Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2004, petitioner Robert Cress was convicted of first degree murder. In 2021, he filed a petition to vacate the murder conviction pursuant to California Penal Code section 1172.6. After considering documentary evidence and argument, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner had the intent to kill when he aided and abetted the murder, and alternatively, that he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. It therefore denied the petition. While an order denying his section 1172.6 petition was on appeal, filed a second section 1172.6 petition. The trial court dismissed the second petition. The Court of Appeal held that, if that was error at all, the error was not jurisdictional. Moreover, it was both invited and harmless, and therefore not reversible. View "California v. Cress" on Justia Law

Cheek was convicted of kidnapping, rape, and forcible oral copulation in 1980. He escaped prison, raped a 15-year-old, and was convicted of rape and furnishing a controlled substance to a minor. When Cheek’s prison term neared its end, he was declared a sexually violent predator (Welfare. & Institutions Code 6600). In 2019, the Department of State Hospitals deemed Cheek appropriate for conditional release. The court found Cheek could be adequately supervised in a less restrictive setting. The agency identified a placement site in rural Santa Cruz. The staff responsible for supervising Cheek would be 65 miles away. The Department notified the surrounding community, as required by statute, prompting significant community response. Specific concerns included that the site has no cellular service, is close to hiking trails. and is near a bus stop used by school children. Months later, the district attorney provided a declaration from a private school operating out of a home less than a quarter mile from the proposed placement site. It began operating weeks after the notice was sent, with two teachers (parents of students), four full-time students, and six part-time students.The court accepted that there is a school within a quarter mile of the site but found the statutory restriction inapplicable because the school was established after the notification of proposed release. The court of appeal vacated the placement order. The statute prohibiting placement of certain sexually violent predators near a school does not require the school to have been operating for any particular time nor preclude application to schools operating in a home. View "People v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michelle Guiffreda appealed an order denying her petition for resentencing on a 2004 conviction for second-degree murder under California Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found there was insufficient evidence of malice aforethought to establish Guiffreda’s liability as a direct aider and abettor to murder. However, the court denied her petition based on a felony murder theory after finding beyond a reasonable doubt under current law that: (1) Guiffreda was a major participant in the underlying robbery which led to the victim’s death; and (2) she acted with reckless indifference to human life. Guiffreda contended on appeal that the record did not support the trial court’s major participant and reckless indifference findings. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal concurred there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that Guiffreda acted with reckless indifference to human life. Consequently, the Court did not resolve whether she was a major participant. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate her murder conviction and conduct further proceedings. View "California v. Guiffreda" on Justia Law

In 1990, a San Diego jury convicted petitioner Christopher Box of three counts of first degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, first degree robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and residential burglary with associated weapons use enhancements. After the jury found special circumstances of multiple murder and murder during the commission of robbery and burglary, Box was sentenced to death in 1991. Box was African American, his codefendant was Hispanic, and the three murder victims were White. During jury selection, the prosecutor used two of her peremptory challenges to excuse both African Americans who were seated in the jury box. Defense counsel objected under California v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 (1978). Although the court did not find a prima facie showing of racial bias as to either strike, it permitted the prosecutor to state her reasons for excusing the jurors on the record. Later the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse an alternate juror, and the defense again raised a Wheeler challenge. The court again found no prima facie case, but permitted the prosecutor to offer reasons for the strike. The judge then denied the motion, finding the prosecutor had not engaged in “racial discrimination” because she would not have excluded a Black prosecutor or police officer from the jury. Ultimately one African American alternate juror was seated, but none of the 12 jurors who deliberated the verdicts was African American. On automatic appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected Box’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion. In January 2022, shortly after the California Supreme Court decided California v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.5th 348 (2021, Jones II), Box filed a motion to compel the District Attorney to produce copies of the trial prosecutor’s jury selection notes to support his federal habeas claim of Batson error. The State objected to their production on grounds of work product privilege. The Court of Appeal found that where a prima facie case of racial bias under Batson/Wheeler has been made, a defendant is entitled to discover the prosecution’s jury selection notes under Penal Code section 1054.9. "Those notes are not categorically shielded from discovery by the absolute work product privilege. To the extent the People maintain that those notes reflect the prosecution’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research and theories about case strategy independent of conclusions or impressions about prospective jurors, they bear the burden to make that foundational proffer and seek appropriate redactions from the trial court." View "Box v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

O’Connor is the parent of John. When John was 14 years old, O’Connor allegedly “supplied excessive amounts of alcohol to her son and his minor friends to the point where minors would vomit, be unable to stand, and fall unconscious. When these minors were extremely intoxicated from the alcohol, she encouraged them to engage in sexual activity with each other, facilitated sexual encounters, and watched some of these sexual encounters.” O’Connor also helped the minors leave their homes at night without their parents’ knowledge, communicating with them via Snapchat or text message and picking them up down the street from their homes.O’Connor is currently held in pretrial custody on charges of 39 offenses involving 15 minor victims. The trial court denied release on bail due to the seriousness of the charged offenses, which include 12 counts of felony child endangerment (Penal Code 273a(a)), along with evidence showing that less restrictive conditions of release on bail would not protect the public or the minor victims. O’Connor filed a habeas petition, contending that she was entitled to bail as a matter of law. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal again denied the petition, concluding that O’Connor was charged with qualifying felony offenses involving an act of violence on another person within the meaning of California Constitution, article I, section 12(b). View "In re O'Connor" on Justia Law

Appellant is a repeat offender who has previously served seven separate prison terms. Facing a “Three Strikes” 25-year to-life sentence in the present case, she “cut” her best deal with the prosecutor and the trial court. Appellant attempted to “whittle down” the 18- year prison term she agreed to serve by relying upon newly enacted subdivision (b)(6) of Penal Code section 1170.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because the trial court t had no discretion to impose a lesser sentence or any sentence that varied the terms to which she had agreed in her plea bargain. The court held that section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) does not apply to sentences imposed pursuant to a negotiated disposition that includes an agreed-upon term of imprisonment. In this situation, the superior court does not have the discretion to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. View "P. v. Kelly" on Justia Law

In 2007, Lipscomb pulled his car up next to Lee and shot him three times. He was convicted of evading a police officer with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons and property, possession of a firearm by a felon, discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, and assault with a semiautomatic firearm, with allegations that Lipscomb had personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury, had three prior serious felony convictions qualifying as strikes, and had served two prior prison terms. He was sentenced to 67 years to life in prison, with a restitution fine (reduced on appeal to the statutory maximum of $10,000).In 2022, Lipscomb was resentenced to 35 years to life; the trial court declined to dismiss a 25-year-to-life firearm enhancement in the interest of justice, finding that doing so would endanger public safety. The court of appeal rejected Lipscomb’s argument that the trial court was required to dismiss the firearm enhancement because its application could result in a sentence of over 20 years. Senate Bill 81 (2021), amending Penal Code section 1385 to specify mitigating circumstances that the court should consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice, does not make dismissal of the enhancement mandatory in every circumstance. View "People v. Lipscomb" on Justia Law

Ross was charged with battery on a nonconfined person by a prisoner. Ross pleaded guilty to the administrative charge of battering the counselor. At trial, several officers and an intercepted letter corroborated the victim’s testimony about the attack. The defense presented no evidence. During discussions about jury instructions, Ross declared, “Man, you are fired” and “I will represent myself.” Ross cursed at the court, which had him removed. Defense attorney Fallman stated that he tried to talk with Ross, who refused and declined to return to the courtroom. Fallman noted that Ross had fired his previous attorney and that he knew of no “provocation.” The court continued without Ross. During closing arguments, Fallman admitted Ross touched the officer willingly, in a harmful or offensive manner, but argued there was no preplanning or weapon. Fallman asked the jury to find Ross guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery. The jury convicted Ross, finding two prior strike allegations true. Finding six aggravating factors true and no mitigating factors, the court sentenced Ross to the upper term of four years, doubled to eight years under the Three Strike Law.The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting Ross’s argument that his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment rights by conceding his guilt. There was no evidence that his claimed desire to maintain innocence to the exclusion of all other defense strategies was ever communicated to Fallman or the court. The court remanded for resentencing due to Senate Bill 567., which requires that when a statute specifies three potential terms of imprisonment, a court must presumptively impose the middle term. View "People v. Ross" on Justia Law

In May 2006, a then-25-year old defendant Matthew White, while drunk and speeding, struck a car stopped on the shoulder of the highway with its hazard lights on, killing the driver and injuring two passengers. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving under the influence causing injury, and driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher causing injury, with enhancements for causing and inflicting great bodily injury on multiple victims. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for second degree murder, and a consecutive determinate middle term of two years for driving under the influence with injury. In 2020, defendant requested and received a hearing pursuant to California v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016) to make a record of information relevant to an eventual youthful offender parole hearing. He then filed a motion to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing under In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) based on amendments to Penal Code section 654 following the passage of Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). The trial court denied the motion. Defendant argued on appeal: (1) the Franklin hearing rendered the judgment nonfinal and subject to Assembly Bill 518; (2) Assembly Bill 518 should have been applied retroactively to all convictions; and (3) failure to remand for resentencing would deprive him of equal protection under the law. Rejecting all these contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. White" on Justia Law

In 2005, Williams was convicted of first degree-murder with true findings on a drive-by shooting special circumstance and true findings on allegations that Williams personally used a firearm and a principal was armed with a firearm. His conviction was affirmed, with the sentence modified to reflect the appropriate term for first-degree murder with special circumstances, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.In 2019, Williams sought resentencing. His petition included allegations that the information filed allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, that he had been convicted of first-degree murder, and that he could not now be convicted of first- or second-degree murder because of changes made to Penal Code sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. The court summarily denied Williams’ petition. The court of appeal affirmed. The jury’s true finding on the drive-by shooting special circumstance allegation, together with the court’s instructions, conclusively demonstrates the jury found Williams acted with the requisite intent and conduct to convict him of first-degree murder under the amendments to sections 188 and 189. He is ineligible for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 as a matter of law. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law