Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Fahim Anthony Multani appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Multani, diagnosed with stage IV lung cancer in 2014, had his cancer metastasize to his brain by 2017. Despite this, his cancer, caused by a specific gene mutation, has been successfully treated with targeted medication for seven years, showing no evidence of disease progression. Multani argued that his illness should be considered as having an end-of-life trajectory, making him eligible for compassionate release.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Multani’s petition, concluding that his illness did not currently have an end-of-life trajectory. The court noted that while Multani’s cancer was incurable, it was perfectly suppressed by his current treatment, and there was no evidence of disease progression. The court found that the term “end-of-life trajectory” required the illness to be actively progressing toward death, which was not the case for Multani.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the term “end-of-life trajectory” in section 1172.2 requires that the illness be progressing toward death, not merely incurable or expensive to treat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Multani’s cancer, while serious and advanced, was not currently on an end-of-life trajectory due to its successful suppression by targeted medication. The court also noted that the legislative intent behind the statute did not support extending compassionate release to those whose illnesses are effectively managed and not actively progressing toward death. View "P. v. Multani" on Justia Law

Santiago Gonzalo Canales was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children, specifically his stepdaughter and niece, both under the age of 14 during the abuse. Canales's niece testified that he molested her from ages seven to 13, while his stepdaughter testified that he began molesting her when she was about 11, including vaginal penetration. Canales denied all allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Canales on all counts and found true the multiple victims allegations. He was sentenced to 60 years to life in prison, consisting of four consecutive sentences of 15 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Canales challenged two jury instructions: CALCRIM No. 1120 and CALCRIM No. 252. The court upheld the use of CALCRIM No. 1120, stating it correctly reflected the statutory requirements for continuous sexual abuse, which did not necessitate a heightened mental state for "substantial sexual conduct." The court acknowledged an error in CALCRIM No. 252 but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Canales's guilt. Canales's argument regarding the unanimity instruction was forfeited as he did not raise it during the trial.The court agreed with Canales and the prosecution that his sentence violated ex post facto principles because the One Strike law, which enhanced his sentence, did not apply to his offenses against his stepdaughter, which occurred before the law was amended to include continuous sexual abuse. Consequently, the court vacated Canales's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also contended the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred by ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed section 1170(d) despite amendments and that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and outside juvenile court jurisdiction. The court also found the stay order would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes. View "P. v. Bagsby" on Justia Law

Francisco Carlos Ibarra was charged with the attempted murders of A.U. and R.M., and two counts of attempted robbery. The incident occurred on a rural property used for illegal marijuana cultivation, where A.U. and R.M. were present. Ibarra and others, wearing black clothes and ski masks, arrived in a truck and began shooting at a shed where A.U. and R.M. had taken cover. A.U. was severely injured, and R.M. was shot in the back. Ibarra was convicted of both counts of attempted premeditated murder and two counts of attempted robbery. The jury found true the arming allegations but not the allegations of personal firearm discharge or infliction of great bodily injury.The Superior Court of Riverside County sentenced Ibarra to a total of six years determinate plus 14 years to life indeterminate. Ibarra appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions regarding the "kill zone" theory, self-defense, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the "kill zone" theory for the attempted murder of R.M., as there was no evidence that Ibarra knew R.M. was present in the shed. Consequently, the conviction for count 2 was reversed. However, the court upheld the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on self-defense or imperfect self-defense, as there was insufficient evidence to support these defenses. The court also affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences, finding substantial evidence that the attempted murders were not incidental to the robberies.The Court of Appeal vacated the conviction for the attempted murder of R.M. and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to allow the prosecution to retry Ibarra on that count or dismiss it. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Ibarra" on Justia Law

Jovan Jones was convicted by a jury of multiple felonies, including rape, sexual penetration, and assault with intent to commit a sex offense during a first-degree burglary, after he attacked a woman, C.M., in her apartment and stole her backpack. The jury also found true the allegations under the One Strike law that Jones committed two of the sex offenses during a burglary with intent to commit a sex offense and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.The trial court dismissed one count of attempted rape at the prosecution's request after the close of evidence. The jury convicted Jones of aggravated burglary, sexual penetration standing in the kitchen, rape in the bedroom, and robbery. The jury found true the burglary and weapon circumstances for the sexual penetration count and the burglary circumstance for the rape count. Jones was also found guilty of attempted sexual penetration and attempted rape, with the jury finding true the lesser allegation that he was armed with a deadly weapon during these offenses. The trial court sentenced Jones to a total term of 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court agreed that a full resentencing was required due to an unauthorized three-year enhancement. The court rejected Jones's other claims, including the argument that the prosecution's alternative theory of burglary based on his entry into the bedroom was an "ambush" and that the prosecutor's closing argument improperly suggested the presumption of innocence was over. The court struck the unauthorized enhancement, remanded for resentencing, ordered certain clerical errors corrected, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Leonardo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. The trial court found Garcia had made a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary hearing. Garcia's counsel subpoenaed the LAPD for contact information of two witnesses, but the trial court granted the LAPD's motion to quash, ruling that section 1172.6 did not allow for postconviction discovery. Garcia then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging this decision.Previously, the trial court had found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, with the jury finding true various firearm and gang-related enhancements. On appeal, the first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder, and Garcia's sentence was adjusted to 120 years to life. Garcia's subsequent petitions for resentencing were initially denied until the current petition was found to state a prima facie case for relief.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that section 1172.6 allows for postconviction discovery after an order to show cause is issued. The court reasoned that denying such discovery would hinder the petitioner's ability to defend against new theories of liability that the prosecution might present at the evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by quashing the subpoena, as it prevented Garcia from obtaining potentially relevant evidence. The appellate court granted Garcia's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Garcia v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Kovtun appealed, arguing that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications during the meeting, as they were not made in good faith contemplation of litigation. The court affirmed the judgment against Kovtun, upholding the $50,000 damages award to Jennifer. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

The defendant, Eliseo Martinez, restrained Nicasio Calixto Pascual while his cousin, Valente Martinez, stabbed Calixto 18 times. During an interview with detectives, Martinez admitted his participation in the stabbing. Martinez claimed the trial court improperly denied an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion, arguing it was not supported by the evidence and was prohibited under Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) due to the victim’s sexual orientation. Martinez also contended that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the court found him voluntarily absent from the trial.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Martinez guilty of attempted murder and determined several aggravating circumstances, including that the crime was a hate crime. Martinez was sentenced to 23 years in state prison. Martinez appealed, arguing the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter and in proceeding with the trial in his absence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court correctly denied the instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no substantial evidence that Martinez acted in the heat of passion due to sufficient provocation. The court also found that Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) rendered any provocation related to the victim’s sexual orientation objectively unreasonable. Additionally, the court determined that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Martinez voluntarily absented himself from the trial, and thus, his right to be present was not violated. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. View "P. v. Martinez" on Justia Law

In March 2011, Prentice Robinson was indicted on multiple felony charges, including attempted murder, for crimes committed between January and February 2011. Robinson pleaded no contest to several charges, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, which was denied by the trial court. Robinson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by considering grand jury testimony, which he claimed was inadmissible hearsay.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially handled the case, where Robinson pleaded no contest and was sentenced. In 2022, Robinson sought resentencing, but the trial court denied his petition after considering grand jury transcripts. Robinson contended that the grand jury testimony should not have been considered, as it constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his Sixth Amendment rights.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the grand jury testimony was admissible under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), which allows for the consideration of evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial if it remains admissible under current law. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and thus fell within the scope of "any prior hearing." The court also determined that Robinson's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, as the section 1172.6 hearing is a postconviction collateral proceeding, not a new criminal prosecution, and thus does not afford the same constitutional protections.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the grand jury testimony was properly considered and that Robinson's due process rights were not violated. View "P. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order that directed the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after the current deputy public defender made remarks during plea negotiations that invoked Sanchez's race, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the reassignment.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate a conflict of interest after the deputy public defender made racially charged comments. During a closed hearing, Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court ordered the reassignment of the deputy public defender, citing potential issues under the RJA and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the court found that the trial court's decision to prevent a potential future RJA claim was within its discretion to avoid substantial impairment of the proceedings.The appellate court concluded that Sanchez's arguments regarding constitutional violations and the necessity of an actual conflict were without merit. The court emphasized that the trial court's order was narrowly tailored and did not violate Sanchez's rights. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law