Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing following an evidentiary hearing. He contended there was insufficient evidence he acted with reckless indifference to human life when he participated in a brutal “takeover” robbery/murder. The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s petition for resentencing following an evidentiary hearing. The court held that there is no miscarriage of justice because Defendant suffered no prejudice by the court’s consideration of any hearsay evidence.   The court reasoned that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Defendant was a major participant because he saw the events, heard the shots, and ran from the bank, passing the victim’s body as she lay on the sidewalk.   The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. In looking at the totality of the circumstances the court considered several factors such as the duration of the crime; Defendant’s knowledge of the killer’s propensity to kill; and Defendant’s efforts to minimize the possibility of violence during the crime.   Finally, Senate Bill No. 775 does not have any impact on the outcome of the appeal. First, there was no objection to the presentence report which contained hearsay, there was no evidentiary “bombshell” crucial to the People’s case in the report, and there is nothing unfavorable to Defendant in any hearsay documents that the trial court did not already know from the other admissible evidence. View "P. v. Owens" on Justia Law

Sara, an elderly woman, owned the property and resided there with her husband, who has dementia. San Mateo County informed Sara that she owed taxes and faced foreclosure. Miller, a real estate salesperson, contacted Sara and offered to secure a reverse mortgage to pay Sara’s tax obligation. Miller provided Sara with a document to sign. Sara believed the document was to secure a $500,000 reverse mortgage and that after she signed, Miller would pay the taxes. Sara did not read the document but signed it. The document was actually a purchase agreement. A deed transferring the property to Rex was recorded the same day. The District Attorney’s Office notified Sara of the sale. Lion had purchased the property from Rex. Miller pled no contest to unlawfully and knowingly procuring and offering a false or forged instrument to be filed in a state public office and grand theft of the property. Lion filed a quiet title action.The state moved to void the deed to Rex. The court determined the deed was forged and that the matter was appropriately addressed in the criminal proceeding. The court of appeal affirmed the adjudication of the deed as void from its inception, rejecting arguments that Miller’s no contest plea “was not an adjudication of the alleged falsity or forgery” of the deed, that the finding was not supported by the record, and the court should have deferred to the pending quiet title action. View "People v. Miller" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ruben Elias was awaiting trial on charges arising from several alleged incidents of domestic violence that occurred in March and April 2020, during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. In early March 2020, the Governor of California declared a state of emergency in California, and the President declared a national emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on health recommendations, the Chief Justice of the State of California issued statewide emergency orders suspending in-person jury trials and, among other things, extending statutory deadlines for trials in criminal proceedings. The Presiding Judge of the San Diego Superior Court issued a general order in April 2020 closing courtrooms and extending the time period provided in Penal Code section 1382 for holding criminal trials. Elias was arraigned on May 13, 2020 and the court held him to answer the charges against him on May 27, 2020. He was arraigned on the information in June 2020, and on an amended information in August 2020. His trial was initially set in October 2020, but it was continued several times until June 2021 based on the COVID-19 general orders and instances when Elias was in medical isolation. After the trial court granted two additional trial continuances on June 24 and July 6, 2021, and denied his motion to dismiss on August 9, 2021, Elias filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus contending the court violated his right to a speedy trial pursuant to section 1382 and the federal Constitution. "Given the unique and unprecedented circumstances caused by the global public health emergency, courts must exercise their inherent power to manage and prioritize their cases to work through the backlog. The record before us shows the court did just that." Construing the petition as a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition requesting dismissal of the case for violation of Elias’ speedy trial right, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause to grant the continuances or in denying Elias’s motion to dismiss. It, therefore, denied his petition for relief. View "Elias v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Respondent Michael Watkins, Jr., and a codefendant were charged with second degree robbery and two counts of identity theft based on purchases they allegedly made at a Best Buy store in Los Angeles County. At Watkins’s preliminary hearing, the State presented evidence that the victims’ wallets had been stolen from parked cars in Orange County, and that later that day, two men had used the victims’ credit cards at a Best Buy in West Covina to purchase laptop computers; a detective had identified Watkins as one of those men based on a still shot taken from Best Buy’s surveillance video. A magistrate refused to hold Watkins to answer, finding there was insufficient evidence to establish that Watkins had taken the wallets from the vehicles or committed any other relevant act in Orange County that would support venue in Orange County Superior Court. The State moved to reinstate the complaint, asserting the magistrate had erroneously dismissed the complaint as a matter of law. The trial court denied the motion, and the State appealed that ruling. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed: the State presented no evidence that Watkins was in any way involved in taking the wallets from the vehicles; venue in Orange County was therefore inappropriate. View "California v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. ("Surety") provided a $100,000 bail bond for a criminal defendant who failed to appear in court as required. The court declared a forfeiture of the bond under Penal Code section 13051 and Surety failed to vacate the forfeiture within the statutorily specified appearance period. Accordingly, the trial court entered summary judgment against Surety in the amount of the bond and court costs.Surety appealed from the denial of its motion to set aside the summary judgment on the forfeited bond. It argued the trial court prematurely entered summary judgment because an emergency rule adopted by the Judicial Council in response to the Covid-19 pandemic (Emergency Rule 9), which tolled “the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action,” also tolled the appearance period for vacating forfeitures of bail bonds.The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order and denied Surety's motion to set aside the summary judgment on the forfeited bond. The court held that the appearance period is not a statute of limitations subject to tolling under Emergency Rule 9. The court reasoned that a motion to set aside bail forfeiture, in which a surety may assert defenses in an existing forfeiture proceeding, is not a pleading that commences a cause of action or special proceeding. View "P. v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant Jeremy Nance was found not guilty by reason of insanity of sexual battery and committed to Atascadero State Hospital. Defendant’s term of commitment has been extended several times under Penal Code section 1026.5. He appealed the trial court’s denial of his application for outpatient treatment pursuant to section 1026.2. After hearing defendant’s evidence, the trial court granted the State's motion for a “directed verdict,” finding defendant “could be a danger to the health and safety of others due to a mental defect, disease, or disorder if under supervision and treatment in the community.” On appeal to the Court of Appeal, defendant contended the court erred by weighing the evidence on a motion for directed verdict. Because the trial court was the fact finder, and therefore entitled to weigh the evidence, the appellate court affirmed the denial of defendant’s application. View "California v. Nance" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Rodrigo Fuentes, Jr. was convicted by jury of two crimes: (1) fleeing a police officer while driving with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property (wanton disregard while fleeing); and (2) resisting a police officer. He raised an issue of first impression by contending that the latter crime was a lesser included offense of the former. The Court of Appeal held that resisting a police officer was not a lesser included offense of wanton disregard while fleeing. The Court rejected his other contentions (except for a custody calculation issue the parties agreed on) and affirmed. View "California v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

Defendant Kejhonne Henderson shot and killed J.P. at a house party in the North Highlands neighborhood of Sacramento. Defendant wounded another. A jury found defendant guilty of one count of second degree murder, and one count of attempted murder, and found true enhancement allegations that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death as to each count. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve an aggregate determinate term of seven years plus an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 65 years to life. Defendant appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that a trial court may not excuse for cause African-American prospective jurors solely because of their belief that the criminal justice system treats African-Americans unfairly, but rejected defendant’s assertion that the two African-American prospective jurors here were excused for that reason. “They were excused because the trial court concluded that, based on the voir dire evidence, they could not be impartial because of their bias and sympathy for defendant.” In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected defendant’s other claims of error except to a firearm enhancement: the conviction was affirmed but the matter remanded for the trial court to consider to exercise its discretion to strike the enhancement and impose instead something lesser. View "California v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Defendant Fernando Lopez was convicted by jury of premeditated attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In challenging his convictions, Lopez raises two related contentions: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial; and (2) the court’s decision to admit what Lopez referred to as “gang evidence” was an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 because, he claimed, the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. After full briefing on appeal was completed in this matter, Lopez sought leave to file two supplemental briefs in which he contended his sentence should have been vacated and the case remanded for resentencing in light of recent ameliorative changes to two different sentencing schemes applicable to his case. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded neither of Lopez’s arguments appealing his convictions had merit. However, the Court agreed that he was entitled to resentencing given the recent changes in the law, which the parties agreed applied retroactively to nonfinal cases. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant Mark Forester pled guilty to one count felony stalking, and was found guilty of five counts of disobeying a domestic violence restraining order. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Forester on felony probation for a period of three years. Forester appealed the judgment, contending Penal Code section 1203.1 (a) precluded the court from imposing a probation term in excess of two years. The Court of Appeal determined that because Forester was found guilty of stalking a victim of domestic violence, the two-year felony probation limitation in section 1203.1(a) did not apply. View "California v. Forester" on Justia Law