Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Frank Moseley was charged with murder after he killed his fiancé, who had told him she might be pregnant with another man's child. Moseley, a combat veteran diagnosed with PTSD, testified that his condition contributed to the crime. The jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and a weapon enhancement.The Superior Court of Orange County sentenced Moseley to 11 years in state prison, striking the additional punishment for the weapon use. The court acknowledged Moseley’s PTSD as a mitigating factor but did not explicitly consider the relevant service-related statutes (Penal Code §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91) when denying probation. Moseley’s counsel mentioned these statutes at the sentencing hearing but stated they were not "directly applicable." The probation department’s report and the sentencing briefs from both parties also failed to cite these statutes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not expressly consider Moseley’s service-related PTSD as required by §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. These statutes mandate that a trial court must consider a defendant’s service-related PTSD as a factor in mitigation when deciding on probation and sentencing. The appellate court determined that the record was ambiguous regarding whether the trial court was aware of its statutory obligations under these sections.The appellate court reversed Moseley’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to comply with its statutory obligations under §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Moseley" on Justia Law

Romeo Deonte Knowles, a 23-year-old unhoused individual, attacked a security guard, William Bullock, at a homeless shelter. The altercation led to Bullock falling, hitting his head, and subsequently dying from blunt force trauma. Knowles claimed self-defense, citing intimidation by Bullock. He was charged with murder but later pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter.The Los Angeles County Superior Court received various reports and memoranda before sentencing. These included a mitigation packet detailing Knowles's traumatic childhood and mental health issues, a diagnostic report from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and sentencing memoranda from both the defense and prosecution. The defense argued for the low term of three years, citing Knowles's age, mental health, and lack of a criminal record. The prosecution recommended the midterm of six years, emphasizing Bullock's non-aggressive behavior and Knowles's failure to take full responsibility.The Superior Court sentenced Knowles to the midterm of six years, finding that the aggravating factors, such as the victim's vulnerability and Knowles's behavior while in custody, outweighed the mitigating factors. Knowles appealed, arguing that the court erred by not imposing the low term.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the lower court. The appellate court held that the trial court correctly understood the scope of its sentencing discretion and appropriately weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "People v. Knowles" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of 20 counts of aggravated sexual assault, rape, sexual penetration, and oral copulation of unconscious or intoxicated persons involving four different victims. The crimes occurred after the defendant provided the victims with alcoholic beverages, rendering them intoxicated and unconscious. The jury found the defendant guilty of multiple offenses against each victim, including aggravated sexual assault, rape of an unconscious person, and rape of an intoxicated person.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially sentenced the defendant to 40 years in prison, including several upper-term sentences based on aggravating factors not admitted by the defendant or found true by a jury. The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under new sentencing reforms, Assembly Bill 518 and Senate Bill 567, which affected the court's discretion under Penal Code sections 654 and 1170, respectively. At resentencing, the trial court imposed mandatory full-term consecutive sentences for three counts of rape of an intoxicated person under Penal Code section 667.6(d) because they involved different victims. The court also imposed upper-term sentences based on the same fact that the crimes involved multiple victims, despite the defendant's objection to this dual use of facts.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by using the same fact (multiple victims) to impose both upper-term and mandatory consecutive sentences under section 667.6(d). The appellate court concluded that the dual use prohibition applies even when consecutive sentencing is mandatory. As a result, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for a full resentencing hearing on the record as it stands, without allowing the prosecution to seek a trial on aggravating factors. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Dorado" on Justia Law

In the 1980s, Robert Edward Maury was convicted of multiple crimes, including three counts of first-degree murder and forcible rape. A jury sentenced him to death in 1989. The California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence in 2003, and his initial state habeas corpus petition was denied in 2011. In 2021, Maury filed a second state habeas corpus petition, which the Shasta County Superior Court dismissed as procedurally barred. Maury appealed, focusing on a claim under McCoy v. Louisiana, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when his counsel presented mitigating evidence against his wishes during the penalty phase.The Shasta County Superior Court dismissed Maury’s second habeas petition, finding it untimely and successive. The court did not address the merits of Maury’s McCoy claim, which argued that his counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights by presenting mitigating evidence over his objection, thus conceding guilt. Maury also claimed that the trial court erred in denying his motions to represent himself during the penalty phase, which he argued forced him to proceed with counsel burdened by an irreconcilable conflict of interest.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no McCoy error. The court concluded that Maury’s counsel did not concede guilt over his objection but instead presented mitigating evidence and argued for life without parole while maintaining Maury’s innocence. The court also found that any error in presenting a defense against Maury’s wishes was harmless, as Maury achieved his objective of obtaining a death verdict by personally addressing the jury. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Maury’s second habeas corpus petition, concluding that Maury failed to demonstrate prejudice or an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his counsel’s performance. View "In re Maury" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his two stepdaughters, L.C. and M.C., when they were under ten years old. The jury found him guilty of thirteen counts, including nine counts of lewd acts. The court sentenced him to 145 years to life under California’s “One Strike” law, which mandates severe penalties for certain sexual offenses involving multiple victims.The Superior Court of San Diego County admitted evidence of both charged and uncharged sexual offenses committed by the defendant. The court conducted a pretrial analysis under Evidence Code section 352 to determine the admissibility of this evidence. The jury was instructed that it could consider this evidence as indicative of the defendant’s propensity to commit sexual offenses. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not conducting a separate section 352 analysis before instructing the jury and that his sentence violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection and prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in its handling of the section 352 analysis, as it had implicitly conducted this analysis pretrial. The appellate court also found that the defendant’s equal protection claim was foreclosed by the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Williams, which upheld the constitutionality of excluding One Strike offenders from youthful offender parole consideration. Additionally, the court concluded that the defendant forfeited his claim regarding cruel and unusual punishment by not raising it at trial and that the claim lacked merit regardless.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the defendant’s conviction and sentence. View "P. v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of felony vehicle burglary, being a felon in possession of tear gas, and misdemeanor receiving stolen property. During jury selection, the defendant, who was in jail, did not appear in court. The bailiff reported that the defendant refused transport, leading the court to find his absence voluntary and proceed with jury selection. The defendant missed another day but was present for the rest of the trial. He was sentenced to two years and eight months in county jail, with part of the sentence suspended for mandatory supervision.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco handled the initial trial. The defendant argued that his constitutional right to be present was violated due to insufficient evidence of voluntary absence and the denial of a continuance. The court found substantial evidence of voluntary absence based on the bailiff's testimony and denied the continuance. The defendant was convicted on most counts, and the court later modified his sentence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the defendant was voluntarily absent, including the bailiff's report and jail procedures. The court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, considering the potential manipulation by the defendant and the inconvenience to jurors and court resources. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions but accepted the Attorney General's concession that the defendant was entitled to four additional days of presentence custody credits. View "People v. Hersom" on Justia Law

In 1998, Khyle Armando Briscoe, then 21, participated in a robbery with Shaun P. During the robbery, Briscoe and Shaun P. both had guns. A struggle ensued, resulting in Ben P., the robbery victim, fatally shooting Shaun P. Briscoe was charged with first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with firearm-use enhancements and a special circumstance of murder during a robbery and burglary. A jury convicted Briscoe on all counts, and he was sentenced to life without parole.Briscoe filed a motion in 2022 for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which allows certain youth offenders to seek parole but excludes those sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder. He argued that this exclusion violated equal protection under the California and U.S. Constitutions. The trial court denied his motion, adhering to the majority view that section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Briscoe appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court noted that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder was previously upheld in People v. Hardin. However, Briscoe raised a narrower challenge, arguing that excluding youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for special circumstance murder, while including those convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), violated equal protection. The court agreed, finding no rational basis for treating these equally culpable offenders differently.The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for a Franklin proceeding and a section 3051 parole hearing, holding that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder during a robbery or burglary violated equal protection. View "People v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

The petitioner sought resentencing on his voluntary manslaughter conviction under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. He had entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in 2019, after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, which eliminated certain theories of murder liability. The petitioner argued that his plea should be reconsidered because he could have faced attempted murder liability under a now-invalid theory had he gone to trial.The Tulare County Superior Court initially charged the petitioner with murder and attempted murder, along with firearm and gang allegations. In 2019, as part of a plea deal, the petitioner pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter, and the remaining charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to 11 years in prison. In 2022, the petitioner filed for resentencing under section 1172.6, but the trial court denied the petition, stating that he was ineligible because he entered his plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the petitioner was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because he entered his plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, which had already eliminated the imputed malice theories of murder liability. The court noted that section 1172.6 is intended to provide relief for specific convictions obtained under now-invalid theories of liability, not for dismissed charges. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the petitioner could not show he could not presently be convicted of murder due to changes in the law, as required by section 1172.6. View "People v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

In March 2010, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder and actively participating in a criminal street gang, resulting in a 22-year prison sentence. Approximately 12 years later, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court admitted statements the defendant made during a parole risk assessment interview and testimony from a parole hearing, ultimately denying the petition.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially handled the case, where the defendant's petition for resentencing was reviewed. The trial court admitted the parole hearing transcript and the defendant’s statements from the comprehensive risk assessment, despite objections from the defense counsel on grounds of hearsay and constitutional violations. The court found that the defendant’s statements demonstrated an intent to kill and denied the petition for resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The defendant argued that his statements and testimony from the parole proceedings should be subject to use immunity and were involuntary. The appellate court held that statements made in preparation for, and during, a parole hearing are not subject to use immunity under the reasoning of People v. Coleman and related authorities. The court also found that the statements were not involuntary, as the defendant was advised of his rights and chose to participate. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the statements and testimony, affirming the order denying the petition for resentencing. View "People v. Zavala" on Justia Law

The case involves Edward Wayne Reid, who was charged with two crimes against Jane Doe: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. Jane testified that Reid grabbed her by the throat, applied pressure, caused her difficulty in breathing and swallowing, and made her feel dizzy. A deputy corroborated Jane's account, noting she reported seeing stars and feeling faint during the incident.The magistrate at the preliminary hearing found probable cause for the assault charge but dismissed the domestic violence charge, stating there was no evidence of a "traumatic injury." The People refiled the information with both charges, and Reid moved to dismiss the domestic violence charge again. The trial court granted Reid's motion, agreeing with the magistrate's assessment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing provided a rational ground for assuming Reid inflicted corporal injury upon Jane through choking, which resulted in a traumatic condition as defined by the statute. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of a traumatic condition includes impeding normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck. The court found that Jane's difficulty in breathing and feeling dizzy or faint met this definition.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the domestic violence charge and remanded the case with directions to allow Reid to withdraw his plea to the assault charge. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. View "P. v. Reid" on Justia Law