Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner entered a no contest plea to first-degree murder. He also admitted that he acted intentionally, deliberately, and with premeditation in committing the murder. Twelve years later, Petitioner filed a petition for resentencing under Cal. Penal Code Sec. 1170.95 and SB 1437 (allowing inmates to obtain a resentencing hearing if they were convicted of felony murder or murder under the "natural and probable consequences" theory).The trial court denied Petitioner's petition, finding that he acted with premeditation. Petitioner appealed.On appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's ruling. The court explained that Petitioner made a binding admission when he admitted to acting intentionally, deliberately, and with premeditation and that this admission precluded SB 1437 relief. View "P. v. Romero" on Justia Law

In 2018, Cuenca pleaded guilty to false imprisonment of his girlfriend and to a related charge of resisting arrest resulting in serious bodily injury to an officer. The court imposed a split sentence: three years of formal probation plus county jail time that amounted to a single day, net of credit for time served. Two years later, while on probation, Cuenca was charged with assault and criminal threats arising out of a physical altercation with a male friend, A jury found Cuenca guilty of a lesser offense of assault. The court revoked probation and sentenced Cuenca to county jail for an aggregate term running a total of five years and two months for the three felony convictions in both cases. Cuenca pursued consolidated appeals.The court of appeal affirmed the convictions and sentence, rejecting an argument that Napa County’s failure to grant county jail inmates the same opportunities that state prison inmates have to earn rehabilitation program credits violated his constitutional right to equal protection. Napa County need not put forward evidence of the actual reasons justifying its policy choice; the challenged classification is presumed to be rational. View "In re Cuenca" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of first degree murder with the special circumstance of lying in wait, and unlawful participation in a criminal street gang ("gang enhancement"). On appeal, Defendants sought reversal of the gang enhancement under the newly passed AB 333, which amended Cal. Penal Code section 186.22 and added a new statute, section 1109 (requiring bifurcation of gang enhancement allegations).The court agreed with Defendants that AB 333 is fully retroactive to all non-final judgments. Thus, the court reversed Defendants gang enhancements. However, the court determined that, based on the language of section 1109, the statute does not apply to special circumstance allegations involving gang murders. Section 1109 says nothing about the special circumstance statutes, and its provisions are specific to section 186.22, subdivisions (a), (b), and (d). Moreover, the procedures required by section 1109 conflict with the procedures set forth in section 190.1 et seq. Thus, the court held that section 1109, as originally enacted by Assembly Bill 333, does not apply to the determination of special circumstance allegations under section 190.2(a)(22).The court reversed all Defendant's substantive convictions under section 186.22(a) as well as the gang enhancements under section 186.22(b). The court also reversed several firearm enhancements for unrelated reasons, otherwise affirming Defendant's murder convictions. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "P. v. Montano" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Christopher Whitmore was convicted by jury of rape, false imprisonment and other crimes. After trial, Whitmore made a Marsden motion to replace his appointed counsel; he also moved for a new trial. Because of circumstances related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Whitmore was not physically present in the courtroom when the trial court heard those motions in late December 2020; instead, Whitmore reluctantly appeared via video for the hearing and at sentencing. The court denied Whitmore’s motions and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. On appeal, Whitmore contended the trial court erred in overruling his demand to be personally present in the courtroom for the hearing on his posttrial motions and at sentencing. He also contended the court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion, and that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for false imprisonment. In its original opinion, filed on April 29, 2022, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment. Whitmore petitioned for rehearing, arguing that among other things: while his appeal was pending, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1170 (b) to make the middle term the presumptive sentence unless certain circumstances exist. Whitmore contended those amendments applied retroactively to him and required remand for resentencing. The Court granted rehearing, which vacated its previous opinion by operation of law. After considering the matter, the Court agreed with Whitmore that the recent amendments to section 1170(b) applied here. Accordingly, the Court vacated the imposed sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Whitmore" on Justia Law

In 2015, defendants AWi Builders, Inc. (AWi), Construction Contractors Corporation, Zhirayr Robert Mekikyan, Anna Mekikyan, and Tigran Oganesian (collectively, the AWI defendants) were under criminal investigation by the Orange County District Attorney's Office (OCDA) and the Riverside County District Attorney's Office (RCDA) in connection with AWi's involvement in certain public works projects. Pursuant to search warrants jointly obtained by OCDA and RCDA, a large amount of AWI' s property was taken into OCDA's custody. In 2017, OCDA decided not to pursue criminal charges against the AWI defendants and reassigned the matter to Orange County Deputy District Attorney Kelly Ernby for civil prosecution. In 2018, Ernby filed a civil complaint, on behalf of the State and against the AWI defendants, for violations of the unfair competition law. The AWI defendants were provided with a copy of OCDA's full investigative file, minus privileged documents, and returned documents seized during the criminal investigation to the AWI defendants. In 2020, the AWI defendants filed a motion seeking an order recusing and disqualifying from this case Ernby and the entire OCDA, arguing OCDA had engaged in misconduct by, amongst other things, improperly handling property seized during the criminal investigation that was protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The AWI defendants also argued that in the UCL action, Ernby had wrongfully threatened one of the AWI defendants, their counsel, and a paralegal with criminal prosecution, a claim Ernby categorically denied. The motion to recuse was denied, and the Court of Appeal affirmed denial: he AWI defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings. The Court found the trial court did not err by denying the motion to recuse because the evidence showed that no conflict of interest existed that would render it unlikely that the AWI defendants would receive a fair trial. View "California v. AWI Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

After having his first degree murder conviction reduced to second degree murder based on instructional error, defendant-appellant Matthew Basler filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Following an evidentiary hearing at which Basler was not present, the trial court denied the petition, ruling: (1) Basler was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 (a) because he was not convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, but was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; and (2) Basler could still be convicted of murder even after the changes made to sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019. The court further found “as an independent factfinder” beyond a reasonable doubt that Basler committed first degree premeditated murder and that he harbored premeditated intent before killing the victim. On appeal, Basler contends the trial court erred by its ruling. The State conceded the trial court reversibly erred by failing to address the merits of Basler's petition as to his attempted murder conviction, and Senate Bill No. 775 required a remand for that determination. The Court of Appeal accepted that concession, and further concluded Basler had a constitutional right to be present at his section 1170.95 evidentiary hearing or competently waive his presence. The case was remanded for a new evidentiary hearing on Basler's murder conviction. View "California v. Basler" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of multiple offenses arising from a domestic violence incident against his wife in the presence of their daughters, including two separate counts of dissuading a witness by force or threat of force or violence under Penal Code section 136.1(c)(1). His count 5 conviction was based on a statement Johnson made to his family that if the police came, he would blow his brains out. His count 2 conviction was based on a separate statement Johnson made to his wife that if she called the police, they would both be dead before the police arrived.The court of appeal vacated in part. As to his count 5 conviction, there was insufficient evidence; Johnson’s threat of self-harm did not constitute substantial evidence of harm to any “witness or victim or any third person,” under section 136.1(c)(1). A defendant who threatens violence upon himself does not threaten a “third person.” As to his count 2 conviction, Johnson forfeited his argument that the court committed an instructional error by incorrectly stating the law under section 136.1(c)(1); his substantial rights were not affected. Johnson’s count 2 conviction was improperly classified on his abstract of judgment as a violent felony. Any unpaid balance of the booking fee imposed on Johnson must be vacated based on recent legislation. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ruman Abdul Richardson acted as the getaway driver for a robbery. During the robbery, one of his coparticipants shot the victim. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder on a felony murder theory. The trial court denied petitioner’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. After review, the Court of Appeal held there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that petitioner was a major participant in the underlying robbery. Hence, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In 2018, Flores was convicted of a series of crimes, including felony corporal injury of his former girlfriend (Pen. Code 273.5(a). The court sentenced Flores to 224 months in prison, which included the upper term of imprisonment for his corporal injury conviction, a five-year enhancement for a prior felony conviction, and a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term. The court also imposed fees and fines. The court of appeal upheld the admission of evidence of Flores’s prior acts of domestic violence and the instruction of the jury with CALCRIM 852: “If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty.” Although S.B. 1393 gave trial courts discretion to strike prior felony enhancements, the evidence and the court’s comments indicate that the court would decline to exercise its discretion to strike Flores’s prior felony sentencing enhancement. S.B. 567 limits a court’s authority to impose aggravated sentences unless certain circumstances exist but Flores need not be must be resentenced for his corporal injury conviction. Based on A.B. 1869, the court vacated the balance of Flores’s $750.00 PSR and $108.19 booking fees. The court struck a one-year sentencing enhancement. View "People v. Flores" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with felony counts of sale/transportation/offer to sell a controlled substance (count 1) and possession for sale of a controlled substance (count 2). He pled guilty to count 1, offer to sell oxycodone in exchange for 36 months of formal probation with the service of 180 days in county jail. Count 2 was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Defendant’s attorney and the trial court advised him at that time that he would be deported based on his negotiated plea. Seven years later he found himself the subject of deportation proceedings.   The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction. The trial court factually found Defendant's credibility to be “severely lacking,” and his declaration was “deceptively phrased” to mislead the court that counsel had not recommended Defendant meet with an immigration attorney when counsel had, in fact, consulted with Defendant's immigration attorney.   The Second Appellate District affirmed and found that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion. The court explained that the plain and unambiguous language contained in the Felony Disposition Statement states: “If I am not a citizen and am pleading guilty to . . . a controlled substance offense, . . . I will be deported.”  The court explained that even on independent review, Defendant’s contentions fail. At the time of the plea proceeding, Defendant had lived in the United States for approximately seven years with his family. The contemplation of his life in Mexico, contemporaneous with his guilty plea, is persuasive evidence Defendant knew he would be deported. View "P. v. Garcia" on Justia Law