Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, an honorably discharged veteran who suffers from a severe mental disorder, was arrested for firearms offenses. In turn, he sought admission to a mental health diversion program under Penal Code section 1001.36. The trial court denied Defendant's request finding that he posed an unreasonable danger, and Defendant appealed.On appeal, the Second Appellate District reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's request for mental health diversion, finding that there was no evidence "he is too dangerous to be treated in the community because he would commit a new violent super strike." The trial court's analysis looked at Defendant's likelihood of committing a crime, not a super strike, which are limited to murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors under the age of 14. View "P. v. Whitmill" on Justia Law

Jones was tried for a 2014 shooting death. The jury was instructed on first-degree felony murder and told that Jones could be guilty under this theory if a coparticipant committed the fatal act. The jury convicted Jones but found not true the allegation that he had personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. Jones was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life. In 2018, Senate Bill 1437 amended the Penal Code such that murder liability is not imposed on persons convicted of felony murder unless they were the actual killer, an aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill, or a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. In 2020, Jones sought resentencing under Penal Code 1172.6.The trial court denied Jones’s petition, finding that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court of appeal remanded “for the court’s consideration of all relevant factors consistent with prevailing law.” It was not clear whether the court considered Jones’s youth as a relevant factor in deciding whether he was a major participant. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Lonnie Kocontes of murdering his ex-wife for financial gain. Kocontes conceded sufficient evidence supported his conviction; he challenged numerous procedural and evidentiary rulings. Although the trial court erred by admitting evidence, Kocontes was not prejudiced by its admission, and his constitutional rights were not infringed. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Kocontes" on Justia Law

The California Constitution directs that laws be made to exclude “persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes” from serving on juries. Former Code of Civil Procedure 203(a)), provided, “All persons are eligible and qualified to be prospective trial jurors, except” “Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights have not been restored.” In 2019, Senate Bill 310 eliminated the exclusion of persons convicted of felonies from serving on juries. Section 203(a) now excepts from eligibility to serve as jurors “Persons while they are incarcerated. … Persons who have been convicted of a felony and are currently on parole, postrelease community supervision felony probation, or mandated supervision for the conviction of a felony. … Persons who are currently required to register as a sex offender … based on a felony conviction.”Plaintiffs alleged that the categorical exclusion of current sex offender registrants from jury service denied registrants equal protection under the California Constitution. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The statutory disparity withstands rational basis scrutiny. Plausible reasons for the Legislature’s line-drawing include ensuring impartial juries by excluding those persons convicted of felonies deemed more likely to harbor anti-government bias. View "Doe v. Finke" on Justia Law

After defendant Ishmael Carter was housed for more than 14 years in a state hospital awaiting trial, the trial court found him to be a sexually violent predator and committed him to an indeterminate term. Defendant appealed that order, contending the trial court: (1) abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion; and (2) failed to obtain a valid waiver of defendant’s right to a jury trial. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Department of State Hospitals (DSH) serves defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST). Chunn was found incompetent to stand trial. After being ordered admitted to Napa State Hospital, he waited 75 days for admission. Chunn argued that DHS’s failure to promptly commence competency assessment and treatment violated his state and federal due process rights. Other defendants, also found incompetent to stand trial, sought sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 against DSH. The trial court consolidated the cases and ordered DSH to implement specific steps within specific timeframes to meet its obligations to IST defendants in Solano County. DSH appealed. Four months later, another court of appeal (Stiavetti) concluded that the DSH had systematically violated the due process rights of all California IST defendants, holding that 28 days is the maximum constitutional limit for commencing substantive services to restore IST defendants to competency.The court of appeal remanded the Chunn order. The trial court’s ruling did not violate separation of powers principles at the time it was made, nor, for the most part, does it conflict with Stiavetti. The court did not abuse its discretion. The problems created by limited funding, resources, and bed space and the many efforts by DSH do not relieve DSH of its responsibilities. Some aspects of the order must be modified and others may be reconsidered, due to changes in the law. Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 now allows DSH to conduct “reevaluations” of IST defendants after the initial commitment order. View "In re Chunn" on Justia Law

In 2012, at the age of 61, Sam Consiglio was committed to Coalinga State Hospital (Coalinga) as a sexually violent predator (SVP). For every subsequent year until 2021, the annual Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluation concluded that he still qualified as an SVP. In 2021, however, a DSH psychologist, Dr. Michelle Vorwerk, performed the annual evaluation and concluded that Consiglio was no longer likely to commit sexually violent predatory crimes because of his age (then 70) and a severe and progressively worsening heart condition that impaired his ability to breathe and exert himself. In a report, she concluded that Consiglio no longer met the definition of an SVP. After Consiglio filed a petition for unconditional release, the trial court held a show cause hearing, rejected Dr. Vorwerk’s opinion, and found no probable cause to believe Consiglio was no longer an SVP. Accordingly, the court did not set the matter for a full hearing under Welf. & Inst. Code section 6605 (a)(2)-(3). Consiglio appealed the trial court’s probable cause ruling. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court failed to apply the proper reasonable person standard for determining probable cause, and improperly rejected Dr. Vorwerk’s opinion based on its own personal belief that Consiglio still qualified as an SVP: "We merely apply the governing probable cause standard to conclude that a full hearing is necessary because a reasonable person evaluating the evidence could at least entertain a strong suspicion that Consiglio no longer qualifies as an SVP. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion." View "California v. Consiglio" on Justia Law

In 1992, Arellano and two others were charged with murder “with malice aforethought” (Pen. Code 187), attempted robbery (sections 664, 211, 212.5(a)), and first-degree burglary (459, 460(a)). The murder and attempted robbery counts alleged that each defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense (12022.5(a), 1203.06). Arellano pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, with the firearm enhancement to be stricken. The court sentenced Arellano to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for second-degree murder concurrent to another sentence for a different case and dismissed the other counts. In 2020. the court recalled Arellano’s sentence and redesignated Count 1 to allege a violation of Penal Code Sections 664/211 and 212.5(a) with an enhancement under Penal Code Section 12022.5(a). On redesignated count 1, the court sentenced Arellano to seven years, the upper term of three years for the attempted robbery and the middle term of four years for the firearm enhancement, which was satisfied by time served, and imposed a three-year period of parole.The court of appeal vacated. The trial court erred under section 1172.6(e) when it included the firearm enhancement in the redesignated conviction. A trial court may not include a sentence enhancement in the target offense or underlying felony when redesignating a conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6(e). View "People v. Arellano" on Justia Law

Sherman posed as an Uber driver to get Doe into his car, where he took her phone, then raped her. Sherman was convicted of kidnapping, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and preventing or dissuading a victim or witness from reporting a crime, and sentenced to 11 years in prison.The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for dissuading a victim or witness. Precedent does not support Sherman’s argument that Penal Code section 136.1(b)(1) cannot apply to an attempt to prevent a victim from calling the police during an ongoing crime. The jury reasonably could conclude that Sherman, by attempting to prevent Doe from using her phone, was attempting to prevent her from reporting his criminal conduct. The case was remanded for resentencing under Senate Bill 567, which took effect on January 1, 2022, and applies retroactively to Sherman. The amendment specifies that, when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen term shall not exceed the middle term, unless the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances are established by the defendant’s stipulation to them, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction. View "People v. Sherman" on Justia Law

Defendant argued that the trial court erred in (1) declining to strike the prior serious felony enhancement, (2) erred in imposing the prior serious felony enhancement twice—once for the assault with a deadly weapon count and again for the elder abuse count, and (3) erred in calculating custody credits by not calculating the time in custody between the date of his arrest and the date of his resentencing.   The Second Appellate District reversed in part to the extent the trial court failed to reflect the proper custody credits earned by Defendant, and the trial court is directed to calculate the appropriate credits. The court also directed the trial court to impose an 11-year sentence on the elder abuse count. Further, the court directed the trial court is to issue an amended abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.   First, the court explained that the mitigating circumstance that exists when there are “[m]ultiple enhancements . . . in a single case” and specifies that “all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed” does not require the court to dismiss all but one of those enhancements in every case with multiple enhancements. Further, the court concluded that section 1385’s mandate to “afford great weight” to mitigating circumstances erects a rebuttable presumption that obligates a court to dismiss the enhancement unless the court finds that dismissal of that enhancement—with the resultingly shorter sentence—would endanger public safety. View "P. v. Walker" on Justia Law