Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Burgess was charged with first-degree residential robbery, with alleged enhancements for personally discharging a firearm during the robbery, and a prior prison term. Burgess was sentenced to nine years in prison for the robbery, a consecutive 20 years for the firearm use enhancement, and a consecutive one year for his prior prison term. In 2022, Burgess unsuccessfully moved to vacate his one-year prison prior enhancement and for resentencing, arguing that newly-amended Penal Code section 667.5 rendered his sentence “illegal.” In 2022, Burgess again sought resentencing, citing new law, Senate Bill 81. The court denied the motion, stating that S.B. 81 only applies to sentences occurring after January 1, 2022.The court of appeal dismissed both appeals. Burgess moved for resentencing many years after the judgment was final. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that motion. He has not yet begun serving the now-invalid prison prior enhancement and is not eligible for priority in resentencing. Remanding this case would undermine the purpose of the staggered statutory deadlines and could allow Burgess to obtain relief before others who are currently serving time on invalid enhancements. Burgess is assured under the statute to be resentenced by December 31, 2023, before he begins serving time for the prison prior enhancement. SB 81 does not apply to him. View "People v. Burgess" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to carrying a loaded, unregistered handgun in a vehicle. He contends a warrantless search of his vehicle, during which a police officer discovered the handgun, did not fall within the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and the trial court should have suppressed the evidence from the vehicle search on his motion under Penal Code section 1538.5.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, concluding that the officers had probable cause to search the car under the automobile exception, and the trial court did not err in declining to suppress the evidence from the vehicle search. The court explained that based on the “strong odor” of “burnt marijuana” emanating from Defendant’s car, Defendant’s admission he had smoked marijuana, and the fact all occupants of the car were under 21 years of age, the officers had probable cause to believe they would find contraband or evidence of a crime (e.g., marijuana possessed by someone under 21) in the car. View "P. v. Castro" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of arson of a structure (Pen. Code 451(c)), with an enhancement for using a “device designed to accelerate the fire.” The offense involved pouring whiskey onto a structure (i.e., a house’s cat door), and into the house through the same door, and lighting the whiskey on fire. The trial court sentenced Johnson to five years in state prison. On appeal, she argued that the three-year enhancement must be stricken because whiskey is not a “device designed to accelerate the fire” under the enhancement statute. The court of appeal affirmed.Johnson’s interpretation is inconsistent with the general purpose of the enhancement, to provide enhancement punishment for arsonists who exhibit a specific intent to harm. The act of using a container to spread a flammable liquid on a structure to be burned shows a specific intent to harm. Using whiskey, which contains alcohol and is also a flammable liquid, shows a specific intent to harm. Whiskey is comprised of alcohol, which similar to gasoline, is a flammable liquid, View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The superior court granted real party in interest Armando Rodriguez Mendez’s motion under California Penal Code section 995 and dismissed an assault with a deadly weapon charge against him. The State petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to reinstate the charge. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel argued that there was not “enough evidence” for the count of assault with a deadly weapon because it was not clear “exactly what happened with the knife, did [Mendez] hold it above his head, was it down around his waist area.” Counsel emphasized that it was not clear what happened because of the numerous accounts of the incident given by the victim, Jane Doe. Doe lived with Mendez and her three children. Mendez was the father of Doe’s two daughters. At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that the magistrate made a factual finding when he concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to hold Mendez on the assault with a deadly weapon count. The State argued to the contrary. The trial court agreed with defense counsel and granted the motion. The State argued to the Court of Appeal that upon independent review, there was sufficient cause to believe that Mendez had committed the offense. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State on all points. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Mendez)" on Justia Law

The victim’s body was found in a storage locker with multiple stab wounds. Maldonado reported witnessing the killing. Police were later unable to locate Maldonado. Maldonado subsequently told people that he was involved in the killing and that he and his friend buried their clothes and the knife. Police found a sweatshirt, knife, and cell phone buried at Maldonado’s former residence, and found a photograph of Morales with the victim’s body in Maldonado’s residence. Maldonado testified that he did not kill the victim or help Morales kill the victim, but that Morales brought him to the body for help in burying the evidence. Maldonado's jury was instructed on two theories: the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated; and the murder was committed by lying in wait. The jury was also instructed on direct aiding and abetting but was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury convicted Maldonado of first-degree murder but found the lying-in-wait special circumstance not true. In 2020, Maldonado sought resentencing (Penal Code 1172.6) based on legislative changes relating to murder convictions under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation.’The court of appeal reversed the denial of his petition. The record does not conclusively establish Maldonado is ineligible for relief. The jury instructions permitted conviction based on an impermissible theory of imputed malice. View "People v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

Carabajal was convicted of three counts of contacting or communicating with a minor with the intent to commit a sex offense. (Pen. Code 288.3(a)) The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Carabajal’s contention that a juror at his trial was biased since she had applied for employment with the district attorney’s office that was prosecuting him. The juror’s testimony at the posttrial hearing provided substantial evidence supporting the finding of no actual bias, and this is not an extraordinary case in which bias should be implied as a matter of law. The court also rejected Carabajal’s claims that section 288.3 was unconstitutionally vague and improperly restricted free speech. Before the statute is violated, the defendant must know or reasonably should have known the other person was a minor, have the specific intent to commit an enumerated sex offense, and then contact or communicate with that minor or attempt to do so. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Rejecting an argument that the court gave conflicting jury instructions that improperly removed the mental state element from the jury’s determination, the court stated that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same had the instruction not been given. View "People v. Carabajal" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a slew of crimes largely in connection with a casino robbery he carried out alongside fellow gang members. In the published portion of this opinion, the Fifth Circuit rejected Defendant’s claim that trial courts have discretion to impose punishment under Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a)1 in lieu of a section 12022.53 enhancement found true by the jury. Specifically the court held that Defendant’s convictions on counts 21, 26, and 28; the gang enhancements (Section 186.22) to counts 1 through 7, 9 through 14, 16 through 19, 23 through 24, and 27; and the gang firearm enhancements (Section 12022.53) to counts 1 through 4 are all reversed. The matter is remanded for a possible retrial of these counts and/or enhancements. The court also concluded any arguments arising under newly enacted sentencing legislation should be raised in the trial court in the first instance on remand. View "P. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Angelita Garcia DeMontoya appealed an order denying a motion under California Penal Code section 1473.7, filed in 2021, in which she sought to withdraw her guilty plea to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon that was entered in 2016. The superior court denied that motion on the grounds of collateral estoppel. The court found that DeMontoya had filed a section 1473.7 motion in 2018 and that motion, which was denied, involved identical issues as the 2021 motion. DeMontoya argues that the superior court erred in denying her 2021 motion because the 2018 amendment to section 1473.7 created a new right, which did not exist when she filed her first motion in 2018. The Court of Appeal found DeMontoya overlooked the fact she appealed the order denying her 2018 motion, and the Court affirmed that order in early 2019, considering the impact of the 2018 amendment on DeMontoya’s claims and independently concluding that DeMontoya’s first motion failed even under the 2018 amendment. DeMontoya did not challenge the Court of Appeal's conclusion through a petition for rehearing or a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. As such, whether the 2018 amendment created a new right did not matter for analysis here. The Court of Appeal specifically considered that amendment during DeMontoya’s appeal of the order denying her 2018 motion. Thus, DeMontoya’s second motion under section 1473.7 did not involve any new rights that were not considered in her previous motion. In addition, she contends that her 2021 motion involved new facts. The Court concluded that claim was without merit too. View "California v. Demontoya" on Justia Law

In 1984, E.M. was convicted on 15 counts, including first-degree robbery, attempted first-degree robbery, forcible oral copulation, forcible false imprisonment, forcible penetration by a foreign object, forcible rape, and second-degree robbery. As to several counts, the jury found E.M. personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon; as to other counts, it found E.M. used a deadly weapon. E.M. had two prior serious felony convictions and had served a prior prison term for forcible oral copulation. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 952 months, including two five-year terms for prior serious felony convictions. In 2019, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended that the court recall E.M.’s sentence and resentence him under former Penal Code 1170(d), citing a recent legislative change to section 1385 that granted courts the discretion to dismiss a prior serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice.The trial court denied recall, finding that the legislative changes did not apply because E.M.’s sentence was final. The Secretary subsequently rescinded its resentencing recommendation. The court of appeal reversed. The Secretary’s letter of rescission did not moot the matter. The trial court erred by denying recall, and it retains jurisdiction to recall and resentence E.M. The statute includes a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing, which may only be overcome if the court finds the defendant presents an unreasonable risk to public safety. View "People v E.M." on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Claypool petitioned for a writ of mandate or prohibition to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges. Petitioner was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon, unauthorized alteration of a firearm, and carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, along with an enhancement for a prior strike pursuant to the three strikes law. The evidence at issue was found in a locked glove box in petitioner’s car during a parole search of a back seat passenger. Petitioner, who was both the driver and owner of the car, was neither on searchable probation nor parole at the time. Police used a key to open the glove box and found a gun containing ammunition. The State argued the parole search of the back seat passenger permissibly extended to the locked glove box because officers could reasonably expect the parolee could have hidden contraband there after he became aware of the police. But, absent additional evidence, the Court of Appeal found the facts did not support such an attenuated inference. Therefore, the Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate and directed respondent trial court to grant petitioner’s motion. View "Claypool v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law