Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, based on convictions for residential robbery and false imprisonment by violence, Monroe was sentenced to a 376-month prison term, which included three firearm enhancements totaling 152 months, three one-year prior prison term enhancements, and a five-year prior serious felony enhancement. In 2020, Monroe sought relief under 2017 legislation (S.B. 620, Stats. 2017, ch. 682, 1 & 2) granting the trial court discretion to strike the firearm enhancements. When 2021 legislation (S.B. 483 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, 3), provided for resentencing to strike the one-year prior term enhancements, Monroe filed a second petition seeking relief under that statute as well. The trial court resentenced Monroe, striking the three one-year enhancements, but concluded it was without jurisdiction to strike the firearm enhancements.The court of appeal reversed. The Attorney General conceded that Monroe is eligible for relief with respect to the firearm enhancements, but not with respect to the five-year prior serious felony enhancement. S.B. 1393 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, 1–2), which took effect in 2019, granted trial courts discretion to strike five-year serious felony enhancements The court concluded that Monroe is eligible for relief with respect to both the firearm enhancements and the prior serious felony enhancement. View "People v. Monroe" on Justia Law

Eight years after defendant-appellant Raymond Griffin was convicted on two murder counts, he petitioned the trial court for resentencing pursuant to California Penal Code section 1172.6. The court summarily denied his petition, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal found defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief that did not raise any issues. Counsel acknowledged this was not defendant’s first appeal of right so the Court of Appeal was not required to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if it contained any arguable issues, but he requested the Court exercise its discretion to do so. The Court granted that request and found no issue. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition was affirmed. View "California v. Griffin" on Justia Law

In December 2018, the juvenile court committed Jhonny to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum term of confinement of four years after he admitted on a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 committing felony assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. In November 2020, Jhonny’s wardship and probation were successfully terminated; in October 2021, the DJJ granted him an honorable discharge. Jhonny sought to have his juvenile record sealed and his petition dismissed under sections 781 and 782, arguing that under section 1179(d), dismissal of his juvenile petition was mandatory based on his honorable discharge. The juvenile court granted Jhonny’s petition to have his juvenile record sealed but declined to dismiss his petition, citing section 782.The court of appeal reversed. The cited statutes deal with the same subject matter (dismissal of a juvenile petition) but there is a conflict arising from the use of mandatory language in section 1179(d) (the court “shall” dismiss) and discretionary language in sections 782 and 1772 (the court “may” dismiss). Under these circumstances, the specific statute must prevail. Only section 1179(d) addresses the specific issue raised here of the dismissal of the petition of an individual who has obtained an honorable discharge from the DJJ. View "In re Jhonny S." on Justia Law

Garcia was arrested after engaging in a physical altercation at his home, then firing a semiautomatic handgun at a responding officer. In 2018, Garcia was sentenced to 24 years after a jury found him guilty of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm and other counts. The court of appeal remanded for corrections to the sentence.Garcia then sought to show that a longer or more severe sentence was imposed on him "than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county,” California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (CRJA). The court denied a motion to strike a firearm use enhancement, stayed the sentence on one count, recalculated Garcia’s custody credits, and sentenced him to 23 years.The court of appeal reversed. Garcia was entitled to a continuance to prepare his CRJA discovery motion. He is also entitled to resentencing under Criminal Code 1170(b). as amended by Senate Bill 567, which requires that a sentence exceeding the middle term be justified by circumstances in aggravation and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt in a court trial. Garcia did not stipulate to the aggravating circumstance that the offense involved a threat of great bodily injury to multiple individuals and there was no trial in which the circumstance was found true beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Officers separately arrested the defendants for DUI and released each with a Notice to Appear. Each signed their respective Notice, agreeing to appear in court on a specified date more than 25 days later. Each Notice included the issuing officer’s declaration alleging the facts of the misdemeanor violation. The specified court dates passed without the filing of charges. The District Attorney filed charges against each defendant just as the one-year statute of limitations for misdemeanor DUIs was about to expire. Both were arraigned about 90 days later, nearly 15 months after arrest. The defendants asserted violations of their speedy trial rights.The trial court determined that the defendants were and remained “accused” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee from the day officers arrested and released them on Notices; the lapse of more than one year from the issuance of the Notices was presumptively prejudicial; and although the delay between arrest and the filing of the complaints was justified by a commensurate delay in analyzing blood specimens, the further delay between the filing of the complaint and arraignment was unjustified. The court of appeal reversed the dismissals. Although the citation was an accusation otherwise sufficient to initiate Sixth Amendment protection against delay, the District Attorney’s election not to file formal charges by the appearance date ceased any legal restraint upon the defendants and had the same effect, for constitutional speedy trial purposes, as a dismissal of charges. View "People v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's judgment after pleading no contest to 24 counts of using a minor to pose to create media depicting sexual acts and one count of possession of matter depicting a minor engaged in sexual acts. The trial court sentenced him to four years and four months in state prison. Defendant contends the judgment should be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.).   The Second Appellate District affirmed, concluding that here, where Defendant agreed to an indicated sentence after the court considered the mitigating and aggravating factors in arriving at its sentence, a remand is not required. The court explained that the trial court considered the aggravating factors and acknowledged the mitigating factors. It decided not to impose its original indicated sentence and to increase the sentence. The facts did not have to be “proven at trial” because Defendant represented by counsel, agreed to plead guilty to a longer sentence than originally indicated. The trial court decided the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. The court reasoned that it is not for it to order the trial court to once again weigh the factors the trial court already considered. Section 1170, subdivision (b) should result in a remand to the trial court when the facts warrant it, which they do not in this matter. View "P. v. Berdoll" on Justia Law

In 1997, two 14-year-old girls were walking near their school when Foster, age 21, approached them, drew a knife, and told them to get on the ground and not try to run or he would kill or stab them. He sexually assaulted the girls and assaulted them with the knife. Foster pled guilty to two counts of forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object and was sentenced to 15 years to life on one count, with special allegations including serious-felony status and use of a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to a consecutive upper term of eight years on the second count--a total of 23 years to life.After the Board of Parole Hearings found him suitable for parole in 2019, the Governor requested en banc reconsideration under Penal Code section 3041.1. The Board ordered a rescission hearing. Foster requested the presence of evidentiary witnesses at that hearing, including the author of the Comprehensive Risk Assessment that the Governor quoted. The Board denied Foster’s request. The panel rescinded the grant of parole. The court of appeal vacated the denial of Foster’s petition for habeas corpus relief. The Board’s denial of Foster’s request to present witnesses violated the Board’s own procedural rules as well as Foster’s due process rights. View "In re Foster" on Justia Law

The trial court denied Defendant’s petition despite the parties’ stipulation to waive the resentencing hearing. Defendant contended that in doing so, the court misinterpreted the statute and violated the doctrine of separation of powers.   The Second Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court explained that it is a core judicial function to “declare the law as it is, and not as either appellant or respondent may assume it to be.” (Bradley v. Clarke (1901) 133 Cal. 196, 210.) Although the court must consider the parties’ stipulation, as with any other stipulation, the court must make its own determination of whether the matter to which the parties have stipulated is consistent with the law. That is especially true in criminal cases, where the public interest is at stake. Thus the court rejected Defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by considering the facts as described in the opinion in his original appeal because even assuming any such error, Defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. View "P. v. Machado" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of her petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. On remand, the trial court issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing. The People offered no argument in opposition to the petition, and neither party presented new evidence, submitting instead on the record of conviction.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court held that the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant is ineligible for relief under Section 1172.6 is supported by substantial evidence. Further, the court held that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Defendant is guilty of murder under a theory that remains valid after the amendments to California’s murder laws. The evidence presented at trial established that from the beginning, Defendant was inextricably involved in the events that led to the murder and she was directly responsible for prompting the other individual to kill the victim. Moreover, the court wrote that even if these circumstances did not establish express malice on Defendant’s part, they certainly constitute sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant acted with implied malice in aiding and abetting the murder. View "P. v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in 1984 for a gang-related stabbing petitioned for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95), and proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. The People introduced statements Defendant made to a psychologist in 2013 during a parole risk assessment interview. Defendant argued that admitting his prior statements was an error because those statements are (1) inadmissible under a judicially crafted “use immunity” doctrine, and (2) involuntary under the due process clause.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief under Penal Code section 1172.6. The court held Defendant’s statement to the psychologist was not involuntary under due process. A finding that Defendant’s statement was involuntary means it would have been inadmissible at the parole hearing itself because involuntary statements are, by definition, coerced and utterly unreliable. Yet Defendant is not asserting that his 2013 interview statement should not have been considered at the parole hearing. At the bottom, Defendant seems to be urging us to construe the due process clause as a sort of “super use immunity” that would preclude the use of his prior statement even to impeach. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "P. v. Duran" on Justia Law