Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant Richard Speck guilty of felony vehicle theft and receiving stolen property with special allegations that the Honda was valued at over $950. Defendant testified; he denied stealing the Honda and knowing it was stolen or had been reported stolen. He claimed he had permission to drive the car and did not think it was stolen because it had an ignition that required particular keys and he had been given those keys; there were no red flags such as a “ripped ignition” or evidence of hot-wiring. Defense counsel requested the trial court instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 3406 regarding mistake of fact, as to both counts, based on defendant’s testimony that he mistakenly but actually believed he had permission from the owner--Jason, whom defendant thought was the owner--to drive the car, which he mistakenly but actually believed was not stolen. Defendant contended on appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact. After review of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. View "California v. Speck" on Justia Law

Assembly Bill No. 333, which altered both the substantive and procedural law regarding gang enhancements under Penal Code section 186.22, applies retroactively in this case. Under the new law, in order to prove that the defendant committed a crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang, the prosecution must show that the benefit to the gang was "more than reputational." Here, the instructional error on this issue was not harmless under the Chapman standard. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal struck the gang and firearm enhancements in all counts; reversed the finding in count 2 that the offense of shooting at an occupied vehicle was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang; and affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Sek" on Justia Law

Chatman was convicted of five counts of “identity theft,” Penal Code section 530.5(a),(c); mail theft, section 530.5(e); and second-degree commercial burglary, section 459. Applying Proposition 47, the court of appeal held that the “identity theft” crimes had to be treated as misdemeanors if the value of the personal identifying information obtained and used or possessed did not exceed $950 and that, as the Attorney General acknowledged, Chatman’s conviction for burglary had to be reduced to shoplifting under new section 459.5 (a).The California Supreme Court subsequently held that Proposition 47 does not apply to convictions for unlawfully obtaining and using personal identifying information under section 530.5(a) and that such convictions may not be reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting. On remand, the parties agreed that nothing in that holding undermined the original holding that Chatman’s burglary conviction must be reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting and that the section 530.5(a) and (c) convictions cannot be reduced to shoplifting or petty theft under Proposition 47. The parties disputed only whether the holding precluded the application of Proposition 47 to redesignate the misdemeanor mail theft conviction as a misdemeanor petty theft conviction (section 490.2). The court of appeal concluded that Proposition 47 does apply to mail-theft convictions in these circumstances and that Chatman’s mail theft conviction must be redesignated as a petty theft conviction. View "People v. Chatman" on Justia Law

Hayden Gerson attacked two police officers attempting to detain him after he refused to comply with their orders. This attack led to a SWAT standoff and gun battle between Gerson and two SWAT officers. After Gerson choked and bit a police K-9, multiple officers were able to subdue and arrest him. A jury found Gerson guilty of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of attempted murder (charged in counts 1 and 2); two counts of assaulting a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 3-4); shooting at an inhabited house (count 5); assault on a peace officer with force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 6); making a criminal threat (count 7); exhibiting a firearm to a peace officer to resist arrest (count 8); two counts of resisting an executive officer (counts 9-10); and harming or interfering with a police animal (count 11). The jury also found true various enhancements to these offenses. The jury found Gerson to be sane during commission of the offenses. The trial court sentenced Gerson to a total term of 33 years eight months in prison. Gerson appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Gerson did not meet his burden of showing he suffered from bipolar disorder, a mental disorder that qualifies for pretrial diversion. Accordingly, its ruling denying Gerson’s motion for pretrial diversion did not amount to an abuse of discretion. The Court also concluded an individual, such as Gerson, who was out on bail and subject to electronic monitoring on home detention was similarly situated to persons participating in an electronic monitoring program pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.018, and that a rational basis did not exist for treating these categories of individuals differently. Accordingly, Gerson was entitled to preconviction custody credit and preconviction conduct credit under the state and federal equal protection clauses. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected Gerson’s remaining arguments. View "California v. Gerson" on Justia Law

On the night of March 29, 2018, defendant Ashneel Mani broke into the house where his mother and his brother lived. At the time, defendant’s brother had a restraining order in place against defendant. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree residential burglary and willfully disobeying a court order. The jury found true the allegation that a person, other than an accomplice, was present during the burglary. At a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that defendant had a previous strike conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 13 years. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence under Evidence Code sections 1109 to prove propensity to commit residential burglary grounded on a theory of intent to steal; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting prior acts evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101(b), and 352; (3) the trial court committed instructional error in instructing the jury with a modified version of the Evidence Code section 1109 instruction, CALCRIM No. 852A, because burglary based on an intent to steal theory was not a crime involving domestic violence; and (4) he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of these errors. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence, and the modified CALCRIM No. 852A instruction was not erroneous. The appellate court rejected defendant’s contention that residential burglary based on an intent to steal theory was not an act of domestic violence for which the prior acts of domestic violence were admissible under section 1109, and rejected the related contention that the trial court erred in instructing that the prior acts in this case could be used as evidence of propensity to commit the residential burglary charge grounded on a theft theory. The Court of Appeal concluded that breaking into the victims’ home with the intent to steal was "an act that surely disturbed the peace of the victims. Consequently, given the expanded definition of domestic violence in the Family Code applicable in section 1109, which includes disturbing the peace as a form of abuse, we hold that such a burglary is a crime of domestic violence for purposes of section 1109." Having rejected defendant’s claims of error, the Court necessarily rejected his cumulative error contention. View "California v. Mani" on Justia Law

Orellana was charged with two counts of criminal threats (Pen. Code 422(a)) and one misdemeanor count of exhibiting a deadly weapon (417(a)(1)), with a prior prison term enhancement. The trial court found a doubt as to Orellana’s competency and suspended criminal proceedings. Orellana was treated and regained competence. The parties entered into a plea agreement. Orellana agreed to serve a prison term of two years. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence consistent with that agreement.On appeal, Orellana argued the trial court’s failure at sentencing to award him conduct credit for the period of time in which he was receiving treatment for restoration to competence in the state hospital violated Senate Bill 317, which was enacted while his appeal was pending and provides for such credits. The court of appeal affirmed. While Orellana’s appellate waiver is invalid and did not bar his appeal, Senate Bill 317 does not apply retroactively and the denial of conduct credit for the time Orellana was committed to the state hospital did not violate equal protection principles. The trial court invited Orellana to ask questions or state any concerns but Orellana’s failure to do so does not affirmatively demonstrate a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of his appellate rights. View "People v. Orellana" on Justia Law

When executing a search warrant at defendant Donald Rorabaugh’s home, police learned that one of his cars was a short distance away, at a ranch. Police went to the ranch and towed the car away to be stored until they could obtain a warrant to search it. Later, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in the car. In closing argument to the jury, the prosecution argued DNA evidence found in the car corroborated its theory of defendant’s culpability for murder. After the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, the trial court imposed a term of 25 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erroneously denied: (1) his suppression motion; and (2) his motion for acquittal. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first claim, but disagreed with his second. The Court found police violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless seizure of defendant’s unattended car on private property. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence obtained after a search of the car was prejudicial error. Accordingly, the Court reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Rorabaugh" on Justia Law

Banner was convicted of two attempted robberies for a single act involving two restaurant employees. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in not considering mental health diversion and that Banner’s counsel was ineffective in failing to request mental health diversion. Penal Code section 1001.36 does not confer a sua sponte duty on trial courts to consider mental health diversion but the record reveals the trial court was mindful of section 1001.36 and did not believe Banner’s mental health played a role in this crime The second attempted robbery conviction was sufficiently proven. The jury could reasonably infer Banner was acutely aware two employees were obstacles in his path and that he waited for the employees to converge before attempting the robbery in an effort to maximize control and success, consistent with an intent to rob both employees. The trial court properly imposed a $300 restitution fine, an $80 operations fee, and a $60 conviction fee as part of the judgment. View "People v. Banner" on Justia Law

California law provides that any person who knowingly distributes or exchanges obscene material involving children performing or simulating sex acts is guilty of a “wobbler offense,” Pen. Code 311.1(a).) When a person knowingly distributes or exchanges child pornography “for commercial consideration,” the offense is a felony punishable by incarceration in state prison for two, three, or six years, section 311.2(b). Wimer was convicted of four counts of distribution of child pornography for commercial consideration and one count of possession of pornographic images of minors after he was found in possession of pornographic images and videos on computer files accessible to other users on a peer-to-peer sharing network.Wimer argued that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that the element of “commercial consideration” in section 311.2(b) may be established by an intent to trade in pornographic material with others and that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his proposed construction of this element. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in its jury instruction and the error necessitates a reversal of Wimer’s convictions. On remand, the prosecution may elect to retry Wimer on the section 311.2(b) allegations or to stand by Wimer’s conviction on the lesser included offense of distributing child pornography without commercial consideration. View "People v. Wimer" on Justia Law

Israel Gutierrez Zamora was convicted on multiple charges, including attempted kidnapping and assault with a semiautomatic weapon. He petitioned for disclosure of juror identifying information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 237. After denying the disclosure petition as untimely, the trial court sentenced Zamora to a total term of 98 years to life. Zamora then filed an appeal challenging the denial of his petition for disclosure; he also argued there were errors in his sentence and the abstract of judgment. As a result of that first appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the order denying the petition, as well as the challenged aspects of the sentence and abstract, and remanded the case with directions. On remand, the court denied Zamora’s disclosure petition on the merits, and corrected the sentence and abstract as directed. Zamora appealed that second order which denied his disclosure petition, arguing that the court was statutorily required to release the identifying information for jurors who did not object to disclosure. Zamora also challenged additional aspects of his sentence that were imposed when the court resentenced him following remand, arguing he was entitled to the benefit of recent changes in the law that rendered certain sentence enhancements. The Court of Appeal found that section 237 obligated the trial court to release the information only if none of the jurors protested the disclosure. "If any juror does object, the court must sustain the objection if it concludes the motion fails to show good cause for the release. That is what occurred in this case. Six of the twelve jurors objected to disclosure, which triggered the court’s obligation to determine whether there was good cause for disclosure. After concluding there was not, the court properly denied the petition." The Attorney General agreed that the challenged enhancements had to be stricken, rather than stayed. To this, the Court of Appeal concurred and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to strike those sentence enhancements. View "California v. Zamora" on Justia Law