Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On appeal, the district attorney argued that The Association of Deputy District Attorneys for Los Angeles County (“ADDA”) lacks standing to seek mandamus relief on behalf of its members and that he does not have a ministerial duty to comply with the legal duties ADDA alleges he violated, that the trial court’s preliminary injunction violates the doctrine of separation of powers and that the balance of the harms does not support preliminary injunctive relief.   The Second Appellate District affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order. The court concluded that ADDA has associational standing to seek relief on behalf of its members. The court concluded the voters and the Legislature created a duty, enforceable in mandamus, that requires prosecutors to plead prior serious or violent felony convictions to ensure the alternative sentencing scheme created by the three strikes law applies to repeat offenders. This duty does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by materially infringing on a prosecutor’s charging discretion; to the contrary, the duty affirms the voters’ and the Legislature’s authority to prescribe more severe punishment for certain recidivists. Further, neither the voters nor the Legislature can create a duty enforceable in mandamus to require a prosecutor to prove allegations of prior serious or violent felony convictions, an inherently discretionary act. Nor is mandamus available to compel a prosecutor to exercise his or her discretion in a particular way when moving to dismiss allegations of prior strikes or sentence enhancements under section 1385. View "The Association of Deputy District Attorneys etc. v. Gascon" on Justia Law

Petitioner argued the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss under section 1385 certain firearm enhancements the People alleged against him. Nazir and the People argued the trial court should have dismissed the sentence enhancements “in furtherance of justice” under section 1385 in accordance with a policy issued by the district attorney for Los Angeles County upon his election. That policy directs all deputy district attorneys “to orally amend the charging document to dismiss or withdraw any [sentence] enhancement” alleged in a pending case. The trial court denied the motion and refused to consider the new policy in determining whether to dismiss the enhancements under section 1385.   The Second Appellate District agreed with Petitioner and the People that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion under section 1385 when it refused to consider the district attorney’s new policy, but we disagree with the People that the trial court lacked discretion to deny a motion by the People to dismiss enhancements pursuant to that policy. The court reasoned that under the relevant statutory scheme, long-standing case authority, and the rules of court governing sentencing, a trial court deciding whether to dismiss a sentence enhancement in furtherance of justice under section 12022.5 or 12022.53 must consider case-specific factors as well as general sentencing objectives. View "Nazir v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Under the 2020 Racial Justice Act, “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin” (Pen. Code 745 (a)). The Act's discovery provision allows a defendant, “[u]pon a showing of good cause,” to obtain evidence from the prosecution relevant to a potential violation. Based on evidence presented at his preliminary hearing, Young argued that racial profiling in a traffic stop led to his arrest for possession of Ecstasy for sale. He cited statistics showing that, statewide, blacks are more likely to be searched during traffic stops than others. He sought discovery relating to charging decisions for the past five years concerning others who were charged with or could have been charged with possession of Ecstasy for sale and related drug offenses. The trial court denied the motion.The court of appeal vacated. Borrowing from the minimal threshold showing that is required to trigger an obligation to provide “Pitchess” discovery (Evid. Code 1043(b), Young may claim entitlement to discovery under the Act if he makes a plausible case, based on specific facts, that any of the enumerated violations of section 745(a) could or might have occurred. The court must engage in a discretionary weighing of the strength of Young’s factual showing, the potential probative value of the information he seeks, and the burdens of gathering the requested information. View "Young v. Superior Court of Solano County" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the judgment entered on his three convictions for second-degree murder. Defendant argued the evidence supporting his convictions is insufficient because the prosecution failed to prove he acted with implied malice when, while under the influence of marijuana, he drove his car at nearly 90 miles per hour through a red light and collided with another vehicle, killing its occupants.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment and found that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The court held that although there is not yet a commonly administered and standardized medical test equivalent to the blood alcohol concentration test that accurately determines a person’s level of impairment from lipophilic, psychoactive drugs such as marijuana, there was substantial evidence that at the time of the accident Defendant was impaired from using marijuana. There was also substantial evidence that Defendant acted with implied malice both when he smoked marijuana with the intent to drive, and when he drove in a manner that demonstrated a conscious disregard for human life.Further, Defendant contended the abstract of judgment contains an error. The court directed the trial court to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment stating the sentences for Defendant’s murder convictions are to run concurrently and to forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. View "P. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Ramirez was convicted of first-degree murder (Pen. Code 187(a)) and the jury found true allegations that he committed the offense in association with a criminal street gang (186.22(b)(1)) and personally used a firearm (12022.53). In another case, Ramirez pleaded no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (245(a)(4)) and admitted that he committed the offense in association with a criminal street gang (186.22(b)(1)).On appeal, Ramirez argued that his trial counsel was prejudicially deficient in failing to object to hearsay evidence that bolstered a witness’s credibility and in failing to object and request a curative instruction when the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof during closing arguments. While his appeal was pending, Assembly Bill 333 became effective January 1, 2022, amending section 186.22 to modify the showing necessary to sustain a gang enhancement. It also added section 1109, which, upon a defendant’s request, requires the bifurcation of the trial of gang enhancement allegations from the trial of the offenses. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings concerning the gang enhancements. Amended section 186.22 applies to this case but the bifurcation provision does not apply retroactively. Ramirez’s defendant’s murder conviction remains valid. View "People v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Following a drive-by shooting, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, three counts of attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder. In Defendant's initial resentencing petition, he sought relief under SB 1437. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, the Second Appellate District reversed and remanded only Defendant's murder conviction. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for review challenging his attempted murder and conspiracy convictions in light of the passage of SB 775.On remand, the Second Appellate District affirmed Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit murder but reversed his three attempted murder convictions. Regarding Defendant's attempted murder convictions, the parties and the court agreed that SB 775 extends SB 1437 relief to Defendant. Regarding Defendant's murder conviction, the court again reversed Defendant's conviction, finding that the jury was instructed under the "natural and probable consequences doctrine," which allowed it to convict Defendant absent a finding Defendant has the intent to kill.The court rejected Defendant's claim that Cal. Penal Code Sec. 1179.95 applies to conspiracy to commit murder, noting that "the language of section 1170.95 is unambiguous. The statute does not permit a challenge to a conviction for conspiracy to murder." View "P. v. Whitson" on Justia Law

Based on a 2013 shooting, Jones was convicted of attempted murder and related charges and enhancements and was sentenced to 59 years in prison. The court of appeal upheld his convictions, first rejecting a due process challenge to a jury instruction that listed 14 factors jurors should consider when evaluating eyewitness identification evidence, including: “How certain was the witness when he or she made an identification? The court also upheld the denial of his pretrial “Pitchess” motion for discovery of information in police personnel records; the motion alleged intentional suggestiveness in the photo lineup procedures by two officers.Noting the Attorney General's agreement, the court remanded for resentencing. Jones, whose convictions are not final, is entitled to retroactive application of changes effected by Senate Bill 567, providing that, when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen term shall not exceed the middle term, unless the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances are established by the defendant’s stipulation, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or based on prior convictions, and Assembly Bill 518, which provides: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case ... under more than one provision.” View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Three men ("Defendants") were involved in a fistfight. During the fracas, one of the Defendants ("the Shooter") retrieved a gun. The Shooter missed his intended target, but several passing vehicles, including a young child. All three Defendants were charged with attempted premeditated murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. All charges contained a gang enhancement under Sec. 186.22. The jury convicted all Defendants of two counts of attempted murder and several counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. The jury also found the gang enhancements to be true.In a May 2, 2022 opinion, the Second Appellate District reversed all Defendants' gang enhancements, remanding for further proceedings. The court held that Senate Bill 333 provides a new framework for determining the applicability of the enhancement. The court affirmed the Shooter's convictions for attempted premeditated murder but reversed the other Defendant's convictions for the same. The court held that the evolving standard of aiding and abetting liability requires a retrial on these charges. The court also affirmed the non-shooting Defendant's convictions for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle.The Second Appellate District released a modified opinion replacing the court's May 22, 2022 opinion. In its modified opinion, court removed certain directives to the trial court regarding the restructuring of Defendants' sentences. View "P. v. Perez" on Justia Law

In 2001, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to annoying or molesting a child under 18 years of age. Subsequently, Petitioner was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and pedophilic disorder and involuntarily committed under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act ("MDO Act"). Upon the conclusion of Petitioner's parole, the attorney general sought to extend Petitioner's commitment by one year under the MDO Act. However, because the extension trial did not commence before her scheduled release, Petitioner was released from custody. Later, the court found continued treatment was necessary, and re-committed Petitioner. By this point, Petitioner had been out of custody and not on outpatient status for over 10 months.The question presented to the court was when Petitioner's one-year extension began. The attorney general claimed the period began upon the court's finding additional treatment was needed. Petitioner claimed the period began upon her initial release.The Fifth Appellate District determined Petitioner's one-year extension under the MDO Act began upon the termination of her previous confinement. View "Myers v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Islas, charged with misdemeanor DUI (Veh. Code 23152(a) and (b)), moved for pretrial diversion under Penal Code section 1001.95, which gives judges discretion to offer diversion to misdemeanor defendants. The trial court denied diversion based on Vehicle Code section 23640, under which DUI defendants are categorically ineligible for diversion. The trial court’s appellate division denied mandate relief. The court of appeal stayed trial court proceedings and issued an order to show cause then denied the petition for writ of mandate. Misdemeanor DUI defendants are categorically ineligible from Penal Code section 1001.95 diversion by operation of Vehicle Code section 23640. View "Islas v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law