Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) to add Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which created new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. Jury selection for the trial of defendant Moises Jamie Jaime (for two counts of transporting controlled substances and two counts of possessing controlled substances for sale) began two months after section 231.7 became applicable. A prospective juror ("L.") asked to speak privately with the court and parties. In a private hearing, L. disclosed that her “cousin was actually convicted of murder in this court” and that the current district attorney spoke to her class when she was a child and “ended up bringing up [her] cousin’s trial in class before it had gone to trial.” She further disclosed that she spoke with a lawyer about the district attorney’s conduct. The prosecutor later exercised a peremptory challenge against L. After a jury found defendant guilty on all four counts, the trial court placed defendant on two years of formal probation. On appeal, defendant’s principal argument was that the Court of Appeal had to reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial because the State's peremptory challenge was presumptively invalid under section 231.7 and the State offered no evidence to overcome that presumption. The Court determined the prosecutor provided no evidence to rebut the presumptively invalid reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge, and the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing it. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "California v. Jaime" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of human trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act, misdemeanor false imprisonment, and forcible rape in concert of a minor 14 years or older as an aider and abettor.  On appeal, Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and the judgment should be reversed on the basis of instructional error.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Section 236.1, subdivision (c), prohibits the human trafficking of a minor and attempted human trafficking of a minor. Defendant was convicted under the attempt prong. Relying on People v. Moses (2020) 10 Cal.5th 893 (Moses I), she contends the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the People had to prove specific intent as to age and by instructing the jury that mistake of fact as to age is not a defense to the attempt charge. The court held there was no instructional error: A defendant violates section 236.1, subdivision (c), when the defendant attempts, but fails, to traffic an actual minor, even if the defendant lacks specific intent regarding the victim’s age. Mistake of fact as to age is not a defense to attempted human trafficking under section 236.1, subdivision (c) when the victim is a minor. Also, substantial evidence supports her conviction for trafficking. View "P. v. Middleton" on Justia Law

In 2021, police identified Andre Lepere as a person of interest through DNA “Investigative Genealogy.” In 1980, a 79-year-old woman was raped and murdered in her Anaheim home. Police booked a rape kit into evidence. In 2002, a forensic scientist was able to extract male DNA from the rape kit. Lepere was living in New Mexico at that time, but there was evidence he had lived in Anaheim in 1980. Police obtained a search warrant and recovered Lepere’s DNA from a trash can next to his home. Lepere’s DNA was a match with DNA recovered from the 1980 murder victim. A jury found Lepere guilty of the 1980 murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). On appeal, Lepere claimed the police officer’s affidavit in support of the search warrant lacked probable cause and the prosecutor misstated the law during the closing argument. After review, the Court of Appeal found the facts about the DNA evidence and the other corroborating facts in the affidavit established probable cause for the search. As far as the closing argument goes, even if we assume the prosecutor misstated the law, we presume the jurors followed the court’s instructions. We also find there was overwhelming evidence of Lepere’s guilt. Thus, we affirm the judgment. View "California v. Lepere" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from judgments of conviction entered after a jury found them each guilty of one count of grand theft. Defendants contend there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions because the evidence failed to establish the value of the stolen items—15 boxes of adjustable dumbbells—exceeded $950. The only evidence of the dumbbells’ value was the testimony of the manager of the warehouse facility where the theft occurred, who testified to the prices listed on three retailers’ websites for the same product. Defendants contend this testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it was offered for the truth of the dumbbells’ value.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that evidence of a retail price for a stolen item, whether based on an online listing or a brick-and-mortar store price tag, is admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that a retailer is advertising the item for a specified price in the marketplace. This price, in turn, is circumstantial evidence of the fair market value of the item, defined under California law as the highest price obtainable in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller. The jury need not decide the truth of whether a specific retailer would sell the item for the advertised price or the value the retailer places on the item, nor should the jury consider the evidence for these hearsay purposes. Further, the court held that there was substantial circumstantial evidence co-Defendant aided and abetted the theft. View "P. v. Portillo" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Alex Alexander challenged the constitutionality of laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and ammunition under the Second Amendment in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. __ [142 S.Ct. 2111] (2022). Applying the new analytical framework set forth in Bruen for assessing Second Amendment challenges, the Court of Appeal concluded that the laws are facially valid. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Based on a 2021 shooting death, a jury convicted Hiller of second-degree murder, Penal Code 187(a), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, section 29800(a)(1). The court found true several enhancement allegations, including that Hiller had suffered convictions in the State of Washington for serious or violent felonies, specifically robbery, and imposed a total sentence of 116 years to life; his terms were tripled under the Three Strikes law and he received two consecutive five-year enhancements for prior serious felonies.The court of appeal vacated the sentence, noting that robbery under Washington law does not require, as California law does, that the defendant intends permanently to deprive another of personal property, and that the trial court cannot supply this missing element of permanency by construing facts recorded in a document supplying the factual basis for defendant’s plea. The one-year arming enhancement (Penal Code 12022(a)(1)) was also stricken. The trial court’s true findings regarding the prior felony allegations under sections 667(a) and the Three Strikes law were reversed. The court remanded for retrial of the prior conviction allegations and resentencing. View "People v. Hiller" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Angelo Sherman petitioned for resentencing nearly 20 years after multiple convictions and receiving a sentence of 123 years to life for raping and sexually assaulting five different women, with a prior serious felony conviction for rape of an unconscious woman. He contended the trial court improperly found him ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91(b), because he adequately alleged that he suffered from a substance abuse problem related to his military service. The State contended Sherman was ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.91(c), which was added to the statute and made effective January 1, 2023, while this appeal was pending. Subdivision (c) stated that section 1170.91 did not apply to a person who has been convicted of a super-strike offense or an offense requiring registration as a sex offender. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 1170.91(c) applied to cases already pending when it became effective and made Sherman categorically ineligible for relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Sherman" on Justia Law

Delores Attig was murdered in 1986. She was with two male friends smoking and talking in their car when they were attacked by four male assailants, two of them armed with guns. The assailants bound her friends and robbed them. Delores was led a short distance away, where she was gang raped and then shot once in the head at close range. Her murder remained a cold case for more than 20 years, until DNA analysis of evidence collected from her body led to the arrest of four men in 2007: Eddie Montanez, his brother Steve Montanez, and two juveniles. In 2010, a jury convicted Eddie of the first degree felony murder of Delores, and found true a principal personally used a firearm. The jury rejected special circumstance allegations that Eddie aided and abetted the murder while engaged in the commission and attempted commission of robbery, rape, sodomy, and oral copulation. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison, plus an additional year for the firearm enhancement. In 2012, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. In 2018, Eddie petitioned to vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code 1172.6, enacted to allow certain defendant to take advantage of legislative amendments to restrict the scope of California's felony murder law. Eddie's petition was denied; on appeal he argued there was insufficient evidence to support the superior court’s findings he was a major participant in the felonies underlying Delores’ murder who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Finding no reversible error in the denial of Eddie's petition, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order. View "California v. Montanez" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought an alternative writ of mandate/prohibition after the superior court denied his Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss a charge for active participation in a criminal street gang. In the motion, Petitioner argued the gang offense and enhancements should be dismissed in light of the changes to section 186.22 effectuated by Assembly Bill No. 333, which became effective January 1, 2022. He asserted the gang offense and enhancements were proven at the preliminary hearing under the former law, but the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was insufficient under the new definitions of “pattern of criminal gang activity” and “criminal street gang” to support the charges. The court denied the section 995 motion, and initially, we denied Petitioner’s writ petition from the court’s order. Petitioner then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, and the matter was transferred back to the Fifth Appellate District.   The Fifth Appellate District agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively to the preliminary hearing proceedings. The court rejected Petitioner’s contention that dismissal of all gang-related charges is required. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to vacate the magistrate judge’s holding order as to the active gang participation offense and the gang enhancements and to hold further proceedings. The court explained that even assuming the language of section 995a, subdivision (b)(1) does not support reopening the preliminary hearing proceedings under the circumstances, the remedy the court adopted is supportable as a rule of judicial procedure by application of the principles governing postconviction reversals based upon a change in the law. View "Mendoza v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Bocanegra and Vernon R. were very close friends for decades. However, one Christmas, defendant, who was married, slept with Vernon R.’s girlfriend. The next year, Vernon R., by his account, slept with defendant’s wife, or, by her account, forcefully tried to. By this point, the friendship between defendant and Vernon R. was “dead.” Rather than allowing this saga to end, on the night of January 12, 2020, defendant drove from his home in San Jose to Vernon R.’s home in Manteca armed with three firearms including an AR-15 style rifle. Defendant broke a front window and fired shots into the house as Vernon R. scrambled through the house and dove out a bedroom window to get away. A jury found defendant not guilty of attempted murder, but found him guilty of assault with a firearm, possession of an assault weapon, discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, and causing a concealed firearm to be carried in a vehicle while an occupant, and found true an allegation that, in committing assault with a firearm, defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of a felony. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the matter had to be remanded for resentencing based on changes to Penal Code section 6541 made by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021- 2022 Reg. Sess.); and (2) his conviction of possession of an assault weapon had to be reversed because Penal Code section 30605 was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, ___U.S.___ [213 L.Ed.2d 387] (2002). Agreeing with defendant on his first point, the Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing. Otherwise, the Court affirmed defendant’s convictions. View "California v. Bocanegra" on Justia Law