Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Aniano Olea was convicted by a jury in 2009 of 25 counts involving violent acts against his spouse, Jane Doe 1, including torture, aggravated mayhem, inflicting corporal injury, assault with a deadly weapon, stalking, and dissuading a witness. The jury also found that Olea personally inflicted great bodily injury during one of the corporal injury offenses. The abuse spanned years and included physical violence, psychological control, and severe injuries to Jane Doe. Olea was sentenced to four consecutive indeterminate terms of seven years to life, plus a determinate term of 20 years, totaling 48 years to life in prison.After his conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, Olea filed a petition in 2024 in Monterey County Superior Court seeking recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1, citing changes in sentencing laws. He argued that his rehabilitation and changes in the law warranted reconsideration of his sentence. The trial court appointed counsel, reviewed Olea’s prison records, held a hearing, and ultimately declined to exercise its discretion to recall and resentence, finding the original sentence just given the severity of Olea’s conduct.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, first addressed whether the trial court’s denial of Olea’s petition was appealable. The court distinguished this case from others where no hearing was held, finding that the trial court’s actions affected Olea’s substantial rights and thus made the order appealable. On the merits, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recall and resentence Olea, as the decision was reasoned and based on permissible factors. The order denying Olea’s resentencing petition was affirmed. View "People v. Olea" on Justia Law

A 25-year-old defendant was charged with multiple counts of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon after allegedly attacking four individuals, all of whom were Black, with a metal pipe in Santa Monica. The attacks were accompanied by racial slurs and resulted in serious injuries to at least one victim. The defendant had a documented history of mental illness, substance abuse, and noncompliance with treatment, including leaving mental health facilities against medical advice and failing to take prescribed medication.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County considered the defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, supported by a psychological evaluation indicating that his schizoaffective disorder was treatable and that he would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if his symptoms were controlled with treatment. The prosecution opposed the motion, citing the defendant’s history of noncompliance and violence when untreated. After a hearing, the trial court granted diversion, ordering residential, medically assisted treatment and compliance with program rules, but made no express findings on whether the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding that the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion. The court emphasized the lack of evidence that the defendant would comply with treatment in a community setting and noted his history of abandoning treatment. The appellate court granted the petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting diversion and to deny the motion. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Taylor)" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2001 of attempted second degree murder, with additional firearm and gang enhancements, resulting in a sentence of 42 years to life. On direct appeal in 2003, the gang enhancement was stricken, reducing the sentence to 32 years to life. In 2021, the defendant sought resentencing under a statute that, at the time, did not apply to attempted murder. Subsequent motions for reconsideration and rehearing were filed, during which the trial court recognized a sentencing error: the defendant, who was not the actual shooter, should not have received the firearm enhancement after the gang enhancement was stricken. The court found the sentence appeared unauthorized but believed it lacked authority to correct it absent a habeas petition or a request from the district attorney or corrections department.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the defendant’s resentencing requests, finding he had not established a prima facie case for relief under the applicable statute. At a later hearing, the court acknowledged the sentencing error but concluded it could not act without a formal habeas petition or other postconviction relief mechanism, despite the prosecutor’s agreement that the sentence was excessive.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, held that a trial court has inherent authority to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, regardless of whether a habeas petition is filed or whether the request comes from the defendant, the prosecution, or the corrections department. The court reversed the order denying resentencing and remanded the case with instructions to hold a prompt resentencing hearing. If the trial court finds the sentence is unauthorized, it must correct it. The court clarified that statutory limitations on resentencing do not bar correction of an unauthorized sentence. View "P. v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

A man was charged with and convicted of raping a woman who was intoxicated. The incident occurred after the two met at a bar, where the woman had consumed significant amounts of alcohol and experienced a blackout, leaving her with little memory of the events. The defendant, who was known for dressing as a pirate and living in his van, accompanied the woman home, where sexual intercourse occurred. The woman later reported the incident to the police after learning from the defendant that they had sex, which she did not remember. Medical examination revealed injuries consistent with intercourse, but expert testimony indicated such injuries could result from either consensual or nonconsensual sex.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court conducted a jury trial, during which the jury found the defendant guilty of rape of an intoxicated person and found true certain aggravating factors. The defendant was sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of battery, and by admitting prejudicial evidence regarding his homelessness. He also raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that battery is a lesser included offense of rape of an intoxicated person and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on this lesser offense. The appellate court found there was substantial evidence from which a jury could have concluded the defendant did not know, and reasonably should not have known, that the victim was too intoxicated to consent. The court determined this instructional error was prejudicial and reversed the conviction, remanding the case for a possible new trial with proper jury instructions. View "P. v. Mirabal" on Justia Law

The case concerns a petition for resentencing filed by Safoloooi Sam Taito, who was convicted in 1994 of first degree murder with a felony-murder special circumstance, as well as second degree robbery, for the killing of Librado Godoy Lopez. The evidence at trial showed that Taito and a codefendant repeatedly punched and kicked Lopez, stabbed him in the head with a screwdriver, and took his personal property. Lopez died from both blunt force trauma and the stab wound. Witnesses testified to Taito’s direct involvement in the attack and theft.Following the charges, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County instructed the jury on theories of premeditated murder and felony murder, including aiding and abetting. The jury convicted Taito of first degree murder and found true the felony-murder special circumstance and a weapon enhancement. He was sentenced to life without parole. The California Court of Appeal previously affirmed his conviction in 1997.In 2021, Taito petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes to California’s felony-murder law made him eligible for relief. The Superior Court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding the record conclusively established that the jury’s findings met the requirements of current law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the denial de novo. The court held that Taito was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the jury’s true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance demonstrated he was convicted under a theory consistent with current Penal Code section 189, subdivision (e)(2). The court affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying Taito’s petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Taito" on Justia Law

Jose Haro Nevarez was involved in a fatal collision on Interstate-15 after driving while intoxicated at excessive speeds. His SUV became disabled and blocked a high-occupancy vehicle lane with its lights off. Minutes later, a motorcyclist, Robert Cole Sutton, struck the rear of Nevarez’s SUV and was killed. Nevarez admitted to officers at the scene that he was drunk and on DUI probation, and subsequent tests confirmed his blood alcohol level was well above the legal limit. Nevarez had previously been convicted of DUI and received a Watson advisement, warning him of the potential for a murder charge if he killed someone while driving under the influence.Following the incident, the People charged Nevarez with second-degree murder and other related offenses in the Superior Court of San Diego County. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for all charges, distinguishing the facts from People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499. Nevarez’s defense moved to set aside the murder charge under Penal Code section 995, arguing that Chagolla precluded liability because he was not driving at the moment of the fatal collision. The trial court denied the motion, finding Chagolla factually distinguishable.Nevarez then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, for a writ of prohibition to overturn the trial court’s order. The appellate court denied the petition, holding that probable cause supported the murder charge. The court clarified that liability for second-degree murder under People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 does not automatically end when an intoxicated driver ceases driving. Instead, a fact-specific analysis of implied malice and proximate cause is required. The court rejected a rigid rule and affirmed that the circumstances supported probable cause for both implied malice and proximate cause in Nevarez’s case. View "Nevarez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A defendant committed several serious offenses, including first-degree murder and attempted murder, when he was 17 years old. In 2002, a jury convicted him of these crimes, and he was sentenced to a total term of 79 years to life with the possibility of parole. The sentence included both determinate and indeterminate terms, with firearm enhancements. The crimes occurred in 2000, and the defendant was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), but rather to a lengthy term that could be considered the functional equivalent of LWOP.Years later, the defendant filed a petition in the Superior Court of Ventura County seeking recall of his sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), which allows for resentencing of juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that the defendant’s 79-year-to-life sentence was functionally equivalent to LWOP, relying on the reasoning in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 and People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435. The court recalled the sentence, conditionally reversed the conviction and sentence, and certified the matter to juvenile court for further proceedings under Proposition 57. Meanwhile, the defendant received a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, but was found unsuitable for parole.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant was not eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A) because he was not sentenced to LWOP, and that subsequent legislative changes, specifically section 3051, rendered the Heard rule moot. The court concluded that since the defendant had already received a parole hearing, he was not serving the functional equivalent of LWOP. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s orders. View "P. v. Lara" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing an officer, domestic battery with corporal injury, and assault on a peace officer. During jury selection, the defendant sought to remove Juror 122 for cause due to the juror’s background in law enforcement and personal experience with domestic violence, but the Superior Court of Orange County denied the challenge for cause after Juror 122 stated he could remain impartial. The defendant then used a peremptory challenge to remove Juror 122, but the prosecution objected under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, arguing the challenge was based on impermissible grounds. The trial court sustained the objection, keeping Juror 122 on the panel. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant on one count, convicted him of a lesser included offense on another, and acquitted him on the third count.The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California, County of Orange, reviewed the case. It reversed the conviction on one count but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. The Appellate Division held that the “deemed prejudicial” standard in section 231.7(j)—which requires automatic reversal if an objection to a peremptory challenge is erroneously denied—does not apply when an objection is erroneously granted. Instead, the court applied traditional harmless error analysis and found the defendant had not shown prejudice from Juror 122’s inclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The main holding is that the “deemed prejudicial” standard in section 231.7(j) applies only to erroneous denials of objections to peremptory challenges, not to erroneous grants. When an objection to a peremptory challenge is erroneously granted, traditional rules regarding prejudicial error govern, and automatic reversal is not required. View "P. v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of first degree murder by torture and assault causing the death of a child. The prosecution’s theory was that the defendant either directly committed the crimes or aided and abetted his codefendant, the child’s mother, in committing them. The jury was instructed only on murder by torture and aiding and abetting, not on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and assault causing death of a child, but a special circumstance finding was later reversed on appeal due to insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill.After the California Court of Appeal reversed the special circumstance finding but otherwise affirmed the judgment, the trial court resentenced the defendant. Following the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, which limited certain theories of murder liability and created a resentencing procedure under Penal Code section 1172.6, the defendant petitioned for resentencing. He argued that the jury instructions permitted conviction on an impermissible theory of imputed malice. The Napa County Superior Court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding the defendant had not shown he could not be convicted of murder under the amended statutes.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the denial. The court held that the record conclusively established the defendant’s ineligibility for relief under section 1172.6 because he was convicted under a theory of murder—murder by torture, either as a direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor—that remains valid after Senate Bill 1437. The court found that any alleged instructional error did not relate to changes made by the new law and affirmed the trial court’s order denying resentencing. View "People v. Warner" on Justia Law

The case concerns a woman who was charged, along with a codefendant, with the murder of her young daughter, with the special circumstance of torture, and with assault resulting in the death of a child under eight. The prosecution’s theory was that the murder was committed by torture, and that the defendant either directly committed the crimes or aided and abetted her codefendant. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine; the only theory presented was murder by torture. The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder by torture and assault causing death of a child. On direct appeal, the special circumstance finding was reversed for insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill, but the murder conviction was affirmed based on evidence of deliberate and premeditated intent to cause extreme pain for a sadistic purpose.After the passage of Senate Bill 1437, which amended California’s murder statutes to eliminate certain forms of accomplice liability and created a resentencing procedure for those convicted under now-invalid theories, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Superior Court of Napa County denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding the defendant ineligible for relief because she was not convicted under any theory affected by the statutory changes. The defendant appealed this denial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the record conclusively established the defendant’s ineligibility for relief under section 1172.6, as she was convicted solely under a theory of murder by torture, which remains a valid basis for murder liability after Senate Bill 1437. The court found that any alleged instructional error did not relate to the statutory changes and thus could not support resentencing relief under section 1172.6. View "People v. Krueger" on Justia Law