Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After June 30, 2021, juvenile courts were no longer able to commit juveniles to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Jason V. was committed to DJJ prior to June 30, 2021, but the trial court erroneously ordered an impermissible maximum term of confinement. In July 2021, the court entered a nunc pro tunc order stating the correct maximum period. Jason contended the commitment order had to be vacated because judicial error could not be corrected by a nunc pro tunc order and, on the date the order was entered, he could not be committed to DJJ. He also contended he was entitled to additional days of credit for time spent in local confinement that the juvenile court failed to award. The Court of Appeal remanded the case for recalculation of the credits Jason was entitled to, but otherwise affirmed the dispositional order. View "In re Jason V." on Justia Law

A superior court granted diversion to real party in interest, Jessica Ortiz, on misdemeanor DUI charges pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.95. In prior writ proceedings, the appellate division of the superior court upheld the diversion order for Ortiz and two other defendants who had also been granted diversion on misdemeanor DUI charges. The State petitioned the Court of Appeal for mandamus relief, to vacate the diversion order for Ortiz. They claimed the diversion order was unauthorized because Penal Code section 1001.95 did not impliedly and partially repeal Vehicle Code section 23640 to the extent that the older statute prohibits diversion for misdemeanor (as opposed to felony) DUI charges. Thus, they argued, Vehicle Code section 23640 rendered misdemeanor DUI charges categorically ineligible for diversion under Penal Code section 1001.95. To this, a majority of the Court of Appeal agreed and granted the State's petition. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Ortiz)" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted by jury of robbery. He waived jury as to the charged enhancements and the trial court, based upon certified records, found true the allegations that he had two serious prior felony convictions and two “strike” convictions. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 20 years in state prison and five years each for the two serious prior felony convictions.   Appellant contends the trial court erred in imposing the upper term pursuant to section 1170 as it existed at the time, there should be a reversal and remand for resentencing because of recent legislative changes, and the trial court erred in imposing fines and fees without determining ability to pay.   Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the trial court did not violate the “dual use” rule, and it did not abuse its discretion in imposing the upper term. The court explained Here, the trial court reasoned that the upper term was appropriate because of Appellant’s “long and significant criminal history, and because of the numerous factors in aggravation.” The trial court considered his criminal history, which began in 1994 and was continuous throughout his adult life. The trial court also considered the probation report, which, as indicated, identified several factors in aggravation. Any one of these factors in aggravation constitutes a sufficient basis to support the upper term. Further, the court wrote that the sentencing hearing was held on May 12, 2021, and Senate Bill 81 does not apply. In addition, there are no mitigating circumstances to consider and there is no reason to dismiss any enhancement. View "P. v. Flowers" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury convicted Sadiq Saibu and Antonio Valentino for their roles in committing a robbery of a video store, two attempted robberies of a liquor store, and a murder and attempted murder in the same liquor store during one of the attempted robberies. In 2019, Saibu filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.63 as to his murder conviction, contending he was not a major participant in the underlying felony murder and did not act in reckless indifference to human life. The superior court granted the requested relief. Further, he argued the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 703 with respect to the felony murder special circumstances allegation. While this case was pending, the California Legislature enacted and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 775 (Senate Bill 775) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551). Senate Bill 775 amended section 1170.95 to expand eligibility for resentencing to persons convicted of attempted murder. The State conceded that Saibu’s conviction for attempted murder was eligible for resentencing under Senate Bill 775. However, it pointed out the parties did not address that issue, and argued it should be given the opportunity to present additional evidence. Saibu argued that the Court of Appeal should find he was entitled to relief based on the superior’s court’s finding that he did not act with reckless indifference to human life. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with Saibu on the jury instruction contention and reversed the jury’s true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance. Regarding the superior court’s determination that Saibu was entitled to relief under section 1172.6 as to his murder conviction, the appellate court determined the State could not show that the court committed reversible legal error. As such, the order was affirmed. The Court remanded this case for the superior court to issue a show cause order and to hold a hearing as to whether Saibu was entitled to relief under section 1172.6 as to his attempted murder conviction. View "California v. Saibu" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Scotlane McCune appealed an order awarding victim restitution. McCune crashed his cousin’s car into a tree, totaling the car’s front end and injuring his passenger. He pled no contest to felony hit and run involving injury, and the court dismissed a charge of misdemeanor driving without a license. As part of his plea, McCune agreed to pay restitution to the victim (the passenger). In June 2018, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed McCune on five years’ probation. Two and one-half years later, the probation department filed and served notice that the victim sought $30,166.23 to recoup medical expenses related to his injuries. Effective the following day, January 1, 2021, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950 (AB 1950) ((2019- 2020 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2). With exceptions not pertinent here, the new law amended Penal Code section 1203.1 (a) to reduce the maximum felony probation term to two years. Accordingly, two weeks later the probation department (with the district attorney’s concurrence) petitioned to terminate McCune’s probation. The petition stated McCune would remain liable for victim restitution. The court granted it the same day. McCune contended the trial lost jurisdiction to order restitution when it terminated his probation early following a change to the Penal Code that shortened his probationary term from five years to two. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: the court retained jurisdiction to determine and award victim restitution under Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1202.461 irrespective of McCune’s probation status. View "California v. McCune" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Legg pleaded guilty to committing a lewd act upon a 14- or 15-year-old child, a conviction that required him to register as a sex offender for life. A subsequent amendment to Penal Code section 290 created a tiered registry for adult sex offenders, requiring a minimum registration period for some offenses and lifetime registration for others; petitioner’s offense continued to require lifetime registration. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate at the trial court, claiming that his lifetime registration requirement denied him equal protection of the laws. The trial court denied the petition, and he appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Legg v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder and several gang-related offenses in 1988 after pleading guilty. He was sentenced to 25 years to life. In 2017, Defendant had a parole hearing, at which he accepted responsibility for the crime and admitted he helped plan the crime. Subsequently, Defendant sought SB 1437 relief. The trial court reviewed Defendant's parole hearing transcripts, among other evidence, and denied Defendant's request for resentencing.The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s resentencing petition, finding that the evidence was sufficient to conclude he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court also held that the lower court did not err in considering Defendant's testimony at his parole hearing. The court acknowledged that Defendant had differing incentives at the parole hearing and in his SB 1437 petition; however, nothing precluded the trial court from considering the parole testimony when reviewing the SB 1437 petition. View "P. v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Minor N.L. appealed an order adjudging her a ward of the court. She argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that she willfully and maliciously committed felony arson of property; and (2) the case should have been remanded for the juvenile court to consider informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2, applying changes to the law that became effective on January 1, 2022 as a result of Senate Bill No. 383 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). After review, the Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to support the true finding, but the Court agreed that N.L. was entitled to a conditional reversal and remand for the trial court to consider informal supervision under the law as amended by Senate Bill No. 383. View "In re N.L." on Justia Law

Danny Beasley, who had a lengthy criminal history, was on parole from a 25-to-life sentence when he committed this first degree robbery. He used a knife in the commission of the offense, which exposed him to a maximum sentence of at least 35 years to life. The trial court dismissed all three of Beasley’s prior strike convictions, his three prior serious felony convictions and the weapon-use enhancement, and sentenced him to the low term of two years in prison. The district attorney objected and filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s order dismissing the prior strike convictions plainly “fell outside the bounds of reason under the applicable law and the relevant facts.” Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Beasley an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. View "California v. Beasley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault with a means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (“force-likely assault”) (Pen. Code,1 Section 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and misdemeanor violation of a protective order (Section 273.6, subd. (a); count 2).   Defendant contends on appeal that her sentence on count 1 must be vacated and her case remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567 because the trial court’s aggravating circumstances findings fail to meet the requirements of amended section 1170.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The court explained that the correct standard for harmless error lies between the standards articulated in Flores and Lopez. As such, the court applied a version of the standard articulated in Lopez, modified to incorporate Watson in the first step. Here, there was no error as to the first aggravating circumstance, Defendant had numerous convictions, meeting the requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), permitting the trial court to rely on certified records of Defendant’s prior convictions. Moreover, the court wrote there was also no error as to the trial court’s reliance on the third aggravating circumstance. Further, there is not a reasonable likelihood the jury would not have found the second aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt, thus, the error was harmless. View "P. v. Dunn" on Justia Law