Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The plan for the 1990 robbery-burglary was for Grady to drive Adger and Oliver (age 23) to Jimenez’s house for a transaction involving cocaine valued at approximately $60,000. Adger indicated he intended to kill Jimenez if he was alone. During the robbery, Jiminez was shot and killed. In 1996, a jury convicted Oliver and Adger of first-degree murder with felony-murder special circumstances, robbery, burglary, and conspiracy to commit those crimes, finding true the three enhancements for being armed with a firearm with respect to Oliver and finding not true the three enhancements alleging Adger’s personal use of a firearm.Oliver was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. In 2019, Oliver sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. After the trial court determined that Oliver had made a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing, a hearing was held and the court denied the petition. After finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Oliver was a major participant in underlying crimes who acted with reckless indifference to human life, the court concluded that he could still be convicted of first-degree murder under current law and was therefore ineligible for resentencing. The court of appeal affirmed. There was adequate consideration of Oliver’s youth and substantial evidence that he was a major participant. View "People v. Oliver" on Justia Law

In May 2022, the juvenile court granted a motion to transfer defendant minor T.A. from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. T.A. argued the Court of Appeal should remand so the juvenile court could reconsider its ruling in light of recent ameliorative changes to the law enacted by Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). The State conceded that the changes applied retroactively to a minor, like T.A., whose case was not final when they took effect. Nevertheless, the State argued, no remand was necessary here because there was no reasonable probability the juvenile court would have reached a different result under the amended law. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore affirmed. View "In re T.A." on Justia Law

Sonny Kim Thai appealed a trial court’s order denying his petition for termination from the sex offender registry and ordering he could not file another petition for five years. Thai argued insufficient evidence supported the court’s order and the court abused its discretion because it failed to properly weigh all the factors. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was insufficient evidence and reversed the order. View "California v. Thai" on Justia Law

In February 2001, Bounthanom Didyavong was convicted by jury of first degree murder for his role in the 1998 gang-related beating and shooting death of David D. In May 2019, following California’s adoption of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), Didyavong petitioned the superior court for resentencing, alleging he was not the actual killer or a major participant who acted with a reckless disregard to human life, and he did not act with intent to kill. The superior court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. The Court of Appeal reversed the denial and directed the superior court to issue an order to show cause. On remand and following a hearing that complied with Penal Code section 1172.6, the superior court concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Didyavong committed second degree implied malice murder. It denied the petition for resentencing. Didyavong appealed that determination, contending there was not substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion. The Court of Appeal agreed with Attorney General that section 1172.6 did not provide a mechanism to reduce a first degree murder conviction to second degree murder. We further conclude there was substantial evidence to support the court’s denial of Didyavong’s petition. View "California v. Didyavong" on Justia Law

Petitioner Vondetrick Carr drove drunk with four children in his car. He ran three red lights; the third time, while going 70 miles an hour, he hit a pickup truck. One of the children was killed. As a result, in 2004, petitioner was convicted of, among other crimes, second degree murder. In 2021, petitioner petitioned to vacate the murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition because petitioner was not convicted either on a natural and probable consequences theory or under the felony murder rule. Petitioner appealed, contending the theory under which he was convicted — causing death unintentionally but with implied malice while driving drunk was an “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” within the meaning of section 1172.6. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "Implied malice is not imputed malice. ... Petitioner’s contrary argument is an artificial concoction that takes the words 'natural consequences' and/or 'natural and probable consequences' out of their proper legal contexts and dumps them all together into a confused semantic stew." Petitioner argued that, by enacting section 1172.6 as it then stood, the California Legislature somehow embraced the view of the dissenting justices in California v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290 (1981) that an unintentional killing while driving drunk should be no more than vehicular manslaughter." The Court held the trial court correctly ruled petitioner was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. View "California v. Carr" on Justia Law

In 2015, Nijmeddin was sentenced to an indeterminate life term, consecutive to a determinate term, for murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of narcotics. In 2023, the Department of Corrections recommended that the court recall Nijmeddin’s sentence under the new compassionate release provisions, Penal Code 1172.2, that apply to defendants who have “serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory,” creating a “presumption favoring recall and resentencing . . . which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”Nijmeddin has advanced incurable pancreatic cancer, biliary adenocarcinoma, and other medical conditions. Nijmeddin is foregoing chemotherapy treatment. Nijmeddin, 65 years old, has committed prison rules violations, including fighting and violent threats. Nijmeddin’s doctor testified Nijmeddin “is barely able to get out of" his wheelchair and estimated Nijmeddin has three-six months to live. Nijmeddin’s brother, an attorney, is willing to be Nijmeddin’s caregiver. The court observed, “Nijmeddin looks quite good. … the doctors may say that he is terminally ill, he is not on that far end.” The court characterized Nijmeddin as “able to use his mental capacity to commit offenses” and declined to recall Nijmeddin’s sentence, finding that he poses an unreasonable risk to public safety.The Attorney General conceded that the court erred and that Nijmeddin is entitled to relief. The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to immediately enter an order recalling Nijmeddin’s sentence. View "Nijmeddin v. Superior Court of Monterey County" on Justia Law

In the first part of a bifurcated trial, a jury found Jones guilty of first-degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm, finding true the allegation that he had personally used a firearm causing death. In the second part, the same jurors found that he had been convicted of a prior serious felony.The court affirmed the murder conviction. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the jury instruction about the relationship between the juror’s reliance on circumstantial evidence and the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a way that violated Jones’s rights. There was no reversible error in the trial court’s purported failure to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. The court reversed the prior serious felony finding. The jurors were discharged and freed of any admonition around 10:10 a.m. and did not return to the courtroom until 2:05 p.m. The record is silent as to whether they abided by the terms of the admonition from which they had already been released and does not account for the jurors’ conduct or specific whereabouts during their absence from the courtroom. It is not possible to conclude that the jury remained within the court’s control. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2016, with a negotiated agreement, Vaca entered a plea of no contest to two counts of violating Health & Safety Code section 11379(a). The court dismissed the remaining charges and placed Vaca on formal probation for three years with a 120-day jail sentence. After completing probation, Vaca moved to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea under Penal Code 1473.7. At an evidentiary hearing, defense counsel stated that Vaca met his burden under section 1473.7 and alluded to the dismissal of the case. The prosecution opposed, and, concerning dismissal, claimed lack of notice. Defense counsel “invite[d] the Court to dismiss under 1385 and move[d] to dismiss under 1473.7 and 1016.2.” The court responded, “I’m going to go ahead and deny both of those requests … Under [ ] 1473.7[,] I find the defense has met their burden, but I will not dismiss.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Vaca’s argument that, after the trial court granted his motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7, the statute required the dismissal of the underlying criminal complaint. View "People v. Vaca" on Justia Law

In 1988, Kerins was convicted of sodomy with a person under 18, a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) qualifying offense. In 1998, Kerins pleaded guilty to two counts of annoying or molesting a child under 18. The trial court sentenced him to 13 years in prison. Before Kerins’s scheduled release date in 2006, two psychologists concluded Kerins met the SVP criteria, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(a). After his probable cause hearing there were multiple continuances, reevaluations, and substitutions of attorney. In November 2020. Kerins filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the People did not bring him to trial in a timely manner and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.The trial court denied the petition in November 2021, describing the delay as “considerable,” but finding that the “overwhelming reason” for the delay was that Kerins’s counsel sought “continuance after continuance.” The court further observed that Kerins did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 2019 and that nothing indicated Kerins’s defense had been impaired. The court of appeal upheld the decision. The court’s findings about the reasons for the delays and concerning prejudice were supported by substantial evidence. Kerins offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that his attorneys provided reasonable assistance. View "In re Kerins" on Justia Law

Minor S.S. (minor) appealed an order transferring him from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction, pursuant to former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1. Minor contended: (1) the juvenile court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) subsequent legislation applies retroactively and requires reversal because the juvenile court did not comply with new requirements for transfer hearings. The State conceded the second argument. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the new law applied retroactively and therefore reversal and remand was appropriate for an amenability hearing in compliance with the new law. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law