Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this habeas corpus petition is the applicability of Defendant's Sec 12022.53 firearm enhancement and the trial judge's discretion in striking the enhancement. Defendant appealed, claiming the trial judge abused its discretion in applying the enhancement and sought relief under Senate Bill 624.The Second Appellate District affirmed Defendant's firearm enhancement under Sec 12022.53, finding the trial court properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors and did not abuse its discretion. Further, Defendant was not entitled to relief under Senate Bill 624, because it is not retroactive in application. View "P. v. Pineda" on Justia Law

Defendant was a known gang member. While police officers were surveying Defendant's home, they observed what they believed to be a narcotics transition as Defendant handed an unknown package to the occupants of a vehicle. The officers stopped the vehicle containing the alleged buyers, recovering cash, narcotics, and illegal firearms. Officers then obtained a warrant to search Defendant's home. Police recovered a cell phone containing videos of Defendant ordering the assaults of minors so they could be "jumped" into his gang. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress and Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and two counts of solicitation or recruitment of another person to participate in a criminal gang.The Second Appellate affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the warrant relied upon to search Defendant's home established probable cause. The warrant affidavit supports the officers' belief that they had witnessed a narcotics or illegal weapons transaction. The visit was three to five minutes long and was consistent with a pick-up or drop-off. Additionally, the location was a known gang hangout.The court also rejected Defendant's claim that the warrant affidavit was stale because it omitted the dates of Defendant's prior convictions. The dates of Defendant's convictions were immaterial based on the other evidence of Defendant's gang membership. View "P. v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Christopher Parra Martinez appealed a Superior Court’s decision not to strike two personal firearm use enhancements imposed pursuant to California Penal Code sections 12022.5 and 12022.53. The firearm enhancement provisions set forth in sections 12022.5 and 12055.53 were amended effective January 1, 2018 upon the passage of Senate Bill No. 620. (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2017, ch. 682.) The Court of Appeal found the trial court record demonstrated that the trial court considered the appropriate circumstances and exercised its discretion in a reasonable manner when it declined to strike the firearm enhancements imposed at the time of defendant’s sentencing. Therefore, it found no reversible error in the trial court's decision not to strike the enhancement. View "California v. Parra Martinez" on Justia Law

Three men ("Defendants") were involved in a fistfight. During the fracas, one of the Defendants ("the Shooter") retrieved a gun. The Shooter missed his intended target, but several passing vehicles, including a young child. All three Defendants were charged with attempted premeditated murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. All charges contained a gang enhancement under Sec. 186.22. The jury convicted all Defendants of two counts of attempted murder and several counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. The jury also found the gang enhancements to be true.The Second Appellate District reversed all Defendants' gang enhancements, remanding for further proceedings. The court held that Senate Bill 333 provides a new framework for determining the applicability of the enhancement. The court affirmed the Shooter's convictions for attempted premeditated murder but reversed the other Defendant's convictions for the same. The court held that the evolving standard of aiding and abetting liability requires a retrial on these charges. The court also affirmed the non-shooting Defendant's convictions for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. View "P. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the juvenile court’s April 13, 2021 order awarding restitution. He contended the juvenile court lacked authority to hold a restitution hearing five years after his sentencing hearing, and the delay was prejudicial. He also claimed parts of the restitution awards to two sets of victims were erroneous.The Second Appellate District affirmed the Superior Court’s restitution order requiring Defendant to pay restitution. The court held that the juvenile court had the authority to hold the restitution and Defendant has not shown prejudice due to the delay in holding the restitution hearing. The court reasoned that Defendant agreed the amount of restitution could be determined at a future date by the probation officer and Defendant failed to provide a record cite showing that he contended at the restitution hearing that the allegation involving a specific victim had not been adjudicated or admitted, or that he argued she was not a proper person to receive restitution. Further, while some of the victims provided testimony that differed from their earlier written accounts of stolen items, Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on all aspects of their testimony, including their memories. Thus, the juvenile court was in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses, including any express or implied claims that their memories were accurate. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Christopher Whitmore was convicted by jury of rape, false imprisonment, and other crimes. After trial, Whitmore made a motion under California v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970) to replace his appointed counsel; he also moved for a new trial. Because of circumstances related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Whitmore was not physically present in the courtroom when the trial court heard those motions in late December 2020; instead, Whitmore reluctantly appeared via video for the hearing and at sentencing. The court denied Whitmore’s motions and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. On appeal, Whitmore contended the trial court erred in overruling his demand to be personally present in the courtroom for the hearing on his posttrial motions and at sentencing. He also contended the court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion, and that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for false imprisonment. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "California v. Whitmore" on Justia Law

San Francisco brought civil actions, alleging the defendants are street-level drug dealers whose drug-dealing activities in the Tenderloin neighborhood create a public nuisance (Civ. Code, 3479, 3480) and violate the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200, UCL). The city sought preliminary injunctions that would prohibit the defendants from entering a 50-block exclusion zone. Defendants acknowledged the Tenderloin area is “facing a drug-related health crisis.”The trial court denied the motions, finding that a stay-away order—as opposed to an injunction prohibiting certain conduct—is not an authorized remedy under either statute, and that even assuming stay-away orders are available statutory remedies, the specific injunctive relief requested would be constitutionally impermissible in these cases. The court determined that excluding defendants from such a large area in the center of San Francisco implicated the constitutional right to intrastate travel and the city failed to establish that its proposed remedy was sufficiently tailored to minimally infringe upon the protected interests at stake. The court of appeal affirmed. While a stay-away order could be a potential remedy for a public nuisance or unfair business practice in an appropriate case, the city failed to show that the proposed stay-away orders are sufficiently tailored to pass constitutional muster based on the evidentiary record. View "People v. Padilla-Martel" on Justia Law

Yang was charged after he struck his father in the head with a flashlight and kicked a juvenile down the stairs. On April 9, 2018, the trial court suspended proceedings, finding Yang incompetent to stand trial, and committed him to the Department of State Hospitals. On August 7, 2019, the state hospital’s medical director certified that Yang was competent to stand trial; he was returned to the county jail. The court reinstated criminal proceedings. Yang pled no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The court imposed a four-year sentence, suspended its execution, and placed Yang on probation.After six petitions for revocation of probation, the court executed the previously-imposed sentence. The probation department recommended he receive only actual time credit and no conduct credit for the time he spent receiving competency treatment in Napa State Hospital. Yang argued, on equal protection grounds, that because Penal Code section 4019(a)(8) had been amended to permit conduct credit for defendants found to be incompetent to stand trial who received competency treatment in county jail treatment facilities, he should receive conduct credit for the time he spent at Napa. The trial court rejected the argument. The court of appeal remanded for resentencing. Yang must be afforded the same opportunity for presentence conduct credit received by defendants receiving competency treatment at a county facility. View "People v. Yang" on Justia Law

The issue presented by this appeal was whether youthful offenders who are statutorily ineligible for early parole consideration were nevertheless entitled to a "Franklin" proceeding to preserve evidence for their eventual parole hearing. During his early 20’s, appellant was involved in three separate criminal incidents. s a result of those incidents, appellant was convicted of kidnapping for robbery and multiple counts of robbery, burglary, false imprisonment and illegal gun possession. He was also found to have personally used a firearm during the offenses and suffered a prior strike conviction. The trial court sentenced him to 59 years to life in prison under the “Three Strikes” law. In 2020, appellant requested a Franklin proceeding to present mitigation evidence in anticipation of his youth offender parole hearing (YOPH). However, the trial court correctly determined appellant was not eligible for a YOPH because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law. Therefore, it denied his request for a Franklin proceeding. Appellant admitted he was statutorily ineligible for a YOPH because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law. However, he contended he is entitled to a YOPH – and a concomitant Franklin proceeding – as a matter of equal protection. Although the Court of Appeal rejected appellant’s equal protection argument, both parties concluded he was entitled to a Franklin proceeding under the standard rules applicable to all parole hearings. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for such a proceeding. View "California v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jaime Lopez was convicted by jury of the first degree murder of Reginold Harry. The jury found true a special circumstance allegation that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of life without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed a trial court order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, contending he made a prima facie case for relief by showing it was possible the jury had convicted him of felony murder and found the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation to be true without finding he was the victim’s actual killer. The Court of Appeal found the term “actual killer” as used in the revised felony-murder rule of Penal Code section 189 (e)(1) referred to someone who personally killed the victim and was not necessarily the same as a person who “caused” the victim’s death. Under this meaning of actual killer, it was possible for the jury to have found defendant guilty of felony murder, and found to be true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, without finding defendant was the actual killer. Defendant therefore met his burden of making a prima facie case for relief under section 1170.95. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing and remanded with directions to the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law