Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed from a judgment granting Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate (judgment). DMV contends the issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred in overturning the suspension of Plaintiff’s driver’s license (1) “by applying [former] Government Code section 11440.30.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the “Judgment Granting Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Awarding Costs And Attorney Fees To Petitioner” and remanded the cause to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment to provide that the matter shall thereafter be remanded to the DMV for further proceedings. The court concluded that former Government Code section 11440.30 was applicable to Plaintiff’s DMV driver’s license suspension hearing. Said former statute is fully consistent with other relevant statutes, including, without limitation, Vehicle Code sections 14100 through 14112 and Government Code section 11501. Further, the court concluded that both CCR section 115.07 and former Government Code section 11440.30 were mandatory and not merely directory. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an implied finding that Plaintiff was prejudiced by DMV’s failure to adhere to former government code section 11440.30. View "Ramirez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In three separate cases consolidated for appeal, a trial court found defendants incompetent to stand trial and ordered them be committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for competency treatment. When DSH failed to admit the defendants in a timely manner, the trial court issued orders to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, and it directed DSH to admit each defendant by a particular deadline. When the defendants were not admitted by that deadline, the trial court issued sanctions of $1,000 for each day past the deadline that the defendants were not admitted, for a total of $91,000. Although only one of the sanctions orders stated sanctions were imposed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, the parties proceeded on the assumption that sanctions were imposed pursuant to that section in all three cases. DSH all three sanctions orders, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in concluding DSH lacked good cause or substantial justification for failing to admit defendants by the court-ordered deadline; (2) the written orders imposing sanctions fail to specify the conduct or circumstances justifying the order in sufficient detail; and (3) the amount of sanctions imposed in each case exceeds the $1,500 limit provided in section 177.5. The Court of Appeal interpreted section 177.5 as allowing sanctions of up to $1,500 for each separate violation of a court order. The Court reversed judgment and remanded for the trial court to determine in the first instance whether DSH committed separate acts of violating a court order on each day that it failed to admit the defendants past the court-ordered deadline, or whether its failure to admit the defendants could only be considered one act of violating a court order. "If the trial court determines DSH committed separate acts of violating a court order, its written order imposing sanctions 'shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying' that determination." View "California v. Edwards, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Brandon Lewis was convicted by jury of pimping three minors, for which he was sentenced to over 73 years in prison. He appealed, contending his Sixth Amendment right to confront an accuser was violated because a computer monitor blocked his view of her face when she testified. Defendant also contended, the State conceded, and the Court of Appeal agreed that a portion of his sentence was unauthorized. The Court disagreed Defendant's confrontation right was violated by the computer monitor; the Court concurred a portion of the sentence was unauthorized. In light of recently enacted legislation, the Court remanded Defendant's case for resentencing. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In consolidated proceedings, Petitioners each sought a writ requiring the Superior Court to dismiss their cases for violating their speedy trial rights under Penal Code section 1382.2. Petitioners argued there was no good cause to continue their cases past the statutory deadline because the Superior Court can no longer rely on the “exceptional circumstances” resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.The court of appeal denied the petitions. The pandemic and its adverse impacts on the courts did not end when the courts reopened; courts had to address both the backlog that had developed during the closure of the courts and new cases. Although the courts reopened, the pandemic continued to wreak havoc, with 36 judicial officers, court staff, sheriff’s deputies, attorneys, defendants, and jurors contracting COVID-19, being required to quarantine due to exposure, or having to care for family members. The persistence of a backlog during the period at issue was principally the result of continuing consequences of the pandemic. Not only the pandemic, itself, but its length, seriousness, and continuing effects were unexpected and unanticipated and resulted in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. The Superior Court did not, in these cases, abuse its discretion in concluding that exceptional circumstances justified the continuance of Petitioners’ trials past their statutory last days. View "Estrada v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Parry, driving on Lakeshore Boulevard, saw Fugit hurl a coffee mug at his vehicle. It shattered the vehicle’s window and sent glass fragments flying into the passenger compartment. Other motorists saw the incident and stopped. Parry found a ceramic mug across the road, broken into pieces. Lake County Sheriff’s Deputies responded in uniform and in a marked vehicle and informed Fugit he was under arrest. When an officer reached for Fugit’s hand to secure him in handcuffs, Fugit turned away, locked his hands together, and refused to comply with commands. The officer had concerns for his safety and warned Fugit that he would be tased if he continued to resist. Fugit was undeterred. The officer deployed his taser, incapacitating Fugit and allowing others to complete the arrest. A jury found him guilty of multiple offenses.The court of appeal remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion under Penal Code section 654 in selecting the principal term for sentencing purposes. Section 654 made the midterm the presumptive sentence in the absence of specified circumstances. Fugit has not established a due process violation that would compel reversal. Because the accusatory pleading alleged that Fugit used a non-inherently deadly “ceramic mug” to perpetrate his aggravated assault, he had notice the prosecution would try to prove that the mug was used with force in a manner likely to cause great bodily injury, which would support a conviction for force-likely assault. View "People v. Fugit" on Justia Law

Ung stole cryptocurrencies from multiple victims in 2018, exploiting a common website security feature: A user can prompt a website hosting an account to send a text message to the user’s phone with a security code that temporarily allows access to the account. Ung employed “SIM swapping” in which the thief tricks the victim’s phone carrier into switching the victim’s phone number to a SIM card in the thief’s phone. The thief then prompts the website hosting the victim’s financial account to send a temporary security code to the hijacked phone; the thief accesses the account and transfers the assets.In 2021, Ung pleaded no contest to identity theft, attempted grand theft, and 10 counts of felony grand theft. He admitted a white-collar crime enhancement; he committed three offenses after his bail was revoked. The court imposed a 10-year prison term, entered a general restitution order, and later ordered Ung to make restitution by transferring cryptocurrencies to the victims in the same kinds and amounts he had stolen. Ung argued the order violated his due process rights to notice. He estimates the value of the cryptocurrencies was about $1.56 million when he stole them; the value was about $15.9 million by the time of the restitution hearing.The court of appeal affirmed. Under the statute, the value of stolen property is the replacement cost of like property. By stealing the victims’ cryptocurrency, Ung deprived them of the ability to sell it for a profit after its value increased; whatever profits they lost were a direct consequence of Ung’s conduct. View "People v. Ung" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed an order denying a recommendation by the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to recall his 2011 sentence and resentence him pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, former subdivision (d)(1). The People concede that pursuant to section 1172.1, “this Court should reverse the order denying the recall and remand for reconsideration of the [Secretary’s] request.”   The Second Appellate District accepted the concession, reversed and did not reach additional contentions. The court explained that Appellant’s plea bargain included a stipulated sentence of 19 years and four months. The court reasoned that once the court has accepted the terms of the negotiated plea, “it lacks jurisdiction to alter the terms of a plea bargain so that it becomes more favorable to a defendant unless, of course, the parties agree.”  But section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(3)(A) provides that “in the interest of justice and regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a . . . plea agreement,” the resentencing court may “reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence.” Thus, under the circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand the matter so that the trial court can consider the CDCR's recommendation to recall and resentence. View "P. v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to one count of assault with a firearm and admitted a prior 2012 conviction for the same offense in exchange for a four-year sentence. Defendant contends the court erred in not awarding him presentence custody credits in accordance with Penal Code section 4019. The sole issue presented is whether the trial court incorrectly calculated presentence custody credits.   The Second Appellate District agreed that presentence custody credits should have been calculated pursuant to Penal Code section 4019. The court, therefore, modified the judgment to reflect presentence custody credits in the total amount of 993 days and otherwise affirmed the judgment as so modified. The court explained while not a qualifying violent felony, Defendant’s assault charge and prior strike qualify as a serious felony. The People, therefore, relied on sections 667 and 1170.12 in arguing that Defendant’s prior strike means his presentence credits were limited by those statutes. But the Three Strikes law has no effect on the calculation of presentence conduct credits. View "P. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Dwayne Burgess appealed a trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing after an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. There was no dispute defendant was eligible for such a hearing, the question was what independent findings the trial court was required to make when determining defendant’s guilt and whether those findings were sufficient. The Court of Appeal found that although defendant claimed the trial court erroneously considered itself to be bound by the jury’s verdict at trial, the trial court did conduct an independent analysis of the record and evidence before finding defendant guilty of murder under current law. The Court agreed with defendant that this independent analysis was required, and that the principles of collateral estoppel were inapplicable to this analysis. Although the State argued the trial court was bound by the jury’s finding that defendant committed attempted robbery under principles of collateral estoppel, and even if not, the trial court’s ultimate finding that defendant was guilty of murder under current law iswassupported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the State on both points. Because theft by false pretenses was not a predicate felony to felony murder, the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of murder under current law. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "California v. Burgess" on Justia Law

In 1992, a jury convicted Pepe Lopez of first degree murder with a true finding on a prior-murder special circumstance after hearing evidence the victim was shot and killed during a robbery in which Lopez participated and that Lopez had previously been convicted of first degree murder for his involvement in another robbery. In 2019, Lopez filed a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition seeking to vacate his conviction under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) which amended the definition of felony murder and eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory of murder. The trial court summarily denied the petition, concluding the special circumstance finding rendered Lopez ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because it demonstrated the jury had found he “personally killed, or personally shared a specific intent to kill.” Lopez conceded the special circumstance finding established the requisite mental state for a conviction of first degree murder under current law, but argued it did not similarly establish “the actus reus necessary for direct aider and abettor liability.” The Court of Appeal agreed with the State that the record established his guilt under the current felony-murder rule. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law