Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, a noncitizen, was charged in Los Angeles County with carjacking, second degree robbery, and resisting an executive officer. The jury found him guilty of carjacking and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon, but acquitted him of robbery. He had previously pleaded guilty to resisting an executive officer. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison. Years later, after being released from criminal custody, the defendant faced removal proceedings in immigration court based on his conviction, and he sought to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7, arguing he had not understood the immigration consequences of going to trial or accepting a plea.The defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate his conviction, providing evidence of indigency and making a prima facie showing for relief. He requested appointment of counsel for the hearing. The trial court denied his request, relying on People v. Fryhaat, and reasoning that appointed counsel was only required if the moving party was in federal immigration custody and unable to attend the hearing. The court proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the motion, finding no evidence that an immigration-neutral plea offer had been made.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the trial court’s denial of appointed counsel. The appellate court held that the right to appointed counsel in section 1473.7 proceedings attaches when an indigent defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief and the court proceeds to an evidentiary hearing, regardless of whether the defendant is in federal immigration custody. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the request for appointed counsel and a new hearing on the merits of the section 1473.7 motion. View "P. v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term tenant of a triplex, entered into a lease in 1995 and was paying below-market rent. In 2020, the property was acquired by a new owner, Connie, LLC, which hired a property management company. The new owners and the management company misrepresented to their attorney that the plaintiff was a property manager receiving discounted rent, and, based on this misrepresentation, concluded that the rent control protections of the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 did not apply. Relying on this advice, they terminated the plaintiff’s supposed management role and raised his rent to market rate, which the plaintiff paid for 11 months. The plaintiff later learned that the rent increase was illegal under the Act and sued to recover the overpaid rent, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under Penal Code section 496 for receiving stolen property.The Superior Court of Orange County conducted a jury trial. After the close of evidence, the court granted a directed verdict against the plaintiff on all claims except for breach of contract, finding that the evidence did not support a claim under section 496 because the defendants’ conduct was based on a mistake rather than theft. The court entered a nominal judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the contract claim.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the directed verdict on the section 496 claim was proper. The appellate court held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that the defendants’ receipt of the illegally increased rent constituted receiving property obtained by false pretenses, as defined by section 496, and that the issue should have been submitted to the jury. The court reversed the judgment as to the section 496 claim and remanded for further proceedings, awarding the plaintiff his costs on appeal. View "Johnson v. Connie, LLC" on Justia Law

Greg Wright was recorded on video robbing a gas station convenience store at gunpoint. The cashier, who was present during the incident, testified that Wright showed no signs of intoxication—he did not smell of alcohol, slur his words, or appear confused. The robbery was carried out efficiently, with Wright taking money, a lighter, and his own dollar before leaving. Police arrested Wright the next day and found a loaded pistol in his car. At trial, Wright represented himself and argued that he was too intoxicated to form the intent to rob, but the evidence from both the cashier and the surveillance video contradicted this claim.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over the trial. The jury convicted Wright of robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition, and found true the firearm use and prior conviction allegations. The trial court sentenced Wright to 36 years and four months to life, including enhancements for firearm use and prior convictions. Wright challenged the jury instructions regarding intoxication, the prosecutor’s closing argument, and the imposition of multiple punishments for related offenses, as well as the process for determining aggravating sentencing factors.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by using the term “specific intent” in the intoxication defense instruction, but found the error harmless given the overwhelming evidence that Wright was not impaired. The court also found any assumed prosecutorial error and cumulative error to be harmless. However, the appellate court agreed that sentencing errors occurred: multiple punishments for the firearm and ammunition offenses violated Penal Code section 654, and Wright was denied his right to a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors as required by Erlinger v. United States. The convictions were affirmed, but the case was remanded for full resentencing. View "People v. Wright" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, in late 2020, concealed his young daughter from her mother in violation of a custody order and threatened the mother with violence if she contacted authorities. He was also alleged to have previously injured the mother with a pocketknife. In 2018, a jury convicted him of felony child custody violation, dissuading a witness, and inflicting corporal injury on a child’s parent. At sentencing, the court imposed an aggregate prison term of 10 years and eight months, including a consecutive term for dissuading a witness calculated as one-third the middle term, doubled under the three strikes law.Several years after sentencing, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County received a letter from a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) case records manager, noting a possible error: the sentence for dissuading a witness should have been the full middle term, not one-third. The court held hearings, some without the defendant present, and ultimately increased the sentence to 13 years and four months by imposing the full consecutive term for that count. The defendant’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed both the sentence modification and the denial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the matter. It held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence in response to the CDCR letter because the judgment was long final and no statutory basis for resentencing existed. The court clarified that such corrections can only occur under specific statutory authority or via habeas corpus. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but treated the appeal as a habeas petition, granted relief, and ordered reinstatement of the original sentence, without prejudice to future lawful efforts to correct the sentence. View "P. v. Singleton" on Justia Law

Greg Wright was recorded on video robbing a gas station convenience store at gunpoint. The cashier, who was present during the incident, testified that Wright showed no signs of intoxication—he did not smell of alcohol, slur his words, or appear confused. Surveillance footage showed Wright acting purposefully and competently throughout the robbery, from his entry and interaction with the cashier to his escape. Wright, representing himself at trial, argued that he was too intoxicated to form the intent to rob, but the evidence at trial did not support this claim.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County tried the case before a jury, which convicted Wright of robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The jury also found true the firearm use allegation and 13 prior convictions. The trial court sentenced Wright to 36 years and four months to life, including an upper-term enhancement for firearm use based on the finding that his prior convictions were “numerous.” Wright appealed, arguing, among other things, that the jury was improperly instructed on the intoxication defense and that there were errors in sentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by using the term “specific intent” in the jury instruction on voluntary intoxication, as this term is ambiguous and not the correct mental state for robbery. However, the court found this error harmless because the evidence overwhelmingly showed Wright was not impaired. The court also found harmless error in the prosecutor’s closing argument and rejected the claim of cumulative error. On sentencing, the court agreed that Wright was improperly punished for both firearm and ammunition possession based on the same act and that he was denied his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factor for the upper-term sentence. The convictions were affirmed, but the case was remanded for resentencing. View "P. v. Wright" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of eight sex crimes involving three juvenile girls, including his stepdaughter and two other children in the household. The most serious incident occurred in December 2016, when a six-year-old girl suffered a severe vaginal injury while in the defendant’s care, leading to hospitalization and subsequent disclosure of sexual abuse. Over the following years, two other girls reported that the defendant had also sexually abused them on multiple occasions, with one describing repeated acts of molestation occurring regularly over a period of time.The Sonoma County Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, including multiple counts of sexual intercourse or lewd acts with a child under 14, and found true several sentencing enhancements. The defendant appealed, challenging two of the convictions related to one victim. He argued that the prosecution relied on the same testimony to support both charged and uncharged offenses, and that the jury instruction regarding uncharged sex offenses (CALCRIM No. 1191A) improperly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof and confused the jury. He also raised an alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the instruction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that, although the same testimony was used to support both charged and uncharged offenses and the instructions could have been clearer, any potential instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the jury was properly instructed that each charged offense had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the evidence supporting the convictions was substantial. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "People v. Dejesus-Galindo" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant charged with second degree robbery after an incident in which the victim was attacked by multiple individuals, including the defendant, who was identified as the Hispanic female participant. The victim suffered significant injuries, including lacerations and a puncture wound, and reported that the defendant made threatening statements during the robbery. The defendant, who had a history of mental health and substance abuse issues, was unhoused at the time and later sought pretrial mental health diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.36, submitting evidence of her diagnoses and willingness to participate in treatment.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion on three grounds: it found the prosecution had rebutted the presumption that her mental health disorders were a significant factor in the offense; it determined she posed an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community; and it exercised its residual discretion to deny diversion based on the nature of the offense and the victim’s injuries. The defendant then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, seeking to overturn the denial.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mental health diversion. The appellate court found there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the prosecution had rebutted the statutory presumption regarding the significance of the defendant’s mental disorder or that she posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super-strike offense if treated in the community. The appellate court also concluded that the trial court’s exercise of residual discretion was inconsistent with the purposes of the mental health diversion statute. The court issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its denial and grant the application for mental health diversion. View "Gomez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Christopher Skaggs was released on parole in 2019 after serving a prison sentence for felony violations of the Vehicle Code. In December 2020, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a petition to revoke his parole, alleging new criminal conduct, and also filed a related criminal complaint. Skaggs failed to appear for hearings, resulting in bench warrants. He was later arrested in Lake County on these warrants and new charges, convicted, and sentenced to additional prison time. While incarcerated, Skaggs repeatedly requested to resolve the Mendocino County parole revocation and criminal matters. The criminal complaint was dismissed under Penal Code section 1381, but the court declined to dismiss the parole revocation petition, finding section 1381 inapplicable.Skaggs subsequently filed a nonstatutory motion to dismiss the parole revocation petition on constitutional due process grounds, arguing that delays prejudiced him by preventing concurrent sentencing and prolonging his custody. The Mendocino County Superior Court construed his motion as a Penal Code section 1385 motion and denied it, reasoning that section 1385 does not apply to parole revocation proceedings. The court then held a contested revocation hearing, found Skaggs violated parole, sentenced him to 90 days in jail, and ordered his parole terminated upon release. Skaggs appealed the denial of his motion and the parole revocation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, determined that Skaggs’s appeal was moot because his parole had already been terminated and no effective relief could be granted. However, the court exercised its discretion to address the trial court’s error, holding that the trial court improperly construed Skaggs’s constitutional due process motion as a section 1385 motion and incorrectly concluded it lacked authority to consider the motion. The appellate court clarified that trial courts have jurisdiction to entertain nonstatutory motions to dismiss parole revocation petitions on constitutional due process grounds. The appeal was dismissed as moot. View "People v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was accused of multiple sexual offenses involving two individuals: his sister-in-law, Nathaly, and a family friend, Evelin. The prosecution charged him with several counts related to alleged assaults on Nathaly when she was a minor, and one count of misdemeanor sexual battery involving Evelin. The jury convicted the defendant only on the misdemeanor count involving Evelin, finding that he groped her after a party. The jury could not reach a verdict on the counts involving Nathaly, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial on those charges, which the prosecution chose not to retry.Following the conviction, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sentenced the defendant to 364 days in county jail for the misdemeanor sexual battery, ordered him to register as a sex offender, and issued a protective order under Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), restraining him from contacting Nathaly. The defendant appealed, arguing that the protective order for Nathaly was unauthorized because she was not a victim of the crime for which he was convicted, and that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that, under the current version of Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), a postconviction protective order may only be issued to protect a victim of the specific crime for which the defendant was convicted. Because Nathaly was not a victim of the misdemeanor sexual battery, the trial court lacked authority to issue a protective order for her. The court also found the 364-day sentence unauthorized, as the statutory maximum for the offense is six months. The conviction was affirmed, but the judgment was reversed with directions to vacate the protective order and resentence the defendant to six months. View "People v. Pena" on Justia Law

The defendant, a military veteran, was convicted in 2017 of multiple firearm-related offenses, including possession of assault weapons and ammunition as a felon, as well as possessing a forged driver’s license. The convictions stemmed from his involvement in acquiring and storing firearms and ammunition, despite being prohibited from doing so due to his criminal record. The defendant’s background included significant childhood trauma, military service, and subsequent mental health and substance abuse issues, which were not considered at his original sentencing. While incarcerated, he received mental health treatment and engaged in rehabilitation efforts.After his conviction and sentencing to 20 years in prison, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, which allows veterans to seek reduced sentences if their mental health conditions related to military service were not considered at sentencing. The Superior Court of Orange County found the defendant eligible for relief, acknowledging a connection between his mental health disorders and military service. However, the court denied resentencing, reasoning that there was no evidence linking his mental health issues to the commission of his offenses and refusing to consider his rehabilitative conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an irrelevant factor—requiring a nexus between the defendant’s mental health condition and his offenses—and by failing to consider relevant factors, such as the defendant’s rehabilitation while incarcerated and changes in the law favoring mitigation. The appellate court reversed the order denying resentencing and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing under section 1170.91, subdivision (b). View "People v. Hayde" on Justia Law