Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Wandrey was convicted of numerous counts of sex offenses committed against the daughter of his then-girlfriend, and sentenced to consecutive aggravated prison terms totaling 756 years. He had been charged with and prosecuted for numerous separate but undifferentiated offenses after being held to answer on a single count of continuous sexual abuse of a child and a single count of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child. Wandrey argued that the requirement that witnesses wear masks covering their noses and mouths violated his constitutional right to confrontation, and the court erred in failing to conduct an "in camera" review of subpoenaed documents and in its instructions to the jury.The court of appeal affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing in light of post-sentencing statutory amendments affecting the imposition of upper terms. Wandrey’s rights were not violated by the manner in which he was charged and prosecuted. His convictions were supported by substantial evidence. Wandrey’s confrontation clause rights were not violated by requiring witnesses to wear masks in light of local conditions with respect to the pandemic, the specific layout of the courtroom, and the available means of assessing the reliability of testimony. The court did not err in quashing Wandrey’s subpoena of the victim’s psychotherapy records. View "People v. Wandrey" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant was convicted of one count of injuring a cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition under Penal Code section 273.5 after he entered a guilty plea to the offense. Shortly after his conviction, Defendant sought to revoke his plea on the ground that he wanted to secure an "immigration safe" plea, as he was fearful that a felony conviction would impact his status as a lawful permanent resident. The court denied Defendant's request.Subsequently, Defendant filed another motion to vacate under Penal Code section 1473.7, claiming that he would not have taken the plea had he known about the immigration consequences. Despite the prosecution agreeing to offer Defendant a misdemeanor in lieu of a felony, the court rejected Defendant's request. Defendant appealed.The Second Appellate District reversed. Section 1473.7 permits a court to grant a motion to vacate based on prejudicial error that doesn't necessarily rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that Defendant demonstrated prejudicial error under Penal Code 1473.7 based on 1.) counsel's failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea, 2.) counsel's failure to defend against deportation, and 3.) Defendant's subjective understanding of the consequences of his plea. Thus, the lower court erred in denying Defendant's motion to vacate. View "P. v. Manzanilla" on Justia Law

After the police saw Ayon commit two minor traffic violations, they stopped him in his car and detained him until a narcotics dog arrived, 12 minutes and 45 seconds into the stop. After the dog indicated the presence of drugs, the police searched the car, wherein they found cocaine, methamphetamine, currency, and a scale. The trial court denied Ayon’s motion to suppress, rejecting his argument that the police unlawfully prolonged the duration of the stop in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.The court of appeal reversed. “A careful reading of the record shows the stop was actually part of a preexisting drug investigation, and the police used the traffic infractions as a pretext for the stop.” While that fact does not by itself render the search unconstitutional, based on the evidence in the record viewed objectively—including police body camera videos of the stop—the police unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. One officer’s body camera continued to record for a total of 61 minutes, at which time the stop and search were still underway. View "People v. Ayon" on Justia Law

Defendant, driving at nearly 90 miles per hour, ran through a red light and collided with another vehicle, killing its occupants. A blood test after the accident confirmed that Defendant had 7.2 nanograms per milliliter of THC, 3.3 nanograms per milliliter of hydroxy THC, and 225 nanograms per milliliter of carboxy THC. Defendant was tried and convicted of second degree murder. An expert testified on behalf of the government, opining that Defendant had smoked marijuana within 24 hours of the accident.On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove he acted with the requisite level of malice. To be convicted of second degree murder, the government must prove that Defendant was subjectively aware his actions endangered human life. Here, given the nature of the accident, evidence of intoxication, Defendant's intent to drive and his knowledge of the dangers of impaired driving, the court concluded that the government presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find Defendant guilty of second degree murder. View "P. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of the involuntary manslaughter of his girlfriend, holding that no violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), occurred in this case.During trial, the county medical examiner opined that the victim had been beaten to death, and the district court relied on that testimony in arguing that Defendant beat his girlfriend to death, thereby committing first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court's failure to disclose certain portions of redacted memoranda written by the office of the district attorney as material relevant to impeachment of the medical examiner's trial testimony. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that, although portions of the redacted memoranda qualified as impeachment material under Brady, the failure to disclose them was not material to the outcome at trial. View "People v. Deleoz" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of multiple counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of fourteen and additional sexual offenses and sentencing him to ninety years to life in prison, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding certain testimony, but the error was harmless.During Defendant's trial, the court allowed the defense to present a psychologist as an expert on false confessions and suggestibility, but the court allowed the psychologist only to give general testimony without permitting the expert to offer his assessment of Defendant's particular suggestibility. Defendant challenged this ruling on appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert's defendant-specific testimony, but the error was harmless; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining claims of error. View "People v. Caparaz" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's petition for conditional release on the ground of restoration of sanity pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 1026.2, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition.Defendant was charged with homicide, found not guilty by reason of insanity, and committed to Napa State Hospital for a term of fifty years to life. Defendant later filed a petition for release into a conditional release program pursuant to section 1026.2. The trial court denied the petition, finding that Defendant had not carried his burden in showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not be a danger to the community if conditionally released. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error. View "People v. Diggs" on Justia Law

Defendant and a codefendant shot and killed another person after an altercation. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with a true finding of the gang special circumstance. He was also convicted of active gang participation. Defendant raised several challenges on appeal, including challenges to the gang-murder special circumstance and his substantive gang-participation conviction.The Fifth Appellate District affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder. The court held that allowing AB 333’s changes to section 186.22 to affect section 190.2(a)(22) would constitute an impermissible amendment of Proposition 21. However, the court agreed with Defendant that AB 333 required the reversal of his gang-participation conviction under section 186.22(a). The court also reversed Defendant's gang and firearm enhancements after the Attorney General agreed that a reasonable jury could conclude the “common benefit” of the murder in this case was not more than reputational. View "P. v. Rojas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 32 years to life in state prison. Defendant appealed the application of gang and firearm enhancements and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence under SB 775.    In light of Assembly Bill No. 333’s changes to section 186.22, the Second Appellate District reversed the true findings on the criminal street gang and firearm enhancements. The court remanded to the trial court to permit the prosecution to retry the criminal street gang enhancements if it so elects.Regarding Defendant's SB 775 claim, the court wrote that the parties agree that when a court instructs a jury on both a valid theory of guilt and an invalid theory of guilt the appellate court must review the error under the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The court explained that in employing that standard it must reverse the conviction unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the evidence of direct aiding and abetting was overwhelming. Accordingly, the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on natural and probable consequences was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "P. v. Lima" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the judgment after the jury found him guilty of false imprisonment by violence or menace (count 1, Pen. Code, Sections 236, 237, subd. (a)) and infliction of corporal injury on a person with whom he had a current or former dating relationship (count 3, Section 273.5, subd. (a)). He admitted a prior strike (Sections 667, subds. (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to state prison for seven years, four months. Appellant contends the trial court erred when it did not: (1) stay the sentence for count 1, and (2) strike his prior strike conviction. He also contends that Senate Bill No. 567, which added a procedural change to section 1170, mandates resentencing.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that a trial court has discretion to dismiss a prior violent or serious felony conviction pursuant to the Three Strikes law. Here, the trial court’s ruling was not irrational or arbitrary. The court explained the reasons for denying the Romero motion. It acknowledged that the strike was 19 years old, but noted it was a “serious offense.” Further, there is a presumption that the trial court considered all relevant factors, even if it did not mention them all, and here the record shows that the trial court did consider Appellant’s life-long history including his mental health history and drug history. The court wrote, that the record “clearly indicates” the trial court would not have imposed the low term had it been aware of its discretion to do so under S.B. 567. View "P. v. Salazar" on Justia Law