Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1992, a jury convicted Pepe Lopez of first degree murder with a true finding on a prior-murder special circumstance after hearing evidence the victim was shot and killed during a robbery in which Lopez participated and that Lopez had previously been convicted of first degree murder for his involvement in another robbery. In 2019, Lopez filed a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition seeking to vacate his conviction under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) which amended the definition of felony murder and eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory of murder. The trial court summarily denied the petition, concluding the special circumstance finding rendered Lopez ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because it demonstrated the jury had found he “personally killed, or personally shared a specific intent to kill.” Lopez conceded the special circumstance finding established the requisite mental state for a conviction of first degree murder under current law, but argued it did not similarly establish “the actus reus necessary for direct aider and abettor liability.” The Court of Appeal agreed with the State that the record established his guilt under the current felony-murder rule. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Johnson sexually abused his eight-year-old adopted daughter, Jane. His wife discovered and reported the abuse. Johnson was convicted of nine counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (Pen. Code 269(a)(4)); nine parallel counts, based on the same conduct, of sexual acts on a child (288.7(b)); and four counts of forcible lewd acts on a child (288(b)(1)). Johnson admits the sexual conduct. His aggregate sentence was 32 years plus 135 years to lifeThe court of appeal rejected Johnson’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient to show he used force, fear, or duress to effect the abuse; that the court abused its discretion and denied his right to confront witnesses by precluding questions about past sexual abuse of Jane; and that his sentence was unconstitutionally cruel and/or unusual.The court remanded for the court to exercise its discretion to resentence Johnson on the lewd acts counts. Insofar as section 667.6(d) required the court to make his sentences consecutive rather than concurrent based on a judicially-found fact, it was consistent with precedent. Insofar as section 667.6(d) mandated the imposition of “full” terms on the second through fourth counts, on which the court would otherwise have had the discretion to impose either a full term or one-third of the middle term, the statute increased the mandatory minimum sentence for those discrete crimes based on judicial factfinding, in violation of the Sixth Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court in “Alleyne” (2013). View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Christopher Kenney was inside his mother’s home in violation of a temporary DVRO that had not yet been served. Sheriff’s deputies yelled through a locked bedroom door, “There’s a restraining order on file, Christopher” and “You’re not allowed to be here.” After Christopher’s reply, “Break my fucking door down, dude. This is my fucking house”: deputies forced the door open and after a scuffle arrested him. Kenney was not charged with violating the temporary DVRO, but instead with resisting an executive officer. The fundamental issue on appeal was whether deputies acted lawfully, which in turn depended on whether they gave Kenney sufficient notice of the restraining order’s “contents.” To keep the peace while at the same time affording due process, Penal Code section 835 (c) provided that a law enforcement officer could enforce a DVRO after verifying it exists and orally informing the restrained person of its “contents.” The Court of Appeal held the deputies gave such notice and affirmed Kenney’s conviction. View "California v. Kenney" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of first-degree murder, three counts of second-degree murder, four counts of attempted murder, one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of due process by coercing the jury to deliberate during the COVID pandemic.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court held that allowing a jury to deliberate during the COVID pandemic is not coercive and does not deprive a defendant of the due process of law. Defendant describes the proceedings below as “a shambles” and having gone “off the rails” because of the pressure placed on the parties and jury. The court reasoned that there was no “hard deadline” of April 30. And the verdicts were reached ten days before that. Defendant’s case required verdicts on four counts of murder, four counts of attempted murder, two firearms-related felonies, and special allegations relating to nine of the ten counts. A few of the jury instructions and verdict forms contained errors that were quickly corrected. The issues identified during jury polling were likewise addressed promptly. These facets of the instant proceedings are not remarkable in a case of such complexity. Accordingly, the court wrote that it cannot conceive of any further efforts the trial court could have undertaken. View "P. v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several sex offenses against Jane Doe, his adoptive niece: oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child ten years old or younger (count 2), sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child ten years old or younger (count 3), and forcible rape (count 4). He argued that (1) the conviction on count two must be reversed as violating the prohibition on ex post facto laws, an argument which the People concede; (2) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) statistics, or, in the alternative, that he received ineffective assistance due to his trial counsel’s failure to object to the statistics testimony; and (3) his aggregate indeterminate sentences on counts 2 and 3 are unconstitutionally excessive.   The Fifth Appellate District, in the published portion of the court’s opinion, held that the admission of the expert’s testimony regarding CSAAS statistics was not an error. In the unpublished portion, the court reversed the conviction on count two and remanded for possible retrial on that count, but the court did not otherwise reach the constitutional challenge. The court explained that there was no error in admitting the expert’s CSAAS statistical testimony about the prevalence of preexisting relationships between abuser and abused because the testimony targeted a common misconception regarding child sexual abuse. That CSAAS statistic thus served the permissible purpose of helping the jury evaluate Doe’s credibility, free of preconceived misconceptions, while not relieving jurors of their ultimate duty to independently determine the truthfulness of her testimony. View "P. v. Sedano" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Travon Venable, Sr. guilty of first degree murder and attempted murder. The jury also found true, on each count, a gang enhancement and a gang-related firearm enhancement. Bullets fired from a small white car killed one victim and wounded another. Both victims were members or associates of the Westside Projects (Projects) gang. Months later, when the police arrested a known informant for an unrelated offense, he offered to give them information about the shooting. He told the police Venable drove the car used in the shooting and Elgin Johnson was the shooter. Both Venable and Johnson were members of the California Gardens Crips (California Gardens) gang, a rival of the Projects. Venable raised multiple arguments on appeal; the State conceded four: (1) the trial judge erred by sentencing Venable on both the firearm enhancements and the gang enhancements; (2) Venable was entitled to a remand so the trial judge could consider striking the prior serious felony conviction enhancement under newly enacted legislation; (3) the gang enhancements and the gang-related firearm enhancements should have been reversed because the jury was not instructed in accordance with newly enacted legislation; and (4) Venable was entitled to a remand for the trial judge to consider reducing the firearm enhancements under newly enacted legislation. The Court of Appeal initially found no errors other than those conceded by the State. However, the California Supreme Court granted review, transferred the matter back to the appellate court, and directed the appellate court to vacate its opinion and reconsider the case in light of the newly effective Evidence Code section 352.2, enacted by Assembly Bill No. 2799 (Stats. 2022, ch. 973) (AB 2799). It was uncontested the trial judge did not consider those additional factors before admitting a rap video in Venable’s trial and that the trial, as a result, didn’t comply with the new requirements for admission. "The question is whether these new requirements apply retroactively to cases like Venable’s, which are pending on appeal at the time of their enactment." To this, the Court concluded the requirements of Evidence Code section 352.2 did apply retroactively in nonfinal cases and that their application likely would have influenced the trial in Venable’s favor. The Court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "California v. Venable" on Justia Law

Kelly Sundberg appealed the denial of his application for outpatient placement pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2. In 1999, Sundberg was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) following a criminal trial, resulting in his commitment to a state hospital. Over two decades later, Sundberg applied to be discharged from the hospital and placed under community supervision on an outpatient basis, but the trial court denied his application. He appealed that order. Sundberg’s appointed counsel raised no arguable issues, but asserts that the procedures set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and California v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979) applied to this appeal. Following existing authority, the Court of Appeal conclude that the review required by Anders and Wende did not apply here. The Court offered Sundberg the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, but he declined to do so. Accordingly, in the absence of any arguable issues to review, the appeal was dismissed. View "California v. Sundberg" on Justia Law

Todd pleaded no contest to three counts of buying or receiving stolen property in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and a stipulated sentence of 44 months. In 2021, the court imposed the stipulated sentence: the three-year upper term on count 1, a consecutive eight-month term on count 7, (one-third of the middle term), and a concurrent three-year upper term on count 8.Effective in January 2022, Senate Bill 567 amended Penal Code section 1170(b) to provide that a court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” The Attorney General argued that although SB 567 applies retroactively here, Todd stipulated to an upper-term sentence in his plea agreement.The court of appeal remanded for resentencing. Under the terms of the plea agreement, no term other than the upper term may be imposed; the court is not authorized to unilaterally modify the plea agreement. Unless Todd waives the statute’s requirements, if the court does not find circumstances to justify the aggravated term, the only remedy available to the court is to withdraw approval for the plea agreement. View "People v. Todd" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to first-degree residential burglary and admitted a prior felony “strike” conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. He also entered a waiver pursuant to People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247 (Cruz). Defendant failed to appear for sentencing. After Defendant was taken into custody, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 12 years in prison. On remand, the trial court concluded that Defendant’s failure to appear had been willful and reimposed the 12-year sentence. Defendant appealed, contending the sentence must be vacated because the record does not support a finding that his failure to appear was willful.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed, holding that section 1170, subdivision (b), does not apply when Defendant enters a plea agreement with a stipulated term of imprisonment. The court explained that Defendant’s explanation for missing the hearing was that he overslept. However, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that if Defendant had merely overslept due to a family emergency, he would have come to court to explain the error as soon as he realized it. Instead, Defendant appears to have made no attempt to appear before the court on the date of his sentencing or the following morning before he was arrested. The trial court was in the best position to determine the credibility of the claim that Defendant failed to appear because he overslept. Thus, based on the record, the trial court could reasonably have concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant’s failure to appear was willful. View "P. v. Sallee" on Justia Law

In 2016, Hunter W. was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, as well as allegations that he personally used a deadly weapon. Shortly after, he was charged with driving without a license and driving under the influence of drugs. After he admitted to the assault with a deadly weapon and driving under the influence charges, the juvenile court granted Hunter conditional probation. In 2018, after multiple reports of probation violations, the juvenile court revoked probation and committed Hunter to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for the maximum term of seven years. Hunter appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the dispositional order and issued the remittitur on August 15, 2019. After the passage of California Senate Bill No. 823, on December 2, 2021, Hunter petitioned to modify the commitment order to the middle term of six years—the maximum confinement permitted under the new law. The District Attorney opposed the petition on the grounds that the new law did not apply to Hunter’s final judgment. The juvenile court agreed with the prosecution and denied Hunter’s petition. Appealing that order, Hunter again argued his juvenile disposition was not a final judgment and because the new law was ameliorative, he was eligible for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded the case was final for purposes of retroactivity of the new law, and affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying his petition for modification. View "In re Hunter W." on Justia Law