Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with three counts of child pornography possession under Penal Code 311.11: count 1–violation of section 311.11(a) that includes over 600 images of child pornography, including 10 or more images of a prepubescent minor or minor under 12 years of age (311.11(c)(1)); count 2–violation of section 311.11(a) that includes sadomasochistic child or youth pornography (311.11(c)(2)); and count 3–possession of child pornography in violation of section 311.11(a). He argued that counts 1 and 2 under section 311.11(c) were not predicated on substantive offenses for which separate convictions were permitted–section 311.11(c) was an alternate penalty provision for a violation of section 311.11(a) where at least one aggravating factor exists.On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal concluded section 311.11(c) is an alternate penalty provision, not a substantive offense. As counts 1 and 2 do not state substantive offenses, they may not be separately charged pursuant to section 954. View "De La Cerda v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Larry Jackson to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the California Sexually Violent Predator Act. The trial court ordered him committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term. Jackson argued the trial court prejudicially erred by granting the prosecution’s motion to exclude Jackson’s only SVP expert witness from testifying at trial. Based on its review of the record, and applying California Supreme Court authority, the Court of Appeal held that in the context of SVP cases, in determining whether to exclude defense expert witness testimony, the trial court must consider both applicable statutory law, including relevant portions of the SVPA and the Civil Discovery Act of 2004 and the defendant’s constitutional due process right to present such evidence. Here, the trial court’s exclusion of critical defense expert testimony to rebut the testimony of the prosecution’s two expert witnesses deprived Jackson of a fair trial. The Court therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new SVP trial. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After seeing Alvarez in their yard on their home security camera, the homeowners called 911. Deputies apprehended Alvarez just as he was at a side door to the house. Taking Alvarez to their patrol car, deputies noticed a large plastic trash bag and asked Alvarez whether the bag was his. Alvarez replied, “Yeah.” Deputies did not provide Alvarez with Miranda warnings before this exchange. Alvarez was convicted of first-degree residential burglary (Pen. Code 459).The court of appeal affirmed. By not properly objecting at trial, Alvarez forfeited a “Miranda” argument that the trial court erred in admitting his statement about the bag. The court also rejected Alvarez’s argument that the court’s order during the COVID-19 pandemic that all persons in the courtroom, including testifying witnesses, wear a mask covering the mouth and part of the nose interfered with the jury’s ability to assess witness demeanor and thus violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The masking order satisfied an important public policy and retained essential safeguards of reliability. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Delgado was convicted of shooting at an occupied vehicle, assault with an assault weapon, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury found true gang and firearm enhancements. The court had instructed the jury with CALCRIM 315 that an eyewitness’s degree of certainty can be considered when evaluating the reliability of the witness’s identification. The court of appeal affirmed in 2021. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of "Lemcke" (2021), in which it found that CALCRIM 315 has the potential to mislead jurors reinforcing a “common misconception" that eyewitness identification is more likely to be reliable where the witness has expressed certainty.Assembly Bill 333 became effective January 1, 2022, modifying the criminal street gang enhancement statute (Penal Code 186.22). The definition of a “criminal street gang” now requires proof that members of a gang “collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.”The court of appeal affirmed the conviction. Considering the jury instructions as a whole and the trial record, the inclusion of the witness-certainty factor did not violate Delgado’s due process rights. The court reversed the criminal street gang findings. The prosecution had to prove that two or more gang members committed each predicate offense. Proof that individual gang members committed the predicate offenses on separate occasions was insufficient to show the gang members “collectively” engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. View "People v. Delgado" on Justia Law

After Cesar, who was then 17 years old and who did not have a driver’s license, pleaded no contest to allegations of alcohol-related reckless driving, he was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation subject to conditions, including that he submit to warrantless searches for alcohol and controlled substances and attend DUI programs.The court of appeal upheld the warrantless search condition, rejecting Cesar’s argument that the condition imposed a heavy burden on his privacy with little justification. The court noted that after he started drinking alcohol at age 16, Cesar would regularly engage in binge drinking. Cesar continued to drink and purchase alcohol after the crash and his arrest. He rejected his parents’ efforts to impose limits on his conduct. The search condition is reasonably related to Cesar’s future criminality. The juvenile court could not order Cesar to pay for his attendance at the DUI-related programs, so the court erred in declining to order the probation department to pay the fees for the DUI programs Cesar was required to attend. View "In re Cesar G." on Justia Law

Defendant Danny Hampton was convicted by jury of first degree murder and on two counts of robbery. He was sentenced to an aggregate terms of 33 years to life. The jury could not reach a verdict on the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, and that allegation was dismissed on the State's motion for insufficient evidence. Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, and requested appointment of counsel. In ruling on the section 1170.95 petition, the court considered the murder-robbery jury instructions given and the State's motion to dismiss the special-circumstance allegation for insufficient evidence. The court concluded “that the dismissal of that special circumstance for insufficient evidence is equivalent to a finding that the defendant did not act with reckless indifference. Consequently the People have failed to carry their burden of proving ineligibility.” The court then proceeded to resentencing, vacated the murder conviction, and lifted the stays on the robbery convictions, leaving a sentence of seven years. The State appealed, contending the dismissal of the special-circumstance allegation was not an acquittal. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the petition for resentencing. There was no dispute defendant was not the actual killer and did not act with intent to kill, to now be convicted of murder the prosecution was required to prove defendant “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” If there was a prior finding by a court or jury that defendant did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the felony the court was required to vacate the conviction and resentence defendant. Because the original trial court dismissed the case for insufficient evidence, this dismissal acted as the equivalent of an acquittal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly granted the petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. View "California v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement approved by the trial court, defendant Anthony Scarano was granted five years of supervised probation after he pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon. Among the conditions of probation were a search condition, drug treatment programming, and drug testing. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and that his term of probation should have been reduced from five years to two in accordance with the recent amendment to Penal Code section 1203.1, enacted while his appeal was pending in Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.). The Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s suppression contention was not preserved because he did not renew his motion in the superior court. As to Assembly Bill 1950, the Court agreed with the parties that it applied retroactively, but disagreed with defendant that the appropriate remedy was to order his supervised probation term be reduced. The Court remanded this matter to allow the trial court and the prosecution the opportunity to withdraw from the original plea agreement. View "California v. Scarano" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Vasquez and Carrillo of first-degree murder and found personal firearm use enhancements to be true as to both defendants and separately found true gang enhancements and discharge of a firearm by a principal causing death enhancements as to both defendants. The court found true prior prison term allegations against Vasquez, sentenced Vasquez to 25 years to life in prison, plus 25 years to life, plus three years, and sentenced Carrillo to 25 years to life, plus 25 years to life. In 2021, the judgment was modified to strike the enhancements imposed on Vasquez but was otherwise affirmed.The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Assembly Bill 333. Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 amends Penal Code 186.22 to require proof of additional elements to establish a gang enhancement and redefines “pattern of criminal gang activity” to require that the last of the predicate offenses “occurred within three years of the prior offense and within three years of the date the current offense is alleged to have been committed,” and that the predicate offenses “were committed on separate occasions or by two or more members, the offenses commonly benefited a criminal street gang, and the common benefit of the offenses is more than reputational.” On remand, the court of appeal struck the gang enhancement under Penal Code 186.22. The prosecution may elect to retry the firearm and/or gang enhancements. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of attempted extortion; attempted robbery; assault with a deadly weapon; assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury; assault with a deadly weapon; and dissuading a witness.The Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for extortion. However, the court concluded that the trial court erred in separately punishing defendant for the two assault counts. The court also concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's Romero motion. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing to exercise its discretion in light of recent amendments to the Penal Code. View "People v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Richard Speck guilty of felony vehicle theft and receiving stolen property with special allegations that the Honda was valued at over $950. Defendant testified; he denied stealing the Honda and knowing it was stolen or had been reported stolen. He claimed he had permission to drive the car and did not think it was stolen because it had an ignition that required particular keys and he had been given those keys; there were no red flags such as a “ripped ignition” or evidence of hot-wiring. Defense counsel requested the trial court instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 3406 regarding mistake of fact, as to both counts, based on defendant’s testimony that he mistakenly but actually believed he had permission from the owner--Jason, whom defendant thought was the owner--to drive the car, which he mistakenly but actually believed was not stolen. Defendant contended on appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact. After review of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. View "California v. Speck" on Justia Law