Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At sentencing, counsel stated that her client, defendant Eric Cooks waived his right to appear at any future restitution hearing. The court noted the waiver orally and in its sentencing minute order. Cooks appealed, claiming he never validly waived his right to be present at a future restitution hearing. At the time of his appeal, a restitution hearing had not yet taken place. The Court of Appeal concluded that until a restitution hearing takes place in Cooks’s absence, any error from an invalid waiver was hypothetical and not concrete. Concluding the claim was not yet ripe for appellate review, his appeal was dismissed. View "California v. Cooks" on Justia Law

Over several months, Jackie Marquez stole about $100,000 from her brother-in-law Robert C., who was then about 80 years old. The prosecution elected to charge Marquez with eight felony counts of elder theft as a noncaretaker. A jury found Marquez guilty of all counts. The court imposed a five-year sentence. Marquez contended the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the prosecution needed to prove she was “not a caretaker.” To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: a defendant’s status as a noncaretaker was not an element of Penal Code section 368 (d); rather, the Court found it more properly characterized as a charging option for the prosecution. Here, the trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution needed to prove the required elements of the crime: (1) Marquez committed a theft; (2) the victim was an elder; (3) Marquez stole more than $950; and (4) Marquez knew, or reasonably should have known the victim was at least 65 years old. View "California v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Stephen Wilson was convicted by jury of the sexual abuse of a child age 10 or younger. Wilson told his adult son that the victim (C.F.) at age six “was a better kisser than every one of my wives except [one].” During a police interrogation, Wilson admitted that he “kissed [C.F.’s] vagina and her breast area” and “she kissed me in private areas too.” In her testimony, C.F. (now 17 years old) described nine years of sexual abuse. Wilson contended the judgment should be reversed because in closing argument the prosecutor told the jury it could “presume” from this evidence that he “committed the crimes here.” The Court of Appeal determined that in the context in which it was said, the jury could reasonably have understood “presume” only in the colloquial sense, and there was no prosecutorial error. And even if there were, the Court concluded it was not prejudicial. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Bautista-Castanon digitally penetrated his four-year-old niece while babysitting. He was convicted of sexual penetration of a child who was 10 years of age or younger (Penal Code 288.7(b)) and commission of a lewd act on a child under 14 years of age (288(a)); the jury found true that Bautista-Castanon had substantial sexual conduct with the victim. The court sentenced Bautista-Castanon to 15 years to life in prison on count 1 and later issued an order sentencing Bautista-Castanon to the upper term of eight years on count 2 and staying that punishment. The court identified several aggravating factors: a high degree of cruelty and callousness; Bautista-Castanon’s position of trust; the vulnerable victim; planning, and Bautista-Castanon had expressed no remorse, and was a “significant danger to the community.” Bautista-Castanon had no prior criminal record.Noting a stipulation by the parties, the court of appeal remanded for resentencing in light of Assembly Bill 518, effective January 1, 2022. AB 518 amended section 654 to specify that, when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen term shall not exceed the middle term unless the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances are established by the defendant’s stipulation, proven to a jury (or to a court, if a jury is waived) beyond a reasonable doubt, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction. View "People v. Bautista-Castanon" on Justia Law

Defendant Jony Pantaleon was convicted by jury on 15 counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a children. In March 2022, after amendments to California’s determinate sentencing law went into effect, the trial court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 111 years in prison plus an indeterminate term of 115 years to life. The trial court also awarded defendant a total of 932 days of custody credit. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court’s imposition of upper term sentences was unauthorized because the State did not plead any aggravating factors as required by current law. Additionally, defendant argued, and the State conceded, the abstract of judgment and minute order had to be corrected to reflect the custody credits awarded by the court at his sentencing. The Court of Appeal accepted this concession and ordered the abstract of judgment and minute order corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment. Because the State was not required to plead aggravating factors relating to defendant’s prior convictions, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Pantaleon" on Justia Law

Defendant Yaroslav Viktorovic Shkrabak was convicted by jury of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and the trial court doubled his sentence based on a prior strike conviction. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to strike his prior strike conviction consistent with California v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996) because the court failed to afford “great weight” to the influence his mental illness had on the current offense. In supplemental briefing, defendant also argued he was entitled to a recalculation of his custody credits to include time he spent in Napa State Hospital after the trial court found him incompetent to stand trial. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the former argument, but agree with the latter, and will remand the case for a recalculation of defendant’s custody credits. View "California v. Shkrabak" on Justia Law

In November 2021, a jury convicted Rahsaan Butler of one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter and other offenses, and found true related allegations that he personally used a firearm and caused great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him to the upper term for the conviction and the firearm enhancement. On appeal, Butler contended he was entitled to resentencing because: (1) the trial court erred by impermissibly relying on the same facts that formed the basis of the enhancements to sentence him to the upper term; and (2) he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which became effective while his appeal was pending. The State conceded the legislation applied retroactively to Butler’s nonfinal judgment but argued that remand was not necessary because sentencing Butler under the applicable law at the time was harmless. The Court of Appeal found there was a split of authority concerning the applicable harmlessness standard. The Court adopted the approach in California v. Lopez, 78 Cal.App.5th 459 (2022) and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Butler" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed an order denying his petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. In 2017, the Second Appellate District affirmed his conviction for attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted shooting at an occupied vehicle. The jury found Defendant personally used a firearm. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate prison term of 23 years and eight months. In February 2022, Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court denied his petition without appointing counsel or holding a hearing.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record supports the trial court’s decision to deny the petition because Defendant was not eligible for relief. He alone attempted to commit murder. As the attempted murderer, he is “ineligible for relief” as “a matter of law,” and “there is no reasonable probability Defendant would have obtained a more favorable result if counsel had been appointed and given the opportunity to file a memorandum supporting the petition”; consequently, the trial court’s errors were “harmless.” But here, harmless error is a misnomer. The trial court committed no error. But in cases like this one, the harmless error doctrine provides a reasonable method to avoid protracted hearings in past cases that are final and should stay that way. This also frees overburdened courts to decide current cases. View "P. v. Hurtado" on Justia Law

Andre Myles was homeless when he broke into an unoccupied Oceanside house. During the 15 hours he was inside, he did not take anything of significant value. But he drank a juice box and ate ice cream belonging to the owner, and he charged the battery in the owner’s vehicle. Several months later, Myles tried to break into the house again. The only disputed issue at Myles’ trial for first degree residential burglary and attempted first degree residential burglary was whether he had the specific intent to commit theft when he entered or tried to enter the house. Myles claimed he did not have the required specific intent and presented evidence he suffered from a mental disorder that caused him to experience delusions, and at the time of each incident, these delusions caused him to believe the home belonged to him because it had been given to him by an “entity” named “Archangel Michael.” The trial court modified the pattern instruction on the definition of theft by larceny (CALCRIM No. 1800). The modified instruction also contained citations to appellate decisions involving burglary charges arising from alleged incidental use of utilities and consumption of food inside a victim’s home. The jury convicted Myles of both charges. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error when it modified the definition of theft and provided the jury with citations to appellate decisions that included factual summaries of other burglary cases. Consequently, Myles’ convictions of burglary and attempted burglary were reversed and the case remanded for possible retrial. View "California v. Myles" on Justia Law

In September 2018, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the People. Defendant pleaded no contest to attempted murder and admitted he had personally used and discharged a firearm in the commission of the crime. In January 2022 Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied Defendant’s petition, stating that Defendant “was the only perpetrator and the only shooter” and, therefore, ineligible for relief.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because the record of conviction establishes Defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The court explained that as the sole and actual perpetrator of the attempted murder, Defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. Further, the court rejected Defendant’s contention that the trial court “‘engage[d] in factfinding, weigh[ed] the evidence, or reject[ed] the petition’s allegations on the basis of adverse credibility determinations.’” The sworn testimony of police officers, based on surveillance video of the crime, that Defendant committed the shooting was and is uncontroverted. In short, Defendant was convicted, by his plea, under a valid theory of attempted murder that survives the changes to sections 188 and 189. View "P. v. Patton" on Justia Law