Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion brought pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a) to withdraw his 2017 no-contest plea to a violation of section 273.5 and to vacate his conviction. He contends that he did not meaningfully understand the actual adverse immigration consequences of the conviction because his counsel misadvised him, and the sentencing court gave a contradictory advisement. He also contends that he would not have agreed to the plea if he had understood, and thus the trial court erred in denying the motion.   The Second Appellate District reversed the order remanded with directions to the trial court to grant the motion and vacate the conviction pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (e). The court explained that Defendant’s undisputed evidence demonstrated a reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised of the immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have pled no contest to an offense requiring mandatory deportation. View "P. v. Villalba" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Latravius Gobert strangled his girlfriend to death in front of their six-year-old daughter. After a jury convicted him of second degree murder, the court imposed a 35 years-to-life prison sentence. On appeal, Gobert contended his conviction should be reversed because the trial court erroneously allowed hearsay evidence of two prior domestic violence incidents. He also sought independent review of the materials considered by the trial court during a Pitchess hearing. Gobert additionally contended that the portion of the minute order from the sentencing hearing prohibiting him from owning, possessing, and controlling deadly weapons and related paraphernalia should be stricken because it was not part of the oral pronouncement of judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed judgment: although the hearsay was inadmissible, it was harmless error. On the Pitchess claim, although the trial court did not follow the correct procedure at the in camera hearing, the Court independently reviewed the materials and concluded there was no resulting prejudice to Gobert. The Attorney General conceded that the discrepancy in the minute order required a strike of the terms “deadly weapon” and “related paraphernalia” from the minute order. At the same time, the Court rejected Gobert’s related contention that a notation in the minute order memorializing the court’s instruction that he not possess any firearms and ammunition constituted an unauthorized sentence. View "California v. Gobert" on Justia Law

Nakano, charged with felony possession of child pornography, entered a plea of no contest after the court stated that its “indicated sentence” would be to grant probation with a suspended sentence and that its “goal" was Nakano's return to Japan. The prosecutor opposed terminating Nakano’s probation upon his leaving the U.S. because terminating Nakano’s probation would mean that he would avoid any meaningful time in custody and would not undertake sex offender treatment required by Penal Code 1203.067. The probation department also opposed Nakano leaving the country.The court sentenced Nakano to 16 months in prison, but suspended that sentence and granted three years of formal probation, ordering Nakano to register as a sex offender and complete a sex offender management program “for a period of not less than a year.” The court imposed a $300 restitution fine plus a $300 probation revocation fine (suspended), waiving all other fines and fees. At a hearing on the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the sentence, Nakano’s counsel stated that Nakano had left the U.S., having paid his fines and fees. Nakano had registered as a sex offender. The court terminated Nakano’s probation. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court failed to apply the proper standard for terminating probation early, i.e., the “ends of justice . . . good conduct and reform” standard, section 1203.3(a). View "People v. Nakano" on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition alleged against E.P. alleged two counts of murder, two counts of  attempted murder, and one count of street terrorism. The juvenile court held a fitness hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 707. The court ordered the case transferred to criminal court. Since the hearing, section 707 has been amended.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for a new fitness hearing pursuant to section 707 as amended. The court explained that the amended section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider all five factors together in determining whether the minor is amenable to rehabilitation. Under the amended statute, like the previous version, the court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result. The prosecution is entitled to a new fitness hearing so that the court can determine, considering all five factors, whether E.P. is amenable to treatment. View "In re E.P." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of carjacking, attempted robbery and arson, all committed shortly after he turned 19 years old. At the conclusion of a resentencing hearing, Defendant’s trial counsel said that he would prepare a notice of appeal. He never did so. As it turns out, Defendant’s counsel had a brain tumor which was diagnosed five months after the hearing. He died in the hospital later that same year. Defendant contends his trial counsel did nothing to assist him at the resentencing hearing and had no tactical reason for his inaction. Defendant also filed this related habeas corpus petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.   The Second Appellate District granted Defendant’s habeas relief and remanded to the trial court for a new resentencing hearing. Here, the available evidence from Defendant and his trial counsel’s secretary supports Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This is not a case where counsel was silent because there was nothing to say. There was no tactical reason to say or do nothing. In addition to the declarations described above, Defendant possessed documentation of his programming in prison, demonstrating that his trial counsel would have had a basis to argue that Defendant had in fact been rehabilitating himself. The court explained that Defendant’s trial counsel had a legal argument to make to strike the gang enhancement. Defendant had a right to the effective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing. As a result of his trial counsel’s total inaction on every front, Defendant was on his own. View "P. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

In 2017, defendant-appellant Carl Tice, Jr., was arrested and charged with committing a felony offense. He was later charged with three counts of battery on a custodial officer, and one count of battery on a detention facility employee by gassing, arising out of four separate incidents that occurred while he was confined awaiting trial. Defendant was convicted on all four counts in a court trial. On appeal, defendant challenged only his conviction on count 4 for a violation of Penal Code section 243.9(a). Subdivision (b) of the statute defined gassing as: “intentionally placing or throwing, or causing to be placed or thrown, upon the person of another, any human excrement or other bodily fluids or bodily substances or any mixture containing human excrement or other bodily fluids or bodily substances that results in actual contact with the person’s skin or membranes.” Defendant argued: (1) because the alleged victim testified she was employed by the county of Riverside, she was not an “ ‘employee of a local detention facility’ ” within the meaning of section 243.9(a); and (2) there was insufficient evidence to establish that the substance he threw on the victim was a bodily fluid, bodily substance, or a mixture containing a bodily fluid or bodily substance. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed on both points and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Tice" on Justia Law

A trial court denied defendant Matthew Burke's request to strike a prior strike conviction under Penal Code section 1385 and to consider applying recent amendments to section 1385 to that determination. Defendant pled no contest to identity theft and admitted the prior strike conviction. The Court of Appeal appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a Wende brief, and the Court requested supplemental briefing on whether the amendments to section 1385 enacted by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) applied to prior strike convictions. Defendant contended the language and legislative history demonstrated the Legislature’s intent that the amendments apply to prior strike convictions. The State disagreed, arguing the plain language of the statute demonstrated the amendments applied only to enhancements. The Court of Appeal found the State's argument more persuasive. The Court found a discrepancy between the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment regarding fines and fees. But the Court found no other arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The trial court was ordered to correct the abstract of judgment to conform with the oral pronouncement of judgment, and the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Burke" on Justia Law

Defendant My Ngo was a “shotcaller” in a Vietnamese gang. At age 19, he was paid $2,000 to commit a murder for hire. In 2021, he filed a motion for a “Franklin hearing”: a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), for a juvenile offender to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for purposes of a youthful offender parole hearing to be held in the future pursuant to Penal Code section 3051.2 Under section 3051, juvenile offenders and most youthful offenders were entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing; however, youthful offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) were not. Defendant was a youthful offender sentenced to LWOP, and the trial court ruled that he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing. Defendant contended that section 3051’s distinction between youthful offenders with LWOP and non-LWOP sentences violated equal protection. Alternatively, he contended he should have been granted a hearing to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for other purposes, such as a hypothetical future resentencing under section 1172.1. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both contentions and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "California v. Ngo" on Justia Law

David Bustamante (the victim) was shot and killed in the parking lot of an In-N-Out restaurant on Christmas Day in 2015. The victim was giving a tattoo to Nancy A. when he told her he had to go out to meet a friend. Ana S., who was Nancy’s girlfriend, was with them. While the victim was driving, he received a phone call from a caller identified as "Jboy 12th Street" advising him to drive to the In-N-Out in Hesperia. The victim drove up to a red truck that was parked in the parking lot. The victim exited his vehicle and the driver of the red truck immediately shot at the victim, yelling “La Eme” a term for the Mexican Mafia. Both Nancy and Ana identified defendant John Oliva as the shooter; cellular telephone records placed defendant near the scene at the time of the shooting; and the victim listed defendant’s cellular telephone number under the name Jboy 12th Street in his contacts. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, the special circumstances of lying in wait and benefitting a criminal street gang, and weapons use and gang enhancements. After the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 333) which amended Penal Code section 186.22 and added Penal Code section 1109. The Court of Appeal recalled the remittitur, canceled the remittitur, vacated its previous opinion, and had the parties submit supplemental briefing on the impact of AB 333 on the judgment in this case. Based on these changes, the Court concluded remand for a new trial on the gang enhancements and the gang murder special allegation pursuant to section 186.22 was necessary. The Court determined the admission of gang evidence in this case was not prejudicial and a retrial on all of the charges was not required. View "California v. Oliva" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed an order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95. The Second Appellate District reversed the order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6. The court reasoned that Section 1172.6 authorizes a defendant “convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” to challenge his murder conviction if, as a threshold matter, he makes a “prima facie showing” of entitlement to relief. This, in turn, requires a showing that, among other things, he “could not presently be convicted of murder” under the amendments to the murder statutes that became effective on January 1, 2019. These statutes, even as amended, still authorize a murder conviction, however, based on murder committed by someone else in the course of a jointly committed felony as long as the defendant “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” Here, Defendant’s special circumstance finding was made prior to Banks and Clark. Defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. However, the trial court may rule after an evidentiary hearing. View "P. v. Arreguin" on Justia Law