Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The victim was listening to earphones and looking at his cell phone while walking. He saw individuals with bicycles outside of a 7-Eleven. Minutes later, someone tapped him on one side while another individual, on a bicycle on the other side, grabbed his cell phone. The victim chased and tackled him. After the victim released the thief, someone punched the victim. The victim was surrounded by three individuals in hoodies who were yelling at him. The victim’s boss arrived on the scene; the three left. Police quickly arrested three minors with bicycles: Kevin, age 15, Angel, who had the cell phone in his backpack, and Armando. The victim identified Angel as having taken his phone, and Armando as having punched him. The victim had trouble identifying Kevin.A juvenile wardship petition alleged that Kevin committed second-degree robbery. The victim identified Kevin in court and recalled seeing Kevin among the people at the 7- Eleven and as one of the people who yelled at him after he tackled Angel. The victim otherwise had no clear memory of Kevin. He did not know whether Kevin was there when his phone was taken. The juvenile court sustained the petition, finding that Kevin had aided and abetted the robbery. The court of appeal reversed. The determination was not supported by substantial evidence. View "In re K.M." on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Jody Ann Clements of second degree murder in 1990 after the trial judge instructed them on both natural and probable consequences and implied malice theories of murder. In 2018, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of murder to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Legislature also added a new provision which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment if they could not be sustained under the amended definition of murder. Clements filed a petition arguing she was convicted of second degree murder under a natural and probable consequences theory and could not be convicted under the current law. After a hearing, at which the parties agreed to limit the evidence to the record of conviction, the trial judge looked to the Court of Appeals' decision in Clements’ original appeal and other portions of the record of conviction and made two alternative determinations that: (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Clements could have been convicted of second degree murder under an implied malice theory; and (2) Clements in fact committed implied malice second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge therefore denied her petition. Clements argued the trial judge erred by considering the Court of Appeal's opinion in her original appeal, by misconstruing the nature of the eligibility determination it was required to make under the new statute, and by denying her petition in the absence of substantial evidence supporting a finding of implied malice. The Court of Appeal held an appellate opinion was part of the record of conviction and could be relied on in deciding a section 1170.95 petition on the merits, so the trial judge did not err in doing so in this case. The Court also held the trial judge sits as a fact finder at a hearing under section 1170.95(d), and that substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements committed implied malice second degree murder. The Court again affirmed the trial court's order denying Clements' petition. View "California v. Clements" on Justia Law

Sanchez was convicted of attempted murder and assault with a firearm after his acquaintance fired a shotgun during a confrontation with other men. To prove attempted murder, the prosecutor argued Sanchez directly aided and abetted the shooter and, alternatively, that attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence of assault with a firearm. The appellate court previously reversed, holding that the evidence sufficiently proved attempted murder and the natural and that the probable consequences doctrine did not violate due process, but, pursuant to SB 1437, the natural and probable consequences doctrine no longer attached accomplice liability to attempted murder. Before the resolution of an appeal by the Supreme Court, SB 775 was enacted, clarifying SB 1437 by amending section 1170.95 to make clear the natural and probable consequences doctrine no longer supplies accomplice liability to attempted murder.On remand, the court of appeal again held that the evidence was sufficient to prove attempted murder, but the natural and probable consequences doctrine cannot prove an accomplice committed attempted murder. The court reversed the attempted murder conviction, stating that it was unable to conclude the jury did not rely on this now-invalid theory. View "People v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In 2019, Lopez was charged with seven felonies, including forcible rape against Amalia, the mother of his minor children. At his September 2020 trial, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Los Angeles Superior Courts were operating under the safety protocols in General Order No. 021, which mandated that all persons entering any courthouse wear a face mask covering the nose and mouth at all times. After a jury trial in which all persons in the courtroom were masked, including witnesses, Lopez was convicted on six charges. The court imposed a 16-year prison sentence and a 10-year protective order prohibiting Lopez from contact with Amalia and both children.The court of appeal rejected Lopez’s argument the court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by denying his pretrial motion to remain unmasked during the trial and to have all witnesses testify without a face mask. Supreme Court precedent establishes the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” The masking procedure fairly balanced Lopez's speedy trial rights with the need to reduce the substantial risk of infection to everyone in the courtroom. The court remanded in part; the minor children were not properly included in the postconviction protective order imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2(i). View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Butler pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of ammunition and admitted to prior prison terms in exchange for five years’ probation. After Butler violated his probation terms, the trial court revoked probation in February 2020. Butler argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because he already served the maximum probation term allowed under Assembly Bill 1950, which reduced the maximum probationary term for most felony offenses to two years. The prosecution sought an opportunity to withdraw approval of the negotiated plea agreement.The court of appeal reversed and remanded for the trial court to modify the term of probation to conform with Assembly Bill No. 1950 and terminate its revocation of probation and Butler’s related prison sentence. In the context of Assembly Bill No. 1950, entering into a negotiated plea agreement does not insulate the parties from mandatory changes in the law that the legislature intended to apply to them. View "People v. Butler" on Justia Law

During the fire season, Pacheco set fire to brush in a river bed near a homeless encampment and a ranch. Pacheco told a psychologist that he lit the fire because voices in his head told him to do so, but told a probation officer he lit the fire “so he could smoke methamphetamine.” Urinalysis confirmed he was under the influence of methamphetamine.” Pacheco, age 30, reported using methamphetamine daily since the age of 16. The psychologist also diagnosed Pacheco as suffering from schizophrenia and opined that, if certain conditions are met, Pacheco “will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.” The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Pacheco on formal probation, with a condition that he serve 330 days in Ventura County Jail with credit for 325 days served. He was released to a mental health facility.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of pretrial mental health diversion for Pacheco, stating: “The safety of the community is the highest law.” The denial was properly based on the court’s finding that Pacheco posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The court vacated sentencing fees imposed contrary to Assembly Bill 1869. View "People v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

Reynoza was convicted of dissuading a witness; Penal Code 136.1(b)(2) punishes any person who attempts to prevent or dissuade a witness from “[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.” The witness was Cornejo. Cornejo and two other men—including Reynoza’s brother—had been arrested for misdemeanor firearm possession in Gilroy in February 2017. The alleged dissuasion occurred in San Jose in June 2017, after charges had been filed in Cornejo’s case. Men in Reynoza’s group outside a bar said something like, “[D]rop the charges,” and “[W]e don’t fuck with snitches.” A member of the group, Cervantes, punched Cornejo in the head. Cornejo fell to the ground and his head struck the pavement. Cornejo died soon thereafter. Cervantes was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.The court of appeal reversed Reynoza’s conviction. The words “[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought” in section 136.1(b)(2) refer to attempts to prevent a complaint from being filed. If the defendant knows a complaint has already been filed and does not attempt to prevent or dissuade the witness from causing any further or amended complaint to be filed, an essential element of the offense is missing. View "People v. Reynoza" on Justia Law

In 2007, Cortes was convicted of first-degree murder and premeditated attempted murder. In 2020, Cortes filed a petition under Senate Bill 1437 and Penal Code 1170.95,1 which provide for vacatur of a murder conviction obtained under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Cortes contended that he was never identified as the actual shooter, and the jury was instructed on aiding and abetting, which allowed it to “impute” malice to him without making a finding that Cortes personally harbored malice.The court of appeal affirmed an order denying his petition. There is no indication that the jury did not follow the court’s instructions. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences theory of liability for murder. Cortes’s mere speculation that the jurors convicted him of murder and attempted murder because he committed some other unidentified and uncharged crime, contrary to the trial court’s instructions, does not overcome the presumption that the jury properly performed its duty. The record of conviction demonstrates that Cortes was not convicted on a theory of vicarious liability; he has failed to meet his burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under section 1170.95. View "People v. Cortes" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with three counts of child pornography possession under Penal Code 311.11: count 1–violation of section 311.11(a) that includes over 600 images of child pornography, including 10 or more images of a prepubescent minor or minor under 12 years of age (311.11(c)(1)); count 2–violation of section 311.11(a) that includes sadomasochistic child or youth pornography (311.11(c)(2)); and count 3–possession of child pornography in violation of section 311.11(a). He argued that counts 1 and 2 under section 311.11(c) were not predicated on substantive offenses for which separate convictions were permitted–section 311.11(c) was an alternate penalty provision for a violation of section 311.11(a) where at least one aggravating factor exists.On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal concluded section 311.11(c) is an alternate penalty provision, not a substantive offense. As counts 1 and 2 do not state substantive offenses, they may not be separately charged pursuant to section 954. View "De La Cerda v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Larry Jackson to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the California Sexually Violent Predator Act. The trial court ordered him committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term. Jackson argued the trial court prejudicially erred by granting the prosecution’s motion to exclude Jackson’s only SVP expert witness from testifying at trial. Based on its review of the record, and applying California Supreme Court authority, the Court of Appeal held that in the context of SVP cases, in determining whether to exclude defense expert witness testimony, the trial court must consider both applicable statutory law, including relevant portions of the SVPA and the Civil Discovery Act of 2004 and the defendant’s constitutional due process right to present such evidence. Here, the trial court’s exclusion of critical defense expert testimony to rebut the testimony of the prosecution’s two expert witnesses deprived Jackson of a fair trial. The Court therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new SVP trial. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law