Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Over a five-year period, Robert Michael Tafoya stalked and harassed E.R. in various ways. He frequently appeared at her workplace, left flowers on her car, followed her while shopping, made numerous Facebook posts claiming to be involved with her and the father of her children, and fraudulently applied for custody and visitation orders. Despite restraining orders, his behavior continued unabated, including attempts to pick up her children from school.Following a jury trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Tafoya was convicted of stalking, perjury, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. He was sentenced to 25 years and eight months in prison. Tafoya appealed the convictions, arguing that his Facebook posts were protected by the First Amendment, there was insufficient evidence for the attempted child abduction conviction, and the perjury and false document convictions lacked false statements. He also appealed the restitution order, claiming the court used the wrong standard and lacked proper verification.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Tafoya’s Facebook posts were not protected activity as they were part of a pattern of conduct that constituted a credible threat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the attempted child abduction conviction, noting that the visitation order was obtained by fraud and thus void. The court affirmed the convictions for stalking, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. However, the court reversed the perjury conviction related to the restraining order (count 10) due to the lack of a false statement under penalty of perjury and remanded for resentencing. The restitution order was upheld, as the need for relocation expenses was justified by the record. View "People v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

Annette Gaylene Batten, who was convicted of first-degree murder in 1996 and sentenced to life in prison, was released on parole in August 2017. In December 2023, she admitted to two parole violations: driving under the influence and failing to inform her parole agent of her arrest. Consequently, the trial court revoked her parole and remanded her to the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole Hearings for future parole consideration.The trial court's decision was based on Penal Code section 3000.08, subdivision (h), which mandates remand to the CDCR for parolees who violate conditions of lifetime parole. Batten argued that a statute enacted in 2020, which limits parole to three years for those released after July 2020, should apply to her, and that the disparity in treatment violates equal protection principles. The trial court, however, followed the existing law applicable to her case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, applies to Batten's equal protection challenge. The court found that there is a rational basis for treating inmates released before July 2020 differently from those released after that date. The Legislature could have reasonably decided that changing the terms of parole retroactively would undermine the Board's parole determinations. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to remand Batten to the CDCR. View "People v. Batten" on Justia Law

Misael Padron, a Cuban citizen granted asylum in the United States, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for carjacking, which he had entered pursuant to a no-contest plea. Padron argued that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea, which included mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. He provided evidence of his mental health challenges related to persecution in Cuba and claimed his defense counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Padron’s motion, partly because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel and had signed a plea form acknowledging potential deportation. The court also noted that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The court found that Padron’s defense counsel did not adequately advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, and Padron’s mental health challenges further impaired his understanding. The court also determined that Padron established a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood the consequences, given his strong ties to the United States and the severe impact on his asylum status.The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of Padron’s motion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Padron’s conviction and permit him to withdraw his plea and enter a different plea. View "People v. Padron" on Justia Law

Carlos Faustinos appealed the trial court's order declining to act on his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1. Faustinos had pled guilty to forcible rape in 2019 and was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment. In 2023, he petitioned for resentencing, citing recent ameliorative sentencing laws, but the trial court took no action, stating it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion.The trial court's decision was based on the fact that under section 1172.1, a defendant is not entitled to seek relief, and the court is not required to respond to such a request. The trial court's order declining to act on the petition is not an appealable order. This is consistent with longstanding precedent that orders responding to unauthorized motions invoking section 1172.1’s predecessor are not appealable.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order is not appealable. The court explained that the right to appeal is determined by statute, and an order after a judgment in a criminal case is appealable only if it affects the substantial rights of the party. Since a defendant is not entitled to file a petition under section 1172.1, and the court is not required to respond, the trial court's order does not affect the defendant's substantial rights. The court also noted that a recent statutory amendment allowing a trial court to act on its own motion under section 1172.1 does not change the non-appealability of an order on a defendant’s unauthorized petition. View "People v. Faustinos" on Justia Law

David Wayne Gray was convicted by a jury of second-degree burglary of a vehicle, attempted second-degree burglary of a vehicle, conspiracy to commit theft, vandalism, and possession of burglar’s tools. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of five years and four months. Gray appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for second-degree burglary of a vehicle and attempted second-degree burglary of a vehicle.The Superior Court of Placer County declared a mistrial on the grand theft charge but found Gray guilty on all other counts. The court also found true the allegations of a prior strike and that Gray had served a prior prison term. Gray's motion to dismiss the prior strike was denied, and he was sentenced accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Gray contended that cutting the locks on the exterior compartments of the trucks did not constitute entering the vehicles under Penal Code section 459. The court disagreed, referencing the legislative intent to treat entry into locked vehicles more harshly than simple theft. The court found that the locked compartments and bins on the trucks were analogous to a car trunk, which has been previously ruled as part of the vehicle's interior for burglary purposes. The court concluded that Gray's actions of cutting the locks to access the enclosed cargo areas and bins constituted entry into locked vehicles.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Gray's convictions for second-degree burglary of a vehicle and attempted second-degree burglary of a vehicle. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law

The case involves defendant Prospero Guadalupe Serna, who was found guilty by a jury of two misdemeanors: knowingly resisting arrest and willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The incident occurred when a California Highway Patrol officer encountered Serna walking within traffic lanes. Despite the officer's attempts to guide Serna to safety, Serna resisted multiple times, leading to his eventual detention with the help of additional officers. Serna's defense argued that his mental health issues should have been considered to negate the knowledge requirement for the offenses.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case, where Serna claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his attorney failed to introduce his mental health records and did not request a jury instruction regarding mental defects affecting intent. The appellate division held that since the crimes were of general intent, evidence of mental disease was not admissible to show lack of specific intent. The court also noted a split in authority regarding whether the offense required actual knowledge that the person resisted was a peace officer.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case to resolve whether Penal Code section 148(a)(1) requires actual knowledge that the person being resisted is a peace officer. The court found the analysis in People v. Mackreth persuasive, which held that section 148(a)(1) does not require actual knowledge. Instead, it is sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the person was a police officer. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the statute does not necessitate the defendant's actual knowledge of the officer's status. View "People v. Serna" on Justia Law

In 2001, Luis Olmos was convicted of murder and other crimes committed at age 17, receiving a 33-years-to-life sentence. In 2023, Olmos petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1)(A), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) to seek resentencing. Olmos mistakenly believed his sentence was 41 years to life and argued it was the functional equivalent of LWOP. The trial court, also under the mistaken belief of a 41-years-to-life sentence, denied the petition, stating it was not equivalent to LWOP.Previously, a jury found Olmos guilty of first-degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury. The jury also found true the allegations of personal use of a deadly weapon and that a principal was armed with a firearm. The trial court sentenced him to 33 years to life. A prior appellate court modified the judgment by staying a sentencing enhancement and awarding presentence credit, but otherwise affirmed the conviction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court noted that section 1170(d)(1)(A) applies to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP and, by extension, those with sentences functionally equivalent to LWOP. However, the court found that Olmos's 33-years-to-life sentence, which included eligibility for a parole hearing in December 2024, was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. The court compared Olmos's sentence to longer sentences in other cases and concluded it was not equivalent to LWOP. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Olmos's petition for recall and resentencing. View "P. v. Olmos" on Justia Law

Terrance Russell Terwilligar was convicted in 2006 of two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and three counts of battery resulting in serious bodily injury. The jury found him guilty of the assault charges, two lesser included counts of battery, and one count of battery resulting in serious bodily injury. He was sentenced to 53 years to life, including indeterminate terms of 25 years to life on the assault counts and three one-year prior prison term enhancements.In 2023, Terwilligar petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which was enacted by Senate Bill 483 to provide retroactive relief from prior prison term enhancements. The trial court struck the three prior prison term enhancements but otherwise reimposed the original sentence, including the consecutive indeterminate terms of 25 years to life on the assault counts. Terwilligar also requested resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), arguing that his current offenses were not serious or violent felonies and that he should be resentenced as a second-strike offender. The trial court denied this request.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act do not apply during resentencing under section 1172.75. The court followed other appellate decisions that concluded applying the Reform Act’s revised penalties during section 1172.75 resentencing would unconstitutionally amend the Reform Act. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether Terwilligar had shown good cause for filing a late petition under section 1170.126, the Reform Act’s resentencing provision, based on his claim that prison counselors misled him about his eligibility for relief. The trial court’s judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Terwilligar" on Justia Law

Samuel Scott Copeland was convicted by a jury of attempting to prevent or dissuade a witness from giving testimony, in violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2). The conviction was based on allegations that Copeland withheld rent to pressure his friend and landlord, Madelyn Wagner, from testifying in a civil dispute involving their mutual friend, Trina West. The trial court sentenced Copeland to two years of formal probation and imposed but stayed a sentence of 365 days in custody, pending successful completion of probation.The Superior Court of San Diego County declined to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. Copeland appealed, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the finding that Wagner was a “witness” within the meaning of section 136, subdivision (2) at the time of the alleged intimidation, that the jury instruction improperly expanded the definition of “witness,” and that the prosecution violated his First Amendment right to free speech.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the term “witness” as defined in section 136, subdivision (2) does not include potential future witnesses to a civil dispute. Therefore, there was not substantial evidence that Wagner was a “witness” as used in the statute of conviction. Additionally, the court found that the model instruction given to the jury misstated the law in a prejudicial manner by improperly expanding the definition of “witness” to include potential future witnesses.As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that the conviction was not supported by substantial evidence and that the jury instruction contained a prejudicial misstatement of the law. View "P. v. Copeland" on Justia Law

In 2014, Donald Hill, Jr. handed a gun to Timothy Mitchell, who, along with Danny Jeffreys, opened fire on a group of men, resulting in the death of Tereaun Berry and the injury of his brother Trent. Hill was convicted in 2015 of first-degree murder and attempted murder. On appeal in 2018, his murder conviction was reversed due to a trial court error, but his attempted murder conviction was affirmed. In 2019, Hill entered a plea agreement, pleading no contest to attempted premeditated murder of Tereaun Berry, and the original murder count was dismissed.Hill petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 in 2022. The district attorney conceded a prima facie case for relief, but the trial court ultimately denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. Hill argued that the trial court erred by relying on principles of implied malice and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Hill was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because he was not convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury instructions and verdicts established that Hill was convicted of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor, a theory still valid under current law. The court also found that Hill's no contest plea to attempted premeditated murder indicated express malice, making him ineligible for relief. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Hill's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law