Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over M.A. upon his admission that he had committed a felony sexual battery (Penal Code 243.4). The juvenile court granted him probation for one year. At the recommendation of the probation officer—who noted that sexual battery was among the offenses referenced in section 29805—and over M.A.’s objection, the court ordered “[t]hat [M.A.] shall immediately surrender any and all firearms … and refrain from possessing, owning, or controlling any and all firearms until his . . . 30th birthday.” Under Penal Code 29820, a minor adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for certain offenses—including “an offense enumerated in Section 29805”—shall be prohibited until age 30 from possessing firearms. Under section 29805, adults convicted of certain misdemeanors are subject to a 10-year prohibition against possessing firearms.The court of appeal affirmed the order. The prohibition against firearms for certain juvenile offenders applies to M.A. because he committed an offense that is “enumerated” in section 29850; to the extent M.A. challenged the imposition of the prohibition as a probation condition, the prohibition against firearms is statutorily authorized and required under section 29820. The term “enumerated” must be interpreted as including both felony and misdemeanor violations of the statutes listed in section 29805. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder for a San Jose shooting death (Pen. Code 187(a)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (29800(a)(1)), with a finding that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the murder (12022.53(d)). The court found true the allegations that Thompson had a prior juvenile strike adjudication and had served a prior prison term and sentenced him to 76 years to life, imposed various fines and fees, and ordered victim restitution.The court of appeal upheld the conviction, rejecting claims concerning evidence of intimidation, the admission of evidence about internet searches, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court remanded for resentencing, for the trial court to strike the prior prison term enhancement and consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement or to impose a lesser enhancement, based on changes in the law, and to vacate the portion of the $129.75 criminal justice administration fee that remained unpaid. On remand, Thompson may raise his inability to pay the fines and fees and his claim that he is entitled to the reimbursement of any portion of the criminal justice administration fee that he has already paid. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Salvador, charged with sexual penetration of a person under the age of 16 by a person over 21, lewd or lascivious act on a child aged 14 or 15, felony false imprisonment, sexual battery, and annoying or molesting a child, pleaded no contest to felony false imprisonment and misdemeanor sexual battery. The trial court granted a three-year term of probation and imposed, among others, conditions requiring Salvador to consent to searches of his electronic devices, and restricting his use of social media and the Internet. Salvador challenged the probation conditions.The court of appeal struck the restriction on Salvador’s use of the Internet as unconstitutionally overbroad but upheld the remaining conditions. There is nothing in the record to support a restriction on Internet access more generally, as compared with the restriction limited to social media. The search and monitoring conditions are tailored with sufficient specificity to avoid unconstitutionally intruding on Salvador’s Fourth Amendment right. Because Salvador used social media to text the victims, the nexus to that condition, while attenuated, is sufficiently established such that imposition of the condition is not an abuse of discretion under California precedent. Any burden on Salvador’s use of social media is reasonably tempered by his ability to obtain prior approval; the use of social media is not so necessary to the activities of daily living that this requirement would unduly burden Salvador’s rights. View "People v. Salvador" on Justia Law

Defendant Alan Bueno, an inmate at the time of the offense at issue, arranged with a prison employee codefendant to obtain a cellular telephone. Bueno pleaded no contest to one felony count of conspiracy to violate California Penal Code section 4576(a), which barred possession with the intent to deliver or the actual delivery of a cellular telephone to a prison inmate. On appeal, Bueno contended he could not be convicted of conspiracy to deliver a cellular telephone to an inmate because he was the inmate to whom the cellular telephone was delivered. Bueno analogized the scenario in this case to cases involving drug sales, in which the “buyer-seller rule” precluded the purchaser from being held criminally liable for a conspiracy to sell drugs to himself. According to Bueno, this principle applied to preclude an inmate recipient of a cellular telephone from being held criminally liable for conspiring to commit the substantive offense of section 4576 (a). Alternatively, Bueno contended that the statutory scheme set out a tiered system of punishment for the different roles that an individual might play in a scheme to deliver/have delivered a cellular telephone to an inmate, and that this scheme evinced a legislative intent that the inmate who participates in such a scheme be punished by a loss of credits only, and not criminally prosecuted. The Court of Appeal concluded Bueno’s argument that he could not be convicted of conspiracy to violate section 4576 (a) was without merit. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Bueno" on Justia Law

Detective Nava obtained a search warrant for Rowland’s residence. Nava had investigated a report from Sergeant Dahl, a member of the Silicon Valley Internet Crimes Against ChildrenTask Force. Dahl was investigating Cybertips from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which had received anonymous Cybertips from a Microsoft Online Operation employee who viewed files of apparent child pornography, which were uploaded from a particular IP address. The Child Victim Identification Program confirmed that the person from Cybertip 1 had been identified and was underage at the time the photograph was taken. Dahl learned the IP address was assigned to AT&T, obtained a search warrant, and learned the subscriber was Rowland. Charged with possessing or controlling matter depicting a person under 18 years of age personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct, Rowland unsuccessfully moved to quash the search warrant that led to the seizure of his electronic devices, including a thumb drive that contained about 1,000 images and 25 videos of child pornography.The court of appeal affirmed. Although the search warrant affidavit did not name the employee who submitted the cybertips to NCMEC or the person who forwarded the cybertips from NCMEC to the police, the totality of the circumstances supported a determination that the cybertips came from unbiased citizen informants who could be presumed reliable and thus did not need independent corroboration. View "People v. Rowland" on Justia Law

In 1993, defendant Albert Garcia physically assaulted and stole money from an 82-year-old man, who died about an hour later from lethal cardiac arrhythmia. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and robbery. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 27 years to life in prison, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. In affirming defendant’s murder conviction, the Court noted that the prosecution’s theory was felony murder, and concluded that the felony-murder rule applied to the facts of this case because there was substantial evidence the robbery, either the physical altercation or the emotional stress, caused the victim’s death. In 2019, after the passage of California Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which narrowed the class of persons liable for felony murder, defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95). The trial court denied the petition in August 2020, finding defendant was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because he was the “actual killer,” a felony-murder theory that remained valid after the passage of the Senate Bill. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court improperly evaluated the validity of his murder conviction under the “actual killer” provision of Penal Code section 189 (e)(1), as there was no “actual killer” within the meaning of the revised felony-murder rule when death results from a preexisting medical condition aggravated by the stress of the underlying felony; and (2) the trial court erroneously relied upon a sufficiency of the evidence standard in denying his petition for resentencing rather than determining whether the prosecution had met its burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of murder under current law. The Court of Appeal disagreed with defendant on his first contention, thus it did not reach his second. Here, the Court found defendant was the actual killer; accordingly, the order denying his petition for resentencing was affirmed. View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In 2016, Santa Clara County charged Nguyen with possession for sale and transportation of a controlled substance. Six months later, the DA filed a second complaint, charging Nguyen with additional controlled substance offenses. In July 2017, Nguyen was arrested in Colorado for selling marijuana. In July 2018, while incarcerated in Colorado, Nguyen sent the warden and the DA an informal request for a final disposition of his Santa Clara County charges. In August 2018, the DA lodged a detainer with the Colorado warden (Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Pen. Code, 1389). The Colorado warden acknowledged receipt the next day; 14 weeks later, the warden served Nguyen with the detainer and notice of his right to demand final disposition of the charges. Nguyen formally requested final disposition of the charges, Three months later, Nguyen was transported to Santa Clara County and was arraigned. Nguyen moved to dismiss, citing the lapse of more than 180 days from receipt by the DA of his informal, pre-detainer request for final disposition.The superior court ordered the reinstatement of the previously dismissed complaints. The court of appeal affirmed. Colorado’s unreasonable delay in notifying Nguyen of his California detainer and right to demand final disposition of the underlying charges does not entitle him to the dismissal of his pending charges. The hearing Nguyen requests as to the reasonableness of this delay would serve no purpose. View "People v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

Over ten years ago, Prince Kurtiss Cheatham fled criminal custody after he heard nonexistent voices that led him to believe his life was in danger. After being returned to custody, he again attempted to escape after again hearing nonexistent voices because of untreated schizoaffective disorder. He was charged based on these events and, after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, was committed to a state hospital. Since that time, Cheatham took medications that largely subdued his mental health symptoms but have not resolved his symptoms entirely. Shortly before Cheatham’s anticipated release from hospital custody, the local district attorney sought to extend his commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5. After two psychologists testified at trial that Cheatham met the statute's criteria, a jury found the district attorney had proved the facts necessary to extend Cheatham’s commitment. On appeal, Cheatham argued: (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s findings; and (2) the district attorney should be barred from trying the matter again under double jeopardy principles. Although he acknowledged these principles generally applied only in criminal matters, he contended they also applied in proceedings to extend a section 1026.5 commitment per 1026.5(b)(7). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with Cheatham on both points: because of the lack of evidence supporting the required showing, the Court found the evidence insufficient to support a commitment extension under section 1026.5. Further, the Court found that, on remand, the district attorney could not again attempt to extend Cheatham’s commitment. The trial court’s order extending Cheatham’s commitment was reversed and the trial court directed to dismiss the petition to extend the commitment. View "California v. Cheatham" on Justia Law

Bowden was driving in Novato when she struck and killed a pedestrian in a marked crosswalk in May 2019. Blood and breath samples taken at the scene indicated that Bowden had been driving under the influence of alcohol. Bowden agreed to plead guilty to a felony violation of Penal Code section 191.5(b) in exchange for the prosecutor recommending a prison term of two years, the first year to be served in county jail, and the second on mandatory supervision. The superior court informed the parties that the agreement was “overly lenient” and proposed placing Bowden on probation for five years, consisting of a full year in county jail followed by probation supervision for the remaining four years. The parties agreed. Less than a year later, in January 2021, Assembly Bill 1950 took effect, amending section 1203.1 to restrict the length of many felony probation terms to two years. The superior court found that A,B. 1950 did not limit Bowden’s probation to two years.The court of appeal vacated. The prosecution and the trial court cannot retract their consent to the plea agreement. A,B, 1950 is retroactive to Bowden’s situation and contains no suggestion that the two-year limitation on felony probation does not apply if lesser, or lesser included, crimes expressly provide for longer probation terms. View "Bowden v. Superior Court of Marin County" on Justia Law

Toren Nieber was convicted in 2017 for his role in the commission of a 2016 burglary and robbery during which one of the victims was shot and killed. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found insufficient evidence to hold Nieber over on a special circumstance allegation, and the matter proceeded to trial without that charge. Nieber appealed his conviction, arguing he should be resentenced pursuant to California Penal Code Section 1172.6 (d)(2) because the court’s decision at the preliminary hearing constituted a “prior finding by a court” that he was not a major participant in the underlying crime. The trial court, which had presided over the preliminary hearing as well as the trial, ordered an evidentiary hearing and followed the procedures outlined in subdivision (d)(3). It concluded the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Nieber was a major participant who acted with a reckless indifference to human life and was therefore ineligible for resentencing. It thus denied the petition. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Nieber argued: (1) the court improperly held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6 (d)(3) because the court’s finding at the preliminary hearing required it to resentence him under subdivision (d)(2); collateral estoppel likewise meant the court was required to follow the procedure detailed in subdivision (d)(2); and (3) the court’s conclusion that he was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life was not supported by sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeal found his contentions without merit, and affirmed. View "California v. Nieber" on Justia Law