Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1998, the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and had two prior serious felony convictions. He was initially sentenced to 25 years to life, plus 11 years for enhancements. In December 2023, the trial court resentenced him to 25 years to life. In January 2024, the defendant filed a motion for discovery under the California Racial Justice Act, seeking information to support a claim of racially disparate charging by the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office. The trial court denied the motion, stating the defendant failed to provide a plausible factual foundation for a potential violation of the Act.The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion. It concluded that the Act permits a defendant to file a stand-alone postjudgment discovery motion before filing a habeas corpus petition. However, the court agreed with the Fourth Appellate District’s decision in In re Montgomery that an order denying such a motion is not appealable.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion but that the order denying the postjudgment discovery motion under the Act is not appealable. The appropriate remedy for challenging such an order is through a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal. Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. View "P. v. Serrano" on Justia Law

In 2006, the petitioner was admitted to the State Department of State Hospitals as a sexually violent predator (SVP). In 2022, the superior court found him suitable for conditional release. However, before placing him in the community, the court reconsidered its decision, held a new hearing, and found him unsuitable for release. The petitioner argued that the superior court erred by denying him the assistance of experts during the contested hearing and that the ruling was not supported by sufficient evidence. The real party in interest conceded that the court erred in denying expert assistance but maintained that the court had the authority to reconsider its order.The superior court initially found the petitioner suitable for conditional release in October 2022, but difficulties in securing housing led to multiple placement hearings. In July 2023, Liberty Healthcare expressed concerns about the petitioner’s readiness for release and requested additional time for further review. The court granted a six-month continuance. In November 2023, the court reconsidered its previous order based on new circumstances and found the petitioner unsuitable for conditional release, citing his behavior and a report from the Department of State Hospitals.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court erred in finding the petitioner unsuitable for conditional release without providing him the assistance of experts, as required by law. The court held that the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing with the procedural protections outlined in section 6608, including the appointment of experts. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and, if reconsideration is sought, to conduct a new hearing consistent with the statutory requirements. View "Price v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2008, Juan Alazar was charged with attempted murder, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The charges included allegations of premeditation and personal use of a firearm causing great bodily injury. At a preliminary hearing, a witness testified that Alazar shot at a new tenant, Rutilio Navarro Hernandez, hitting him in the arm. Alazar pleaded no contest to attempted murder and admitted to personally and intentionally discharging a firearm in exchange for a 29-year sentence, with other charges dismissed. His counsel stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript contained a factual basis for the plea.The trial court denied Alazar's petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which allows for resentencing if a conviction was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court found that Alazar was the sole perpetrator and thus ineligible for relief. Alazar argued that the court improperly engaged in judicial factfinding at the prima facie stage.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred in its prima facie determination. The appellate court found that the record did not conclusively establish that Alazar harbored the intent to kill, as required under the current versions of sections 188 and 189. The court noted that Alazar's West plea allowed him to maintain his innocence while accepting a plea bargain, and his stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript did not equate to an admission of the facts therein.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate Alazar's attempted murder conviction, recall his sentence, and resentence him. The court emphasized that it expressed no opinion on the merits of the resentencing petition. View "P. v. Alazar" on Justia Law

In 2010, the defendant was prosecuted for multiple counts of attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and other charges. He pleaded no contest to one count of attempted murder and admitted to several enhancements, resulting in a 30-year prison sentence. In 2022, he filed a petition to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court found made a prima facie case for an evidentiary hearing. The defendant then sought discovery of peace officer personnel records, which the trial court partially granted after an in-camera review.The Monterey County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. The defendant appealed, requesting the appellate court to review the trial court's application of Pitchess standards to the discovery motion. The appellate court requested supplemental briefing on whether the trial court's review should also encompass Brady principles, which require the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, determined that a petitioner may obtain disclosure of peace officer personnel information under Brady principles through Pitchess procedures in advance of a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court did not clearly consider Brady principles when ruling on the discovery motion. Consequently, the appellate court conditionally reversed the trial court's order denying the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Brady requirements. If the trial court finds additional discoverable information, it must allow the defendant to demonstrate prejudice and potentially order a new evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Nuno" on Justia Law

Frank Moseley was charged with murder after he killed his fiancé, who had told him she might be pregnant with another man's child. Moseley, a combat veteran diagnosed with PTSD, testified that his condition contributed to the crime. The jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and a weapon enhancement.The Superior Court of Orange County sentenced Moseley to 11 years in state prison, striking the additional punishment for the weapon use. The court acknowledged Moseley’s PTSD as a mitigating factor but did not explicitly consider the relevant service-related statutes (Penal Code §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91) when denying probation. Moseley’s counsel mentioned these statutes at the sentencing hearing but stated they were not "directly applicable." The probation department’s report and the sentencing briefs from both parties also failed to cite these statutes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not expressly consider Moseley’s service-related PTSD as required by §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. These statutes mandate that a trial court must consider a defendant’s service-related PTSD as a factor in mitigation when deciding on probation and sentencing. The appellate court determined that the record was ambiguous regarding whether the trial court was aware of its statutory obligations under these sections.The appellate court reversed Moseley’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to comply with its statutory obligations under §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Moseley" on Justia Law

Romeo Deonte Knowles, a 23-year-old unhoused individual, attacked a security guard, William Bullock, at a homeless shelter. The altercation led to Bullock falling, hitting his head, and subsequently dying from blunt force trauma. Knowles claimed self-defense, citing intimidation by Bullock. He was charged with murder but later pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter.The Los Angeles County Superior Court received various reports and memoranda before sentencing. These included a mitigation packet detailing Knowles's traumatic childhood and mental health issues, a diagnostic report from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and sentencing memoranda from both the defense and prosecution. The defense argued for the low term of three years, citing Knowles's age, mental health, and lack of a criminal record. The prosecution recommended the midterm of six years, emphasizing Bullock's non-aggressive behavior and Knowles's failure to take full responsibility.The Superior Court sentenced Knowles to the midterm of six years, finding that the aggravating factors, such as the victim's vulnerability and Knowles's behavior while in custody, outweighed the mitigating factors. Knowles appealed, arguing that the court erred by not imposing the low term.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the lower court. The appellate court held that the trial court correctly understood the scope of its sentencing discretion and appropriately weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "People v. Knowles" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of 20 counts of aggravated sexual assault, rape, sexual penetration, and oral copulation of unconscious or intoxicated persons involving four different victims. The crimes occurred after the defendant provided the victims with alcoholic beverages, rendering them intoxicated and unconscious. The jury found the defendant guilty of multiple offenses against each victim, including aggravated sexual assault, rape of an unconscious person, and rape of an intoxicated person.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially sentenced the defendant to 40 years in prison, including several upper-term sentences based on aggravating factors not admitted by the defendant or found true by a jury. The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under new sentencing reforms, Assembly Bill 518 and Senate Bill 567, which affected the court's discretion under Penal Code sections 654 and 1170, respectively. At resentencing, the trial court imposed mandatory full-term consecutive sentences for three counts of rape of an intoxicated person under Penal Code section 667.6(d) because they involved different victims. The court also imposed upper-term sentences based on the same fact that the crimes involved multiple victims, despite the defendant's objection to this dual use of facts.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by using the same fact (multiple victims) to impose both upper-term and mandatory consecutive sentences under section 667.6(d). The appellate court concluded that the dual use prohibition applies even when consecutive sentencing is mandatory. As a result, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for a full resentencing hearing on the record as it stands, without allowing the prosecution to seek a trial on aggravating factors. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Dorado" on Justia Law

In the 1980s, Robert Edward Maury was convicted of multiple crimes, including three counts of first-degree murder and forcible rape. A jury sentenced him to death in 1989. The California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence in 2003, and his initial state habeas corpus petition was denied in 2011. In 2021, Maury filed a second state habeas corpus petition, which the Shasta County Superior Court dismissed as procedurally barred. Maury appealed, focusing on a claim under McCoy v. Louisiana, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when his counsel presented mitigating evidence against his wishes during the penalty phase.The Shasta County Superior Court dismissed Maury’s second habeas petition, finding it untimely and successive. The court did not address the merits of Maury’s McCoy claim, which argued that his counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights by presenting mitigating evidence over his objection, thus conceding guilt. Maury also claimed that the trial court erred in denying his motions to represent himself during the penalty phase, which he argued forced him to proceed with counsel burdened by an irreconcilable conflict of interest.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no McCoy error. The court concluded that Maury’s counsel did not concede guilt over his objection but instead presented mitigating evidence and argued for life without parole while maintaining Maury’s innocence. The court also found that any error in presenting a defense against Maury’s wishes was harmless, as Maury achieved his objective of obtaining a death verdict by personally addressing the jury. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Maury’s second habeas corpus petition, concluding that Maury failed to demonstrate prejudice or an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his counsel’s performance. View "In re Maury" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his two stepdaughters, L.C. and M.C., when they were under ten years old. The jury found him guilty of thirteen counts, including nine counts of lewd acts. The court sentenced him to 145 years to life under California’s “One Strike” law, which mandates severe penalties for certain sexual offenses involving multiple victims.The Superior Court of San Diego County admitted evidence of both charged and uncharged sexual offenses committed by the defendant. The court conducted a pretrial analysis under Evidence Code section 352 to determine the admissibility of this evidence. The jury was instructed that it could consider this evidence as indicative of the defendant’s propensity to commit sexual offenses. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not conducting a separate section 352 analysis before instructing the jury and that his sentence violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection and prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in its handling of the section 352 analysis, as it had implicitly conducted this analysis pretrial. The appellate court also found that the defendant’s equal protection claim was foreclosed by the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Williams, which upheld the constitutionality of excluding One Strike offenders from youthful offender parole consideration. Additionally, the court concluded that the defendant forfeited his claim regarding cruel and unusual punishment by not raising it at trial and that the claim lacked merit regardless.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the defendant’s conviction and sentence. View "P. v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of felony vehicle burglary, being a felon in possession of tear gas, and misdemeanor receiving stolen property. During jury selection, the defendant, who was in jail, did not appear in court. The bailiff reported that the defendant refused transport, leading the court to find his absence voluntary and proceed with jury selection. The defendant missed another day but was present for the rest of the trial. He was sentenced to two years and eight months in county jail, with part of the sentence suspended for mandatory supervision.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco handled the initial trial. The defendant argued that his constitutional right to be present was violated due to insufficient evidence of voluntary absence and the denial of a continuance. The court found substantial evidence of voluntary absence based on the bailiff's testimony and denied the continuance. The defendant was convicted on most counts, and the court later modified his sentence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the defendant was voluntarily absent, including the bailiff's report and jail procedures. The court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, considering the potential manipulation by the defendant and the inconvenience to jurors and court resources. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions but accepted the Attorney General's concession that the defendant was entitled to four additional days of presentence custody credits. View "People v. Hersom" on Justia Law