Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Arreguin pleaded guilty to human trafficking and second-degree robbery in separate cases. The court imposed a term of five years for the human trafficking offense plus a consecutive term of one year for the robbery. Execution of the sentence was suspended. Arreguin was placed on probation for 60 months. About 30 months later, the court summarily revoked probation for eight months. Probation was reinstated in November 2019. In January 2021, the court again summarily revoked probation. In April 2021, the court found Arreguin had violated probation in both cases based on the conduct underlying a January 2021 arrest. In May 2021, the court formally revoked probation in both cases and put into effect the suspended six-year aggregate sentence.The court of appeal reversed in part. The trial court erred in denying Arreguin’s motion to dismiss the violation of probation in the human trafficking case; that 60-month probation term was originally set to expire on December 1, 2021. However, effective January 1, 2021, the maximum probation term for many offenses, including the human trafficking offense, became limited to two years; Arreguin had served significantly more than two years of probation. His probation terminated as a matter of law., so the court lacked jurisdiction to order summary revocation. The robbery offense was statutorily exempt from the two-year probation limitation. View "People v. Arreguin" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted carjacking. He requested and was denied, mental health diversion several times. After the last hearing and denial, Defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in state prison. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial court erred by requiring the consent of the prosecution before granting diversion. Defendant also contended that his due process rights were violated when the trial court refused to allow live testimony in the last diversion hearing by a psychiatrist that had examined Defendant.   The Second Appellate District agreed with Defendant that it was an error for the trial court to conclude that diversion required consent by the People. But found that the error was harmless because the trial court independently found that Defendant did not meet the criteria for diversion. And, the court acted within its discretion in considering the expert’s report, but not live testimony, in the pre-trial diversion hearing. View "P. v. Watts" on Justia Law

In a previous opinion in this matter involving defendant James Bunas, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment and the underlying convictions and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a mental health diversion eligibility hearing under Penal Code section 1001.36 and to determine whether to place Bunas in mental health diversion. (Bunas I.) The Court further directed that, if the trial court determined Bunas was ineligible for diversion or exercised its discretion not to place Bunas on diversion, then the court was to reinstate Bunas’s convictions and resentence him. On remand, the trial court denied Bunas’s request for mental health diversion, but did not resentence. On appeal, Bunas argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mental health diversion; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to resentence him in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s prior decision. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not commit reversible error in denying Bunas mental health diversion, but it did err in failing to issue a new sentence. Judgment was affirmed in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Bunas" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant David Zuniga pled no contest to felony hit and run resulting in death or serious bodily injury. In late 2018, the court placed him on formal probation for three years. The terms and conditions of probation included that Zuniga “pay restitution [to the victim] through the Probation Department in an amount and manner to be determined by the probation officer at a later date.” Effective January 1, 2021, two years into Zuniga’s probation term, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) which amended Penal Code section 1203.1(a) by reducing the maximum felony probation term to two years, with certain exceptions not applicable here. In November 2021, the parties agreed that Zuniga was entitled to have his term of probation shortened to two years under Assembly Bill No. 1950. Accordingly, the court terminated Zuniga’s probation nunc pro tunc to December 31, 2020. When the court terminated Zuniga’s probation, the probation officer still had not determined the amount of victim restitution, as contemplated in the original probation order. Zuniga then argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set the amount of victim restitution because his probation had terminated. After soliciting briefing on the issue, the trial court disagreed with Zuniga and ordered direct restitution to the victim in the amount of $313,518.74. Zuniga appealed the restitution order. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction and affirmed the order. View "California v. Zuniga" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Cristina Qualkinbush threw a pair of scissors at her 75-year-old mother and then spat on a police officer who detained her following the incident. After the trial court denied Qualkinbush’s motion for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, she pled guilty to elder abuse and misdemeanor battery on a peace officer. The trial court placed her on formal probation for three years, subject to certain conditions, including residential mental health treatment. Qualkinbush appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mental health diversion. She also contended, and the State conceded that the Court of Appeal: (1) order an amendment of the probation order to vacate certain fees or costs pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1869); and (2) order a correction of the probation search condition to accurately reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement. After briefing, the parties agreed that the offense of conviction fell under an exception to Penal Code section 1203.1 and required a three-year minimum probation term. The Court concluded the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for mental health diversion, and remanded for the court to consider the primary purposes of the mental health diversion statute. “If after conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court again denies mental health diversion, the order granting formal probation shall be reinstated, as modified, to vacate the unpaid portion of the challenged fees and costs, and to correct the probation search conditions to delete authorization of searches of computers and recordable media.” View "California v. Qualkinbush" on Justia Law

Smith, a single mother, was arrested in connection with the theft of cell phones and an iPad. Police also located a receipt containing the last four digits of a stolen credit card; Smith stated that she had attempted to use the credit card four times. In addition, the police found suspected methamphetamine in her purse. Smith admitted it was hers.Smith pled guilty to a single count of unauthorized use of personal identifying information belonging to another person for the purpose of obtaining goods. The probation report recounted Smith’s statement that she had been using methamphetamine since 2014 and that she had stopped using it approximately four months after her arrest, in 2020. Defense counsel noted that Smith had been unable to find child care for her daughter during the coronavirus pandemic. The court sentenced Smith to two years of supervised probation, imposing conditions requiring Smith to “complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow through with treatment as directed by probation,” including residential, and “provide complete and current financial information, including verification of earnings, as directed by the probation officer.” The court of appeal held that the treatment condition improperly delegates judicial authority to the probation officer, but upheld the financial disclosure condition. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jesse Sambrano sought to reverse his attempted murder convictions because his jury was given a kill zone instruction that was erroneous under California v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019). The State conceded the error but argued it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal concluded after a review of the trial court record: (1) the jury should not have been instructed on the kill zone theory at all; (2) the instruction’s description of the kill zone theory was erroneous; (3) the prosecutor relied almost exclusively on the kill zone theory in arguing that Sambrano had the necessary mental state for attempted murder; and (4) the prosecutor’s argument concerning the kill zone theory was likewise erroneous. From this, the Court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would not have reached a verdict more favorable to Sambrano. "Accordingly, the convictions on the attempted murder counts must be reversed." the petition was granted and the attempted murder convictions were vacated. View "In re Sambrano" on Justia Law

In February 2020, following an argument by text message, Rodriguez drove his vehicle into his girlfriend’s vehicle three times while she was driving. Rodriguez was charged with assault with a deadly weapon (Penal Code 245(a)(1)) and pleaded guilty to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (245(a)(4).) Rodriguez was to be placed on formal probation for three years. At the sentencing hearing, the Solano County Superior Court imposed a three-year state prison sentence, suspended the execution of that sentence, placed Rodriguez on probation for three years, and ordered that Rodriguez attend a 52-week batterer’s program as required by section 1203.097. Overruling an objection, the trial court ruled that because there was a “domestic violence nexus” to Rodriguez’s assault, imposition of section 1203.097 was required.The court of appeal affirmed. Assembly Bill 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), effective on January 1, 2021, limits the maximum probation term for felony offenses to two years. (1203.1(a)) and applies retroactively. However, Rodriguez is not entitled to relief because he was convicted of a domestic violence offense that includes a specified term of probation, an exception to Assembly Bill 1950. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop in September 2009, police searched defendant Manual Soto and found 29.9 grams of methamphetamine in his breast pocket. According to the officer who arrested him, defendant stated he was to receive $200 for delivering the drugs on behalf of another person. A probation report noted defendant had never attended school, was illiterate in English and spoke it poorly, and was subject to an immigration hold as a noncitizen. Defendant was charged with drug possession and transportation charges, in addition to driving without a license. Pursuant to a plea negotiation, defendant initialed and signed a waiver of rights and plea form, in which he indicated his understanding that, as a noncitizen, his plea “may cause my deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States and denial of citizenship or naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” He also initialed the following line on the form: “I read and understand the English language.” Defendant’s attorney signed an acknowledgement on the form stating, among other things, he had “explained the consequences of this plea” to his client. A Spanish interpreter signed an acknowledgement on the form stating she was duly sworn, had translated the form to defendant, and that defendant indicated he understood its contents. He appealed the trial court’s denial of his 2020 motion to vacate his 2010 drug trafficking conviction, claiming he would have rejected the plea had he correctly understood its actual immigration consequences. Defendant contended his conviction was invalid due to prejudicial error. Applying its independent judgment, the Court of Appeal concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonably probable defendant would have rejected the plea had he correctly understood its actual immigration consequences. Therefore, defendant established prejudice. The trial court's order denying the section 1473.7 motion was reversed and the matter remanded with directions to grant the motion and vacate the conviction. View "California v. Soto" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Alan Dohner and William Gerber were, when their lawsuits were filed, general population inmates living in dormitory housing at Chuckawalla Valley State Prison (CVSP). They claimed they had the right to possess a personal television in their cells, rather than being limited to shared televisions located in common areas. They raised various claims flowing from the enforcement of the regulations that prohibited them from doing so. The trial court rejected all the claims, denying their request for a writ of habeas corpus without issuing an order to show cause and sustaining respondents’ demurrer to their claims for a writ of mandate and declaratory relief. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Dohner" on Justia Law