Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a gun. The jury also convicted him of second-degree murder, finding he had personally and intentionally discharged a gun causing death. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the felon-in-possession law violates the Second Amendment.The Second Appellate District rejected Defendant's argument. Relying on dicta from various opinions, including District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 592, the court found that all constitutional rights have limits and the Second Amendment right to bear arms is not offended by a statute prohibiting individuals who have been convicted of felony offenses from possessing a firearm. The court also rejected Defendant's jury instruction claims. View "P. v. Odell" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the basis that the 230 years to life sentence was unauthorized because his three prior violent or serious felony convictions under the “Three Strikes” law all arose from the same underlying case. Consequently, appellant contended he should only be sentenced as a second strike offender. The court construed this as an application for writ of habeas corpus and denied relief.Subsequently, Defendant appealed the order denying post-conviction relief. Because courts have the discretion to initiate an independent review of the denial of a post-judgment motion, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's petition. View "P. v. Hodges" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Travis Cody petitioned for postconviction relief under California Penal Code former section 1170.95. In 2012, a jury found Cody and codefendant Steven Banister guilty of murder during a home invasion burglary/robbery and found true a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. Under the prior felony-murder rule, if a death occurred during a listed felony, all the participants in the underlying crime could be convicted of murder. And under the felony-murder special-circumstance enhancement, if a participant was the actual killer, directly aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill or was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life, then he or she could be sentenced to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). As to Cody, the trial court imposed an LWOP sentence plus two years. On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by failing to give the accomplice felony-murder special-circumstance jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 703), but the Court determined the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The California Supreme Court later clarified the terms in the felony-murder special-circumstance statute. In 2016, a federal court disagreed with the California Court of Appeal and found the error in Cody’s trial was prejudicial. The district court ordered the state to either (a) grant Cody a new trial on the felony-murder special-circumstances allegation, or (b) vacate Cody’s special-circumstances enhancement and resentence him. n 2017, the prosecutor elected not to retry Cody on the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. The court then resentenced Cody to 25 years to life based on the murder charge, plus two years for two prison priors. In 2019, the California Legislature limited the scope of the felony-murder rule, which now mirrored the felony-murder special circumstance. The Legislature also enacted section 1172.6, which allowed persons to challenge prior convictions under the former felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Cody then filed a 1172.6 petition. After reviewing the 2012 trial transcripts (neither side offered additional evidence at the evidentiary hearing), the trial court denied Cody's petition. The Court of Appeal affirmed the court's order denying Cody's section 1172.6 petition. View "California v. Cody" on Justia Law

In 2016, petitioner Daniel Garcia was diagnosed as having porphyria, an extremely rare condition that is potentially fatal, especially if not properly treated. Garcia was in jail awaiting trial on charges including murder. Garcia made a series of requests for testing, evaluation, treatment, and preventive measures to deal with his porphyria. The trial court granted some of them (which may not even have been contested). However, when Garcia made an ex parte application for multiple measures — including being given protective clothing, being kept out of direct sunlight, and being transported only in air-conditioned vehicles with tinted windows — the court denied the application. About a month later, Garcia filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the jail’s failure to deal properly with his porphyria constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case was assigned to the same judge who denied his ex parte request. Garcia promptly filed a peremptory challenge to the judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The Court denied the section 170.6 challenge as untimely; he reasoned that the habeas proceeding was a continuation of the criminal action. Garcia thereafter filed a petition for writ of mandate to require the judge to grant his section 170.6 challenge. The Court of Appeal determined the trial judge correctly found the habeas proceeding was a continuation of the criminal action. Hence, the court correctly rejected the section 170.6 challenge as untimely. View "Garcia v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging Governor Gavin Newsom’s reversal of her 2020 grant of parole. Petitioner is serving concurrent sentences of seven years to life for the 1969 murders which she committed with other members of a cult led by Charles Manson. This is the fourth time a governor has reversed Petitioner’s parole.   The Second Appellate District granted Petitioner’s petition. The court held that there is no evidence to support the Governor’s conclusions. The court explained that Petitioner provided an extensive explanation as to the causative factors leading to her involvement with Manson and the commission of the murders, and the record does not support a conclusion that there are hidden factors for which Petitioner has failed to account. The court wrote that the Governor’s finding of inconsistencies between Petitioner’s statements now and at the time of the murders fails to account for the decades of therapy, self-help programming, and reflection Petitioner has undergone in the past 50 years. The historical factors identified in the criminal risk assessment are the sort of immutable circumstances our Supreme Court has held cannot support a finding of current dangerousness when there is extensive evidence of rehabilitation and other strong indicators of parole suitability, all of which Petitioner has demonstrated. View "In re Van Houten" on Justia Law

As four medically comprised inmates who required skilled nursing care were approaching their parole dates, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) unsuccessfully attempted to locate post-parole skilled nursing facilities. When their parole dates arrived, the CDCR paroled them to Kern County and transported them to the emergency department at Kern Medical Center (KMC), a licensed general acute care hospital. Kern County Hospital Authority (Hospital Authority), which operates KMC, sought a peremptory writ of mandate and injunction against the CDCR and its Secretary.The trial court granted the Writ, and the CDCR appealed, arguing it does not have a ministerial duty to obtain Hospital Authority’s express consent before transporting parolees to KMC’s emergency department.The Fifth Appellate District reversed, holding that the Department failed to comply with regulation 79789 when transferring the parolees to KMC, and therefore abused its discretion. However, finding that the injunction was overbroad, the Fifth Appellate District remanded to the trial court for issuance of a new peremptory writ. View "Kern County Hospital Auth. v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

After defendants Frayba and William Tipton pled guilty to committing insurance fraud, they were ordered to pay victim restitution to Nationwide Insurance Company of America (Nationwide). Later, Nationwide petitioned the trial court to convert the criminal restitution orders to civil judgments against both defendants. Defendants opposed. Relying on Penal Code1 section 1214, the trial court granted Nationwide’s petition and entered civil judgments against the defendants. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred because (1) Nationwide “failed to provide citation to any . . . authority supporting” conversion of the victim restitution orders to civil judgment; and (2) Nationwide’s petition lacked supporting evidence. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tipton" on Justia Law

The Contra Costa County Superior Court found McKneely, the defendant in multiple criminal actions, incompetent to stand trial. McKneely was admitted to Napa State Hospital. A year later, the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) issued a certificate that McKneely had regained mental competence, with a comprehensive report prepared by a senior forensic psychologist. McKneely was returned to court. His attorney filed an “Objection,” accompanied by counsel’s declaration “setting forth the basis for her good faith belief that [McKneely] was not competent to stand trial.” A 2022 amendment to Penal Code 1372(b) required that “[i]f the court rejects a certificate of restoration, the court shall base its rejection on a written report of an evaluation, conducted by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, that the defendant is not competent.” The attorney argued that no further expert declaration should be required if McKneely could present a sufficiently detailed declaration from his attorney.The court concluded that the court could not reject a certificate based solely on that declaration. Although the court was prepared to appoint an expert, McKneely requested that it not do so. The court of appeal rejected McKneely’s arguments that section 1372(c)(2)’s requirement of the appointment of an expert violated separation of powers principles and due process because, by “dictat[ing] the form of proof” required to reject a certificate of restoration, the Legislature “usurps the judiciary’s role.” View "McKneely v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

During a confrontation with three strangers, defendant Thomas Scott shot and killed one of them. As a result, he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, with various enhancements and one “strike” prior felony conviction. On appeal, Defendant contended, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence that his prior conviction violated Penal Code section 186.22 (amended effective January 1, 2022), and therefore there was insufficient evidence that it was a strike. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, because the prior was a strike on the date of the conviction, it remained a strike, regardless of the amendments to section 186.22. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court found an error in the abstract of judgment, which had to be corrected. Otherwise, the Court found no other error requiring reversal. View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after the jury found him guilty with respect to four victims of three counts of false imprisonment by violence; three counts of forcible oral copulation; three counts of forcible rape; and one count of attempted forcible rape. Defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of due process by ordering him to wear a restraint belt during jury selection, which was held in an unsecured jury assembly room instead of a courtroom because of the pandemic. Further, he argued that the trial court violated his constitutional and statutory rights by receiving the jury verdicts in his absence.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of conviction, vacated the sentence, and directed the trial court to resentence Defendant per sections 654 and 1170, subdivision (b), and any other applicable ameliorative legislation. The court agreed that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring Defendant to wear a restraint belt without making an individualized finding at the time of jury selection that Defendant posed a safety or flight risk or that he was likely to disrupt the proceedings; however, the error was harmless. Further, the court held that there was no constitutional violation because Defendant’s absence during the reading of the verdicts did not interfere with his ability to defend against the charges. However, the court held that Defendant is entitled to resentencing under amended section 654 because the one-strike law does not preclude a stay under section 654. View "P. v. Govan" on Justia Law