Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of robbery. On his initial appeal, Defendant raised several issues, each of which was rejected. Defendant subsequently filed a habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. This, too, was denied. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing, requesting the court order a resentencing hearing under then then-newly-passed AB 124.AB 124 provides that the court shall impose the lower term if a defendant, among other things, “experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence” and this contributed to the commission of the offense.The Fifth Appellate District found AB 124 applies retroactively to non-final cases that are still on direct appeal. Further, the court held that Defendant presented a plausible AB 124 claim and, although the record was unclear regarding the trial court’s treatment of his psychological trauma, a resentencing was proper. Defendant’s convictions were otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Banner" on Justia Law

In 2017, Joanne Slaieh filed a divorce action against her husband, Nabeel Slaieh. A few years later, while the action was still pending, Nabeel was arrested on allegations of stalking and making criminal threats against Joanne, resulting in the opening of a criminal case against him. When Nabeel subsequently sought to depose Joanne in the divorce action, Joanne objected, citing a victim’s right under California's Marsy’s Law to refuse being interviewed or deposed by the defendant. Nabeel responded by filing a motion to compel her deposition, arguing Marsy’s Law applied to criminal proceedings only. After a hearing on the issue, the trial judge agreed with Joanne and denied Nabeel’s motion to compel. Nabeel filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to vacate the trial judge’s order and conclude the right to refuse a deposition contained in article I, section 28, subdivision (b)(5) of the California Constitution did not apply to a civil action like a marriage dissolution proceeding. He argued the text of Marsy’s Law made clear its protections applied in criminal proceedings only. To this the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore granted the petition. View "Slaieh v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Accredited Surety and Casualty Company, Inc. (Accredited) posted a $75,000 bail bond for the release of Jesus Perez. The trial court increased the amount of the bail to $165,000 after the State added two more counts and a firearm-use allegation to the complaint, and Perez was remanded to the custody of the sheriff. Accredited then executed a bail bond in the amount of $90,000 for Perez (the difference between the previously posted $75,000 bail bond and the new bail amount of $165,000), securing Perez’s release from custody. The two bonds were declared forfeited when Perez did not appear at a trial readiness conference. Accredited appealed that portion of the trial court’s order denying its motion to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the $90,000 bond, and the subsequently entered summary judgment. The County of Tehama (County) cross-appealed that portion of the trial court’s order granting Accredited’s motion as to the $75,000 bond. The County contended: (1) that to the extent the trial court’s order was based on Penal Code section 1305, the statute did not apply; (2) exoneration of the $75,000 bond made it voidable, not void; and (3) Accredited ratified the $75,000 bond, it was then equitably estopped from challenging the validity of the $75,000 bond, and it waived any objection to the trial court’s jurisdiction over the bonds. Accredited argued: (4) the trial court erred in denying its motion to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail as to the $90,000 bond because the posting of a bond in an amount different from that ordered by the trial court did not create a valid contract. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the trial court properly determined that the $75,000 bond was exonerated; (2) the authorities the County cites did not support the claim that the $75,000 bond was voidable and not void; (3) the County could not raise a claim of ratification, equitable estoppel or waiver for the first time on appeal; and (4) no valid bail contract was formed with the issuance of the $90,000 bail bond. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the $90,000 bond, and reversed the resulting summary judgment. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the $75,000 bond. View "California v. Accredited Surety & Casualty" on Justia Law

During Defendant’s murder trial, the prosecution used five of its eight peremptory challenges to remove Black women from the jury panel. Defense counsel raised a Batson challenge at trial. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The court accepted the prosecution’s proffered reasons for the use of its peremptory challenges. Defendant was convicted and appealed.When the trial court requires the prosecution to place its reasons for exercising peremptory challenges on the record, an appellate court skips the first two steps of the Batson analysis and goes straight to considering the credibility of the prosecution’s stated reasons and whether the record as a whole reveals a discriminatory motive for removing even a single prospective juror.The court found that there was no valid basis to strike at least one of the Black women. Moreover, there were several reasons why the struck panel member should have been an “ideal juror” from the prosecution’s perspective. The prosecutor’s stated reason for striking the juror “didn’t hold up" and appeared to be based on impermissible discrimination. View "P. v. Salinas" on Justia Law

Defendant Woody McMurray appealed a trial court’s denial of a recommendation made by the Secretary (Secretary) of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) under former Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) that the trial court consider recalling defendant’s sentence and resentencing him in light of changes made to section 12022.53. Defendant contended the trial court’s denial of resentencing without notice or the appointment of counsel violated his constitutional rights and was reversible error. While defendant’s appeal was pending, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, sections 1-7) came into effect on January 1, 2022, and moved the recall and resentencing provisions of former section 1170(d)(1) to new section 1170.03. Assembly Bill 1540 also clarified the Legislature’s intent regarding procedural requirements and the provision’s application to “ameliorative laws . . . that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion, regardless of the date of the offense of conviction.” In addition, where requests for recall and resentencing are made, Assembly Bill 1540 added a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing. To the change in the law, Defendant argued: (1) Assembly Bill 1540 constituted a clarification of existing law and applied to cases involving the interpretation of former section 1170(d)(1); and (2) Assembly Bill 1540 applies retroactively to his case. The State argued Assembly Bill 1540 was not retroactive, but acknowledged, however, that in the interest of judicial economy, that the Court of Appeal may reverse the trial court’s order and remand for new proceedings under section 1170.03. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that Assembly Bill 1540 applied to his case because it is a clarification of former section 1170(d)(1), so it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "P. v. McMurray" on Justia Law

The ex-girlfriend of defendant Johnathan Kiger testified that he got drunk and started an argument with her. During the argument, he slapped her, pushed her head against a car, dragged her by the leg, and finally strangled her into unconsciousness. There was evidence that defendant had committed three prior assaults: one on the same girlfriend and two on previous girlfriends. The assaults on the previous girlfriends had resulted in a conviction in 2009 for domestic battery and in 2016 for attempted domestic battery. At a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of domestic battery with a prior, and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, each with a domestic violence great bodily injury enhancement. One “strike” prior, and one prior serious felony conviction enhancement, were found true. Defendant was sentenced to a total of 16 years in prison, along with the fines, fees, and ancillary orders. On appeal, defendant contended there was insufficient evidence of domestic battery with a prior because his only sufficiently recent prior conviction was for an attempt, not for a completed crime. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by finding defendant guilty of domestic battery with a prior when his only relevant prior conviction was for attempted domestic battery. In the unpublished portion, the Court rejected defendant’s other contentions. Accordingly, the judgment was modified and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Kiger" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal agreed with petitioner that he established a prima facie claim for resentencing relief pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the petition without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing. In this case, neither the charge nor the plea excludes petitioner from resentencing eligibility as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remanded to the trial court to issue an order to show cause and to conduct further proceedings as required under section 1170.95, subdivision (d). View "People v. Flores" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Kelley, III and the victim, L.S., were dated and lived together for two years and had a child together. When the relationship ended, L.S. obtained a domestic violence restraining order against defendant. He violated the order repeatedly. In one of several consolidated cases, defendant was charged with felony stalking. He pled guilty and the charges in the other consolidated cases were dismissed. The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years in state prison, imposed fines and fees, and issued a criminal protective order. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing certain fines and fees despite his inability to pay, and this violated his right to due process under California v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019); and (2) the criminal protective order was unconstitutionally vague because its stay-away provision did not specify that he not do so “knowingly.” In a supplemental briefing, defendant argued (3) he was entitled to resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., Senate Bill 567). In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded it did not have to modify the criminal protective order because the requirement that defendant not “knowingly” come within 400 yards of L.S. was implicit in the order. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court agreed with both parties that Senate Bill 567 applied retroactively to defendant’s case, and that the matter had to be remanded for resentencing in compliance with the Bill. Because the case was remanded for resentencing, defendant’s claims concerning the trial court’s imposition of fines and fees and Dueñas were deemed moot and were not addressed. View "California v. Kelley" on Justia Law

By passing Proposition 83 (Jessica's Law), voters intended to continue to classify the crime of possession of child pornography as a "wobbler" so that juvenile courts could continue to declare it as either a felony or a misdemeanor.In this case, H.N., a minor, appeals an order of the juvenile court sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition with a finding that he possessed child pornography. The Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court erred by not making an express finding per Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 whether the Penal Code section 311.11, subdivision (a) offense was a felony or a misdemeanor. The court struck the maximum turn of confinement finding H.N. was placed on home probation and remanded to the juvenile court to make a finding whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor. The court otherwise affirmed. View "In re H.N." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second degree robbery and assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to eight years in prison, but the execution of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on five years of formal probation. The trial court also imposed a 10-year protective order pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1).The Court of Appeal concluded that the postconviction protective order pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) must be vacated and that a remand for resentencing is warranted in light of the passage of Senate Bill 567 and Assembly Bill 124 while this appeal was pending. The court otherwise affirmed defendant's conviction, rejecting defendant's claims of instructional error, violation of her constitutional rights, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law