Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Krissy Werntz sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Werntz committed murder by failing to protect her daughter. Werntz contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings. She asked the Court of Appeal to review the denial of her petition de novo because there was no live testimony. In the alternative, she contended there was not substantial evidence to support the court’s factual conclusions. Furthermore, she contended the trial court’s order could not be affirmed based on a finding of aiding and abetting implied malice murder because such a theory was not valid under the current law. The Court of Appeal concluded the proper standard of review was substantial evidence, and found that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Werntz failed to protect her child and was guilty of second degree murder. In addition, the Court rejected Werntz’s contention that aiding and abetting implied malice murder no longer exists under California law. View "California v. Werntz" on Justia Law

In 2016, Fredrickson (age 23) was charged, based on the discovery of honey oil (concentrated cannabis), marijuana, and equipment for honey oil production at her house. In 2019, Fredrickson pleaded no contest to manufacturing a controlled substance. The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Fredrickson on formal probation for three years with conditions, including that she serve 185 days in county jail. In February 2022, Fredrickson admitted probation violations, including failure to surrender for time in custody. The trial court revoked probation and sentenced Fredrickson to a five-year middle-term split sentence--two years in custody and three years of mandatory supervision.Penal Code 1170(b)(6)(B), effective January 1, 2022, establishes a presumption that the court should impose the lower term if the defendant’s youth was a contributing factor in her commission of a crime unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. A “youth” is defined as any person under 26 years of age on the date of the crime.The court of appeal rejected Fredrickson’s argument that the court abused its discretion in failing to treat the lower term as the presumptive sentence. The court was not required to make an express finding regarding the presumption because nothing in the record shows Fredrickson’s youth was a “contributing factor.” The court also rejected Fredrickson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "People v. Fredrickson" on Justia Law

In 2004, Wilson was charged with shooting three people, killing two. Wilson argued that a deceased third party was the actual perpetrator. A jury found Wilson guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder but was unable to reach a verdict on allegations that he personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the offense, causing great bodily injury and death. The court of appeal affirmed, stating there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions on a theory of accomplice liability and even “sufficient evidence to support a conviction on the direct perpetrator theory.”In 2018, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Wilson’s petition for resentencing. A jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the sentencing enhancement allegations for personally using and discharging a firearm does not preclude the court, in a subsequent Penal Code section 1170.95 hearing, from finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the actual shooter. The evidence was sufficient for a trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Wilson was guilty as the actual shooter. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2015, after his co-defendant stole a camera from tourists, Fox shot at the tourists as the two fled. Fox was charged with eight felony counts, exposing him to a life sentence. He pleaded guilty to robbery, admitted to personally using a firearm during the offense, and agreed to a 15-year prison sentence--10 years for the firearm enhancement and the aggravated term of five years for the robbery. While his appeal was pending, Senate Bill 620 took effect, granting trial courts new discretion under Penal Code 1385 to strike firearm enhancements. The court of appeal rejected Fox’s request for a remand to ask the trial court to strike his firearm enhancement while he retained the other benefits of his plea. In 2020, the California Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of “Stamps.” On remand, Fox unsuccessfully moved for the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement.The court of appeal held that Fox is entitled to a remand for resentencing under Senate Bill 567, which amended Penal Code 1170(b)) to alter a trial court’s discretion to choose the lower, middle, or upper term for a crime with a sentencing triad, such as the robbery charge to which Fox pleaded guilty. Based on the logic of Stamps, a defendant who agreed to serve the upper term under a plea agreement is nonetheless entitled to a remand to ensure section 1170(b)’s requirements are met. View "People v. Fox" on Justia Law

Coulthard was convicted of abducting his eight-year-old daughter after he failed to return the child to her mother in the United Kingdom (Pen. Code 2781 ). For this offense, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Coulthard on probation for two years.The court of appeal affirmed. The prosecution was not required to prove that a foreign court order used to prove Coulthard’s guilt had previously been registered under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. There was no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws; the court rejected Coulthard’s argument that “no reasonable interpretation of [section] 278" would put him on notice that violating an order of a foreign court, never registered with any U.S. court, could subject him to criminal penalties in this country. The court also rejected a preemption argument and an argument that the trial court denied Coulthard’s constitutional right to present a defense by failing to give him “a Hague Convention hearing,” denying him an opportunity to show that the laws of the UK granted him a right to custody; and foreclosing arguments about the necessity to protect the child. The remote, two-way audio/video testimony of the child’s mother did not violate his confrontation rights. View "People v. Coulthard" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Webb was an amputee with only one leg. He challenged his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, claiming he lacked the present ability to commit a violent injury when, balanced on his remaining leg and braced against a table in front of him, he lunged at a restaurant worker with a knife. The Court of Appeal accepted that a defendant’s own physical limitations or other circumstances might affect how far he could move to strike a victim, which in turn may affect whether that defendant had the present ability to commit a battery. "But this case lies nowhere near that line." One victim testified that the tip of Webb’s blade came within a foot of him and would have struck him had he not backed away. On this record, the Court concluded substantial evidence supported Webb’s assault conviction, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Webb" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought dismissal of the third attempt by the Merced County District Attorney to prosecute him for felony escape by force or violence under Penal Code section 4532, subdivision (b)(2). The People argued the exception to the two-dismissal rule set forth in section 1387, subdivision (c), applies and allows the third prosecution to proceed.   The Fifth Appellate District (1) vacated its November 17, 2022, ruling denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the information, (2) issued a ruling granting the motion to dismiss, and (3) restrained the court from conducting further proceedings with respect to the felony escape charge under Penal Code section 4532. The court held that Petitioner is entitled to relief as a matter of law and further prosecution would be prejudicial. The court concluded that the exception to the two-dismissal rule does not apply to these factual circumstances and further prosecution of Petitioner for escape is barred by section 1387. View "Barron v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Saucedo was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of evading a police officer causing injury, after a stolen truck he was driving collided with another truck and killed two young girls. He was sentenced to prison for 15 years to life, consecutive to a term of seven years plus eight months for the evading and taking charges.The court of appeal affirmed in part, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to the jury instructions, to the admission of autopsy photos, and to the exclusion of evidence about the victims or of Saucedo’s assertion that his foot slipped. The trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding numerous minor driving offenses committed by Saucedo to prove he acted with implied malice, but the error was nonprejudicial. The court reversed the conviction for evading. The deputy did not turn on the lights or siren until Saucedo turned off the highway down an embankment, the collision occurred only two to five seconds later, the deputy testified he was 15 car lengths behind at that moment, and there is no evidence Saucedo looked back or should have heard the sirens at that distance. View "People v. Saucedo" on Justia Law

In a joint trial involving a gang shooting, a jury convicted Daniel Ramos and Elias Ramos of: first degree murder; attempted first degree murder; and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also made true findings on firearm and gang enhancements. The court sentenced Daniel (the shooter) to an aggregate prison term of 92 years to life and Elias (the aider and abettor) to 84 years to life. Daniel and Elias appealed, raising over 30 issues. The Court of Appeal originally issued an opinion in late 2020, addressing all of the issues raised by defendants and affirming the judgments. The California Supreme Court subsequently granted Daniel and Elias’s petitions for review and held the matter pending its eventual decision in California v. Tirado, 12 Cal.5th 688 (2022). After Tirado issued, the matter was transferred back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of Tirado. As a result of the remand, and as a result of statutory amendments to Penal Code section 186.22, the appellate court found the true findings on the gang enhancement allegations as to both Daniel and Elias in counts 1, 2, and 3 had to be reversed, as well as the true finding on the firearm enhancements for Elias in counts 1 and 2, which depended on the true finding on the gang enhancements. As a result of the new enactments the following sentences and enhancements became legally impermissible,: (1) For Elias, (a) the 25-year- to-life sentence for the firearm enhancement in count 1; (b) the 20 year sentence for the firearm enhancement in count 2; (c) the four-year sentence for the gang enhancement in count 3; (d) the upper term three-year sentence on count 3; (e) a $154 fee imposed (to the extent it remained unpaid); and (2) for Daniel, (a) the 15-year- to-life sentence on count 2, which had to be reduced to a sentence of seven years to life, absent a legally permissible finding on the gang enhancement for that count; (b) the four-year sentence for the gang enhancement in count 3; (c) the upper term three-year sentence on count 3; and (d) the $154 fee imposed (to the extent it remained unpaid). The case was remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgments were affirmed. View "California v. Ramos" on Justia Law

Defendants were arrested and convicted of murder charges after law enforcement obtained a geofence warrant, leading to the discovery of evidence connecting them to the crime. Defendants filed motions to quash and suppress, which were denied. Defendants then entered guilty and no contest pleas and then appealed their conviction based on the geofence warrant.The Second Appellate District found that, while the geofence warrant satisfied the requirements of CalECPA, it was overbroad and violated the 4th Amendment. However, the court affirmed Defendants’ convictions nonetheless, finding that the officers relied on the geofence warrant in good faith. View "P. v. Meza" on Justia Law