Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2018, appellant Ryan Kite was driving a truck while under the influence of alcohol. He pulled out of a parking lot into traffic without coming to a stop, causing motorcyclist D.P. to slam on his brakes and fall off his motorcycle. Kite drove away from the scene without stopping. D.P. got back on his motorcycle, called 911, caught up to Kite’s truck, and signaled for Kite to pull over. At first, Kite did not stop. Kite eventually did stop at an intersection, where his passenger exited the truck. When the police arrived, Kite’s eyes were watery and red, and he had a strong odor of alcohol. Kite failed a variety of field sobriety tests. The motorcyclist D.P. suffered a spinal compression fracture as a result of the accident.Kite was charged with three counts: (1) driving under the influence causing injury; (2) driving with measurable blood alcohol content causing injury; and (3) hit-and-run with injury. A jury convicted Kite as charged on all three counts. At sentencing, the trial court placed Kite on formal probation for five years for counts two and three, imposed but stayed a 365-day jail term pending completion of probation, and stayed the sentence for count one under Penal Code section 654. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court violated Penal Code section 1203.1 as amended by Assembly Bill No. 1950 by imposing a five-year term of probation. As amended, section 1203.1(a) generally limited felony probation to a maximum of two years. But the statute included several exceptions, including one for violent felonies or any offense that “includes specific probation lengths within its provisions.” For these offenses, the maximum length of probation was “the maximum possible term of the sentence.” The Court of Appeal held that the maximum term of imprisonment was that which could have been imposed, rather than the maximum probationary period allowable under another law specifying a specific probation length; the maximum possible probation length had to be calculated by reference to the aggregate prison term that could have been imposed for all counts of conviction. Based on this holding, the Court found Kite’s term of probation had to be reduced from five years to three years and eight months. View "California v. Kite" on Justia Law

Minor K.C. appealed the order imposing a condition of probation that prohibits unconsented sexual touching of another person. K.C. argues that probation condition 6A is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define “sexual touching.” He points out, for example, that lewd or lascivious conduct prohibits touching of a child with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the child, but the touching need not be done in a sexual manner.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the condition. The court explained that probation condition 6A provides fair warning of the conduct it prohibits. A reasonable person would interpret this provision to proscribe unconsented touching of another person that involves any sexual connotation, either due to the parts of the body involved or K.C.’s intent in touching the person. The term “unconsented” provides guidance and permits K.C. to avoid violating the condition in those instances where he has that person’s consent. That different penal statutes define and proscribe particular sexual crimes in different terms makes no difference; K.C. must avoid all unconsented sexual touching. The condition is sufficiently definite to preclude constitutional infirmity. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of first-degree murder by a jury. The jury also found that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Defendants' convictions were affirmed on appeal and then they each filed for resentencing relief under Sec. 1172.6. The trial court denied relief, and on initial appeal, the court remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court the court found Defendants guilty of murder as direct aiders and abettors and denied their petitions for resentencing.Ultimately, the Second Appellate District denied relief after considering each Defendant's arguments. View "P. v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 1981, defendant Richard Morgan was convicted of vehicular manslaughter caused by unlawful exhibition of speed and DUI, neither of which was listed as a qualifying prior for elevating a DUI to a felony under California Vehicle Code section 23550.5 (b). The sole question presented in this appeal was whether Morgan’s nonqualifying 1981 convictions could be treated together as if they were a qualifying prior conviction for violating Penal Code section 191.5 (a), even though the latter statute was not enacted until five years later. After deciding that they could be, the trial court sentenced Morgan’s current DUI convictions as felonies. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by treating Morgan as if he had previously been convicted of violating a Penal Code provision that was not yet in existence at the time of his 1981 convictions. "Without legislative authorization, we cannot expand the statute by judicial fiat to authorize courts to cobble together the elements of older California convictions and treat them as if they were a violation of a Penal Code provision that was not enacted until years later." Accordingly, the Court vacated Morgan’s sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. View "California v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Davis and 16-year-old C.W., met at a party where C.W. and others, including Davis, drank alcohol. C.W. also smoked marijuana. Others saw C.W. vomit several times. Around 2:00 a.m., Davis, M., and C.W. went to sleep in a bedroom. Around 5:00 a.m., J. heard moaning coming from the master bedroom and heard a female voice say “ ‘ow.’ ” He looked into a bedroom and saw that M. sleeping alone. When J. knocked on the master bedroom door and told the occupants to leave. C.W. came out sobbing. Davis exited the same bedroom, stating, “I didn’t mean to hurt anyone.” C.W. suffered serious injuries.Davis was booked and posted bail. Months later, Davis was arrested for possession of Percocet without a prescription. He voluntarily entered a residential treatment program for 90 days. Months later, Davis was charged with multiple counts related to the rape. Davis pleaded no contest to raping an intoxicated person in return for a three-year prison sentence and dismissal of all other charges. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Davis’s request to receive 90 days of custody credits against his three-year term based on his voluntary time spent at the drug treatment program. His stay at that facility did not constitute custody; any restraint on his liberty was not attributable to the rape charges. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned the superior court, pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now Section 1172.6) of the Penal Code, for resentencing on his conviction for second-degree murder. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition after finding Petitioner was guilty of murder under an implied malice theory. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the order denying the petition must be reversed because Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) eliminated implied malice as a valid theory of murder liability for aiders and abettors and, in any event, substantial evidence did not support a finding Petitioner acted with implied malice.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that for implied malice, the intent requirement is satisfied by proof that the actual perpetrator “knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and . . . acts with conscious disregard for life.” Therefore, notwithstanding Senate Bill [No.] 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second-degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second-degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life.” Accordingly, the court rejected Petitioner’s contention that an aider and abettor to murder must act with express malice. Further, substantial evidence supports the superior court’s finding that Petitioner acted with implied malice. View "P. v. Silva" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Nash was convicted of three lewd acts on two young girls, and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of ten years after the trial court determined a 15-yers-to-life sentence on each count under California's One Strike Law would be cruel and/or unusual punishment. Nash appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed, agreeing with the State that a mandatory life term was constitutional. Following remittitur, the trial court resentenced Nash to concurrent 15-years-to-life terms on each of the three lewd acts counts. Nash again challenged the constitutionality of his sentence, an argument the Court rejected based on law of the case. The State further contended on appeal that prison terms of 15 years to life were unauthorized because Penal Code section 667.61(j)(2) of the One Strike law mandated 25 years to life where lewd acts involved multiple victims each under the age of 14. The Court of Appeal found California courts were divided as to whether imposing a 25-years-to-life sentence under subdivision (j)(2) violated due process where, as here, the accusatory pleading only alleged a violation of subdivision (b) of section 667.61. The Court of Appeal found the amended information expressly stated that the effect of the One Strike law allegations was potential exposure of 15 years to life, it did not place Nash on fair notice that he would face 25 years to life. Rejecting the State's argument on narrow factual grounds, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Nash" on Justia Law

Jail personnel search inmate mail for contraband. To preserve confidentiality, mail from an inmate to an attorney is opened in front of the inmate; the contents are visually inspected but not read. An officer noticed an envelope from Cortez addressed to his attorney; with a “bulk in the center.” It smelled of feces. Suspecting the envelope contained contraband, he opened it but not in front of Cortez. The envelope contained another envelope fashioned from the lined yellow paper, marked “do not read.” The officer opened it and found multiple "kites," each made from different colored paper and with different writing. Kites are clandestine notes, written by inmates on small pieces of paper in very small print, then rolled up to minimize their size and facilitate concealment. The officer informed his supervisor.A magistrate conducted an in-camera examination and concluded: The messages have “the teeny tiny writing ... indicative of a gang-related kite…. I did not read the substance … none of them were addressed to [Cortez’s attorney]. None of them ... appeared to even be written by Cortez…. I do not find the attorney-client privilege applies.” The court of appeal agreed. The magistrate’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Even if the jail violated the regulation requiring legal mail to be opened in the inmate’s presence, the remedy would not automatically render everything inside the envelope—including communications intended for people other than an attorney—subject to attorney-client privilege. View "People v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County" on Justia Law

In 2004, petitioner Robert Cress was convicted of first degree murder. In 2021, he filed a petition to vacate the murder conviction pursuant to California Penal Code section 1172.6. After considering documentary evidence and argument, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner had the intent to kill when he aided and abetted the murder, and alternatively, that he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. It therefore denied the petition. While an order denying his section 1172.6 petition was on appeal, filed a second section 1172.6 petition. The trial court dismissed the second petition. The Court of Appeal held that, if that was error at all, the error was not jurisdictional. Moreover, it was both invited and harmless, and therefore not reversible. View "California v. Cress" on Justia Law

Cheek was convicted of kidnapping, rape, and forcible oral copulation in 1980. He escaped prison, raped a 15-year-old, and was convicted of rape and furnishing a controlled substance to a minor. When Cheek’s prison term neared its end, he was declared a sexually violent predator (Welfare. & Institutions Code 6600). In 2019, the Department of State Hospitals deemed Cheek appropriate for conditional release. The court found Cheek could be adequately supervised in a less restrictive setting. The agency identified a placement site in rural Santa Cruz. The staff responsible for supervising Cheek would be 65 miles away. The Department notified the surrounding community, as required by statute, prompting significant community response. Specific concerns included that the site has no cellular service, is close to hiking trails. and is near a bus stop used by school children. Months later, the district attorney provided a declaration from a private school operating out of a home less than a quarter mile from the proposed placement site. It began operating weeks after the notice was sent, with two teachers (parents of students), four full-time students, and six part-time students.The court accepted that there is a school within a quarter mile of the site but found the statutory restriction inapplicable because the school was established after the notification of proposed release. The court of appeal vacated the placement order. The statute prohibiting placement of certain sexually violent predators near a school does not require the school to have been operating for any particular time nor preclude application to schools operating in a home. View "People v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County" on Justia Law