Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The People of the State of California (People), appealed the denial of the motion for victim restitution, i.e., attorney fees and costs after Respondent was convicted by plea of felony driving with a .08 blood alcohol level or higher causing bodily injury. the denial of the motion for victim restitution, i.e., attorney fees and costs, after Respondent was convicted by plea of felony driving with a .08 blood alcohol level or higher causing bodily injury release of liability signed by the victim in the civil case discharged respondent’s obligation to pay restitution in the criminal case.The Second Appellate District agreed with the People and reversed. Here, the People presented evidence that the injured driver received a civil settlement of $235,000. Of the settlement, $61,574.44 was paid to the driver’s attorney as a contingency fee of 25 percent plus costs. Respondent did not present any witnesses or evidence in opposition. Instead, he argued the signed releases by the victims meant they “ha[d] received full and complete compensation,” and the contingency fee was “not a true amount of attorney’s fees.” However, “[a] crime victim who seeks redress for his injuries in a civil suit can expect to pay counsel with a contingency fee.” Because the People established that the driver paid her attorney a contingency fee of 25 percent, the burden shifted to Respondent to refute this showing. Respondent contends the trial court’s denial of fees was an “implied finding”. But an implied finding of fact must be supported by substantial evidence. View "P. v. Nonaka" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Noy Estul Boukes guilty of the first degree murder of victim 1, threatening victim 2, and falsely imprisoning victim 2. The jury also found true allegations that defendant intentionally murdered victim 1 while he was an active member of a criminal street gang, and that he personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the murder, proximately causing great bodily injury or death. In a separate proceeding thereafter, defendant admitted he had suffered three prior prison terms and two prior strike convictions. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for life without the possibility of parole plus 78 years to life. On appeal of the judgment and sentence, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. The trial court then struck the prior prison term enhancements and imposed, but struck punishment on the gang enhancements attached to counts 2 and 3. Appealing again, defendant contended that pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021- 2022 Reg. Sess.), the judgments of conviction on counts 1 through 3, and the true findings on all the gang-related allegations, including the special circumstance finding, had to be reversed: “the prosecution did not present evidence that the predicate offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang in a manner that was more than reputational” and that “the prosecution relied, in part, on the reputational benefit of the shooting in this case to” defendant’s gang. To this point, Court of Appeal concurred and reversed the gang enhancements and special circumstance finding; the Court remanded the matter to give the State the opportunity to retry the issue relating to gang activity. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Boukes" on Justia Law

Respondents are a group of college students, all of which face criminal charges for marching though San Luis Obispo in the wake of the murder of George Floyd. Respondents sought recusal of the San Luis Obisbo District Attorney's Office on the basis that the District Attorney had a well-publicized association with critics of the Black Lives Matter movement. The trial court granted respondents' motion, appointing the Attorney General to the case, and the District Attorney and Attorney General appealed.On appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed. Based on social media posts, public statements and targeted fundraising appeal to undermine the Black Lives Matter movement, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the San Luis Obisbo District Attorney's Office was not likely to treat respondents fairly. View "P. v. Lastra" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea and vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a). The Legislature has declared that section 1473.7, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2867, “shall be interpreted in the interests of justice and consistent with the findings and declarations made in Section 1016.2 of the Penal Code.” (Stats 2018, ch. 825, Section 1, subd. (c).)   As a result, the Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea and vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7. The court remanded to the superior court with directions to grant the motion and vacate the conviction. The court concluded that Appellant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised of the immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have pleaded no contest to an offense that would subject him to mandatory deportation from the United States. Accordingly, the court wrote, that Appellant has carried his burden of establishing prejudicial error and is entitled to relief. View "P. v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Frank Heard was serving a sentence of 23 years plus 80 years to life for two counts of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder for a drive-by shooting he committed at age 15, and one count of voluntary manslaughter for a homicide he committed just after he turned 16. After 15 years of incarceration, he petitioned the trial court to recall his sentence and resentence him to a lesser sentence under Penal Code section 1170 (d)(1) (formerly (d)(2)). The trial court denied Heard’s petition, finding him ineligible for relief because he was not sentenced to an explicitly designated term of life without the possibility of parole. Heard appealed, presenting two issues of first impression: (1) the resentencing provision should be interpreted to apply not only to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicitly designated terms of life without parole, but also to a juvenile offender, like him, who have been sentenced to multiple terms that are the functional equivalent of life without parole; and (2) a contrary interpretation of the resentencing provision would violate his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The Court of Appeal rejected Heard's his first contention, instead interpreting section 1170 (d)(1)(A), to limit eligibility to petition for recall and resentencing to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicitly designated life without parole terms. But the Court concluded denying juvenile offenders, who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole, the opportunity to petition for resentencing violated the guarantee of equal protection. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Heard" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the State argued that a sentencing court’s discretion under California v. Tirado, 12 Cal.5th 688 (2022) was limited to imposing a lesser enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53, so a court that strikes an enhancement under section 12022.53 cannot impose an uncharged lesser included enhancement under section 12022.5. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that under Tirado the sentencing court may impose an uncharged lesser included enhancement under section 12022.5 after striking a greater enhancement under section 12022.53. View "California v. Fuller" on Justia Law

In 1997, real party in interest and appellant Nathan Ramazzini was convicted of first degree murder with a special circumstance regarding a killing that occurred when Ramazzini was 16 years old. Pursuant to California Penal Code section 190.5 (b), enacted by Proposition 115 (the Crime Victims Justice Reform Ac), Ramazzini was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). At the time Ramazzini was sentenced, courts interpreted section 190.5 (b) as establishing a presumption in favor of LWOP. In 2012, the US Supreme Court concluded the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution barred mandatory LWOP sentences for minors. The California Supreme Court subsequently concluded that section 190.5 (b) conferred discretion on the sentencing court to impose either a sentence of 25 years to life or LWOP, but the presumption in favor of LWOP was inconsistent with Miller. In response to Miller, the California Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 394 (2017- 2018 Reg. Sess.), which provided that those sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed when they were 16 or 17 years old were eligible for release on parole during their 25th year of incarceration. Ramazzini became eligible for a parole hearing in July 2021. Upon learning of that eligibility, the Colusa County District Attorney’s Office (Office), petitioned for writ of mandate seeking to invalidate Senate Bill No. 394 on its face and as applied to Ramazzini, and to enjoin the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) from enforcing its provisions. The trial court granted the Office’s writ petition as applied to Ramazzini. The Board appealed, contending the Office lacked standing to petition for writ of mandate, and Senate Bill No. 394 was lawfully enacted. Ramazzini also appealed, joining the Board’s contentions and separately contended that Senate Bill No. 394 was lawfully enacted because it did not amend Proposition 115’s alternative sentencing scheme for 16- and 17-year-old defendants. The Court of Appeal agreed the Office lacked standing to bring the writ petition, and invalidated the judgment invalidating Senate Bill No. 394 as applied to Ramazzini. View "California v. Board of Parole Hearings" on Justia Law

Between 2018 and 2020, Electric Frontier Foundation, Inc. (EFF) moved to unseal affidavits filed in support of executed search warrants requested by the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (the Sheriff) and issued under seal by the San Bernardino Superior Court between March 2017 and March 2018. EFF was a “non-profit civil liberties organization working to protect and promote fundamental liberties in the digital world.” According to EFF, cell-site simulators collected the digital data of innocent people. “EFF claims law enforcement authorities in San Bernardino County lead the state in the use of cell-site simulators. Because of its concerns about the use of cell-site simulators, EFF petitioned to unseal eight “search warrant packets” that contained warrants issued by the Superior Court between March 2017 and March 2018 that allowed the Sheriff to use cell-site simulators. The Sheriff and the San Bernardino County District Attorney (collectively, the County) did not object to the unsealing of one warrant packet (SBSW 18-0850), but opposed the unsealing of portions of the seven other warrant packets. Specifically, the County argued the returns to the executed search warrants and the so-called “Hobbs affidavits” in support of the warrants should have remained sealed indefinitely, because they contained sensitive information about confidential informants and “official information.” The trial court denied EFF’s motion and ordered the affidavits to remain sealed. EFF appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The defendants were charged with murder and kidnapping. Scott was also charged with robbery and a special circumstance of felony murder in the course of kidnapping, with a special allegation that he personally, intentionally discharged a firearm that caused death. Garcia was charged with the commission of an offense in which the principal was armed with a firearm, with a special allegation that he was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Following their trial, the jury was scheduled to return on March 17, 2020, for closing arguments. Because of COVID-19 shelter-in-place orders, court proceedings were canceled. The trial resumed on June 8. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial based on the delay. The jury found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and kidnapping but did not find true the firearm allegation; found Scott guilty of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery; and found true the kidnapping special circumstance and the firearm allegation.The court of appeal affirmed. Under the unique circumstances of this case--the timing of the continuance, the relative lack of complexity, and the court’s communications with and instructions to the jury--there was no error. Recent amendments to Penal Code 654.1 apply retroactively but did not grant the court discretion to essentially “strike” the special circumstance finding and reduce Scott’s sentence to less than life without the possibility of parole. The court rejected Scott’s contentions that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated his right to equal protection and Garcia’s arguments that his inability to accept a package plea deal violated his due process rights and that the verdict was coerced. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In 2003, Sifuentes was convicted of first-degree murder under a felony-murder theory; his co-felon killed Deputy Monego during a 1998 restaurant robbery. The jury found not true the felony-murder special-circumstance allegations against Sifuentes (Penal Code 190.2 (a)(17)(A), (G)). In 2019, after the amendment of the felony-murder law, Sifuentes sought resentencing under former section 1170.952. The parties agreed Sifuentes could not be convicted of felony murder under current section 189(e). The trial court found that the peace officer exception in section 189(f) applied and denied the petition because the prosecution established beyond a reasonable doubt that Monego was a peace officer who was killed while in the course of his duties, and Sifuentes knew or reasonably should have known that Monego was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial court used the wrong legal standard to assess whether Sifuentes knew or reasonably should have known that Monego was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties. Substantial evidence supported the finding that Sifuentes had the requisite knowledge. The jury’s not true findings on the felony-murder special-circumstance allegations did not require the court to grant the petition after Sifuentes established a prima facie case. View "People v. Sifuentes" on Justia Law