Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions for two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child. In the published portion of the opinion, the court concluded that the trial court had discretion under Penal Code section 667.61, subdivisions (c) and (i), to impose concurrent sentences. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's sentences and directed the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences on those convictions. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

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In 2001, a jury convicted defendant-appellant Yolanda Harden of murdering 85-year-old Alfred P. during a residential burglary and robbery. The Court of Appeal affirmed her conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances in a partially published opinion. Among other things, the previous case rejected a claim of instructional error because there was no evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that Harden was an aider and abettor. "Harden I" concluded, “a rational jury could not reasonably infer that . . . any person other than Harden[] was Alfred’s actual killer.” Twenty years later, Harden claims she did not kill anyone, but merely “crept in and stole” property, Harden filed a petition to vacate her conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court, which did not have the benefit of the California Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in California v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (2021), denied the petition on the grounds that her claim was “completely inconsistent” with the facts recited in Harden I. The Court of Appeal affirmed, but on slightly different reasoning. In reviewing the record of conviction at the prima facie stage, a trial court was not permitted to engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” The relevant inquiry at this stage was not whether factual findings recited in the prior appellate opinion were inconsistent with the petitioner’s claims. "Rather, the key question is whether legal determinations in the prior opinion refute those claims as a matter of law." The Court found Harden I conclusively established as law of the case that Harden’s first degree murder conviction was based on a theory that she was the actual killer. Because, as the actual killer, she would still be convicted of first degree murder even under recent amendments to the murder statutes that narrowed liability for the crime, the trial court correctly denied her 1170.95 petition without issuing an order to show cause. View "California v. Harden" on Justia Law

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Based on a 2019 incident, Tan was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI). Effective January 1, 2021, Penal Code section 1001.95, made defendants charged with misdemeanors generally eligible for diversion at the discretion of the trial judge. The law expressly exempts several offenses from eligibility for diversion, but DUI is not one of them. However, Vehicle Code section 23640, provides that those charged with DUI are categorically ineligible for diversion. Tan sought diversion, arguing that section 1001.95 superseded Vehicle Code section 23640.The court of appeal upheld the denial of his petition. The two statutes can be reconciled and misdemeanor DUI convictions are not eligible for statutory diversion. Nothing in section 1001.95 indicates an affirmative intent to allow misdemeanor diversion for DUIs and Vehicle Code section 23640 clearly prohibits it; reconciling the two does not require rewriting the statutes, or striking a compromise the Legislature itself did not reach. The court noted that the scant legislative history was particularly ambiguous in this case and of little assistance in divining the will of the Legislature. View "Tan v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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In 2008, defendant Hector Pacheco and other gang members "jumped" two people: one victim died, the other survived. A jury found Pacheco guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor, attempted murder, and gang participation. The jury also found true a gang special circumstance sentencing enhancement. In 2019, Pacheco filed a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition seeking to vacate his murder conviction. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. On appeal, the Attorney General argued the jury’s true finding on the gang special circumstance instruction made Pacheco ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court found the trial court instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences theory, which was no longer a valid theory of murder liability. "While the gang special circumstance instruction told the jurors they needed to find Pacheco had the requisite intent to kill (the mens rea), the instruction did not require the jurors to find that Pacheco directly aided and abetted the target crime of murder (the actus reus). Therefore, without weighing the evidence, the jury’s true finding on the gang special circumstance does not conclusively establish Pacheco could be found guilty of murder under current law (that he had the intent to kill, and he directly aided and abetted the target crime of murder)." The Court reversed the trial court’s summary denial of Pacheco’s section 1170.95 petition. On remand, the court was directed to issue an order to show cause (OSC) and to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to the murder charge. View "California v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to vacate his 1989 conviction by no contest plea to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), on the basis that he did not understand the immigration consequences of the plea. The court agreed with the trial court's findings that defendant's declarations were self-serving and not credible. In this case, the evidence does not support defendant's assertions that his attorney did not inquire about his immigration status or advise him of the adverse consequences of his plea, or that defendant himself did not believe that the District Attorney's advisement applied to him. Furthermore, defendant knew he had temporary resident status that would soon expire and an upcoming appointment to obtain permanent resident status that he would necessarily miss if incarcerated. The court also concluded that defendant has not established that it is reasonably probable that he would not have pleaded no contest to robbery with use of a deadly weapon if he was certain that it was a deportable offense. View "People v. Diaz" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a pause in a criminal jury trial due to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic violated an accused’s due process right to a fair trial. Here, the prosecution nearly completed its case-in-chief against Defendant-appellant John Breceda when the trial court paused proceedings on March 16, 2020, because three of the 14 jurors were ill. Breceda refused to waive time and refused to proceed with 11 jurors. The trial court denied his motion for a mistrial and continued the case. Beginning that day, and for months after, the COVID-19 pandemic caused California officials to issue a series of orders to continue to provide essential government services, safeguard constitutional rights, and protect people from a "mysterious, contagious, and deadly virus." The effect of some of those orders was jury trials could not proceed. Seventy-two days after the trial court paused proceedings, the court denied Breceda’s second motion for a mistrial. Trial resumed the following day. The prosecution completed its case-in-chief, and Breceda testified. The jury acquitted Breceda of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder and arson of another’s property. Breceda argued on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his mistrial motions because the pause in his jury trial due to the COVID-19 pandemic violated his due process right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeal disagreed: "Although the pause in the trial was lengthy, 10 weeks, Breceda’s constitutional rights were not set aside and forgotten. ... the record demonstrates the court remained appropriately focused on Breceda’s constitutional rights during the onset of an unprecedented global health crisis." Judgment was thus affirmed. View "California v. Breceda" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Taylor Pixley appealed the denial of his petition seeking resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91, which allowed a person convicted of a felony who may have certain kinds of trauma as a result of his or her military service to petition for resentencing. The trial court ruled that section 1170.91 did not apply to a person who pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that provided for a stipulated sentence. Petitioner argued the language of section 1170.91(b), which allowed “[a] person currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea” to petition meant that the existence of a plea agreement could never bar resentencing. He also argued that, if the petition were granted, the trial court could withdraw its approval of the plea agreement. The Court of Appeal disagreed on both points, and affirmed the trial court. View "California v. Pixley" on Justia Law

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On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency in response to the global outbreak of COVID-19, On March 16, the San Francisco Health Officer issued a shelter-in-place order. On March 23, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye issued an emergency statewide order suspending jury trials and continuing them for 60 days, extending by 60 days the speedy trial time period provided for in Penal Code section 1382 for holding a criminal trial. The order was later extended an additional 30 days. In December, in response to the surge in COVID-19 cases, the San Francisco health officer issued another stay-at-home order. After trials resumed, there were backlogs and trials were continued beyond the statutory deadlines. Defendants alleged violations of their speedy trial rightsThe court of appeal declined to order dismissal of their cases. The continuances were supported by good cause. In making a determination of good cause based on reasons of court congestion or backlog, the critical inquiry is whether the congestion or backlog is attributable to chronic conditions as opposed to exceptional circumstances considering all of the relevant circumstances. The District Attorney adequately showed exceptional circumstances connected to the COVID-19 pandemic, not chronic conditions in the court. View "Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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After a police officer found him asleep in his car with a bag of methamphetamine and a loaded gun at his feet, a jury convicted defendant-appellant Daniel Gonzalez of possession of a controlled substance while armed, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. On appeal, Gonzalez challenged the constitutionality of Health and Safety Code section 11370.1, arguing the provision violated the Second Amendment by restricting a nonviolent offender’s right to possess firearms. The Court of Appeal concluded the argument lacked merit and affirmed. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

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Defendants Elijah and Michael Rodriguez, two brothers, were jointly tried and convicted of actively participating in a criminal street gang and gang-related, premeditated attempted murder plus attendant crimes and enhancements. The Court of Appeal concluded, and the People concede, that Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively and requires the court to reverse the active participation gang crime and the gang-related crime findings. The court also found merit in two of Elijah's evidentiary claims, and concluded that the record in his case insufficiently proved his precise role in the crime, substantially undermining the personal infliction and personal use enhancements. The court concluded that defendants' remaining claims lacked merit. The court reversed the conviction in count 4; vacated the section 186.22, subdivision (b), enhancements on all counts; struck Elijah's section 12022.5 and section 12022.7 enhancements; and affirmed the remaining convictions and findings. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law