Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Picazo was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against children and possession of child pornography. Picazo was sentenced to a determinate prison term of 10 years and eight months consecutive to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life.The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, rejecting his arguments that the trial court erred in permitting the two victims to be accompanied by a support dog while testifying, admitting evidence of uncharged acts, and allowing expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The court remanded for resentencing. The trial court imposed an upper-term sentence that is invalid under amendments to Penal Code section 1170 that became effective subsequent to Picazo’s sentencing. None of the circumstances the trial court relied upon were established by stipulation or jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The abstract of judgment must be corrected by striking the provision for payment of $700, spent on forensic examination, as victim restitution to the Daly City Police Department. On remand, Picazo can raise arguments concerning his ability to pay a court facilities assessment, court operations fee, and restitution fine. View "People v. Picazo" on Justia Law

In 2005, fifteen-year-old Davion Keel and eighteen-year-old Ariel Bolton held Barry Knight at gunpoint and robbed him of twenty dollars on the streets of San Bernardino. One of them shot and killed Knight when he resisted the robbery and tried to flee. Keel and Bolton were both prosecuted in adult criminal court and convicted of first degree murder in connection with Knight’s death. More than a decade later, Keel petitioned to vacate his murder conviction and to be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6 based on legislative changes to California's murder laws. The trial court denied the petition for resentencing, finding Keel was not entitled to relief because he remained liable for Knight’s murder because he was a major participant in the underlying robbery and he acted with reckless indifference to human life. Keel appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he was a major participant in the underlying robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. In the alternative, he contended the court applied an incorrect legal standard when it adjudicated his petition for resentencing. The Court of Appeal agreed with Keel’s first argument, which rendered it unnecessary to reach his second argument. Because there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination, the Court reversed the order denying Keel’s resentencing petition and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to grant Keel’s resentencing petition and vacate his murder conviction. Further, the Court concluded Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, and Senate Bill 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) would apply retroactively to Keel once his petition for resentencing was granted and his murder conviction was vacated. Therefore, on remand, the Court instructed the trial court to transfer the matter to the juvenile court for resentencing in accordance with those measures. View "California v. Keel" on Justia Law

Defendant joined in an “eight against one” gang assault resulting in the victim’s death. While his cohorts used a baseball bat, a shovel, and a knife, Defendant pummeled the victim with his fists and feet. The trial court found that this participation in the gang assault resulting in death is an implied malice murder.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s petition for resentencing on his 2001 second-degree murder conviction. The court explained that it suffices that Defendant knew was aiding in a violent attack, knew dangerous weapons were being used against the victim and intended to stop the victim from escaping or defending himself by helping the perpetrators to surround and hit him. The court also rejected Defendant’s assertion that second-degree implied malice murder cannot be shown unless the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was a substantial factor in aiding and abetting the actual perpetrators of the murder. The court also rejected Defendant’s claim that SB 775 invalidated the theory of aiding and abetting a second-degree implied malice murder. View "P. v. Schell" on Justia Law

In 2001, Gerardo Vizcarra was convicted of the second degree murder of Richard Holcomb. Vizcarra and three confederates beat, kicked, and stabbed Holcomb to death after he bumped a mutual companion’s young child into a wall while playing with him. In 2019, Vizcarra filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction and to be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6 based on changes to California’s murder laws effectuated by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.). The trial court denied the petition for resentencing, finding Vizcarra was not entitled to relief because he remained liable for Holcomb’s murder under a still-valid theory of liability: he directly aided and abetted an implied malice murder. Vizcarra appealed the order denying his petition for resentencing, arguing direct aiding and abetting of implied malice murder was not a legally-valid theory of murder liability. Further, he argued he was entitled to resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the order denying Vizcarra’s petition for resentencing. View "California v. Vizcarra" on Justia Law

The State of California appealed after a juvenile court declared defendant-respondent T.O. a ward of the court and placed him in a secure local facility for committing a sexual offense against his seven-year-old cousin. The State contended the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex offender registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290.008 because the court improperly relied on a strict interpretation of section 290.008 without adequately considering the illogical or consequences and harmonizing the statutory scheme. Based on the legislative intent in enacting changes to the juvenile delinquency provisions and the plain language of section 290.008, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re T.O." on Justia Law

Victor Tellez asked the Court of Appeal to vacate his conviction based on a plea of guilty to committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years. He contended his appointed counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him before the plea that he could be subject to lifetime commitment as a sexually violent predator after service of the prison term. Finding that Tellez did not state a prima facie case for habeas relief, the Court denied his petition. View "In re Tellez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in 1990 of special-circumstance felony murder for a crime committed when he was 25 years old. Current law entitles anyone who commits a special-circumstance murder at age 16 or 17 is entitled to both a Youth Offender Parole Hearing and a Franking Hearing. However, those who commit a special-circumstance murder at 18 or older are ineligible for both.Defendant challenged California law on Equal Protection grounds. The Second Appellate District agreed with Defendant, finding there is no rational basis to support the Legislature’s distinction between young adult offenders who committed a special-circumstance murder and were sentenced to life without parole and other young adult offenders who committed different serious or violent crimes and received parole-eligible indeterminate life terms, including those that could be the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence. Thus, the court determined that Defendant was eligible for a Youth Offender Parole Hearing as well as a Franklin Hearing. View "P. v. Hardin" on Justia Law

A.A. drove drunk and killed another driver. He was charged with gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and other offenses, with enhancements. A month later, represented by counsel, he pleaded no contest to all charges and stipulated the factual basis for the plea based on a defense investigation. A.A. was later found to be incompetent (Pen. Code 1370), and was committed to the state hospital. About a year later, the hospital submitted a report, indicating that there was no substantial likelihood that A.A. would be restored to competency in the foreseeable future. The Public Guardian sought a “Murphy conservatorship,” a renewable one-year civil commitment for criminal defendants who are otherwise incompetent to stand trial for a felony involving death, great bodily harm, or a serious threat to the physical well-being of another, and who do not have the prospect of a restoration of competency,” Welf. & Inst. Code 5008(h)(1)(B)(ii). A forensic psychiatrist evaluated A.A. and testified that A.A. had substance-use disorder and schizophrenia and that he had not improved despite getting multiple antipsychotic medications. The court of appeal affirmed the imposition of the conservatorship. A.A. received an adversarial hearing. His counsel cross-examined the forensic psychiatrist and argued that the evidence did not establish he was a danger to others; there was no need to hold an additional probable-cause hearing about the underlying charges in light of A.A.’s plea. View "Conservatorship of A.A." on Justia Law

Long before the passage of California Senate Bill No. 620 in 2002, defendant Frederick Johnson pleaded no contest in two cases to various counts in connection with multiple armed robberies and, as relevant here, admitted seven Penal Code section 12022.53(b) enhancements. He was sentenced to 46 years four months in prison, and resentenced approximately 15 years later to 46 years in prison. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal to decide related to the extent to which fairly recent legislation, when considered together with the available caselaw interpreting that legislation, conferred new discretion on trial courts at sentencing. The discretion at issue here was a trial court’s choice to impose an uncharged lesser included firearm enhancement in lieu of the greater enhancement of conviction, after the greater enhancement was stricken by the trial court in its exercise of discretion. The Court agreed with defendant that the trial court had broad discretion to impose a lesser uncharged firearm enhancement provided for by section 12022.5(a) when it exercises its discretion to strike a Penal Code section 12022.53(b) firearm enhancement of conviction. The Court remanded the case for a full resentencing hearing, where the trial court could consider exercise of its discretion and any other new laws related to sentencing that might apply to defendant. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Mitchell was doing donuts in a parking lot and tried to hit people with her car. An officer activated his lights and siren to pursue Mitchell. Mitchell sped up and drove through a red light; she made a U-turn and drove directly toward the officer’s vehicle. When Mitchell was finally arrested, her blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.183 percent. Mitchell, charged with multiple counts, had a prior strike conviction for second-degree robbery. Mitchell pleaded no contest to reckless driving while evading a peace officer and to driving with a BAC of .08 percent or more and admitted to the strike allegation. The plea agreement included a sentence of six years imprisonment--the upper term of three years, doubled due to the strike. The court ordered that Mitchell pay restitution and fines. Mitchell’s counsel did not object.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting a challenge based on Senate Bill 567 (effective January 1, 2022), which limits a court’s ability to impose upper-term sentences absent a stipulation by the defendant or a finding of aggravating circumstances at trial. Where there is a stipulated plea, there is no occasion for the court to find aggravating facts to justify the imposition of an upper term. Any concern that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated when aggravating facts are not found by a jury does not exist. The court also rejected Mitchell’s ineffective assistance of counsel challenge to the fines. View "People v. Mitchell" on Justia Law