Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with assault with a deadly weapon after an altercation with a neighbor in April 2020. The defendant, who had a prior falling out with the victim, was accused of attacking the victim with a skateboard following a brief verbal exchange. In September 2023, the defendant sought pretrial mental health diversion, submitting a recent diagnosis from a qualified mental health professional indicating he suffered from major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion. The court acknowledged the recent diagnosis but concluded that because the diagnosis was made three years after the offense, it did not demonstrate that the mental disorder played a significant role in the commission of the crime. The court did not find clear and convincing evidence that the mental disorder was a contributing factor, and the defendant subsequently pleaded guilty. After his plea, the defendant renewed his motion for diversion and sought to withdraw his plea, but both motions were denied.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that under the amended Penal Code section 1001.36, a qualifying mental health diagnosis made within five years of the diversion request creates a presumption that the disorder contributed to the charged offense. The trial court erred by imposing a stricter timing requirement and by failing to recognize the statutory presumption. Because the prosecution did not present clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, the appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to determine the defendant’s suitability for diversion, rather than eligibility. If found suitable, diversion may be granted; otherwise, the conviction will be reinstated. View "P. v. Harlow" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in which the defendant, while on probation, delivered an unexpected punch to a friend, causing the victim to fall and sustain a fatal brain injury. The two had been drinking with others, and after a separate altercation, the victim attempted to calm the defendant. As the victim backed away, the defendant struck him, resulting in the victim’s head hitting the street. The defendant fled the scene. The victim died from catastrophic brain swelling due to the impact.A jury in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter based on conscious disregard for human life. The defendant admitted to a prior serious felony and a prior strike under California’s “Three Strikes” law. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the strike and imposed a 27-year sentence, consisting of the upper term for manslaughter, doubled for the strike, plus an enhancement for the prior serious felony. The defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the required risk of death for voluntary manslaughter and that the jury instructions were inadequate. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed the judgment.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, instructing reconsideration in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that the “high degree of probability of death” standard articulated in People v. Reyes applies only to implied malice murder, not to voluntary manslaughter based on conscious disregard for life. The court found no error in the prosecutor’s statements or the jury instructions. However, the court determined that resentencing was required due to statutory changes and recent Supreme Court guidance on sentencing procedures. The sentence was reversed and remanded for full resentencing; the judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Fleming" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old defendant assisted his employer, a drug dealer, in abducting a drug addict at gunpoint. The victim, who had previously sold drugs for the dealer under threat, was lured to a parking lot, forcibly taken to the dealer’s home, and subjected to prolonged violence and threats in an attempt to extort $100,000. The victim was beaten, tied up, threatened with death, forced to ingest or absorb drugs, and ultimately locked in a closet with the door screwed shut. After approximately 28 hours, a SWAT team rescued the victim. The defendant was present throughout the ordeal, actively participated in the violence, and threatened the victim and his family.A jury in the Superior Court of Orange County convicted the defendant of aggravated kidnapping with bodily harm and a firearm enhancement. The court imposed a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus a 10-year firearm enhancement, and also imposed a $300 parole revocation fine. The defendant appealed, arguing that the LWOP sentence was unconstitutional as applied to 18-year-olds under both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, and that the parole revocation fine was improper because he was ineligible for parole.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court does not extend the constitutional protections against LWOP sentences for juveniles to offenders who were 18 at the time of the crime. The court also found that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate under the California Constitution, given the defendant’s conduct and criminal history. However, the court agreed that the parole revocation fine was improper and ordered it stricken. The judgment was affirmed as modified. View "P. v. Christensen" on Justia Law

In 2024, Carlos Huerta filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, seeking relief under the Racial Justice Act (RJA). The superior court denied the petition without appointing counsel, concluding that Huerta had failed to establish a prima facie claim for relief. Huerta then filed a petition in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, alleging racial discrimination in his charges and sentence, supported by statistical data.Previously, in 2010, Huerta was convicted of three counts of premeditated attempted murder and other felonies, with gang enhancements, and sentenced to 53 years to life plus 14 years. In 2022, he was resentenced to a determinate term of 26 years following changes in the law concerning attempted murder, retaining multiple gang enhancements. The RJA was not addressed during the resentencing.The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause (OSC) in October 2024, appointing counsel for Huerta and directing the parties to address the legal showing required for the appointment of counsel in an RJA petition. The respondent initially argued that a prima facie showing was necessary for counsel appointment but later conceded that the McIntosh decision correctly interpreted section 1473, subdivision (e), which requires the appointment of counsel if the petition alleges facts that would establish an RJA violation.The Court of Appeal held that the superior court misapplied the statutory sequence by requiring a prima facie showing before assessing the lower pleading threshold for appointing counsel. However, the Court of Appeal concluded that Huerta's petition was facially defective as it failed to allege facts showing a qualifying offense under the RJA. The petition relied solely on gang enhancements, which do not fall within the scope of the relevant statutory provisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Huerta" on Justia Law

Defendant Sergio Munguia Torres was found guilty of first-degree murder in the killing of his wife, Sonia Suarez. The evidence showed that Torres waited in his vehicle until Suarez drove by, followed her, ran her off the road, and shot her when she tried to drive off. He then fled the scene. The jury also found true the allegation that Torres personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. Torres was sentenced to 25 years to life for murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, totaling 50 years to life.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County reviewed the case. The prosecution filed a sentencing brief requesting the court to deny probation and not dismiss the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 1385. Torres did not file a sentencing brief. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged its discretion to strike the enhancement but noted the victim's vulnerability and the planning involved in the crime. The court concluded it would not dismiss the firearm enhancement and imposed the maximum sentence.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Torres contended that the trial court erred in failing to strike the firearm enhancement under section 1385 based on the mitigating circumstance that the enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. The appellate court disagreed, interpreting the statute to mean that the enhancement itself must result in a sentence exceeding 20 years. Since Torres's sentence already exceeded 20 years without the enhancement, the court found that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) did not apply. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Torres" on Justia Law

On May 6, 2022, Royce Gresham drove his car into the bedroom wall of his neighbors, Alix and Jose S. After the crash, Gresham got into a fight with their son, Anthony, who accused him of endangering his parents. When sheriff's deputies arrived, Gresham resisted arrest, leading to a struggle during which he appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine and alcohol. Gresham claimed he did not know the deputies were police officers due to his confusion from a head injury and his schizoaffective disorder.The Los Angeles County Superior Court charged Gresham with assault with a deadly weapon, misdemeanor vandalism, misdemeanor resisting arrest, and hit and run. The jury convicted him of resisting arrest but acquitted him of the other charges. Gresham filed a Pitchess motion for information on complaints against the deputies, which the court denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Gresham argued that his conviction for resisting arrest required proof that he actually knew he was resisting a peace officer. The court disagreed, holding that the statute requires only that the defendant "knew or reasonably should have known" the person was a peace officer. The court found substantial evidence supporting the conviction, noting the deputies' marked car, uniforms, and body camera footage. The court also upheld the denial of the Pitchess motion, citing the video evidence that captured the incident and showed no excessive force or false reporting by the deputies. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Gresham" on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to allow the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) to award credits for good behavior and rehabilitative or educational achievements. The department adopted regulations to award credits beyond statutory limits and to use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and several family members of crime victims challenged these regulations through a petition for writ of mandate.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the writ in part and granted it in part, invalidating the department’s regulations to the extent they allowed the use of credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Both the department and the petitioners appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Proposition 57 properly removed statutory restraints on the department’s authority to award credits, allowing the regulations to supersede contrary statutes. However, the court also held that the department may use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates only if permitted by existing law, as Proposition 57 is silent on this issue. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to modify the writ of mandate and enter a modified judgment. View "Criminal Justice Legal Foundation v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at age 17. In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.In 2024, Valdez petitioned for resentencing again, arguing that his 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying resentencing relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates equal protection. The trial court construed Valdez's filing as a petition under section 1170(d)(10), which allows for resentencing after 20 years of imprisonment if the defendant was resentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that Valdez's 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that excluding him from resentencing relief would violate equal protection.The People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to deny Valdez's resentencing relief. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the petition. The court clarified that the reasoning in Heard does not apply to section 1170(d)(10) if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed at resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). Valdez was eligible for youth offender parole under his 50-year-to-life sentence, making it not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Therefore, Valdez was not entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10). The court directed the trial court to vacate its order granting resentencing relief and to deny Valdez's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Superior Court (Valdez)" on Justia Law

In 1997, Robert Wayne Cunningham was convicted by a jury of provocative act murder and other offenses following a 1995 shootout with police. Cunningham and his accomplice, Daniel Soly, were under police surveillance for a series of armed robberies. After robbing a liquor store, they were blocked by police, leading Cunningham to shoot at the officers. The police returned fire, killing Soly and wounding Cunningham and at least one officer.Cunningham was convicted of special-circumstance murder, attempted murder of peace officers, robbery, commercial burglary, and conspiracy to commit robbery, with a personal firearm use enhancement. He was sentenced to life without parole plus additional consecutive sentences. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 2021, Cunningham petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage, concluding he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reconsidered the case following the Supreme Court's directive in light of People v. Antonelli. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Cunningham's petition, holding that the jury instructions and the first-degree murder verdict established that Cunningham acted with personal malice. This finding rendered him ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6, as the provocative act doctrine required proof of malice, which was not imputed solely based on his participation in the crime. The court concluded that Cunningham's conviction was based on his own actions and malice, not on a theory of imputed malice. View "People v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Juan Carlos Benitez-Torres, a lawful permanent resident, was stopped by police while driving a car with tinted windows. The car, not registered to him, was searched, and methamphetamine was found in hidden compartments. Benitez was charged with narcotics offenses. His family hired attorney Kenneth Reed for $15,000, but Reed appeared only four times and did not file a motion to suppress the evidence. In August 2015, Reed advised Benitez to accept a three-year plea deal without adequately explaining the immigration consequences. Benitez pleaded guilty and was deported after his release.Benitez filed a motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 in January 2023 to vacate his guilty plea, arguing he did not understand the immigration consequences and was prejudiced by this lack of understanding. The Superior Court of Orange County denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence that Benitez did not understand the consequences of his plea.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Reed did not provide adequate advice regarding the immigration consequences of the plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky. The court determined that Benitez did not meaningfully understand the mandatory deportation consequences of his plea and that there was a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood these consequences. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with directions to allow Benitez to withdraw his 2015 guilty pleas. View "People v. Benitez-Torres" on Justia Law