Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In March 2011, Prentice Robinson was indicted by a grand jury for multiple criminal counts, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He pleaded no contest to the charges and received a 22-year prison sentence. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that the trial court erred in considering grand jury testimony. The People agreed that the grand jury testimony was inadmissible hearsay but disagreed on the proper remedy. The San Joaquin County District Attorney, as amicus curiae, argued that the grand jury transcripts were part of Robinson’s record of conviction and admissible under section 1172.6.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County denied Robinson’s petition for resentencing, finding that the grand jury transcripts were admissible and that Robinson was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. Robinson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury testimony and that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) created a hearsay exception for evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial, including grand jury testimony. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and that the procedural safeguards in place ensured the reliability of the testimony. The court also held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to section 1172.6 hearings, as they are postconviction collateral proceedings. The court concluded that Robinson’s due process rights were not violated, as he had the opportunity to present new evidence and challenge the grand jury testimony at the evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Ulysses Gonzalez entered a no-contest plea to two charges of domestic violence against two different victims and admitted to an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury, as well as various prior convictions. He was sentenced to 15 years in state prison. Following the passage of Senate Bill 483, Gonzalez requested resentencing in 2022, arguing that his sentence should be reduced due to changes in the law. The trial court struck the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, reducing his sentence by one year but denied further reduction.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially sentenced Gonzalez to 15 years, including enhancements for prior convictions and great bodily injury. In 2022, Gonzalez sought resentencing under Senate Bill 483, which invalidated certain enhancements. The trial court struck one enhancement, reducing his sentence to 14 years but refused to reduce it further, citing aggravating factors and Gonzalez's conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in not applying the requirements of amended section 1170, subdivision (b), which mandates that aggravating factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated by the defendant. The appellate court held that the trial court improperly relied on unproven aggravating factors and failed to consider Gonzalez's childhood trauma as required by section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to apply the amended sentencing laws and consider all relevant factors. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Jose Nunez-Dosangos filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his ongoing detention in county jail pending trial on a charge of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. He was later released on his own recognizance after pleading guilty to a new charge of accessory after the fact, rendering his petition moot. However, the court decided to address the case due to its broad public interest and likelihood of recurrence. The petitioner had accrued presentence time-served and conduct credits exceeding the maximum potential sentence for the charged offense, and a probation report assessed him with a low risk of recidivism.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco initially denied bail and set the case for a preliminary hearing. The magistrate judge found insufficient evidence to show the petitioner knew of his co-defendant's intent to use the firearm, leading to the dismissal of the murder charge against him. The People refiled the murder charge, which was again dismissed by the trial court. The petitioner filed multiple motions for release, arguing his prolonged detention violated due process, but the trial court denied these motions, citing public safety concerns and the possibility of refiling the murder charge.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioner's pretrial detention was excessive in relation to the government's public safety goals, constituting impermissible punishment in violation of due process principles. The court noted that the length of detention exceeded the maximum potential sentence and that the trial court erred in relying on the possibility of refiling the murder charge. The petition was ultimately dismissed as moot due to the petitioner's release. View "Nunez-Dosangos v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was convicted in 2003 of attempted murder, kidnapping, and assault with a firearm. He was sentenced to a determinate term of 14 years, an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, and a life term with the possibility of parole. While incarcerated, Nguyen earned various credits, including good conduct and educational merit credits. These credits were applied to his minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) and youth parole eligible date (YPED), respectively.Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus in 2022, arguing that he should be able to use all types of credits to advance his YPED, not just educational merit credit. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the appellate court to vacate its order, and issued an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and held that Nguyen's right to equal protection was not violated. The court found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the challenged regulations, as youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED) while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court also determined that there is a rational basis for the regulation that limits the types of credits that can advance a youth offender's YPED, as it aligns with the legislative intent to provide a fixed and relatively stable parole eligibility date for youth offenders. Consequently, the court denied Nguyen's petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Nguyen" on Justia Law

Fahim Anthony Multani appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Multani, diagnosed with stage IV lung cancer in 2014, had his cancer metastasize to his brain by 2017. Despite this, his cancer, caused by a specific gene mutation, has been successfully treated with targeted medication for seven years, showing no evidence of disease progression. Multani argued that his illness should be considered as having an end-of-life trajectory, making him eligible for compassionate release.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Multani’s petition, concluding that his illness did not currently have an end-of-life trajectory. The court noted that while Multani’s cancer was incurable, it was perfectly suppressed by his current treatment, and there was no evidence of disease progression. The court found that the term “end-of-life trajectory” required the illness to be actively progressing toward death, which was not the case for Multani.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the term “end-of-life trajectory” in section 1172.2 requires that the illness be progressing toward death, not merely incurable or expensive to treat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Multani’s cancer, while serious and advanced, was not currently on an end-of-life trajectory due to its successful suppression by targeted medication. The court also noted that the legislative intent behind the statute did not support extending compassionate release to those whose illnesses are effectively managed and not actively progressing toward death. View "P. v. Multani" on Justia Law

Santiago Gonzalo Canales was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children, specifically his stepdaughter and niece, both under the age of 14 during the abuse. Canales's niece testified that he molested her from ages seven to 13, while his stepdaughter testified that he began molesting her when she was about 11, including vaginal penetration. Canales denied all allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Canales on all counts and found true the multiple victims allegations. He was sentenced to 60 years to life in prison, consisting of four consecutive sentences of 15 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Canales challenged two jury instructions: CALCRIM No. 1120 and CALCRIM No. 252. The court upheld the use of CALCRIM No. 1120, stating it correctly reflected the statutory requirements for continuous sexual abuse, which did not necessitate a heightened mental state for "substantial sexual conduct." The court acknowledged an error in CALCRIM No. 252 but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Canales's guilt. Canales's argument regarding the unanimity instruction was forfeited as he did not raise it during the trial.The court agreed with Canales and the prosecution that his sentence violated ex post facto principles because the One Strike law, which enhanced his sentence, did not apply to his offenses against his stepdaughter, which occurred before the law was amended to include continuous sexual abuse. Consequently, the court vacated Canales's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also contended the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred by ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed section 1170(d) despite amendments and that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and outside juvenile court jurisdiction. The court also found the stay order would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes. View "P. v. Bagsby" on Justia Law

Francisco Carlos Ibarra was charged with the attempted murders of A.U. and R.M., and two counts of attempted robbery. The incident occurred on a rural property used for illegal marijuana cultivation, where A.U. and R.M. were present. Ibarra and others, wearing black clothes and ski masks, arrived in a truck and began shooting at a shed where A.U. and R.M. had taken cover. A.U. was severely injured, and R.M. was shot in the back. Ibarra was convicted of both counts of attempted premeditated murder and two counts of attempted robbery. The jury found true the arming allegations but not the allegations of personal firearm discharge or infliction of great bodily injury.The Superior Court of Riverside County sentenced Ibarra to a total of six years determinate plus 14 years to life indeterminate. Ibarra appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions regarding the "kill zone" theory, self-defense, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the "kill zone" theory for the attempted murder of R.M., as there was no evidence that Ibarra knew R.M. was present in the shed. Consequently, the conviction for count 2 was reversed. However, the court upheld the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on self-defense or imperfect self-defense, as there was insufficient evidence to support these defenses. The court also affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences, finding substantial evidence that the attempted murders were not incidental to the robberies.The Court of Appeal vacated the conviction for the attempted murder of R.M. and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to allow the prosecution to retry Ibarra on that count or dismiss it. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Ibarra" on Justia Law

Jovan Jones was convicted by a jury of multiple felonies, including rape, sexual penetration, and assault with intent to commit a sex offense during a first-degree burglary, after he attacked a woman, C.M., in her apartment and stole her backpack. The jury also found true the allegations under the One Strike law that Jones committed two of the sex offenses during a burglary with intent to commit a sex offense and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.The trial court dismissed one count of attempted rape at the prosecution's request after the close of evidence. The jury convicted Jones of aggravated burglary, sexual penetration standing in the kitchen, rape in the bedroom, and robbery. The jury found true the burglary and weapon circumstances for the sexual penetration count and the burglary circumstance for the rape count. Jones was also found guilty of attempted sexual penetration and attempted rape, with the jury finding true the lesser allegation that he was armed with a deadly weapon during these offenses. The trial court sentenced Jones to a total term of 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court agreed that a full resentencing was required due to an unauthorized three-year enhancement. The court rejected Jones's other claims, including the argument that the prosecution's alternative theory of burglary based on his entry into the bedroom was an "ambush" and that the prosecutor's closing argument improperly suggested the presumption of innocence was over. The court struck the unauthorized enhancement, remanded for resentencing, ordered certain clerical errors corrected, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Leonardo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. The trial court found Garcia had made a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary hearing. Garcia's counsel subpoenaed the LAPD for contact information of two witnesses, but the trial court granted the LAPD's motion to quash, ruling that section 1172.6 did not allow for postconviction discovery. Garcia then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging this decision.Previously, the trial court had found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, with the jury finding true various firearm and gang-related enhancements. On appeal, the first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder, and Garcia's sentence was adjusted to 120 years to life. Garcia's subsequent petitions for resentencing were initially denied until the current petition was found to state a prima facie case for relief.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that section 1172.6 allows for postconviction discovery after an order to show cause is issued. The court reasoned that denying such discovery would hinder the petitioner's ability to defend against new theories of liability that the prosecution might present at the evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by quashing the subpoena, as it prevented Garcia from obtaining potentially relevant evidence. The appellate court granted Garcia's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Garcia v. Superior Court" on Justia Law