses if the defendant commits a simple kidnapping of the victim. By finding the aggravated kidnapping circumstance true, the jury necessarily determined that Waqa committed a simple kidnapping, a finding that was supported by substantial evidence. Where there is insufficient evidence of a circumstance supporting a 25-year-to-life term under the One Strike law but sufficient evidence of a lesser included circumstance supporting a 15-year-to-life term, an appellate court may reduce the sentence to the lesser term. View "People v. Waqa" on Justia Law

The complaint, filed in September 2021, alleged that “San Francisco’s criminal legal system is in a state of crisis,” as over 400 criminal defendants had cases pending past their statutory deadline for trial. Of the defendants, 178 were in jail, typically locked in cells for 23 hours a day.The trial court dismissed, reasoning that, under the “Ford” decision, one department of a superior court may not restrain the implementation of a judgment entered by another department. On appeal, the defendants challenged the plaintiffs’ taxpayer-standing cause of action based on Penal Code provisions that impose a duty on the courts (and others) to expedite criminal proceedings, including by prioritizing them over civil cases, and to follow specific procedural steps before a criminal trial may be continued beyond statutory time limits.The court of appeal reversed. Ford is not relevant; the plaintiffs did not seek to review, revise, or reverse any decision in an individual criminal case. The court rejected the defendants’ alternative legal challenges, noting that courts must implement calendar management procedures, in accordance with local conditions, to ensure that criminal cases are assigned before the last day permitted for trial. With respect to standing the court stated that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded “waste” or “illegal expenditure” of public funds and did not impermissibly challenge a discretionary act. View "Raju v. Superior Court" on Justia Law