Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2021, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) sent a letter to the superior court recommending that it resentence Gabriel Mendoza because of errors in his original sentence. Mendoza was resentenced in 2022, after amendments to Penal Code section 1385 became effective. The trial court concluded that section 1385(c)(2)(C) did not always require dismissal of a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(c), even when imposition of the 20-year sentence for that enhancement results in a sentence of over 20 years. On appeal, Mendoza argued that under section 1385(c)(2)(C) dismissal of the enhancement was mandatory, not discretionary. The Court of Appeal concluded that section 1385(c)(2)(C) did not mandate dismissal of an enhancement when the court finds that dismissal would endanger public safety. The Court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the enhancement. View "California v Mendoza" on Justia Law

The prosecution filed a complaint alleging that a defendant committed a lewd or lascivious act on a child by force, violence, duress, menace, and fear. The North River Insurance Company and its bail agent (collectively, North River) posted a $100,000 bond to release the defendant. The trial court declared the bond forfeited when the defendant did not appear for a hearing on February 22, 2018. North River moved to vacate the forfeiture and to exonerate the bond under section 1305, subdivision (d) or (g). In the alternative, it moved to toll time under section 1305, subdivision (e) or (h). On July 10, 2019, the court entered a judgment of $100,000 against North River. North River appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained it decided a similar case against a surety in People v. Tingcungco (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 249 (Tingcungco). The court reasoned that North River’s position is contrary to the language and legislative history of Penal Code section 1305, subdivisions (g) and (h). North River posted a bail bond on a defendant who fled California. North River chased him but found him too late to get the prosecution’s decision on extradition, which is a necessary part of the statutory process. To save itself now, North River maintains legislative purpose should override, or guide, the interpretation of the words of this statute. However, the court wrote, rescuing anyone who may have pledged assets as security for the bond is not an issue before the court. View "P. v. The North River Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Following Defendant’s 2009 guilty plea to seven felony counts arising from the theft and use of credit cards and other items, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate indeterminate state prison term of 35 years to life under the three strikes law. The Second Appellate District rejected Defendant’s challenges to her sentence on appeal. After the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Secretary) recommended Defendant be resentenced, the trial court resentenced Defendant to an aggregate determinate state prison term of 23 years, four months. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to strike one of the two 5-year prior serious felony enhancements and by imposing the upper term of six years for first-degree burglary.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court did not err by sentencing Defendant pursuant to multiple enhancements. Further, the court found that Defendant forfeited her claim that the upper term is improper. Not only did Defendant fail to object to the court’s imposition of the upper term, but also it was Defendant’s counsel who repeatedly suggested the court sentence Defendant to the upper term on count 3 and sentence Defendant as a second-strike offender but retain one or both of the five-year enhancements on count 3, resulting in a sentence of either 18 years four months or 23 years four months (including the one-third middle term sentence, doubled, on count 4). View "P. v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Markham heard the engine of his Mazda idling and saw Pack drive it away. Markham and Walker got into another car and followed. When Pack stopped, a chase and confrontation ensued. Pack was charged with four counts, including assault with a deadly weapon for an assault upon Markham with a “stabbing weapon.” Pack had on his person “silver-edged metal knuckles.” Walker observed Pack holding what Walker thought was a knife.Pack was convicted of several offenses, including one with which he was not charged: assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. Over Pack’s objection, the court instructed the jury that assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury is a lesser included offense of the charged offense of assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, the Attorney General conceded that this instruction was erroneous but argued that, rather than reverse Pack’s conviction the court should modify the judgment to reflect a conviction for simple assault.In 2022, the California Supreme Court held that, for the purpose of the prohibition on multiple convictions for one offense, assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury and assault with a deadly weapon are alternative means of committing the same offense. The court of appeal subsequently concluded that Pack’s right to due process was violated and reversed the conviction of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. View "People v. Pack" on Justia Law

When Leonardo Fernandez arrived at the hospital with his son Marco, the child was 13 weeks old and already dead. Marco sustained 18 separate rib fractures and bruises spattered his body. Blunt forces had caused several skull fractures and contusions on his brain. An expert later testified that Marco died from a blow to the left side of his skull. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals was whether the State demonstrated a rational ground for concluding that Fernandez intended to kill Marco, an element necessary to charge the torture-murder special circumstance. The Court concluded that showing was made and granted a writ of mandate to order the charge reinstated. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Fernandez)" on Justia Law

Fuentes pleaded guilty to inflicting corporal injury on Doe, a person with whom he had a dating relationship, and admitted inflicting great bodily injury on the (then-pregnant) victim in circumstances involving domestic violence. His plea agreement called for probation with a suspended sentence of eight years. After he was released pending sentencing, Fuentes was found to have violated a provision in the plea agreement specifying that if he committed another crime, violated a condition of release, or willfully failed to appear for sentencing, he would be sentenced unconditionally. Doe had reported a violation of Fuentes’s order to have only peaceful contact with her in that he yelled at her and withheld access to her phone and internet access. Fuentes was determined to have violated his criminal protective order “as the victim was in fear of [him] and he was preventing her access to call for help.” Fuentes was sentenced to a nine-year prison term.The court of appeal rejected his arguments that the condition he was found to have violated was unconstitutionally vague and that the evidence did not support finding a violation. The court remanded for resentencing based on post-sentencing statutory amendments. Senate Bill made the middle term of imprisonment the presumptive sentence. View "People v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

In 2001, a body was found with multiple stab wounds. Maldonado reported witnessing the killing and seeing a man with blood on his chest who may have been the killer. Police found a sweatshirt and knife buried in the yard of Maldonado’s former residence, and found a photograph of Morales with the victim’s body in Maldonado’s residence at the time of his arrest. Maldonado, charged with first-degree murder with an allegation that the murder was committed by means of lying in wait, testified that Morales took him to the body after the killing; Maldonado helped Morales bury the evidence.The jury was instructed on willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder; lying in wait; and direct aiding and abetting. It was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury convicted Maldonado of first-degree murder. In 2019, Senate Bill 1437 eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule, allowing retroactive relief.The trial court summarily denied Maldonado's petition for resentencing, finding that Maldonado’s conviction was not obtained under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory. The court of appeal remanded, An evidentiary hearing is required; the court may find that Maldonado was the actual killer or that he was an aider and abettor who facilitated the killing with personal disregard for human life, in which case his petition will be denied. Otherwise, he will be entitled to relief. View "People v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

Ornelas pled no contest to a felony count of offering to give away a controlled substance, conditioned on two years of felony probation. A few months after being placed on probation, Ornelas failed to report as directed. His probation was summarily revoked, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He was eventually arrested and admitted to violating his probation. In April 2022—within his original two-year probationary term—the trial court reinstated him on probation, but with a new termination date in November 2023 to account for the days he had been “in warrant status” and his probation had been summarily revoked.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Ornelas’s argument that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by extending his probation to a date beyond the two-year maximum probationary period authorized by statute. When probation is summarily revoked and then reinstated within the initial probationary term, the trial court has the discretion to extend probation to account for the time when probation was summarily revoked so long as the total period of probationary supervision does not exceed the statutory maximum. Even with the extension, Ornelas’s term of probation, not including the time he was on warrant status and his probation was summarily revoked, is less than two years. View "People v. Ornelas" on Justia Law

Ortiz took a baseball bat to an unoccupied Jeep belonging to a stranger and was charged with felony vandalism causing property damage in excess of $400. Ortiz pleaded no contest and admitted a prior strike, a 2020 attempted robbery conviction. Ortiz, age 28, had associated with a criminal gang since age 12 and had accrued multiple sustained juvenile petitions, adult convictions, and violations of probation and parole. Ortiz had a history of assaulting jail staff. After his recent release from prison, Ortiz started using methamphetamine and became homeless, violating his conditions of parole multiple times. Ortiz was unemployed and not seeking employment. Ortiz was diagnosed with schizophrenia and depression.Ortiz argued that mitigating factors should guide the trial court to dismiss the prior strike: his current offense was “connected to mental illness”; and was not a violent felony under Penal Code 667.5(c). Denying the “Romero motion,” the court rejected Ortiz’s assertion that the offense was connected to mental illness, and stated that, while the current offense, was “not a violent felony, countervailing considerations outweighed the mitigating factor in the furtherance of justice.” The court of appeal affirmed. Under Penal Code 1385, courts have broad discretion to dismiss a charge “in furtherance of justice.” Senate Bill 81 enumerated mitigating circumstances that the court is to “weigh greatly” in favor of dismissal of an enhancement unless dismissal would endanger public safety. Those factors do not establish a presumption in favor of dismissal that is rebuttable only by danger to public safety. View "People v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Defendant was 22 years old when he committed various sex crimes for which he was sentenced to serve multiple life in prison without parole and multiple life in prison with parole terms. These sentences were based on the One Strike law. On an unrelated occasion, he stole a car and was convicted for its theft. On appeal, Defendant made several claims mostly related to sentencing. Primarily, he suggested the youthful offender parole scheme—which excludes people sentenced under the One Strike law, and people sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as adults—violates equal protection. The People disputed any equal protection violation. Second, Defendant complained the court erred in pronouncing one of the life in prison with parole terms. The People concede, but the parties diverge on the appropriate remedy. Their disagreement centers on due process and notice. Third, Defendant contends the trial court should have stayed some of the One Strike sentences pursuant to section 654, which generally prohibits multiple punishments for a single act. The People disagree.   The Fifth Appellate district, in the published portion of the opinion, found against Defendant on three issues. In the unpublished portion, the court addressed his remaining contentions. Ultimately, the court reversed the car theft conviction for insufficient evidence, directed the court to stay certain other sentences, and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the judgment, including the life without parole terms. View "P. v. Bolanos" on Justia Law